

ACA NEWSLETTER

ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

The ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION

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This newsletter, the first since the Arms Control Association began full operations on January 1, takes the form of a general outline of the objectives and programs of the ACA, as its Board of Directors presently views them. Subsequent newsletters will report on current activities in arms control and disarmament with special emphasis on critical issues of the moment.

A TIME OF TRANSITION

The world of the 1970s is much changed from that of the late 1940s and 1950s when the Cold War began. Recent dramatic events—the entry of Great Britain into the Common Market, major international economic realignments, the continuing emergence of Japan and Europe as major economic and political entities, the dramatic awakening of Americans to the reality of China with President Nixon's journey there in February, all underscore the rapidity and the extent of the changes that are taking place.

Another event of great importance will soon occur when the President travels to Moscow at the end of May and, it is hoped, announces the achievement of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, the result of three years of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in Helsinki and Vienna.

It would be premature, and overly euphoric, to declare that the Cold War is over, but it is certainly clear that the bipolar confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union that characterized international politics over much of the last 25 years has given way to a world of multipolar competition and cooperation. President Nixon took note of this changed reality earlier this year when he said in a *Time* magazine interview:

It is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitor that the danger of war arises . . . I think it will be a safer and a better world if we have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance.

The President, in his trips to China and the Soviet Union, is showing in a dramatic fashion that political realities in the world have changed greatly. If the assumptions on which our foreign and military policies are based are changing, our concepts of the use of force and of the requirements for military forces must keep pace with these changing realities. Otherwise we continue to look backward and to resist pressures for change in ways and with results which we can ill afford.

Some commentators and military planners have been slow to welcome this development, however; their counsel may delay or inhibit the extent and type of adjustment to new realities that will be needed in meeting the critical social, economic, and political needs of the '70s, and in taking a fresh look at national security requirements.

It is in this last context that the Arms Control Association will concentrate, seeking to inspire a reassessment by the American people and their leaders of the role of arms control and disarmament as integral elements of national security—perhaps the most urgent and critical among the many priority issues requiring attention. They are urgent because the continued development of nuclear arsenals far beyond our needs potentially threatens the survival of mankind. They are critical because so long as the resources of this country and others engaged in an armaments race are applied to the continuation of that race they inhibit the prospects for orderly and peaceful economic growth.

FIRST SALT AGREEMENT IN SIGHT: SALT II IMPERATIVE

The Arms Control Association strongly supports and encourages the moves of the Nixon administration to negotiate meaningful limitations to the strategic arms competition between this country and the Soviet Union, now apparently about to result in a first-stage SALT agreement. It is deplorable that the delays in starting the talks since agreement to begin them was reached in 1968, and the slow pace of negotiations since then, have permitted many undesirable advances in weapons development by both sides while the talks have been going on. Now, inevitable pressures are developing to restrain the administration from moving for further restraints on the arms race beyond even those limited measures that the initial SALT agreement is likely to bring about. Unless resisted these pressures could even nullify the benefit of any SALT limitation by bringing about the continuation of other arms programs. It is therefore critically important to view the outcome of the current negotiations as only the first step toward far more stringent and meaningful arms limitations. An overall objective of balanced, general strategic weapons disarmament must be the ultimate goal.

As the date of President Nixon's journey to Moscow approaches the general outline of the anticipated SALT agreement is becoming clearer. Although specific details may change, at this writing it appears that the President is likely to bring home from Moscow the text of a treaty, which would require Senate approval, limiting the number of antiballistic missiles (ABMs) deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union to somewhere between 100 and 300, and some sort of agreement, probably not a treaty, placing a numerical upper limit, although no qualitative controls, on offensive land-based strategic missiles. It is unlikely that any agreement will be reached on limiting submarine-launched missiles, although efforts presumably will be continuing to include them in an overall missile limitation.

