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"I find hope in the work of long-established groups such as the Arms Control Association...[and] I find hope in younger anti-nuclear activists and the movement around the world to formally ban the bomb."

– Vincent Intondi
Author, "African Americans Against the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Colonialism, and the Black Freedom Movement"
July 1, 2020
US-Russia Nuclear Arms Control

A Beginning, Not an End

Daryl G. Kimball

The May 24 signing of the new Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin is a welcome, though incomplete, step toward reducing U.S. and Russian nuclear dangers. In their zealous pursuit to maintain strategic nuclear flexibility well into the next decade, U.S. negotiators have spurned a historic opportunity to verifiably eliminate excess nuclear weaponry, leaving behind numerous dangers that demand further action.

The new agreement is short. It requires each side to reduce its number of deployed strategic warheads to no more than 2,200 by 2012. It places no restrictions on strategic missiles and bombers and allows each side to determine the composition of its deployed nuclear forces. The treaty does not spell out what is to be done with warheads removed from service.

The White House asserts that this formulation suits the more amicable U.S.-Russian relationship. But the treaty’s limited scope and lack of detail reflect the fact that negotiators simply could not agree on core issues, including how to count deployed warheads. On the whole, the new treaty does not significantly alter the number of existing nuclear delivery systems and therefore only marginally affects the residual nuclear potential of the United States and Russia. The allowance for storage of thousands of reserve warheads undercuts the treaty’s verifiability and makes it more difficult to forecast future force levels. The agreement’s emphasis on flexibility detracts from its predictability, lessening its value in building a more stable and secure U.S.-Russian relationship.

As the Senate reviews the treaty in the coming weeks, it will surely applaud the treaty’s mandate for deployed nuclear force reductions. But the Senate should also press the administration to explain the gaps left in the treaty text and seek action from Bush on a more comprehensive and effective nuclear risk reduction strategy vis-à-vis Russia.

First, the Senate should examine why the old premises of Cold War nuclear targeting continue to dictate the size of the U.S. arsenal. Clearly, the United States and Russia are no longer enemies and have no reason to go to war, but the Bush administration’s proposed nuclear force size and posture are still very much based on deterring and defeating Russia’s nuclear and conventional military forces. As a result, the condition of mutual assured destruction persists. Absent such requirements, there is no plausible threat scenario that requires the deployment of more than a few hundred nuclear warheads, let alone 2,200, with thousands more available for rapid redeployment.

If Putin follows Bush’s policy of warehousing, rather than eliminating, excess warheads, the long-term burden of safeguarding Russia’s already vast and insecure nuclear weapons complex will only grow. The United States should pursue a policy of minimizing reserve forces and offering Russia more assistance to safeguard and demilitarize their excess warheads and nuclear materials.

The treaty promises to remove some but not all strategic warheads from ready launch status. Consequently, the Senate should press the administration to seek further operational changes in the alert status of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces to guard against the risk of accidental launch or miscalculation.

Though verification provisions from the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty will remain in effect until 2009, the new treaty provides no additional verification or transparency measures. Proposals to expand data sharing and improve monitoring of treaty compliance were on the table, but the two sides failed to close a deal. Senators should task U.S. negotiators to work with Russia on new mechanisms to enhance transparency and establish a better baseline on weapons holdings through the Bilateral Implementation Commission established by the new treaty.

Given the pursuit of nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations, it is troubling that Russia retains thousands of poorly accounted-for tactical warheads, which are relatively more vulnerable to theft or diversion than strategic warheads. For now, tactical nuclear weapons are not a top Bush administration priority. Meanwhile, the administration is contemplating the development of new types of—and new uses for—tactical nuclear weapons, a policy that only makes the control of such weapons more challenging. Negotiations leading to the verifiable elimination of tactical nuclear weapons should be high on the U.S.-Russian agenda.

National security adviser Condoleezza Rice has said that the new treaty is “a transitional measure to a day when arms control will play a very minor role in U.S.-Russian relations, if a role at all.” But because this treaty fails to lock in strategic nuclear reductions and does not address the vast array of other Cold War-era dangers, that day remains far too distant. The task now is for the United States and Russia to pursue the much-needed next steps with a more comprehensive and lasting nuclear risk reduction strategy.

Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty and Joint Statement

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Embarking upon the path of new relations for a new century and committed to the goal of strengthening their relationship through cooperation and friendship,

Believing that new global challenges and threats require the building of a qualitatively new foundation for strategic relations between the Parties,

Desiring to establish a genuine partnership based on the principles of mutual security, cooperation, trust, openness, and predictability,

Committed to implementing significant reductions in strategic offensive arms,

Proceeding from the Joint Statements by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Strategic Issues of July 22, 2001 in Genoa and on a New Relationship between the United States and Russia of November 13, 2001 in Washington,

Mindful of their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and

Convinced that this Treaty will help to establish more favorable conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation, and enhancing international stability,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each Party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads, as stated by the President of the United States of America on November 13, 2001 and as stated by the President of the Russian Federation on November 13, 2001 and December 13, 2001 respectively, so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1700-2200 for each Party. Each Party shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads.

Article II

The Parties agree that the START Treaty remains in force in accordance with its terms.

Article III

For purposes of implementing this Treaty, the Parties shall hold meetings at least twice a year of a Bilateral Implementation Commission.

Article IV

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 2012 and may be extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement.

3. Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw from this Treaty upon three months written notice to the other Party.

Article V

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Done at Moscow on May 24, 2002, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: [signed]
FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: [signed]

Source: White House


Joint Statement

The United States of America and the Russian Federation,

Recalling the accomplishments at the Ljubljana, Genoa, Shanghai, and Washington/Crawford Summits and the new spirit of cooperation already achieved;

Building on the November 13, 2001 Joint Statement on a New Relationship Between the United States and Russia, having embarked upon the path of new relations for the twenty-first century, and committed to developing a relationship based on friendship, cooperation, common values, trust, openness, and predictability;

Reaffirming our belief that new global challenges and threats require a qualitatively new foundation for our relationship;

Determined to work together, with other nations and with international organizations, to respond to these new challenges and threats, and thus contribute to a peaceful, prosperous, and free world and to strengthening strategic security;

Declare as follows:

A Foundation for Cooperation

We are achieving a new strategic relationship. The era in which the United States and Russia saw each other as an enemy or strategic threat has ended. We are partners and we will cooperate to advance stability, security, and economic integration, and to jointly counter global challenges and to help resolve regional conflicts.

To advance these objectives the United States and Russia will continue an intensive dialogue on pressing international and regional problems, both on a bilateral basis and in international fora, including in the UN Security Council, the G-8, and the OSCE. Where we have differences, we will work to resolve them in a spirit of mutual respect.

We will respect the essential values of democracy, human rights, free speech and free media, tolerance, the rule of law, and economic opportunity.

We recognize that the security, prosperity, and future hopes of our peoples rest on a benign security environment, the advancement of political and economic freedoms, and international cooperation.
The further development of U.S.-Russian relations and the strengthening of mutual understanding and trust will also rest on a growing network of ties between our societies and peoples. We will support growing economic interaction between the business communities of our two countries and people-to-people and cultural contacts and exchanges.

Political Cooperation

The United States and Russia are already acting as partners and friends in meeting the new challenges of the 21st century; affirming our Joint Statement of October 21, 2001, our countries are already allied in the global struggle against international terrorism.

The United States and Russia will continue to cooperate to support the Afghan people’s efforts to transform Afghanistan into a stable, viable nation at peace with itself and its neighbors. Our cooperation, bilaterally and through the United Nations, the ‘Six-Plus-Two’ diplomatic process, and in other multilateral fora, has proved important to our success so far in ridding Afghanistan of the Taliban and al-Qaida.

In Central Asia and the South Caucasus, we recognize our common interest in promoting the stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all the nations of this region. The United States and Russia reject the failed model of “Great Power” rivalry that can only increase the potential for conflict in those regions. We will support economic and political development and respect for human rights while we broaden our humanitarian cooperation and cooperation on counterterrorism and counternarcotics.

