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“For 50 years, the Arms Control Association has educated citizens around the world to help create broad support for U.S.-led arms control and nonproliferation achievements.”

– President Joe Biden
June 2, 2022
US-Russia Nuclear Arms Control

Implications of the Duma's Approval of START II

On April 17, the Arms Control Association held a press conference to examine the motivations and ramifications of the Russian Duma's April 14 approval of START II. The treaty, which was originally signed in 1993 and then updated in 1997, reduces the number of deployed strategic warheads in the U.S. and Russian arsenals to 3,000-3,500 each. (See news story.)

Panelists for the discussion were Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., president and executive director of the Arms Control Association; Jack Mendelsohn, vice president and executive director of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security; Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., president of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security; and Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers.

The following is an edited transcript of their remarks and the question-and-answer session that followed.

Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.

We thought it would be useful to have a general discussion of the significance of the Duma's approval of START II, the opportunities that it presents, and the problems that remain in bringing it into force.

START II was negotiated under President Bush and signed on January 3, 1993, as one of his last acts as president. It was hailed at the time, correctly I believe, as a major and far-sighted achievement. START II, in its most general terms, cuts in half the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads that were permitted under START I and also outlaws multiple warheads on land-based missiles, which were correctly considered a major threat to strategic stability.

After this, things stopped moving for some time. Russia had its hands full with domestic developments and the problems of repatriating nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, and there was no real pressure in the United States for action. The Senate did not ratify START II until January 1996, and, as you all know, the Duma took more than seven years to do so.

The reasons for Russia's long delay will be the subject of many books, but from early on, ratification was opposed in large part because of hostility to President Yeltsin and his regime from the Duma, which was dominated by communist and nationalist forces. But there also was a general feeling among non-military critics that Russia had gotten a bad deal in START II-that the treaty favored the United States. Those critics pointed to what they saw as inequities in the treaty that were very restrictive on Russian land-based forces, which were a large part of Russian power, but that were in many ways quite permissive about U.S. sea-based forces. On top of this, in due course, came the question of NATO expansion, which was received with great hostility by the Duma as a clear attempt to take advantage of a weakened Russia and threaten it from a long-term perspective. Nevertheless, the senior active military personnel in Russia have supported START II pretty consistently.

To facilitate Duma approval, a number of changes were made in March 1997 at the Helsinki summit, including an agreement to negotiate a START III accord with lower levels, and those and other agreements were formalized in New York in September 1997. The Duma subsequently came close to ratifying on a number of occasions, two of which were particularly significant. The first was Christmas Day of December 1998, when the Duma was scheduled to vote on ratification and appeared likely to approve it. But the week before the vote, the United States began bombing Iraq and the Duma shelved action. The Duma scheduled another effort on ratification for April 2 of last year, but it too was shelved when the United States and NATO began their military campaign against Yugoslavia the week before.

At that point, many analysts and commentators said START II is never going to be ratified, it is essentially a dead issue. So, ratification must come as quite a surprise to those people who said it was unlikely that START II would ever be ratified. Now, some of those same people have minimized the significance of the event as being something that looks back at history and not forward. I think these observers are wrong on both accounts. Clearly, they've been proved wrong on Russian ratification.

Putin surprised a lot of people by making ratification one of his first major acts after becoming president. I think the message here is that he has a willingness to work with the United States on matters of mutual interest, including arms control. However, he has also made clear that the United States can have START II and continue beyond that to START III, but it can't have that and a national missile defense [NMD] involving significant changes to the ABM Treaty. I think it's also important to note that by being able to put this forward expeditiously and receive a substantial majority, he has demonstrated to the West that he is in a position to complete significant actions with a cooperative Duma. This is a total change from the situation under Yeltsin. Whether this is just a very short Russian honeymoon remains to be seen. But I think the evidence is that he is in a position to take dramatic actions if he wishes.

I must call attention, however, to the fact that while this is a major breakthrough in the arms reduction process, the actual implementation of START II has serious barriers to overcome. The Duma law ratifying START II made some very strong and explicit conditions. The most important is in Article 9 of the resolution of ratification, which states that the instruments of ratification will only be exchanged with the United States when the United States-Senate, in this case-carries out a number of actions. One is that the United States must also update the START II that the Senate originally ratified. The treaty was significantly changed in the Helsinki accords, which extended the implementation of START II by five years.

But more importantly, the resolution also calls on the United States to implement the famous memorandum of understanding [MOU] on succession of the parties to the ABM Treaty, which in addition to Russia now includes Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, as well as two protocols defining the demarcation line between permitted theater missile defenses [TMD] and ballistic missile defenses covered by the ABM Treaty. Article 2 of their ratification also contains a provision specifically stating that U.S. withdrawal from or violation of the ABM Treaty would constitute grounds for Russia to withdraw from START II.

This presents the administration with a serious problem, if not a dilemma, as to what to do next because the administration has obligated itself to submit this package of agreements to the Senate once Russia ratified START II, which it now has. The Senate-or at least the right-wing Republicans-has made it abundantly clear that they are not about to approve the memorandum of understanding on succession-assuming that the Senate's approval is necessary, but they assume it is-because they want to eliminate the ABM Treaty, not to institutionalize it.

Nor do the real missile defense enthusiasts in the Senate support the protocols on demarcation-even though you might think a defense enthusiast would welcome them because they essentially permit all current U.S. theater missile defense activities-because they don't want any restrictions on missile defense. In fact, they don't want any ABM Treaty. Again, they see these agreements as institutionalizing a treaty they want to abolish.

So, does the administration submit these agreements to the Senate and run the risk-I would say run the certainty-that they would be rejected by the Senate, which follows pretty clearly from the Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [CTBT]; or does the administration simply sit on them and take whatever criticism this entails abroad and domestically that it is impotent and obsolete when it comes to implementing arms control agreements?

The other problem is with START III. One of the big accomplishments of START II, in addition to cutting in half the number of weapons permitted under START I, is that it was agreed at Helsinki in 1997 that as soon as Russia ratified START II, START III negotiations would begin. It was agreed that the reduction of the 3,000-3,500 warheads in START II would be further reduced to 2,000-2,500. Russia has clearly indicated it would like even lower numbers. In fact, Putin has now formally stated Russia would like 1,500.

In addition to lower numbers, Helsinki called for a much broader negotiation that involved transparency in the handling of nuclear weapons and efforts to control the nuclear warheads themselves, not just the associated delivery vehicles. It also opened up the problem of dealing with theater nuclear weapons and the whole spectrum of nuclear weapons. The administration is going to have to make a decision: whether START III is going to be a very simple treaty that just goes to lower numbers, or whether they're going to initiate a very elaborate negotiation, which cannot possibly be completed in this administration and may take many years.

So, with these caveats as to the problems that face us, I think there's no question that even though it's old news in one sense, the fact that the Duma has agreed to START II and more or less given Putin a free hand to pursue these issues is a major step forward. We shouldn't open the last bottle of champagne, however, because there's a lot of work yet to be done. But now most of the problems are in the United States-how we're going to deal with agreements that have already been made and endorsed by Russia, and how we're going to exploit the potential for substantial further progress in START III. [Back to top]

Jack Mendelsohn

I could have entitled this discussion "Linkages." It's about the interrelationship among START II and START III, theater missile defense, national missile defense, and the future.