During the three years of negotiations both sides have been busily increasing their nuclear armaments, in ways that have not contributed to increased security. Of particular concern has been the U.S. deployment of MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles). It is not clear why the President did not take the advice of arms control experts, including his General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, as far back as 1969 to forego the deployment of MIRV before it had begun, or to place top priority on some kind of MIRV restriction as well as limitations on ABMs. Until very recently, it appeared that fear of a Russian MIRV lay at the root of his Defense officials' concern about the future. Yet the U.S. MIRV program has continued and a Soviet MIRV program will undoubtedly eventually come about unless ways of halting the programs of both sides are found.

But even without controls on MIRVs, the ABM limitations expected to be announced in May are significant. They do indeed remove the military justification for proceeding with such destabilizing offensive weapons developments as MIRV, and provide a strong note of urgency to the need to move ahead rapidly toward further agreement on more restrictive limitations on qualitative

THE ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION

1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Suite 503 - Washington, D.C.
(202) 265-0700

The Arms Control Association is a nonpartisan national membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of effective policies and programs in arms control and disarmament. Formed in 1971 by a group of concerned individuals with extensive experience in the fields of arms control, disarmament, and national security policy, the Association seeks to create broad public appreciation of the need for positive steps toward the limitation of armaments and the implementation of other measures to reduce international tensions on the road to world peace.

The Association will pursue its objectives through programs of research on theoretical and practical questions of arms control; through a publications program to keep its members and other interested persons abreast of developments in the field; through a program of public education involving meetings, publications, and other media; and by making the technical knowledge and advice at its disposal available, on request, on the broadest possible basis to appropriate officials of the Executive Branch and the Congress.

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advances in the strategic arms race. SALT I must move into SALT II.

Indeed, unless further restrictions are agreed upon, it is entirely possible that the SALT I negotiations will have produced a situation worse than would have occurred had there been no negotiations at all.

There are two concerns in particular that must be borne in mind. First, the "bargaining chip." Many advocates of a tough negotiating stance at SALT over the past three years have argued that the continued deployment of the Safeguard ABM, despite growing evidence of its ineffectiveness, was required as a "bargaining chip" to force the Russians to negotiate. When the Russians did so, it was suggested that only U.S. insistence on the "bargaining chip" kept their feet to the fire. In the same manner, hope of negotiating further restrictions on other weapons programs such as the new B-1 bomber or ULMS submarine may in turn result in pressure to continue deploying those weapons, even if there is no

immediate military justification for them; indeed, the Department of Defense is now requesting nearly a billion dollars for preliminary work on ULMS this year.

The "bargaining chip" tactic also has had the effect of diminishing, if not eliminating, Congressional criticism of proposed weapons programs. Congressional skeptics, never as well equipped with technical detail as DOD protagonists, may have been made still more reluctant to ask searching questions about the need for new weapons programs (questions which might have benefited both advocates and opponents) by the fear that their opposition might hinder SALT negotiations or could be used as an excuse for any possible failure in those negotiations.

Second, the existence of *quantitative* controls on some weapons systems—numerical limits on ABMs and land-based offensive missiles—will undoubtedly provide enormous incentives to go all out on a *qualitative* arms race and on the procurement of those non-prohibited weapons systems, whether or not the "bargaining chip" argument is advanced. The argument will be made that if we are to be required to limit the numbers of land-based missiles, for example, we must make the ones we have as sophisticated as possible by incorporating in them many MIRVs and other refinements, and by building bombers, submarines, and other weapons not prohibited by the agreement, regardless of the military necessity for them.

Thus, while welcoming the advances brought about by the administration thus far at SALT, the Arms Control Association deplores the long delay in achieving concrete results, while weapons have continued to pile up on both sides, and sees an urgent need for immediate and continuing follow-on negotiations to make these preliminary agreements worth while. Among the desirable further steps for early consideration are the following:

1. A moratorium on further qualitative and quantitative strategic weapons construction; so long as negotiations go forward there should be no construction of new "bargaining chips."

2. Reopened negotiations towards a treaty to extend the 1963 test ban to include all underground tests. An immediate halt to all testing while negotiations continue. ACA believes a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty can now be safely agreed to by the United States without the need for on-site inspections (see further discussion below).