The United States and Russia will cooperate to resolve regional conflicts, including those in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Transnistrian issue in Moldova. We strongly encourage the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia to exhibit flexibility and a constructive approach to resolving the conflict concerning Nagorno-Karabakh. As two of the Co-Chairmen of the OSCE’s Minsk Group, the United States and Russia stand ready to assist in these efforts.

On November 13, 2001, we pledged to work together to develop a new relationship between NATO and Russia that reflects the new strategic reality in the Euro-Atlantic region. We stressed that the members of NATO and Russia are increasingly allied against terrorism, regional instability, and other contemporary threats. We therefore welcome the inauguration at the May 28, 2002 NATO-Russia summit in Rome of a new NATO-Russia Council, whose members, acting in their national capacities and in a manner consistent with their respective collective commitments and obligations, will identify common approaches, take joint decisions, and bear equal responsibility, individually and jointly, for their implementation. In this context, they will observe in good faith their obligations under international law, including the UN Charter, provisions and principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE Charter for European Security. In the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, NATO member states and Russia will work as equal partners in areas of common interest. They aim to stand together against common threats and risks to their security.

As co-sponsors of the Middle East peace process, the United States and Russia will continue to exert joint and parallel efforts, including in the framework of the “Quartet,” to overcome the current crisis in the Middle East, to restart negotiations, and to encourage a negotiated settlement. In the Balkans, we will promote democracy, ethnic tolerance, self-sustaining peace, and long-term stability, based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states in the region and United Nations Security Council resolutions. The United States and Russia will continue their constructive dialogue on Iraq and welcome the continuation of special bilateral discussions that opened the way for UN Security Council adoption of the Goods Review List.

Recalling our Joint Statement of November 13, 2001 on counternarcotics cooperation, we note that illegal drug trafficking poses a threat to our peoples and to international security, and represents a substantial source of financial support for international terrorism. We are committed to intensifying cooperation against this threat, which will bolster both the security and health of the citizens of our countries.

The United States and Russia remain committed to intensifying cooperation in the fight against transnational organized crime. In this regard, we welcome the entry into force of the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters on January 31, 2002.

Economic Cooperation

The United States and Russia believe that successful national development in the 21st century demands respect for the discipline and practices of the free market. As we stated on November 13, 2001, an open market economy, the freedom of economic choice, and an open democratic society are the most effective means to provide for the welfare of the citizens of our countries.

The United States and Russia will endeavor to make use of the potential of world trade to expand the economic ties between the two countries, and to further integrate Russia into the world economy as a leading participant, with full rights and responsibilities, consistent with the rule of law, in the world economic system. In this connection, the sides give high priority to Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization on standard terms.

Success in our bilateral economic and trade relations demands that we move beyond the limitations of the past. We stress the importance and desirability of graduating Russia from the emigration provisions of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, also known as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. We note that the Department of Commerce, based on its ongoing thorough and deliberative inquiry, expects to make its final decision no later than June 14, 2002 on whether Russia should be treated as a market economy under the provisions of U.S. trade law. The sides will take further practical steps to eliminate obstacles and barriers, including as appropriate in the legislative area, to strengthen economic cooperation.

We have established a new dynamic in our economic relations and between our business communities, aimed at advancing trade and investment opportunities while resolving disputes, where they occur, constructively and transparently.

The United States and Russia acknowledge the great potential for expanding bilateral trade and investment, which would bring significant benefits to both of our economies. Welcoming the recommendations of the Russian-American Business Dialogue, we are committed to working with the private sectors of our countries to realize the full potential of our economic interaction. We also welcome the opportunity to intensify cooperation in energy exploration and development, especially in oil and gas, including in the Caspian region.

Strengthening People-to-People Contacts

The greatest strength of our societies is the creative energy of our citizens. We welcome the dramatic expansion of contacts between Americans and Russians in the past ten years in many areas, including joint efforts to resolve common problems in education, health, the sciences, and environment, as well as through tourism, sister-city relationships, and other people-to-people contacts. We pledge to continue supporting these efforts, which help broaden and deepen good relations between our two countries.

Battling the scourge of HIV/AIDS and other deadly diseases, ending family violence, protecting the environment, and defending the rights of women are areas where U.S. and Russian institutions, and especially non-governmental organizations, can successfully expand their cooperation.

Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Non-Proliferation and International Terrorism

The United States and Russia will intensify joint efforts to confront the new global challenges of the twenty-first century, including combating the closely linked threats of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We believe that international terrorism represents a particular danger to international stability as shown once more by the tragic events of September 11, 2001. It is imperative that all nations of the world cooperate to combat this threat decisively. Toward this end, the United States and Russia reaffirm our commitment to work together bilaterally and multilaterally.

The United States and Russia recognize the profound importance of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The specter that such weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists and those who support them illustrates the priority all nations must give to combating proliferation.

To that end, we will work closely together, including through cooperative programs, to ensure the security of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies, information, expertise, and material. We will also continue cooperative threat reduction programs and expand efforts to reduce weapons-usable fissile material. In that regard, we will establish joint experts groups to investigate means of increasing the amount of weapons-usable fissile material to be eliminated, and to recommend collaborative research and development efforts on advanced, proliferation-resistant nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies. We also intend to intensify our cooperation concerning destruction of chemical weapons.

The United States and Russia will also seek broad international support for a strategy of proactive non-proliferation, including by implementing and bolstering the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the conventions on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. The United States and Russia call on all countries to strengthen and strictly enforce export controls, interdict illegal transfers, prosecute violators, and tighten border controls to prevent and protect against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Missile Defense, Further Strategic Offensive Reductions, New Consultative Mechanism on Strategic Security

The United States and Russia proceed from the Joint Statements by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Strategic Issues of July 22, 2001 in Genoa and on a New Relationship Between the United States and Russia of November 13, 2001 in Washington.
The United States and Russia are taking steps to reflect, in the military field, the changed nature of the strategic relationship between them.

The United States and Russia acknowledge that today’s security environment is fundamentally different than during the Cold War.

In this connection, the United States and Russia have agreed to implement a number of steps aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing transparency in the area of missile defense, including the exchange of information on missile defense programs and tests in this area, reciprocal visits to observe missile defense tests, and observation aimed at familiarization with missile defense systems. They also intend to take the steps necessary to bring a joint center for the exchange of data from early warning systems into operation.

The United States and Russia have also agreed to study possible areas for missile defense cooperation, including the expansion of joint exercises related to missile defense, and the exploration of potential programs for the joint research and development of missile defense technologies, bearing in mind the importance of the mutual protection of classified information and the safeguarding of intellectual property rights.

The United States and Russia will, within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, explore opportunities for intensified practical cooperation on missile defense for Europe.
The United States and Russia declare their intention to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with their national security requirements and alliance obligations, and reflecting the new nature of their strategic relations.

A major step in this direction is the conclusion of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions.

In this connection, both sides proceed on the basis that the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, remains in force in accordance with its terms and that its provisions will provide the foundation for providing confidence, transparency, and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions, along with other supplementary measures, including transparency measures, to be agreed.

The United States and Russia agree that a new strategic relationship between the two countries, based on the principles of mutual security, trust, openness, cooperation, and predictability requires substantive consultation across a broad range of international security issues. To that end we have decided to:

• establish a Consultative Group for Strategic Security to be chaired by Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers with the participation of other senior officials. This group will be the principal mechanism through which the sides strengthen mutual confidence, expand transparency, share information and plans, and discuss strategic issues of mutual interest; and

• seek ways to expand and regularize contacts between our two countries’ Defense Ministries and Foreign Ministries, and our intelligence agencies.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

Moscow
May 24, 2002.


 

Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)

Description: 

This treaty required the United States and the Russian Federation to reduce their deployed strategic nuclear forces. It took effect and expired on Dec. 31, 2012. Both could then change the size of their deployed strategic nuclear forces.

Body: 
 

The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) required both the United States and the Russian Federation to reduce and limit their strategic nuclear warheads to a certain number, determine the composition and structure of their offensive arms, and agree that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) remain in force. SORT did not have any verification or compliance provisions. Yet, both states agreed to meet at least twice a year at the Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC) for progress updates. The treaty allowed for withdrawal upon 90 days of written notice.