START II does four important things. First, it reduces the deployed strategic nuclear arsenals of both the United States and Russia to 3,000-3,500 warheads-that's more than a 50 percent cut from where START I is going to bring us. Second, START II eliminates land-based, multiple-warhead missile systems. Third, it specifically eliminates the Russian heavy SS-18 missile-the elimination of that missile system has been a special target for the United States since the beginning of strategic arms talks. Fourth, an interesting point that is often ignored, it changes the counting rules to actual deployed warhead numbers rather than the current system of indirectly counting or discounting warheads that prevailed during SALT and START I-indirect counting because we were counting launchers in the beginning, discounting because in START I we gave bombers leeway in the number of weapons they could carry. In START II, one warhead deployed counts as one warhead against your limit.

Those are the four major parts of START II. The amendments to START II were signed in September 1997 along with an agreement-in-principle on START III and a packet of documents on theater missile defense. All of these were designed to help obtain Duma approval of START II. However, that approval took from September 1997 until April of this year for a number of reasons, including the conflict and distrust between the executive and the legislative branches in Moscow and the fact that Yeltsin was basically unable to lead the Duma in any meaningful way.

Now, the amendment to START II, its associated documents, the START III agreement-in-principle, and the TMD documentation together did five important things. First of all, the amendment extended the deadline for the elimination of weapons under START II to December 31, 2007, which is five years beyond the original January 2003 deadline. That was important for Moscow because Russia won't have the money or the time to destroy, restructure, and replace its strategic forces by the original 2003 date. Because of the delay in implementing all of the treaties that are involved here, that 2003 date would have actually come no more than a year after the end of START I reductions. When START II was signed, 2003 was 10 years off, so the deadline looked reasonable at the time. But the longer it takes to approve it, the less time you have to implement it. Also, I think the Russians were quite clearly seeking a little breathing room to evaluate, during this extension, the impact that the U.S. theater missile defense program, national missile defense program, and NATO expansion would have on Russia's national security interests.

Second, an associated document to START II proposes that the sides establish an interim date of the end of 2003 for deactivating all the weapons scheduled for elimination under START II. The Russian side, however, made that deactivation contingent on a START III agreement being achieved and entering into force well before that deactivation deadline. So there's already a hook, or a linkage if you will, within this documentation relating to START II, driving us toward getting a START III agreement.

Third, the START III agreement-in-principle lowered the aggregate level of weapons from 3,000-3,500 in START II to 2,000-2,500 by the same ending date as START II. So START III has lower levels, but it also ends at the same time, so in practical terms you're just lowering the START II levels. Now this lowering of the levels to 2,000-2,500 was intended-it didn't totally succeed-to help overcome Russian concerns that they would have to reduce their MIRVed land-based missile forces under START II, build up single-warhead forces, and then reduce them later if there was a START III somewhere off in the future. This way they got a picture of what was coming sooner.

However, almost immediately after the START III agreement-in-principle, Russia began to suggest the levels of 2,000-2,500 were too high and that 1,500 might be more appropriate. Now Putin has said it officially.

The START III agreement-in-principle called not only for lower levels, but also for extensive transparency measures relating to strategic inventories (stockpiles) and warhead destruction, as well as other measures to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions, including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads. That's a not-so-masked reference to the fact that the United States has a greater opportunity to increase the size of its reduced arsenal under START III because it's going to achieve lower levels by "downloading," or simply taking warheads off, multiple-warhead systems that will remain in the strategic forces.

Fourth, the sides also agreed that in the context of START III they would explore, as separate issues, measures relating to sea-launched cruise missiles, which are of interest to the Russians, and tactical nuclear systems, which the United States is very interested in. This would include appropriate confidence-building and transparency measures. I should point out that there was no mention of levels. The United States has levels in mind on tactical nuclear weapons, but it's not in the agreement-in-principle.

And finally, the United States and Russia concluded a series of ABM Treaty-related documents clarifying the demarcation line between strategic and theater missile defenses, formalizing the succession status of the former Soviet republics, outlining confidence-building measures in the TMD program, and addressing future U.S. TMD plans.

So that's where we were as a result of the documentation that came out of Helsinki as regards the future of START III, TMD, and the amendments to START II. In ratifying START II, the Duma reaffirmed a number of important linkages. First, it linked Russia's continued adherence to START II to U.S. adherence to the ABM Treaty. Second, it linked adherence to START II to concerns about the buildup of strategic nuclear weaponry in third countries-it's a standard Soviet, now Russian, reference to the other nuclear powers: China, France, Britain-to make sure that increases in their forces don't get out of hand in terms of Russia's interests or Russia's concerns. Third, it linked adherence to no deployment of nuclear weapons in the new member states of NATO. Fourth, it linked its own commitment to START II deactivation to the completion by the end of 2003 of START III. And finally, it linked entry into force of START II to U.S. ratification of the TMD documentation on demarcation, succession, and confidence-building measures.

Summing it up, for Russia at least, implementation of START II is linked to the preservation of the ABM Treaty, to approval of the TMD documents, and to an eventual START III. Remember START II at 3,500 is not an interesting treaty for Russia. At 2,500 they're saying START III is not interesting. And they're even saying at 2,000 it's not interesting. Let's talk about 1,500. So they are linking START II to an eventual START III.

As President Putin said after the Duma ratification, the ball is now clearly in the U.S. court. The Senate must now act on the amendments to START II, which in themselves should not be objectionable. The U.S. Senate has never said the START II documentation was a particular problem, and it probably would approve those alone. But they've insisted that they be submitted along with the TMD documentation, which is highly objectionable to the conservative, anti-ABM Treaty members of that chamber.

So, what do we do now? The administration has three options. Option one: It can submit the START amendments and the TMD documentation, which the Senate has insisted upon, and risk almost certain defeat of the latter. This would block the exchange of instruments of ratification and keep START II from coming into force. Not terribly attractive. Option two: It can hold the amendments and documentation until the next Congress and next administration. It's unclear whether chances would improve for approval, but they couldn't be any worse since you can't get the approval now. And the third option, which may not be a real-world one, is to attempt to strike a deal in the near term with the Russians on START III and ABM modifications-the so-called grand bargain. That was mentioned in the reporting that came out after the ratification. The administration under this option would then try to win approval of the larger package with its combination of START reductions, no meaningful constraints on TMD, and easement of restrictions on NMD deployments in Alaska. This could supposedly satisfy the conservative elements of Congress.

There are at least two problems with the third option. Not to put too fine a point on it, the problems are time and substance. There's almost certainly not enough time to work out START III in the detail originally called for-that is, dealing with levels and with stockpile and warhead destruction transparency and irreversibility. A levels agreement alone-that is, one substituting 1,500-2,000 warheads for the current 2,000-2,500 proposed for START III-is one night's work. Agreeing to transparency measures and irreversibility rules, however, would almost certainly take some time.

There's another linkage here with transparency measures and irreversibility measures in that the lower the levels go, the more interested the sides are in making certain that they understand the size of the stockpile and the limits on reversing or building up or breaking out-so you've got a big problem there. There may also be other problems with the substance of the grand bargain. According to [Deputy Chair of the Duma Defense Committee] Alexei Arbatov, Russia may be willing to accept an Alaska-site NMD deployment-i.e., Phase I, one site, no space sensors, etc. That's the essential grand bargain. That is all the United States is actually seeking in the negotiations at this time-amendments to permit Phase I to go ahead. But many, including the Russians, believe that much more grandiose plans are in the works. For their part, the conservative members of the Senate, hoping to nip this one in the bud, are already saying they will not approve any minor adjustments to the ABM Treaty. So, if you did get the grand bargain that just slightly changed the ABM Treaty to permit an Alaska deployment, they're saying they're not interested in that. They want the ABM Treaty gutted and gutted good. And if the ABM Treaty is gutted, Russia will clearly want to revise the START III settlement, if there ever is one. So, we're back where we started. Everything is linked to everything else. [Back to top]

Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr.

The Duma's approval of START II is a positive occasion, but it's only one small step for mankind. On January 3, 1993, I held the book for President Bush to sign START II in Moscow. At that time, I never imagined it would be seven years before both legislatures had backed this treaty. And it's still not in force. The Duma action certainly is a positive step, but entry into force is probably a long way off.

As has been said, the amendments to START II have to go to our Senate to be approved before entry into force can take place, and the Russians have said in their resolution of ratification that they will not exchange instruments of ratification bringing START II into force until the U.S. Senate approves these START II amendments, as well as the 1997 ABM documents clarifying succession and establishing the demarcation between strategic and theater ballistic missile defense systems. Those are the main parts of the 1997 package.

In late 1997, in connection with the ratification of the flank agreement to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty, the administration committed itself to submitting the 1997 ABM documents to the Senate when it submitted the START II amendments. So both sides have linked the ABM documents to the approval of the amendments to START II, which are necessary to bring it into force.

I might add that although the 1997 CFE agreement did not have to go to the Senate for approval, it was sent anyway. The ABM Treaty succession document of 1997 definitely does not have to go to the Senate. So, in a treaty that didn't have to go to the Senate, the administration pledged to send another treaty document that doesn't have to go to the Senate. That doesn't seem to me to be the pinnacle of successful management of congressional relations.

The 1997 documents are very controversial, meaning that it is going to be very difficult to bring START II into force anytime soon. The demarcation agreement establishes the speed and range of targets against which TMD interceptors can be tested and remain exempt from ABM Treaty limits. This was designed to permit the THAAD [Theater High Altitude Area Defense] system, which in the mid-1990s was the system of choice of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, and the other TMD systems that are under development. So, we got what we wanted in the 1997 documents. We got all that we asked for.

However, there are those in our body politic who don't think that this is enough, and a number of them sit in the Senate. Basically, they want a full-scale national missile defense resembling the Strategic Defense Initiative, and so they are going to try to defeat the demarcation amendment in the Senate. I'm not sure how many votes they have. Undoubtedly, if the 1997 documents are sent to the Senate, it will precipitate a major debate in the Senate on the future of national missile defense, but the outcome would be hard to predict. I don't think the vote count would be as bad as it was with the CTBT, but it would be uncertain whether it would get the necessary two-thirds vote.

I think the succession agreement, which simply states that for the purposes of the ABM Treaty, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine are the successors to the Soviet Union, could get a better vote because there is no need for that to be approved by the Senate. Any Senate action on it is essentially irrelevant in the law, despite what some of the conservative members in the Senate assert.

I participated in a debate on this subject at the Council on Foreign Relations in October 1998, and since the succession agreement is an important question, I thought I might read to you a couple of paragraphs from the statement that I made:

"Determination of succession to treaties is part of the foreign policy power of the president. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does provide that a state may withdraw from a treaty on, among other grounds, fundamental change of circumstance or impossibility of performance, and the ABM Treaty has a withdrawal clause permitting a party to withdraw on six months notice if it believes that its supreme interests are threatened. But treaties just do not vanish or go away. A party must declare that it is withdrawing or that it regards itself as no longer bound for one of the above reasons or some other legitimate reason. It is the head of state or of its government that makes this decision and declaration-in our case, the president.

"Thus, the ABM Treaty remains in force, and neither action nor inaction by the U.S. Senate on the memorandum on succession signed in New York in September of 1997, nor a declaration by the Senate or the Congress that the ABM Treaty is null and void, will affect the legal standing of the treaty. Continued U.S. adherence to the ABM Treaty is a matter of national policy; absent a decision by the president to withdraw from the treaty, our obligation is to abide by its provisions.

"Succession under international law is a question of fact and agreement, and the United States on the one hand, and Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan on the other, have agreed that the latter four states are the duly constituted successors to the Soviet Union for the ABM Treaty. Signature of the MOU in September 1997 by the president's authorized representative reflected the fact that succession had occurred for the ABM Treaty as a matter of law. For the United States, this is a presidential function which does not involve the Senate as it is not a question of a new treaty, rather it is a continuation of the old treaty."

So, whatever the vote is on the succession agreement, from a legal point of view it is completely irrelevant. Politics are another matter, but as far as the law is concerned, it has no effect. But there will be a huge debate over this issue, and undoubtedly a number of members of the conservative wing of the Senate will try to defeat both agreements.

The question of whether or not to send these documents to the Senate at this time certainly is a valid one. Jack Mendelsohn laid out the options quite clearly. In my own mind, I recognize the perils that lie ahead, but I just don't think that we have any choice but to send them forward. That is what we have always said we would do. The Russians have now put us on the spot.

I don't think the option of waiting for the next administration is much more attractive. If it's a Gore administration, you're going to have the same result, and a Bush administration may not want to send them forward or may want to change them. The idea of trying to strike this so-called grand bargain first and then getting these other documents approved suffers from the fact that a number of members of the Senate may not approve the grand bargain because they want a full-scale national defense along the lines of what was contemplated in the 1980s.

I think the best course of action, although I recognize it is perilous, is to send the 1997 agreements to the Senate reasonably promptly and argue that negotiations are underway to try to strike a grand bargain and that a negative Senate vote on these documents would severely cripple the negotiations. Therefore, you urge the Senate to act on these documents or, if a positive vote is not in the cards in the short term, to put them on the shelf. I don't know how many legislative days are left this year. There may not even be time to get these documents through. They do have to go through committee. But we can be sure that there will be a major debate in the Senate on the subject of national missile defense if these documents do arrive.