Opened for Signature: 24 May 2002

Entry into force: 1 June 2003

Official Text: https://media.nti.org/documents/sort_moscow_treaty.pdf

Status and Signatories: http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/strategic-offensive-reductions-treaty-sort/

ACA Backgrounder: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/sort-glance

Country Resources:

Experts Call Nuclear Arms Treaty a Missed Opportunity, Urge Pursuit of Comprehensive Nuclear Risk Reduction Strategy

Sections:

Body: 

For Immediate Release: May 24, 2002

Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball (202) 463-8270 x107 or Philipp Bleek (202)
463-8270 x103

(Washington, D.C.): A leading American arms control and international security organization called today’s signing of the new U.S.-Russian “Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions” a modest step that unfortunately falls short of what could and should be done to move beyond the Cold War-era nuclear rivalry. Experts from the Arms Control Association called on Russian and American leaders to pursue more comprehensive steps to reduce the risks posed by residual Cold War nuclear arsenals.

“Reducing deployed strategic forces by roughly two-thirds is a welcome and long-overdue step, but President Bush has passed up an historic opportunity to verifiably eliminate excess Cold War nuclear weaponry for the sake of maintaining a U.S. capacity to quickly expand strategic nuclear forces in the future,” according to Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.

The agreement requires each side to reduce its number of “operationally deployed strategic warheads” from today’s 5,000-6,000 to no more than 2,200 by 2012, when the treaty will expire. Under the treaty each side would reduce its deployed strategic forces by removing warheads from missiles, bombers, and submarines, while allowing the retention of those delivery systems. The treaty does not spell out what is to be done with warheads removed from service. Though verification provisions from the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) will remain in effect until 2009, the new treaty provides no additional verification measures. Either party may withdraw within three months notice.

“The new treaty does not significantly alter the number of existing nuclear delivery systems and therefore only marginally affects the residual nuclear potential of the United States and Russia,” observed Jack Mendelsohn, a former member of the U.S. Strategic Arms Limitations Talks and START negotiating teams. “It creates thousands of ‘phantom warheads’ undercutting its own verifiability, and it contains no reduction schedule, making it difficult to predict force levels over the next decade,” he added.

“The treaty’s content is consistent with the Bush administration’s goal of maintaining maximum strategic flexibility,” Kimball observed. “The agreement ’s emphasis on flexibility only detracts from its predictability, lessening the likelihood that it can play a role in building a more stable and lasting
U.S.-Russian relationship,” he added.

While the Bush administration has said it intends to dismantle some warheads, it also plans to maintain the capability to redeploy at least 2,400 warheads from its active reserves within three years of the conclusion of the agreement, giving the United States the capability to deploy at least 4,600 strategic warheads by 2015. Several thousand more warheads in lower stages of readiness could also be redeployed over a longer period of time. Russia is likely to follow the U.S. lead and seek to retain the capability to increase its nuclear forces if necessary.

“If Russia mirrors the U.S. policy of warehousing, rather than eliminating, these deadly weapon systems, Moscow will be adding warheads to a vast and insecure nuclear weapons complex, which already poses a significant proliferation risk,” said Wade Boese, research director for the Association.

The new agreement is a departure from past agreements. Unlike START I and START II, signed by the first President Bush in 1993, this treaty allows each side to maintain existing strategic bombers, submarine-launched missiles, and land-based intercontinental missiles, leaving each side with the capability to quickly reconstitute its current arsenal.

Consistent with the Pentagon’s nuclear posture review, this agreement permits each side to deploy over 2,000 strategic warheads, the majority of which will likely be ready for quick use. Leaked portions of the classified review state “in the event that U.S. relations with Russia significantly worsen in the future, the U.S. may need to revise its nuclear force levels and posture.”

The United States currently deploys approximately 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads on its strategic triad of land-based missiles, submarines, and bombers, and, in addition, it currently has over 1,000 tactical nuclear warheads and more than 5,000 total nuclear warheads in reserve stockpiles. Russia currently deploys an estimated 5,500 strategic nuclear warheads on its strategic triad of land-based missiles, submarines, and bombers. Russia also deploys an estimated 4,000 tactical nuclear weapons and is believed to stockpile another 13,000 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads.

“We encourage the Senate to carefully review the treaty and also secure assurances from the White House that it will pursue a more comprehensive nuclear risk reduction agenda with Russia. That agenda should include verifiable dismantlement of excess strategic warheads; accelerating the withdrawal of excess warheads from deployment; verifiable elimination of the thousands of remaining tactical nuclear weapons; and augmented efforts and resources to improve safeguards of Russian nuclear weapons storage and materials facilities,” Kimball said.

# # #

The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies.


For more information on the Bush-Putin treaty and nuclear weapons, see the
Association’s Web site at www.armscontrol.org

Description: 
Media Advisory

Country Resources:

Arms Control Association Answers Questions About Bush-Putin Arms Talks

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For Immediate Release: May 13, 2002

Press Contacts: Daryl Kimball, (202) 463-8270 x 107; Philipp Bleek, (202) 463-8270 x 103; and Wade Boese, (202) 463-8270 x 104

(Washington, D.C.): Making his first visit to Russia since taking office, President George W. Bush will meet with his counterpart Vladimir Putin May 23-26 in Moscow and St. Petersburg. President Bush announced May 13 that the two sides have "agreed to a treaty which will substantially reduce our nuclear arsenals." The agreement is expected to be signed at the summit and will call upon the United States and Russia to reduce their nuclear forces to 1,700 to 2,200 deployed strategic warheads apiece.

What is likely to be agreed on nuclear forces? What will the likely agreement do? The Arms Control Association, an independent, nonprofit membership organization, answers these and other basic questions about the upcoming summit.

1.) What sorts of nuclear weapons do the United States and Russia currently field?

2.) How many nuclear weapons do the United States and Russia currently have?

3.) What agreements might Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin sign at their upcoming May 23-26 summit in Russia?

4.) What have the two countries proposed for the nuclear reductions agreement and what is the likely result?

5.) How does an agreement on strategic nuclear reductions relate to the threat posed by Russia's vulnerable weapons of mass destruction and related infrastructure?

6.) Does this possible agreement fulfill President George W. Bush's promise to move the United States and Russian relationship beyond "mutual assured destruction"?

7.) How does the nuclear arms agreement that Washington and Moscow are discussing compare to the reductions planned under previous arms control accords?

8.) Is it true that previous arms reductions treaties have not required the dismantlement of warheads removed from service?

9.) Reports indicate the United States and Russia have disagreed about "counting rules." What are counting rules, and why are they controversial?

10.) Will there be an agreement on missile defenses signed at the summit, particularly in light of the fact that the United States will formally withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty on June 13?

11.) Some analysts say that Russia's nuclear forces will decline no matter what. If that is true, why should the United States seek an agreement with Russia?

12.) U.S. and Russian officials are seeking a legally binding agreement that would be submitted to each side's legislature for approval. President Bush said it will be a treaty. What were the options under consideration?


1.) What sorts of nuclear weapons do the United States and Russia currently field?

The United States and Russia both deploy nuclear weapons that fall into two general categories: strategic and tactical. Strategic weapons generally consist of more powerful nuclear warheads deployed on long-range delivery systems (missiles, submarines, and bombers) capable of striking the other side's territory. Tactical nuclear weapons, which generally incorporate less powerful nuclear warheads deployed on shorter-range delivery systems, are intended for battlefield use and are deployed today in far fewer numbers than they were during the Cold War.

2.) How many nuclear weapons do the United States and Russia currently have?

The United States currently deploys approximately 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads on its strategic triad of land-based missiles, submarines, and bombers, according to START I counting rules. (See question 8 for more on counting rules.) It is estimated that the United States deploys over 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons and more than 5,000 total nuclear weapons in reserve stockpiles.

Russia currently deploys an estimated 5,500 strategic nuclear warheads on its strategic triad of land-based missiles, submarines, and bombers. Russia deploys an estimated 4,000 tactical nuclear weapons and is believed to stockpile more than 13,000 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads.