Perhaps it would be a good thing to have a debate on national missile defense. I think it's better than just going ahead with national missile defense without a debate. I would further say that I cannot imagine anything more destructive right now to the foreign policy interests of the United States and to the cause of non-proliferation and disarmament than to go forward on national missile defense unilaterally without at least the understanding of the Russians, the Europeans, and the Chinese. It is a recipe for a rekindling of the nuclear arms race, for a disastrous relationship with our allies, Russia, and China, and for a more dangerous and less secure world.

With respect to the review conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT], which starts next week, I'm sure all of you are aware that the treaty is in trouble. The commitments that were made in 1995 in connection with making the NPT a permanent treaty largely have not been met by the nuclear-weapon states. Russia's ratification of START II essentially puts the United States on the wrong side, or at least it puts the ball in the U.S. court, to quote President Putin. We have senior French officials-as well as Russian, Chinese, German, and British officials-coming here, lecturing us, saying, "We've done our part. When are you going to do yours, in terms of carrying out your international obligations?"

If we are not able to move forward to bring START II into force, we will be on the wrong side of that issue, as we already are with respect to the CTBT. We're obviously not on the right side of the ABM/NMD issue as far as the international community is concerned. And there is also the question of the debate over doctrine that has been going on in NATO. Many of our NATO allies want NATO to consider changing its nuclear doctrine, so as not to retain the option of using nuclear weapons first, especially the option of using them against non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT. Jack Mendelsohn and I have been to most NATO countries in the last year and a half, and I can say with some confidence that all of our allies would welcome such a change. It is only the United States that is holding back.

So, in my judgment, this move by Russia is positive, but it squarely puts the onus on the United States with respect to reductions, with respect to the CTBT, with respect to the ABM Treaty, and with respect to the doctrine issue, although Russia shares the wrong side of that latter issue with us. There is also a strong rumor that Putin may ask the Duma to ratify the CTBT as well, which would add to the U.S. isolation. [The Duma approved the CTBT April 21. See p. 43.] It is important that our government come to grips with these issues and try to set our policy on a new course that will strengthen our security, strengthen the NPT regime, and make for a more peaceable and secure world for the next century. [Back to top]

Daryl Kimball

I agree with the others that START II approval by the Duma is a welcome and long-overdue step, and that Russian action puts the onus squarely on the president and Congress now to follow through. If the president and Congress don't follow through and don't cooperate, we could have another CTBT-like political meltdown that could create a severe international security crisis, especially, as Ambassador Graham said, in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference coming up this month.

I hope that the president and the Congress can work together to get the 1997 START II and ABM amendments through so that START II can finally be implemented, but the early signs are not good. One specific example: Last Friday in an interview with CNN, Senator Thad Cochran [R-MS] questioned the value of nuclear arms reductions with Russia if it means limiting U.S. missile defense options by approving the 1997 agreements. This is not a hopeful sign from a senator who is generally considered to be one of the more reasonable Republicans on these questions.

Now, there's been some discussion about what the president should do in terms of transmitting or not transmitting the 1997 agreements. I would differ with Tom Graham on this. Given that there is clear opposition from people like Senator Cochran to the 1997 agreements, and given that other senators, like Senator Jon Kyl [R-AZ]-who might be called the head of the Dr. Strangelove caucus-oppose this grand bargain agreement that might come about, it is pretty clear that many pro-missile defense senators are going to do what they can to scuttle these talks over the next several months. If the Clinton administration does transmit the 1997 START and ABM agreements, I think the opportunity for mischief is going to be far too great for some of these senators to resist.

It is important to note that the president did agree to transmit these agreements in the context of the CFE flank agreement approval, but he did not say when he would transmit them after START II approval by the Duma. If the U.S. Senate is not going to be cooperative on this subject, there is no reason why the president should forward these agreements. Doing so could lead to a debate that might be good for some reasons, but that could be catastrophic in terms of preventing a START III agreement that could lead to further meaningful reductions and in terms of working around the ABM conundrum that the United States and Russia are now in.

Compounding the problems on START II implementation is one other important factor. In the last three years in the defense authorization bill, Congress approved legislation that bars reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal below START I levels-that is, around 6,000 deployed warheads-and that bars changes in the alert posture of the U.S. nuclear arsenal until and unless START II is implemented. If these arms control agreements cannot be implemented and pursued, that legislation essentially bars the president from pursuing the alternative approach-that is, unilateral, reciprocal measures. This legislation just does not make any sense, especially when you consider the fact that the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal is right now probably below 6,000 deployed warheads. It's estimated to be around 5,900.

The thing we need to keep in mind with START II is that even after this very important agreement is implemented, the United States and Russia will still retain thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, poised for mass attack, with decision-makers having just minutes to decide whether to launch their thousands of nuclear-armed missiles. The U.S. arsenal, even after START II, is still going to include about 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons, the 3,500 strategic weapons allowed by START II, 500 strategic spares, then another 2,500 nuclear weapons held in reserve as a hedge against a renewed nuclear arms race.

So, START II is helpful, but we have to acknowledge that the Cold War nuclear doomsday machine is still going to be online well after 2007, the scheduled completion date for START II. So, what seems to me to be the most significant and helpful aspect of the Russian Duma approval of START II is the opportunity for deeper, more meaningful, and irreversible cuts through START III. Each side has exchanged positions on START III, and there are various issues that divide the two sides. Russia is believed to favor the elimination of submarine-launched cruise missiles. They are interested in restrictions on activities in anti-submarine warfare zones where strategic nuclear submarines patrol, and there are some other issues.

But perhaps there is no issue more pivotal than the warhead level that both sides might negotiate. As has been said several times before, Russia is willing to go down to 1,500 strategic nuclear weapons, but the Clinton administration continues to insist on the START III framework number of 2,000-2,500 agreed at Helsinki. Quite simply, if the president expects to reach an agreement with Russia on START III and, at the same time, achieve some agreement or understanding about modifications to the ABM Treaty that would allow for the limited missile defense system he is pursuing, he should be prepared to lock in reductions with Russia, as low as Russia will be able to accept and verify.

Some Pentagon leaders recognize the absurdity of keeping such large warhead levels but say that the U.S. position on the warhead levels cannot be changed until the president issues new guidance establishing new criteria for post-Cold War nuclear deterrence. One of these military leaders is former head of U.S. Strategic Command Eugene Habinger, who said on 60 Minutes earlier this year that "the fact that we have not been able to get down to lower and lower levels of nuclear weapons is troubling to me, and it should be troubling to you."

As has also been mentioned, Senator Kyl and others are opposing any sort of agreement for limited modifications to the ABM Treaty, which would just allow for the system that the administration is pursuing. What Senator Kyl and others who consider themselves disciples of President Reagan should remember is that START II was a mere stepping stone in the nuclear reduction process envisioned and begun by Reagan and Gorbachev. Of course, in the intervening years, leaders of both countries have failed to show the statesmanship and vision of their predecessors. While it is true that Reagan did instigate a move toward ballistic missile defenses, Washington has also forgotten that part of his vision was to use defenses as a means for the Soviet Union and the United States to cooperate in getting rid of offensive nuclear weapons.