3.) What agreements might Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin sign at their upcoming May 23-26 summit in Russia?

The United States and Russia are currently working on at least two documents on security issues for the upcoming summit. One document, which will take the form of a treaty or executive-legislative agreement (see question 13), will set out legally binding U.S. and Russian commitments to reduce their deployed strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,700-2,200 warheads apiece. The second document will likely be much broader in scope and will cover the so-called "new strategic framework" between the two sides. This document, which will likely be politically but not legally binding, will address other security and arms control issues aside from strategic reductions, such as nonproliferation, counterproliferation, anti-terrorism, and missile defenses.


4.) What have the two countries proposed for the nuclear reductions agreement and what is the likely result?

Initially, the Bush administration proposed that the United States and Russia reduce their deployed strategic arsenals without an agreement. For its part, Washington volunteered to reduce the number of strategic warheads deployed on its ICBMs, submarines, and bombers to 1,700-2,200 and encouraged Moscow to do the same. Russia, however, called for a formal agreement and recommended that future deployed strategic warheads number no more than 1,500-2,200.

On February 5, 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the United States had agreed to negotiate a "legally binding" agreement. The two countries have now reportedly settled on the proposed U.S. range of 1,700-2,200 deployed strategic warheads as the target level. U.S. officials have proposed that the reductions be completed by 2012.

In the negotiations, Russia has sought to limit the size and deployment readiness of warheads removed from service, including calling for their dismantlement. Moscow's intent is to limit the ability of either side to quickly redeploy the warheads after they have been removed from their respective delivery systems.

The United States has opposed the Russian proposal. Instead, Washington is planning to store rather than dismantle warheads removed from their delivery vehicles under the agreement, although it has said it will dismantle some warheads and their delivery vehicles. The Bush administration says it wants the flexibility to quickly redeploy warheads in the future to respond to new threats or to guard against a change in strategic relations, e.g. a more hostile relationship with Russia or a growing Chinese threat. To facilitate this flexibility, the Bush administration plans to keep at least 2,400 of the warheads removed under the agreement in a so-called "responsive force," which would mean keeping the warheads in a state that would permit them to be redeployed within weeks, months, or years. This would enable the United States to deploy a total of 4,600 strategic warheads within three years of completion of the agreement's reductions in 2012 if it chose to do so. In addition, the United States will keep several thousand more warheads in lower stages of readiness that could also be redeployed over a longer period of time.

If the United States maintains substantial nuclear reserves, Russia has said it will do the same.

Tactical nuclear weapons do not appear to have been discussed in the current negotiations, and neither side has made public plans to reduce deployed or stockpiled tactical nuclear forces.


5.) How does an agreement on strategic nuclear reductions relate to the threat posed by Russia's vulnerable weapons of mass destruction and related infrastructure?

If the United States maintains substantial warhead reserves, as currently planned, Russia is likely to do the same. But Russia's nuclear complex is far less secure than the United States', so stockpiled weapons and weapons components, including fissile material, pose a substantial, long-term proliferation threat. The United States currently funds programs that help upgrade security at vulnerable Russian nuclear complex sites, but those programs have not yet fully secured many sites viewed as potential proliferation risks. There are significant concerns that terrorists or rogue states could steal or buy nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials from Russia's vast nuclear weapons complex, which reportedly has enough nuclear material available for building another 40,000 nuclear weapons.


6.) Does this possible agreement fulfill President George W. Bush's promise to move the U.S. and Russian relationship beyond "mutual assured destruction"?

No. While the removal of more than 4,000 strategic warheads from their delivery vehicles over the next decade is a welcome step, the United States and Russia will continue to deploy approximately 2,000 strategic warheads each-more than enough warheads for either country to inflict total destruction on the other. This reality is further compounded by the fact that both countries will likely maintain several thousand warheads that could be redeployed and targeted against each other.

Although President Bush has said that the United States should no longer size its nuclear arsenal relative to that of Russia, the Bush administration's retention of thousands of nuclear warheads reveals that this is not the case. No other possible scenarios could warrant the retention of thousands of nuclear warheads except for the mirroring of Russian force levels. In its recent nuclear posture review, the Bush administration stated, "In the event that U.S. relations with Russia significantly worsen in the future, the U.S. may need to revise its nuclear force levels and posture."


7.) How does the nuclear arms agreement that Washington and Moscow are discussing compare to the reductions planned under previous arms control accords?

The 1991 START I deal, which was negotiated by President George H. W. Bush and fully implemented by the United States and Russia last December, limits the two countries to 6,000 deployed strategic warheads each.

The 1993 START II deal, which was signed in the final weeks of the previous Bush administration, called for the reduction of deployed strategic warheads for the United States and Russia from 6,000 warheads each to 3,000-3,500 warheads apiece. The treaty called for these reductions to be completed by 2007. START II, however, has never entered into force and now appears unlikely to do so in the future.

In 1997, Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed to a framework for START III negotiations that included a limit of 2,000-2,500 deployed strategic weapons and "measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads…to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads." START III negotiations were supposed to begin after START II entered into force, which is unlikely to occur.

The Bush administration has suggested counting rules for the agreement currently under negotiation with Russia that would make the proposed 1,700-2,200 limit roughly comparable to the proposed START III limits. For example, the Bush administration does not want to count missiles deployed with submarines undergoing overhaul in port, which the START agreements counted as deployed weapons.


8.) Is it true that previous arms reductions treaties have not required the dismantlement of warheads removed from service?

START I and START II did not require the dismantlement of warheads removed from operational service, but the treaties did require the destruction of delivery vehicles (missiles, submarines, and bombers) removed from service, significantly reducing the ability of either side to quickly redeploy reserve warheads.

The Bush administration, however, says it plans to preserve some delivery vehicles, which would allow warheads removed from service to be quickly redeployed if the United States opts to increase the number of its weapons systems ready for action. By mandating the destruction of delivery vehicles, the START agreements made it more difficult for a country to quickly add to its deployed force level, providing confidence to both the United States and Russia that neither would face a dramatic increase in the other's forces that could jeopardize its own security.


9.) Reports indicate the United States and Russia have disagreed about "counting rules"? What are counting rules and why are they controversial?

How weapons are counted determines the actual impact on deployed forces of any agreement. Russia has sought START I-style counting rules in which warheads are counted according to the maximum capacity of deployed delivery vehicles-missiles, bombers, and submarines. The United States has sought to count only "operationally deployed" strategic warheads, i.e. those warheads that could actually be used shortly after a decision to do so.

Under the U.S. proposal, a missile capable of carrying ten warheads, but deployed with only one, would be counted as one warhead under the agreement. The U.S. proposal would give both sides far more flexibility, since warheads removed from delivery vehicles to meet the agreement's limits could be rapidly redeployed on those delivery vehicles. And without intrusive transparency measures it would be difficult to verify that each side was only arming each missile with the exact number of warheads that it was declaring. This could cause greater uncertainty about how many warheads the other side is actually deploying, lessening the predictability and stability afforded by an arms control agreement.


10.) Will there be an agreement on missile defenses signed at the summit, particularly in light of the fact that the United States will formally withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty on June 13?

President Putin has pressed for limits on future U.S. strategic missile defense deployments, but the Bush administration has said it will not accept constraints on its missile defense programs. The expected summit outcomes on missile defense will likely be minimal. There may be a joint statement outlining possible opportunities for future cooperation on theater missile defenses and possibly a U.S. declaration that its proposed strategic missile defenses are not directed at Russia and do not threaten Moscow's deterrent, even at the proposed lower force levels of 1,700-2,200 deployed strategic warheads.


11.) Some analysts say that Russia's nuclear forces will decline no matter what. If that is true, why should the United States seek an agreement with Russia?

The size of Russia's deployed strategic nuclear arsenal is declining, in large part due to the country's financial woes. This process is likely to accelerate as existing forces reach the end of their service lives in the coming decade. However, Russia could decide to allocate more funds to maintaining its strategic forces, if it deems this a sufficient priority. In addition, Russia could field its remaining forces in ways that undermine U.S. security. For example, it could continue to field destabilizing multiple-warhead land-based missiles, limit bilateral transparency initiatives, and maintain weapons on high alert despite deteriorating early warning systems, thereby increasing the chance of an accidental or mistaken launch.