Reagan rejected the mutually assured destruction [MAD] doctrine that we use today, and I think he was right in recognizing the inherent dangers there. But the current approaches that Senator Kyl and others in Congress and even the Clinton administration are pursuing ignore the linkage that Reagan saw between missile defense and offensive reductions. What Kyl and others are doing by continuing to preserve the MAD nuclear posture and trying to add defenses to it will only cause instability, especially if the United States pursues ballistic missile defenses unilaterally.

Finally, it is important to remember that the American public has been largely absent from this debate over the last several years because of the perception that the Cold War has led to the elimination of these nuclear arsenals by the United States and Russia. The public still does back deep reductions in nuclear arsenals, and a nationwide poll that was conducted April 7-9 by the Mellman Group for my organization found that 68 percent of Americans believe that the reduction or the elimination of nuclear weapons should be the goal of U.S. policy. Forty percent said that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons should be the U.S. goal, and 28 percent said reductions of these weapons should be the goal. So, I think that in the public support for this there is perhaps some room for optimism. [Back to top]

Questions and Answers

Question: What do you perceive Clinton's game plan to be? I get the impression that there is none.

Keeny: I think that Clinton's advisers believe that if they keep pushing a proposal to amend the ABM Treaty, the Russians will agree. But ultimately this is going to be the president's decision. Most people feel that the decision is almost predetermined, that he is going to decide on deployment. I don't agree with that because I see the arguments against it as so overwhelming and because Clinton's own political situation is such that I don't believe he would decide to deploy if it meant withdrawing from the treaty.

The one missing piece of this puzzle is what the president really intends to do, or if he has really made up his own mind. He's clearly being pushed continuously by his own lieutenants to a decision to deploy-by their arguments on the extreme urgency of the deployment and their efforts to cover up the total lack of appropriate development progress to justify a normal deployment decision.

I do think that the administration was really surprised that the START II ratification went through so quickly. For Putin to move so quickly and for the Duma to be so supportive of the relationship to take on this hot potato came as a surprise. My impression is that they are struggling with what their tactics are, much less their strategy.

Kimball: One way to summarize the Clinton administration's strategy over the last three years is that this is the ultimate triangulation strategy. In 1997, they put together this package of agreements with the Russians in the hope that Russia would ratify START II sooner, but they're getting caught in a vise because they can neither really satisfy the Russians nor can they satisfy 67 senators. So, their hope right now, as far as I can tell, is that they will have six more months to work out this agreement on offenses and defenses, but as we said, there are big hurdles in the way.

If they do conclude that agreement, the issue is what the Senate and the next president are going to do with it. I don't believe they have any strategy whatsoever for that phase, so they are trying to work this through, but even if they do, the chances are low. We do need to keep open the option for unilateral reciprocal reductions. It makes sense for both countries. This legislation saying that we cannot go below START I levels until START II is implemented has to be eliminated, and I hope that the Republicans will see the reasoning behind that.

Graham: I don't think there is a game plan that's carefully thought through. A substantial motivator for all of what the Clinton administration does in this area is domestic politics and the election, and the highest priority is the election of the vice president. So, they see what is best to do to obtain that objective.

In my judgment, the grand bargain may well not be negotiable. Why would Russia make a deal with this president if it's going to go down the chutes when the next administration comes along? It is at least possible that if an attempt is not made with the 1997 documents, we can probably forget about the grand bargain as well. With respect to unilateral reciprocal reductions, they won't happen either if a unilateral ABM abrogation is a prospect.

Mendelsohn: What the administration would like to do is to make a deployment decision and not withdraw from the ABM Treaty. What they would like to work out is something short of a grand bargain. They would like to get the Russians to say that they are willing to discuss the future of the ABM Treaty, and then they could say, "We are going to deploy, but because we are discussing the treaty we are not going to withdraw. The discussions will catch up with us at some point."

Question: Would the administration then tell Congress that that should be good enough for it to act on the 1997 agreements?

Mendelsohn: I'm not sure what they're going to do with the existing documentation. That's a tough decision for them. What they're saying right now is that they want to wait until they have more.

Graham: I think Jack [Mendelsohn] may well be right, but that only gets you a short-term gain. It's going to catch up with you come spring. That just gets them into the next administration.

Question: To what extent, if any, does the Republican right in the Senate pick up even more ammunition from Russia's embrace of this new national security concept, which, at least nominally and ambiguously, lowers the nuclear threshold? Does that give the Kyls and the Cochrans even more ammunition and make life even harder, or are the problems you've already described so substantial that the national security concept is essentially irrelevant?

Mendelsohn: Others may not agree with me, but I think it is primarily a rhetorical issue. If you want to beat up on the Russians, you have a whole list of things, and then, by the way, they changed their doctrine. I don't think that is the compelling element in the debate that's going on in the United States. We pursued START II, and they had that doctrine, so I don't think that is a determining aspect of it. There is something more profound there: the desire of the Republican right essentially to dismantle all of strategic arms control across the board.

Graham: I differ slightly with Jack [Mendelsohn]. I think it could be an additional argument for Senator Kyl and others, who could say, "Well, the Russians are going to develop a new generation of small tactical nuclear weapons to counteract NATO. Therefore, we should do the same and start testing again."

Question: Is it conceivable, with all that's at stake, that the administration could persuade the Russians to allow some tinkering with the ABM Treaty by suggesting some notion of sharing?

Graham: Well, I don't think that we'll ever convince the Russians that Chicago is under imminent threat from North Korea, but something along the lines of what the Bush administration was talking about, the GPALs [Global Protection Against Limited Strikes] concept. If we were really willing to share, and that's a big if, that might make a difference.

Question: But we're not even willing to share high technology with our European allies in many instances, so how are you going to get GPALs?

Mendelsohn: The technology-sharing idea is the last refuge of conservative scoundrels on this issue. Can you imagine this Congress approving the sharing of sensitive sensor technology with the Russians? It boggles the mind. It's absurd.

Keeny: The Russian policy people who are working on this are quite aware that switching a site from North Dakota to Alaska is not going to affect their strategic deterrent. They are very explicit, privately and publicly, that their problem is that this is a slippery slope. And they know that it is a very slippery slope because [Deputy Secretary of State] Strobe Talbott, in pursuing the first phase, says that we'll be back to work out the details of the second and third phases. And by the third phase, the Russians are saying that you'll have lots of X-band radars, you're going to have space sensors, you're going to begin to establish the base of what could rapidly become a serious national missile defense.

And then they hear Senator Kyl and all of his associates saying that a limited defense is not what we really have in mind. What we really want is a layered defense, which is really directed at China initially and then Russia. The Russians look on this as a matter of principle-if they make the first step, how do they argue that you don't make the second, the third, the fourth step. That is their problem. Maybe the Russians would accept some minimal first step, but I think that would be overwhelmingly opposed by the national missile defense movement in Congress, and it would be made an issue in this election year. I think it's really going to prove to be a non-starter.

Question: You mentioned the NPT review conference. How far can we go before the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty dissolves, given the lack of progress on strategic issues by the nuclear powers and the lack of inclusion of Israel, India, and Pakistan?