12.) U.S. and Russian officials are seeking a legally binding agreement that would be submitted to each side's legislature for approval. President Bush said it will be a treaty. What were the options under consideration?

On May 13, President Bush said the agreement would be in treaty form.

There are two types of legally binding international agreements that can be submitted to the U.S. Congress for approval: executive-legislative agreements and treaties. The two options are considered the same under international law, but vary in their domestic approval mechanisms.

An executive-legislative agreement must be approved by a majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. If the two bodies attach different conditions to their approval of the agreement, the two bodies would need to hold negotiations to iron out their differences.

A treaty must be submitted to the Senate for "advice and consent" by a two-thirds majority. Senators Joseph Biden (D-DE) and Jesse Helms (R-NC), the ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote a March 15 letter to the president voicing their preference for a treaty.

# # #

The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies.

For more information on the Bush-Putin summit visit the Association Web site at www.armscontrol.org.

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Media Advisory

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U.S. and Russia at Odds Over Strategic Reductions Agreement

May 2002

By Philipp C. Bleek

Despite months of talks, substantial differences remain between Washington and Moscow over a legally binding accord to codify strategic nuclear force reductions, and it remains unclear whether the two sides will reach agreement by a presidential summit planned for late May.

Both sides have cited progress in the past two months, but more recently talks appear to have bogged down as U.S. officials continue to emphasize flexibility while Russia seeks to negotiate more substantial constraints on each side’s strategic nuclear forces.

President George W. Bush announced last November that the United States would reduce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear forces to 1,700-2,200 warheads by 2012, and Russian President Vladimir Putin subsequently called for reductions of strategic forces to 1,500-2,200 warheads each. Bush initially expressed skepticism about codifying the reductions in a legally binding pact, but Russian officials lobbied hard for such an arrangement and won U.S. agreement in February.

However, in late April both U.S. and Russian officials began to suggest that the two sides might not reach agreement in time for the upcoming summit, scheduled to begin May 23. During an April 29 briefing, a senior U.S. defense official said that reaching agreement by the summit remains “a possibility” but added that whether an agreement is reached “is not necessarily going to be a make or break issue for the summit.”

Similarly, Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgy Mamedov said during an April 24 interview with Russia’s ORT public television that the talks had “made some progress” but noted, “It is too soon yet to declare that we will or will not have a treaty because there are still some differences.”
Both sides have announced that the agreement will have a 10-year duration, meaning that if it entered into force this year it would expire in 2012. A U.S. official close to the negotiations said that when the agreement expires, the two sides would either seek to negotiate a successor pact or agree that no further agreement was necessary.

Washington and Moscow have reached an understanding on some facets of an agreement, but some of the most significant issues appear unresolved. When queried about areas of agreement during an interview, the U.S. official said that the two sides had agreed to pursue a legally binding agreement limiting both sides to between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed warheads each by 2012. But the official noted that Russia is seeking a “specific number” rather than a range.

According to the official, the most significant remaining stumbling block is how to count deployed weapons. Russian negotiators have proposed extending START I counting rules to apply to the new agreement, while the United States has proposed a new concept that would involve simply counting “operationally deployed” warheads, the official said.

Like START I, the Russian approach would limit the number of warheads that could be deployed by restricting the number of delivery vehicles each side may field and by mandating the verifiable dismantlement of excess delivery vehicles. Such an approach would count the maximum number of warheads the missiles and bombers could bear, regardless of how many they were actually deployed with. This would greatly reduce the potential for “uploading” stored warheads and thereby for rapidly increasing the size of deployed forces.

By only counting deployed warheads, the U.S. approach would allow maximum flexibility because it would permit the stockpiling of warheads and thereby preserve the ability to redeploy them rapidly. For example, the United States hopes to meet its reductions commitment by removing warheads from some multiple-warhead missiles, but those warheads could be quickly replaced on the missiles.

Whether and how the two sides will be permitted to store warheads under the new agreement is being addressed within the context of counting rule discussions, according to the U.S. official. The Bush administration has said that in addition to the 2,200 deployed strategic warheads it plans to field by 2012, it will stockpile in operational condition another 2,400 strategic warheads that could be redeployed within weeks, months, and years, with the full 2,400 warhead reserve deployable within three years.

Moscow has long called for nondeployed strategic warheads and delivery vehicles to be dismantled. But Mamedov appeared to indicate new flexibility on this issue when he noted that Moscow had been “satisfied” with the approach taken in previous bilateral strategic arms reduction treaties, under which nondeployed delivery vehicles were destroyed but warheads were stored.

Linking strategic offensive nuclear weapons with strategic defensive capabilities also continues to be a source of disagreement. Citing the impending U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which limits strategic missile defenses, Mamedov said that language on defensive capabilities “should be [a] fundamental provision” of any agreement. But Mamedov also hinted that Russia might be satisfied if language on defenses were incorporated into a separate “declaration of new strategic relations” that the two sides are also discussing.

The U.S. official said that Washington is not prepared to include language on defensive capabilities in the reductions agreement but noted that “there are other ways the Russians could get what they want,” apparently referring to the declaration.

The two sides are also discussing a provision that would supplement the agreement’s six-month-notice withdrawal clause by allowing either side to exceed the pact’s numerical limits if warranted by a change in strategic circumstances. U.S. government sources indicated that the United States is proposing that either side provide 45 days’ notice to the other side before it could exceed the agreement’s limits.

Moscow and Washington have also yet to agree whether the pact will be a treaty or a legislative-executive agreement, according to the U.S. official. Under international law, the two options are the same, but domestically they differ in that the former requires the Senate’s advice and consent while the latter must be passed by both the House and Senate and is subject to conference negotiations if the two legislative bodies disagree. According to the U.S. official, Russian negotiators “have made [a treaty] a matter of principle,” but the issue will not be decided until the two sides can evaluate a more advanced draft.

The official also noted that the agreement will be a “very short text” of only several pages, unlike the lengthy texts of past strategic arms control agreements. A short text is possible because the document can reference past accords, notably START I, and because “the strategic situation has changed” and there is an “increased level of trust” between the two countries, the official said.

U.S. and Russia at Odds Over Strategic Reductions Agreement

The Pressing Need for Tactical Nuclear Weapons Control

Alistair Millar

When Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin meet in Moscow at the end of May to formalize reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, the issue of tactical nuclear weapons control will not be on the agenda, halting a decade-long trend toward increasing constraints on such weapons. President George H. W. Bush and his counterparts in Moscow took steps in 1991 and 1992 to reduce substantially the Cold War deployments of tactical nuclear weapons. In 1997, Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed that tactical nuclear weapons would be addressed in the context of future START III negotiations.

In the post-September 11 world, however, where fears of nuclear terrorism ostensibly top his list of priorities, President Bush has inexplicably dropped the issue of tactical nuclear weapons. John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, has said that the administration is “willing to discuss tactical nukes” with Russia but that tactical nuclear weapons are not a top priority.1 Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith has admitted, “The issue of Russian tactical nuclear weapons…gets very little attention.”2

At the same time, Feith acknowledges that the Russians have “lots of tactical nuclear weapons” that are dangerous from a proliferation standpoint and that there have been news reports that terrorist organizations are actively attempting to procure nuclear weapons from Russia, which has notable problems securing its nuclear forces. President Bush has stated that al Qaeda is seeking nuclear weapons and ways to deliver them against U.S. and other Western targets.

Although further reductions in operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons is a laudable goal, transparency in tactical stockpiles and reductions of tactical nuclear weapons is a more urgent concern from a proliferation standpoint. The Bush administration needs to place tactical nuclear weapons control at the top of the U.S.-Russian agenda, and by ignoring the issue at the upcoming Moscow summit, it is missing an excellent opportunity to do so.