Graham: There are four states outside of the NPT that disregard its provisions-India, Pakistan, Israel, and Cuba-and there are five nuclear-weapon states within the treaty that to some extent have disregarded its provisions and related undertakings. How long can this last? I would say that if policies don't change, if CTBT is not brought into force, if deep reductions are not pursued, if the first-use option is not given up, if legally binding negative security assurances are not agreed to, and if national missile defenses are deployed-unless deployed with the understanding of Russia, China, and Europe-then I'd say five to 10 years. And then, we will have a much bigger problem than we have today.

Once the treaty starts to dissolve, it will never be possible to put it back together. Just a few straws in the wind: senior Japanese officials have told quite a few people now that when they signed up for the NPT, they signed up for five nuclear-weapon states, not seven, and if there is going to be an eighth, and the name of it is North Korea, then there will be a ninth, and it will be Japan, and there will be a 10th, South Korea. And there could be an 11th and 12th in Taiwan and Indonesia. And that is just one region. There's also Iran, Iraq, Ukraine, Nigeria, and who knows what will happen in South Africa. But I think we have five to 10 years to change our policies and get this regime where it should be: a strong, vibrant regime that clearly works and will be there indefinitely to protect our security in the 21st century.

Implications of the Duma's Approval of START II

Russian Ratification of START II and Its Implications for Arms Control

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An Arms Control Association Press Conference

Monday, April 17, 2000


The Carnegic Endowment for International Peace

The Russian State Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament, approved START II on Friday, April 14. Signed in January 1993 by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin, START II would reduce U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals to a level of 3,000 to 3,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, which is roughly half that allowed under START I and 25 percent of levels deployed during the Cold War. Russian ratification of START II will permit initiation of formal negotiations on START III, which would establish ceilings of 2,000 to 2,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads or possibly lower.

The panel will address the significance of START II and START III, the relationship between Russian START II ratification and U.S. efforts to amend the ABM Treaty, and the status of legislative barriers in the United States to bringing START II into force.

The Panelists:

(Click on the underlined names of the participants to jump directly to their portions of the transcript in the May 2000 issue of Arms Control Today.)

  • Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., President and Executive Director of the Arms Control Association; former Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
  • Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., President of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security; former Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament from 1994-1997, and former Acting Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
  • Jack Mendelsohn, Vice President and Executive Director of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security; former member of the U.S. delegations to the SALT II and START I negotiations.
  • Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers.
  • Questions and Answers













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ACA Press Conference

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Putin Elected President, Addresses Nuclear Agenda

Philipp C. Bleek


IN A WIDELY predicted victory, Vladimir Putin was elected March 26 as Russia's second post-communist president. Putin, who has served as acting president since Boris Yeltsin's surprise resignation on New Year's Eve, called for strengthening the stability of the Russian nuclear arsenal and expressed support for the strategic arms reduction process in a March 31 address to Russian nuclear scientists.

Putin delivered the speech in Snezhinsk (formerly Chelyabinsk-70), one of Russia's closed nuclear cities, and stated that he would "preserve and strengthen the Russian nuclear weapons complex," though he emphasized that this did not mean increasing the size of Russia's arsenal. Referring to START II and START III, Putin also said that in order to "make our world safer and reduce the excess of weapons," Russia is "holding and will continue talks on further cuts in strategic offensive weapons."

START II has been stalled in the Duma, Russia's lower house of parliament, for seven years, though several unsuccessful attempts have been made to bring it to a vote. Alexei Arbatov, deputy chair of the Duma Defense Committee, stated in a March 29 press conference that "if the final signal comes from the Kremlin, the Duma, I think, will easily ratify [START II and other arms control agreements] in the course of April and May."

If START II is ratified soon, it could facilitate negotiation of a START III agreement in the coming months—a prospect in which high-level U.S. and Russian officials have expressed repeated interest. Russia has proposed reductions as low as 1,500 deployed warheads, while the United States has argued for 2,000-2,500 warheads, the level proposed when Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed in 1997 to pursue a START III agreement.

However, the Clinton administration's attempts to amend the ABM Treaty to facilitate deployment of a limited national missile defense may undermine both current and future strategic arms reduction agreements. Some Russian officials have stated that if the United States violates the ABM Treaty, Russia will automatically withdraw from START I and START II. The START II resolution of ratification currently before the Duma states that U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would give Russia the right to withdraw from START II. (See ACT, December 1999.)

While Putin has hinted at possible flexibility on this issue in recent months, both he and senior Russian officials have formally stated that they are opposed to amending the treaty. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov reaffirmed this position in a March 27 meeting with U.S. Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA), who was in Russia to monitor the presidential election.

U.S. officials responded with guarded optimism to news of Putin's election. "President-elect Putin has an opportunity to translate his electoral mandate into concrete steps to advance economic reform, to strengthen the rule of law, to intensify the fight against crime and corruption, and to join with us on a broad common agenda of international security, including arms control, non-proliferation, and regional peace and security," President Clinton said March 27. However, in a March 28 speech, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering noted, "The truth is that we don't yet know what kind of a president Vladimir Putin will be."

According to statements by Russian and U.S. officials, Ivanov and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright will discuss issues relating to both the amendment of the ABM Treaty and further strategic nuclear reductions during meetings in Washington, currently scheduled for late April.

Putin Elected President, Addresses Nuclear Agenda

Civil Reactors to Replenish U.S. Tritium Supply

January/February 2000

In a departure from the long-standing U.S. tradition of separating civilian and military nuclear reactors, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson announced December 22 that the Department of Energy (DOE) had reached an agreement with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to produce tritium for U.S. nuclear weapons in TVA's civilian light-water reactors at the Watts Bar nuclear plant near Knoxville. Production is currently scheduled to begin in 2003.

Tritium, which the United States has not produced since 1988, is a radioactive gas used to boost the yield of nuclear weapons. The United States currently maintains a five-year reserve supply of tritium-a store based on the time required to restart production at former tritium-producing reactors that were shut down because of safety concerns-but supplies are decaying. Using TVA's reactors would allow the United States to reduce its reserve to a two-year supply, since TVA's reactors need only two years to begin tritium production.

If the United States maintains its current nuclear arsenal under START I, reserve nuclear warheads and a sizable tritium reserve, it will need a new source of tritium by 2005. If the United States further reduces its arsenal to the warhead ceiling allowed under START II while maintaining a reserve sufficient to return to START I levels, it will not need a new tritium supply until 2011.

DOE has pursued and continues to fund several other options for tritium production, including construction of a particle accelerator or a new light-water reactor, or completion of a light-water reactor already under construction in Bellefonte, Alabama. DOE chose to use TVA's reactors primarily because of the low cost, but the department continues to fund alternatives in case the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which is scheduled to complete a review of the TVA option by next summer, fails to approve the use of TVA reactors.

Producing tritium in civilian power reactors could have unintended consequences for U.S. arms control and non-proliferation efforts, potentially undercutting the policy of encouraging other states to not use civil reactors for military purposes.

Civil Reactors to Replenish U.S. Tritium Supply

Russia Postpones START II Vote Again

The Russian Duma again postponed consideration of START II on December 8. The treaty, which the U.S. Senate ratified in 1996, has been repeatedly withdrawn at the last minute due to insufficient support, first as a result of U.S.-British airstrikes against Iraq in December 1998 and then because of NATO's airwar against Yugoslavia last spring. The Communist Party, which held 35 percent of the Duma's seats in early December, opposes the treaty, arguing that it undermines Russian national security.

The legislation currently before the Duma makes exchange of the instruments of ratification (the final step required to bring the treaty into force) contingent on U.S. ratification of the 1997 amendments to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which name Russia as the successor state to the Soviet Union and clarify distinctions between theater missile defenses, which are not prohibited by the treaty, and national missile defenses, which are. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and an outspoken opponent of the ABM Treaty, has indicated that the amendments will be rejected if submitted to the Senate.

The legislation also links START II ratification to U.S. non-abrogation of the ABM Treaty, stating that "extraordinary events giving the Russian Federation the right to withdraw from the Treaty...[include]...the United States of America's withdrawal from the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems...."

Ratification of START II by the Duma would thus provide additional disincentives for U.S. deployment of a limited national missile defense, which would either require amending the treaty—an idea the Russians have resisted—or withdrawal from the treaty altogether. Ratification would also allow for negotiation of deeper strategic reductions through START III, which the United States has insisted must await Russian ratification of START II.

First of 150 Minuteman III Missile Silos Destroyed

In an effort to comply with START I provisions and finish its destruction timetable by November 2001, the United States imploded the first of 150 Minuteman III ballistic missile silos in North Dakota on October 6.

The $12.1 million project, under the direction of the Air Force and the Army Corps of Engineers, will destroy only the 150 silos necessary for compliance with the treaty; 150 other sites remain "in service" in North Dakota, according to an Air Force official.

The last Minuteman III missile was removed from the silos slated for implosion in June 1998 after being taken off alert in 1995. Destruction of all the silos is estimated to take two years.

Compromise Reached on Trident Subs

The conference report to the fiscal year (FY) 2000 defense authorization bill, which was completed August 5, permits the Navy to remove the four oldest Trident ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) from service before START II enters into force, provided the president can certify that such a step will not jeopardize national security. Senior administration officials testified in April that reducing the Trident force from 18 to 14 SSBNs would save $5-6 billion through FY 2005 without undermining the survivability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The status of the Trident fleet had been in question after the Senate and the House of Representatives completed their versions of the defense authorization bill this spring. (See ACT, April/May 1999.)

The conference report stipulates that no funds may be spent on the retirement or dismantlement of the 18 Trident SSBNs unless START II enters into force or the president certifies that four achievable conditions have been met. Specifically, the president must certify that the Trident force reductions will not threaten the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, will not provide a disincentive for Russian ratification of START II or negotiation of future arms control measures, will not interfere with U.S. abilities to carry out its nuclear war plans (known as the SIOP) and will not prevent the United States from "uploading" its nuclear delivery systems should new threats arise.

Once this certification has been transmitted to Congress, the United States can maintain 16 SSBNs for the first 240 days and 14 SSBNs thereafter. The conference report includes $13 million to preserve the option of converting the four retired boats to a conventional role. Despite the exemption for the Tridents, the United States is still required to stay at START I force levels (6,000 "accountable" warheads) until START II comes into effect. 

Little Progress Made at START/ABM Talks

Craig Cerniello

THE FIRST ROUND of U.S.-Russian "discussions" on START III and the ABM Treaty ended August 19 without any apparent progress, casting a shadow on the Clinton administration's plans to resolve treaty issues before June 2000, when it will decide whether to deploy a limited national missile defense (NMD) system. During the talks, which began August 17 in Moscow, Russia continued to argue that NMD deployment would upset strategic stability and spark a new arms race. The Russians did propose, however, that the sides deploy a maximum of 1,500 strategic warheads each under START III instead of the 2,000–2,500 limit agreed to by Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin at the Helsinki summit in March 1997. Further consultations on these issues are planned for September in Moscow.

In an attempt to get their bruised relationship back on track after the Kosovo conflict, the United States and Russia had agreed at the June 18–20 Group of Eight summit in Cologne, Germany, to hold discussions on START III and the ABM Treaty this summer. (See ACT, June 1999.) Building on this progress, Vice President Al Gore and then-Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin announced at the conclusion of their July 27 meeting in Washington that discussions on these issues would begin in Moscow the following month. The consultations, which were conducted by John Holum, Clinton's nominee for undersecretary of state for arms control and international security affairs, and his Russian counterpart, Grigory Berdennikov, took place despite the August 9 shake-up in the Russian government in which Yeltsin fired Stepashin, later replacing him with Vladimir Putin.

Although the United States did not propose specific amendments to the ABM Treaty during the talks, senior Russian officials made their position quite clear. "We do not see any variant which would allow the U.S. to deploy a [NMD] system and at the same time maintain the ABM Treaty. If this takes place, talks on a START III treaty will be ruined, as well as the existing START I and START II agreements," said Berdennikov on August 19. Furthermore, he warned that NMD deployment would compel Russia "to raise the effectiveness of its strategic nuclear armed forces and carry out several other military and political steps to guarantee its national security under new strategic conditions."

These views were echoed by Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, head of the Russian Defense Ministry's department for international military cooperation. "The ABM Treaty is the basis on which all subsequent arms control agreements have been built. To destroy this basis would be to destroy the entire process of nuclear arms control," he said August 20. Despite this rhetoric, the United States and Russia once again characterized the ABM Treaty as a "cornerstone of strategic stability" in an August 19 press release.

Concerning nuclear reductions, the United States and Russia "reaffirmed" their readiness to begin official negotiations on START III as soon as the Russian Duma ratifies START II. The sides also noted their strong commitment to the START II ratification process and the treaty's entry into force. Russia's proposal to lower START III levels stems from the concern that it will have to downsize its strategic forces over the next decade because of obsolescence and mounting economic problems. However, there is no indication that the United States is considering reductions below the 2,000–2,500 warhead level agreed to at Helsinki.

THE FIRST ROUND of U.S.-Russian "discussions" on START III and the ABM Treaty ended August 19 without any apparent progress, casting a shadow on the Clinton administration's plans to resolve treaty issues before June 2000, when it will decide whether to deploy a limited national missile defense (NMD) system. During the talks, which began August 17 in Moscow, Russia continued to argue that NMD deployment would upset strategic stability and spark a new arms race. The Russians did propose, however, that the sides deploy a maximum of 1,500 strategic warheads each under START III instead of the 2,000–2,500 limit agreed to by Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin at the Helsinki summit in March 1997. Further consultations on these issues are planned for September in Moscow. (Continue)

Joint Statement Between the United States and the Russian Federation Concerning Strategic Offensive and Defensive Arms and Furth

June 20, 1999

Confirming their dedication to the cause of strengthening strategic stability and international security, stressing the importance of further reduction of strategic offensive arms, and recognizing the fundamental importance of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) for the attainment of these goals, the United States of America and the Russian Federation declare their determination to continue efforts directed at achieving meaningful results in these areas.