The Danger From Russian Weapons

The definition of “tactical,” or “substrategic,” nuclear weapons is somewhat tenuous and can include many criteria, such as range, yield, target, national ownership, delivery vehicle, and capability. For the most part, tactical nuclear weapons have smaller explosive power than strategic nuclear weapons and are generally intended for “battlefield” use against enemy forces, rather than against enemy cities or strategic nuclear forces. Tactical nuclear weapons include a broad array of devices, from so-called nuclear landmines and nuclear artillery shells to air-dropped or missile-launched nuclear warheads. Their yields can be relatively low (0.1 kiloton), equal to those of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (15-20 kilotons), or very large (1 megaton).3

Tactical nuclear weapons were identified as a separate category of weapon during the Cold War to allow U.S. and Soviet arms control negotiators to concentrate on the larger weapons that they considered more threatening to stability. (In a sense, then, the definition of tactical nuclear weapons can be expanded to include all weapons not covered by the SALT and START agreements.) But the failure of arms control to address tactical nuclear weapons in a treaty belies the threat they pose. Even a “moderately sized” tactical nuclear weapon could destroy a city, and the relative smallness of tactical nuclear weapons—and therefore their relative portability—increases their vulnerability to theft by terrorists. Even in the hands of state militaries, tactical nuclear weapons are more susceptible to unauthorized or accidental use than strategic weapons—they are often deployed near the front line; they are far more sensitive to communications problems under crisis conditions; and they can be fired by a soldier in the field without going through the stringent safety precautions that govern the launch of strategic nuclear weapons.

For these reasons, when the Soviet Union began to disintegrate in late 1991 following an aborted coup, the fate of its tactical nuclear arsenal was of great concern. To prevent these weapons from falling into the hands of rogue states or individuals in the Soviet republics, the elder President Bush announced the unilateral reduction of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons and proposed that the Russians respond in kind. The Soviet Union under Gorbachev, and then Russia under Yeltsin, reciprocated by agreeing to reduce the Soviet/Russian tactical nuclear arsenal.

The reductions under the so-called presidential nuclear initiatives of 1991 and 1992 have been significant. An estimated 3,050 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were to be eliminated under the 1991 and 1992 initiatives.4 Currently, the U.S. tactical nuclear arsenal contains approximately 1,670 warheads. Of these, about 180 are land-based, substrategic nuclear gravity bombs stored at 10 bases in seven European countries.5 Although exact figures are not available, it is believed that since 1992 Russia has reduced the number of tactical nuclear warheads it deploys by as many as 18,000—either by removing them from service and storing them in central facilities or by dismantling them.6 The reductions were defined by Yeltsin as the elimination of all army tactical nuclear weapons; one-third of naval tactical nuclear weapons; half of all air force tactical nuclear weapons; and half of all air defense tactical nuclear weapons. Other weapons removed from deployment were to be transferred and placed in central storage facilities, provided that the United States did the same.7

However, Moscow’s reductions have not been transparent, fueling concerns about the extent to which Russia actually fulfilled its pledges under the initiatives, how many tactical nuclear weapons remain, and how they are stored. There have been occasional, vague announcements from Russian officials about progress made, but Western experts and officials rightly see the lack of information on the location and safety of these weapons as a serious security problem. Without reliable data on the vast number of Soviet-era tactical weapons, no one can be sure if any have fallen, or are in danger of falling, into the wrong hands.

The “loose nuke” problem in Russia has, of course, been a source of concern for some time, but viewed through the prism of the September 11 attacks, Russia’s lax nuclear security is even more troubling. For example, Colonel General Yevgeniy P. Maslin, chief of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, which is responsible for nuclear munitions, claimed in 1996 that theft from Russian nuclear weapons facilities is “impossible.” But he qualified his statement by noting that during transport Russia’s nuclear weapons could be vulnerable to theft by criminals or terrorist groups. Maslin expressed concern about the potential theft of nuclear weapons by insiders, rhetorically asking, “What if such acts were to be undertaken by people who have worked with nuclear weapons in the past? For example, by people dismissed from our structures, social malcontents, embittered individuals?”8

As defense analyst Matthew Bunn has pointed out, Russia’s security problem stems partly from its communist past in which Russia had “a closed society; closed borders; pampered, well-cared-for nuclear workers; everyone under close surveillance by the KGB. Now, it’s largely the same security system having to face a world with an open society; open borders; rampant theft; crime; corruption; desperate, unpaid nuclear workers. It’s a totally different situation that the system was never designed to address.”9 In a February 2002 report, the CIA explained, “The [Russian nuclear weapons] security system was designed in the Soviet era to protect weapons primarily against a threat from outside the country and may not be sufficient to meet today’s challenge of a knowledgeable insider collaborating with a criminal or terrorist group.”10

These concerns about the security of Russian nuclear weapons are compounded for tactical nuclear weapons because of their size and because Moscow’s haste to move its tactical force from a variety of Soviet republics into Russia in the early 1990s led to poor accounting of the number and location of those weapons. It is possible that even the relevant high-level officials in Moscow have no idea how many tactical nuclear weapons there are on Russian territory.

As Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) stated in an October 1997 hearing, “No one in the West, and few in Russia, know for sure whether dozens of small nuclear weapons, ideal for terrorist use, are unaccounted for and perhaps in the wrong hands. The important point is that increases in crime, corruption, incompetence, and institutional decay are so advanced in Russia that the theft of nuclear weapons, unthinkable in the Soviet war machine of the Cold War, seems entirely plausible in the Russia of today. The mere possibility that terrorists or rogue states may have acquired some Russian nuclear weapons should be a matter of gravest concern to the governments of the West.”

Recent Efforts

Since the presidential nuclear initiatives, further efforts to control tactical nuclear weapons have been largely unsuccessful despite an apparent U.S. and NATO desire to address the problem. According to the Congressional Research Service, “Some in the United States would like further restrictions on Russian tactical nuclear weapons both because they believe these might pose a proliferation risk and because Russia has a far greater number of these weapons than does the United States.”11 NATO has openly expressed its concerns about the large number of Russian “tactical nuclear weapons of all types” and has called upon Russia “to bring to completion” the reductions in these forces that were announced in the 1991 and 1992 presidential nuclear initiatives.12

In fact, NATO proposed a set of transparency measures in a December 2000 report that was part of an internal review of NATO’s nuclear weapons policies. The NATO report had more to say on the issue of Russian substrategic nuclear weapons than any public document previously released by NATO. Noting “the extensive Russian nuclear arsenal,” the report called for “specific CSBM [confidence- and security-building measures] proposals to enhance mutual trust and to promote greater openness and transparency on nuclear weapons and safety issues,” including the “exchange [of] data on U.S. and Russian sub-strategic nuclear forces.”

More recently, the final communiqué from the NATO foreign ministers meeting in December 2001 noted that NATO and Russia are intensifying their cooperation on “non-proliferation, export control and arms control matters, arms transparency and confidence building measures.” At the defense ministers meeting later that month, NATO announced that it had reached agreement with Russia on the need for dialogue on nuclear weapons safety and security issues, noting that such an exchange would be a “constructive development toward improved transparency, predictability and growing mutual trust between NATO and Russia in this important field.”

These proposals and agreements, however, have not achieved many tangible results in large part because tactical nuclear forces continue to be viewed as essential security guarantees in both Europe and Russia.

Although the collapse of the Soviet Union and the core threat to NATO that it embodied enabled radical reductions in substrategic forces in Europe, the political significance attached to the remaining weapons has remained essentially the same as during the Cold War. Indeed, despite the seeming lack of a military rationale for these weapons given Russia’s current conventional weakness, the European-based U.S. tactical nuclear arsenal possesses a strong symbolic value for the European defense establishment that should not be underestimated.

NATO maintains that it depends heavily on widespread participation in nuclear roles by its European members. For example, the final communiqué of a NATO working group on nuclear weapons said that NATO will continue “widespread participation in nuclear roles and peacetime basing by Allies. Sub-strategic nuclear forces committed to NATO continue to provide the necessary political and military link to NATO’s strategic nuclear forces and an important demonstration of Alliance solidarity.”13 For the alliance, the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on European soil ensures that allies on both sides of the Atlantic are sharing the risk and the burden associated with NATO’s nuclear mission. Withdrawal of these forces would weaken the value of the alliance substantially because the European members want both a tactical and a strategic nuclear umbrella to be part of NATO’s defenses.

Russia’s reluctance to restrict further its tactical arsenal stems more from demonstrable military need. Russia’s economic straits have made the cost of maintaining conventional military hardware and supporting personnel unmanageable, and Russia’s military may be further stressed by future rounds of NATO expansion. Russia has sought to make up for the qualitative and quantitative deficiencies in its military forces by, in 1993, officially abandoning its pledge not to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict and, in 2000, placing increased emphasis on the combat role its tactical nuclear arsenal would play in a defense of Russia. Russian defense analysts have articulated a number of roles for tactical nuclear weapons, including compensating for weaknesses of conventional forces brought on by economic retraction, serving as placeholders of Russian status and prestige in the post-Cold War world, preventing regional conflicts, and serving as deterrents against strategic escalation.14

Progress between NATO and Russia on tactical nuclear weapons has thus been slow because each side considers its remaining weapons to have value. While NATO insists on maintaining some tactical nuclear forces in Europe, the Kremlin has repeatedly asserted that it will not consider negotiations to control its tactical nuclear arsenal if the United States will not remove its nuclear weapons from Europe. As NATO expands eastward toward the Russian border, Moscow is also anxious about the deployment of NATO nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states. In addition to demanding the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe, Russia has continually refused to enter into talks on tactical nuclear weapons until NATO formally agrees not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.

Further difficulties stem from the recent U.S. push to redesign or develop new models of nuclear weapons. For example, Paul Robinson, director of Sandia National Laboratories, has argued that “nuclear weapons do have a place and a purpose today.” He suggested development of what he called a “To Whom It May Concern” force for use against nations or subnational entities.15 The Bush administration’s nuclear posture review calls for “greater flexibility” in nuclear forces and its 2003 budget requests $15.5 million for cost and feasibility studies of a “robust nuclear earth-penetrator” that could destroy deeply buried or hardened underground targets, such as bunkers and bomb shelters.

In Russia, although there have been debates about the military role of tactical nuclear weapons in recent years, no drive to modernize nonstrategic nuclear weapons has been publicized, and it is difficult to conclude that research is being conducted in this direction. However, there have been reports that Russian officials are mimicking the U.S. call for low-yield weapons to threaten underground targets,16 and U.S. efforts in this area will not serve to make Russia’s tactical arsenal less important to its military.

A Way Forward

Although there is no confirmed evidence that tactical nuclear weapons are missing or have been stolen by terrorists, poor data and lack of transparency concerning Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons makes the issue of tracking and preventing theft more complicated. It is imperative that the United States and NATO gain verifiable information about the quantity, security, and safety of these weapons to assess the threat accurately and take steps to prevent their proliferation.

Despite the Bush administration’s reticence to address tactical nuclear weapons and the less-than-outstanding success of NATO’s transparency initiatives, the improving relationship between Russia and the West provides an opportunity to make progress on tactical nuclear weapons. Statements by Putin in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks suggest a greater willingness to accept NATO expansion, and in late 2001 NATO and Russia announced that they had “decided to give new impetus and substance to our partnership, with the goal of creating a new council to bring together NATO member states and Russia to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at 20.” Building NATO-Russian relations and cultivating a common sense of purpose in the campaign against terrorism could generate a level of confidence between both parties necessary to tackle the issue of tactical nuclear weapons.

To gain Moscow’s acquiescence in its last round of expansion, NATO offered Russia the “Founding Act” and the Permanent Joint Council, which set up a consultative mechanism for “cooperation, joint decision-making and joint action” on security issues, including arms control and nuclear safety between NATO and Russia. In response to Russian concerns about the possible nuclear roles of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, NATO said it had “no intention, no plan and no reason” to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members of the alliance. Given Russian concerns about further enlargement, NATO could offer additional palliatives, including an adjustment to the symbolic reliance on NATO nuclear weapons and a more enhanced role for the Permanent Joint Council on nuclear issues.

Of course, even in such a cooperative atmosphere, difficult problems will have to be addressed. Past discussions on tactical nuclear weapons control have broken down over the U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe. The argument for maintaining these weapons in Europe is difficult to justify from a military standpoint, but some European governments attach exaggerated political importance to maintaining tactical nuclear weapons on their soil. A U.S. offer to withdraw these weapons could help to jump-start negotiations with Russia on accounting for and reducing its arsenal.

Other steps could be taken without getting bogged down on the question of withdrawing nuclear weapons from Europe. For example, NATO could offer to disclose to Russia the exact number and location of stored and deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as a voluntary transparency measure and could offer to provide technical and financial assistance to help Russia account for its tactical nuclear weapons. Such steps would provide the West with vital information about Russia’s weapons and allow the United States and NATO to prevent proliferation better. It would have the added advantage of enabling Russia and the United States to demonstrate progress toward their commitments to increase transparency under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

There are also near-term, bilateral opportunities for the United States and Russia to address control of tactical nuclear weapons. If Washington is serious about working with the Russians to prevent nuclear terrorism, it could put the issue of reducing tactical nuclear arsenals back on the table at the Moscow summit. Russia is concerned about the breakout potential of Washington’s newly proposed “responsive force” and is therefore seeking verifiable and irreversible reductions in strategic warheads. Given concerns about the lack of basic information about Russian tactical nuclear weapons, the United States should offer to destroy rather than store its downloaded weapons in exchange for a Russian agreement to provide transparency concerning excess nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

The United States and Russia have made progress in controlling these weapons under less favorable circumstances over the past decade. Sweeping an entire class of nuclear weapons under the rug perpetuates an unnecessary security risk and will not remove unwanted relics from a budding post-Cold War relationship. At the very least, the issue of tactical nuclear weapons should be put back on the agenda and discussed in an effort to build trust and confidence.


NOTES
1. “Expounding Bush’s Approach to U.S. Nuclear Security: An Interview With John R. Bolton,” Arms Control Today, March 2002.
2. Douglas J. Feith, “Breakfast Meeting in Washington, D.C. With the Defense Writers Group,” February 20, 2002.
3. For an overview of world tactical nuclear weapons munitions and delivery systems, see “Appendix: Types, Delivery Systems and Locations of TNWs,” in William Potter et al., Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Options for Control (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000).
4. Joshua Handler, “The September 1991 PNIs and the Elimination, Storing and Security Aspects of TNWs,” presentation for “Time to Control Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” hosted by UNIDIR et al., United Nations, September 24, 2001.
5. Handler, “The September 1991 PNIs”; Martin Butcher, Otfried Nassauer, and Stephen Young, “Nuclear Futures: Western European Options for Nuclear Risk Reduction,” BASIC/BITS Research Report, December 1998.
6. According to Alexei Arbatov, member of the Russian Duma, “Whereas in 1991 the USSR had about 22,000 tactical nuclear weapons, at present Russia retains around 3,800….” Alexei Arbatov, “Deep Cuts and De-alerting: A Russian Perspective,” in Harold Feiveson, ed., The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC.: Brookings Institution, 1999), p. 320.
7. Handler, “The September 1991 PNIs.”
8. Graham H. Turbiville, “Russian Officer Admits Concerns Over Nuclear Theft,” Special Warfare, January 1996.
9. Tony Wesolowsky, “Russia: Nuclear Security Poses Challenges,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 8, 2001.
10. Central Intelligence Agency, Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces, February 2002.
11. Amy F. Woolf, “Nuclear Weapons in Russia: Safety, Security and Control Issues,” Congressional Research Service, December 5, 2001.
12. NATO Ministerial Meetings of the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, Final Communiqué, June 12, 1997.
13. Final communiqué of a meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group of the North Atlantic Alliance, October 17-18, 1991. www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911018a.htm.
14. Nikolai Sokov, “The Advantages and Pitfalls of Non-Negotiated Arms Reductions: The Case of Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Disarmament Diplomacy, December 1997; David S. Yost, “Russia and Arms Control for Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces,” in Jeff Larsen and Kurt Klingenberger, eds., Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities, (Colorado Springs: U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, 2001).
15. C. Paul Robinson, “A White Paper: Pursuing a New Nuclear Weapons Policy for the 21st Century,” Sandia National Laboratories, March 2001.
16. Pavel Felgenhauer, “Bomb Makers’ Trade Union,” The Moscow Times, March 14, 2002, p. 9.