The two governments believe that strategic stability can be strengthened only if there is compliance with existing agreements between the Parties on limitation and reduction of arms. The two governments will do everything in their power to facilitate the successful completion of the START II ratification processes in both countries.

The two governments reaffirm their readiness, expressed in Helsinki in March 1997, to conduct new negotiations on strategic offensive arms aimed at further reducing for each side the level of strategic nuclear warheads, elaborating measures of transparency concerning existing strategic nuclear warheads and their elimination, as well as other agreed technical and organizational measures in order to contribute to the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid build-up in the numbers of warheads and to contribute strengthening of strategic stability in the world. The two governments will strive to accomplish the important task of achieving results in these negotiations as early as possible.

Proceeding from the fundamental significance of the ABM Treaty for further reductions in strategic offensive arms, and from the need to maintain the strategic balance between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, the Parties reaffirm their commitment to that Treaty, which is a cornerstone of strategic stability, and to continuing efforts to strengthen the Treaty, to enhance its viability and effectiveness in the future.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, recalling their concern about the proliferation in the world of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including missiles and missile technologies, expressed by them in the Joint Statement on Common Security Challenges at the Threshold of the Twenty First Century, adopted on September 2, 1998 in Moscow, stress their common desire to reverse that process using to this end the existing and possible new international legal mechanisms.

In this regard, both Parties affirm their existing obligations under Article XIII of the ABM Treaty to consider possible changes in the strategic situation that have a bearing on the ABM Treaty and, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty.

The Parties emphasize that the package of agreements signed on September 26, 1997 in New York is important under present conditions for the effectiveness of the ABM Treaty, and they will facilitate the earliest possible ratification and entry into force of those agreements.

The implementation of measures to exchange data on missile launches and on early warning and to set up an appropriate joint center, recorded in the Joint Statement by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation signed on September 2, 1998 in Moscow, will also promote the strengthening of strategic stability.

Discussions on START III and the ABM Treaty will begin later this summer. The two governments express their confidence that implementation of this Joint Statement will be a new significant step to enhance strategic stability and the security of both nations.

U.S., Russia to Begin 'Discussions' on START III, ABM Treaty

Craig Cerniello

HOPING TO RESTART their interrupted strategic dialogue, the United States and Russia held face-to-face meetings in June at the Group of Eight summit in Cologne, Germany. During talks, both sides agreed to press for ratification of START II and to hold dual-track "discussions" later this summer on both START III and possible amendments to the ABM Treaty that would allow deployment of a limited national missile defense (NMD) system. The Clinton administration is expected to make an NMD architecture decision in the coming months so that it can determine what specific treaty amendments deployment would require. However, a decision on whether to deploy an NMD system will not be made until June 2000.

Although no major breakthroughs on arms control were achieved at the June 18-20 summit, the "Joint Statement Between the United States and the Russian Federation Concerning Strategic Offensive and Defensive Arms and Further Strengthening of Stability" (see document) is significant because it indicates that both nations are now prepared to resume an agenda that had been essentially frozen during the 78 days of NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia.

In their June 20 statement, the United States and Russia reiterated their strong commitment to the START II ratification process. Although the Senate gave its advice and consent in January 1996, the Russian Duma has not yet approved the treaty. A long-awaited vote on START II had been scheduled for April 2, but it was quickly shelved after NATO began its bombing campaign against Yugoslavia on March 24.

By late June, however, START II was showing new signs of life. On June 21, Duma speaker Gennady Seleznyov said the treaty would be on the agenda for the fall session, which begins in September. Two days later, the Duma approved legislation guaranteeing funding for Russian strategic nuclear forces through 2010. Previously, Roman Popkovich, chairman of the Duma's defense committee, had argued that this bill was a prerequisite to START II ratification.

The Cologne statement also reaffirms U.S. and Russian readiness to negotiate START III. At the March 1997 Helsinki summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin reached an agreed framework for such a treaty, under which the United States and Russia would deploy no more than 2,000-2,500 strategic warheads each by the end of 2007 and would adopt measures promoting the irreversibility of deep reductions. The United States has reiterated its willingness to begin formal negotiations on START III, which has already been the subject of expert-level discussions, as soon as the Duma ratifies START II.

ABM Discussions

With respect to strategic defenses, the United States and Russia reaffirmed their commitment to the ABM Treaty and noted their obligation under Article XIII "to consider possible changes in the strategic situation that have a bearing on the [treaty] and, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing [its] viability." In a June 20 White House briefing, National Security Adviser Samuel Berger said that the Cologne statement "is very significant because for the first time the Russians have agreed to discuss changes in the ABM Treaty that may be necessitated by a [NMD] system were we to decide to deploy one." However, agreement to hold discussions on the ABM Treaty does not mean that Russia has endorsed amendments allowing for NMD deployment. Consistent with earlier statements, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said June 23 that U.S. NMD plans are "dangerous" and have the potential to upset strategic stability.

The Cologne statement also emphasizes the importance of the September 1997 package of strategic agreements signed in New York. These agreements extend the START II implementation period by five years, clarify the demarcation line between strategic and theater missile defenses and identify the successor states to the former Soviet Union under the ABM Treaty. (See ACT, September 1997.) The Cologne statement notes that the United States and Russia "will facilitate the earliest possible ratification and entry into force of those agreements." In his briefing, Berger restated the administration's position that it would not submit the strategic package to the Senate until the Duma has ratified START II.

Other Developments

The joint statement also recognizes the importance of the September 1998 U.S.-Russian agreement to share early-warning information on the worldwide launches of ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles. (See ACT, August/September 1998.) Efforts to implement this long-term sharing arrangement, as well as efforts to establish a temporary joint early-warning center in Colorado Springs to deal with the Year 2000 computer problem, have been on hold as a result of the NATO air strikes. Edward Warner, assistant secretary of defense for strategy and threat reduction, said June 28 that the United States hopes to "re-engage" Russia on these issues in the near future.

At Cologne, the sides also agreed to continue the dialogue under the Joint Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation, co-chaired by Vice President Al Gore and Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin. The Gore-Stepashin Commission, which conducts business on a broad range of issues, including arms control, will meet July 27 in Washington. Gore and then-Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov were scheduled to meet in late March, but the meeting was postponed because of the Kosovo conflict.

HOPING TO RESTART their interrupted strategic dialogue, the United States and Russia held face-to-face meetings in June at the Group of Eight summit in Cologne, Germany. During talks, both sides agreed to press for ratification of START II and to hold dual-track "discussions" later this summer on both START III and possible amendments to the ABM Treaty that would allow deployment of a limited national missile defense (NMD) system. The Clinton administration is expected to make an NMD architecture decision in the coming months so that it can determine what specific treaty amendments deployment would require. However, a decision on whether to deploy an NMD system will not be made until June 2000. (Continue)

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