Alistair Millar is vice president of the Fourth Freedom Forum and director of its Washington office.

 

U.S., Russia Agree to Codify Nuclear Reductions

Philipp C. Bleek

U.S. and Russian officials announced in February that they have agreed to work toward a formal agreement codifying strategic nuclear cuts that will be subject to approval by their respective legislatures, and they provided more details on the possible terms of such an accord.

Speaking to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 5, Secretary of State Colin Powell said that the United States and Russia are working to reach a “legally binding” agreement on strategic nuclear cuts. Indicating that the specific form of the agreement remains undecided, Powell said, “It can be an executive agreement that both houses of Congress might wish to speak on, or it might be a treaty.”

The secretary’s comments marked the first time the administration has said it would codify the nuclear reductions first announced by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin in November. (See ACT, December 2001.) Previously, administration officials, including Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, had repeatedly voiced an aversion to what they characterized as Cold War-style arms control treaties.

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Alexander Yakovenko echoed Powell’s remarks in a February 27 statement, saying that the “treaty” on strategic arms reductions would have “a legally binding character” and would be submitted “for the consideration of [both countries’] legislative bodies.”

In a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing February 28, Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI) asked Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, who had just returned from Moscow, about Yakovenko’s reference to a “treaty.” Feith replied that negotiators had agreed to a “legally binding” arrangement but had yet to decide whether it would be a treaty or an “executive-legislative agreement.” The latter has the status of a treaty in international law but must be approved by a majority vote in both houses of Congress rather than by a two-thirds vote in the Senate, the approval mechanism for a treaty.

In a statement to the committee two weeks earlier, Feith had testified that U.S. officials are “perfectly open, if we can achieve an agreement that warrants it, to have it be a treaty,” but he had also said that “we see no reason to try to dictate the size and composition of Russia’s strategic forces by legal means.” Feith further indicated that because “new dangers” are likely to emerge, “we do not believe it is prudent to set in stone the level and type of U.S. nuclear capabilities.”

Feith had also reaffirmed some of Powell’s statements, saying the administration is considering “multiple agreements” with Moscow covering strategic reductions, transparency and predictability, and military cooperation, including on missile defenses.

More Details Provided

Officials from Washington and Moscow have also provided new information on an agreement’s likely composition. Yakovenko indicated in his statement that the United States and Russia had agreed to a “duration” of 10 years for the pact, that it would be “based on the verification mechanisms” of START I, and that the agreement would be “supplemented with new transparency and confidence measures with respect to nuclear warheads.”

When asked February 5 if a new agreement with Russia would include START II’s verification provisions and ban on multiple-warhead ICBMs, Powell had repeated previous statements that Moscow and Washington are considering how to “bring forward” START I verification and transparency provisions, and he indicated that the administration was also considering “how to deal with START II.”

Powell also said that Bush had told his Russian counterpart that if he wants to add multiple warheads to missiles, as Putin had threatened to do if the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, he could “go ahead.” Powell noted that relations between Moscow and Washington are now under a “different framework,” whereby “you do what you have to do to defend yourself, we’ll do what we have to do to defend ourselves.”

U.S.-Russian talks on an agreement have been underway since January. John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, met with his Russian counterpart, Georgy Mamedov, February 19 but noted at a subsequent press conference that the two sides may not reach agreement by May, when Bush and Putin are scheduled to meet for a summit. A State Department official indicated February 20 that further talks are likely “in a couple weeks” but that no date has yet been set.

Despite apparent agreement on key issues, substantive differences have yet to be resolved. Yakovenko indicated in his February 27 statement that “a number of serious outstanding issues still remain.” Most importantly, he indicated, the two sides must agree on “real, not virtual strategic arms reductions,” a clear criticism of Washington’s plan to stockpile rather than dismantle warheads removed from operation.


U.S., Russia Complete START I Reductions

Philipp C. Bleek

The United States and Russia completed nuclear weapons reductions required by the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) on December 5, seven years after the accord entered into force.

Under the treaty, the two countries have reduced their strategic nuclear arsenals by more than 40 percent over the past decade, decommissioning more than 4,000 strategic warheads since exchanging baseline stockpile information in September 1990. Reductions were implemented under a comprehensive monitoring and verification regime that included periodic information exchanges and intrusive monitoring and inspection provisions.

The accord requires Washington and Moscow to deploy no more than 1,600 long-range missiles and strategic bombers and caps deployed strategic warheads at 6,000, using rules that slightly undercount the number of warheads actually deployed. In addition, the countries must meet sublimits on ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Signed by Presidents George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in July 1991, START I was the first treaty to substantially reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the United States and Soviet Union. The accord built on the first strategic arms pact between the two superpowers, an interim agreement that emerged from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in the early 1970s and capped—but did not reduce—the countries’ arsenals.

Shortly before leaving office, Bush also signed a START II agreement with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in January 1993. That agreement would have reduced U.S. and Russian arsenals to 3,500 deployed strategic warheads by 2007, but it has not entered into force, largely due to disagreements over U.S. national missile defense efforts.

In 1997 the United States and Russia also agreed to a framework for START III negotiations, which would have reduced the two sides’ strategic arsenals to 2,500 warheads by 2007. Under the framework, the two parties also agreed to consider measures to destroy their downloaded warheads and to increase the transparency of their strategic nuclear warhead inventories.

START I does not require the destruction of nuclear warheads removed from delivery vehicles; the United States and Russia have stockpiled substantial numbers of warheads as a result. Washington’s strategic and tactical warhead “hedge” is currently estimated at more than 5,000 warheads, while Moscow is estimated to have stockpiled more than 13,000 warheads.

The accord also does not cover nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The United States currently deploys an estimated 200-400 nuclear gravity bombs in Europe and stores, in operational condition, more than 1,000 additional tactical nuclear weapons. Experts estimate that Russia deploys about 3,500 tactical nuclear weapons.

The other three START I parties—Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—all met their treaty obligations well in advance of the implementation deadline. These three states inherited nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union dissolved, only five months after START I had been signed. Under a May 1992 agreement, these states agreed to become parties to START I and to transfer all their nuclear warheads to Russia, a process completed by 1996. However, the three states retained most of the warheads’ strategic delivery vehicles—including both bombers and ICBMs—which the United States has helped them to destroy.

START I will remain in effect until December 5, 2009, during which time the treaty parties can request challenge inspections of suspect activity. The treaty parties also have the option to extend the accord for successive five-year periods if the treaty has not been superceded by another arms reduction agreement.


U.S., Russia to Discuss Strategic Reductions

In Moscow on December 10, Secretary of State Colin Powell said that the United States and Russia would seek to “formalize” an agreement to lower strategic nuclear weapons levels.

At a briefing in Brussels a week later, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov added that the two sides had agreed to begin discussing “radical reductions of strategic offensive weapons” at the “expert level” in January.

According to Ivanov, the discussions will cover the depth of the reductions, their time frame, and the issues of verification and transparency. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov will initially lead the talks, which will reportedly begin January 26 in Washington.

President George W. Bush pledged November 13 to reduce deployed U.S. strategic nuclear forces to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads over the next 10 years. Russian President Vladimir Putin promised to try to “respond in kind,” and one month later, he indicated he had a range of 1,500-2,200 in mind.

Putin has repeatedly called for the negotiation of a formal arms control pact to codify the reductions. Bush initially appeared averse to formal negotiations, but recent statements by key Washington officials indicate that some sort of binding compact is possible. And senior U.S. officials have recently indicated that an agreement to extend START I and START II verification provisions to cover the planned reductions is under discussion with Moscow.

It remains unclear whether the Bolton-Mamedov talks will aim to negotiate an arms control treaty or whether they will try to agree on an informal arrangement. When asked about the possibility of a formal treaty, U.S. officials have continued to emphasize that all options remain under consideration. A Moscow summit between Bush and Putin is planned for late spring or early summer and could serve as the target date for the signing of an agreement.

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