3. A limitation on further missile flight testing. This would inhibit the deployment of improved MIRVs by the United States and prevent the development of MIRVs by the Soviet Union (and would thus of course be extremely difficult to negotiate, but nevertheless a most desirable objective).

4. Restrictions on certain anti-submarine warfare developments. As long as mutual deterrence remains the mainstay of Soviet and United States defense postures, the continued invulnerability of the missile launching submarines on each side is critical. Thus, mutually agreed measures which will perpetuate that deterrence will be in the net security interest of both.

5. A reduction in the numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. An initial reduction of at least 30 percent across-the-board in all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles would in no way inhibit the security of either the United States or the Soviet Union, and would in some respects enhance it. A 30 per cent reduction was advocated by the United States a decade ago when force levels were considerably smaller than they are today.

The foregoing are only representative of perhaps a much longer list of inhibitions which might be imposed by treaty or other agreement on both sides to enhance mutual security. As the shape of the May SALT agreement becomes clearer, we will report further on these and other elements of a proposed road map that might be followed after SALT. Obviously, many of these proposals will be difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate in the near term. Some are more suitable for multilateral negotiations than continued U.S.—Soviet bilateral talks. A study of these and other proposals for follow-on negotiations, carried out by Herbert Scoville, Jr., under the joint auspices of the Arms Control Association and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was published in the April 1972 issue of *Foreign Affairs*.

ACA'S EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Since January 1 Thomas A. Halsted has served as ACA's Executive Director. Halsted, 38, comes to the Association from Capitol Hill where he was National Director for four years for the Council for a Livable World and later Legislative Assistant to Senator Alan Cranston (D-Calif). Prior to his service at CLW he was a staff member of the ACDA and earlier served in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. In addition to serving as ACA's chief administrative officer, Halsted is also Arms Control Program Director for the Carnegie Endowment.



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BACKLASH GENERATED BY PROSPECTS OF SALT AGREEMENT

It is painful for any people to accept a need for major change. Our military policies for a generation—over 25 years—have been based essentially on the continuation of two-power confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. As the obsolescence of that concept becomes apparent we should be adjusting our military policies to keep pace with adjustments being made in our political and economic policies. But old habits die hard; while pressures to move too precipitously away from older policies may exist, pressures not to move at all are still strong. It is not surprising, therefore, that powerful and influential elements in American society are working hard to deny that changes have occurred in the international political structure and to prevent a readjustment of the ways in which this country can move to meet these changing realities.

Thus, as prospects for a SALT treaty grow, a predictable wave of opposition to it is growing too, taking the form of adverse radio commentary, critical editorials and columns in small-town newspapers, and full-page advertisements sponsored by prominent businessmen in their local communities—all stressing these themes or variations on them:

- The United States is losing or has already lost the arms race to the Soviet Union;
- The U.S.S.R. is using SALT as a cover for obtaining arms superiority over the United States;
- If the U.S.S.R. gains nuclear superiority over the United States it will be tempted (and presumably it will not be able to resist this temptation) to use such superiority as a club to force us to grant political concessions, "just as our nuclear superiority forced the Russians to back down in Cuba in 1962;"
- Political figures, particularly any and all peace candidates, are at best naive and at worst willfully trying to sell our nation's security down the river.

Frequently the names of prominent retired generals and admirals and former diplomats have been used to lend the campaign further authenticity.

One organization, the Institute for American Strategy, has for some months been advertising its plans to put on a half hour television program, outlining in detail the supposed erosion of the nation's security. The Institute is mailing computer letters widely in an effort to raise funds—nearly half a million dollars—for the broadcast.

It is distressing to see exaggerated charges cropping up with such frequency, and it is dangerous to let them go unanswered.

The Secretary of Defense, surprisingly, has provided in recent months perhaps the most authoritative facts in rebuttal. Mr. Laird has testified that the rate at which the Soviet Union is increasing the number of its missiles and submarines and the amount of deliverable megatonnage (the usual measuring rod for illustrating the growing "gap") is more than offset by the rate at which the United States, through its MIRV programs, is increasing the number of

nuclear warheads it can deliver on targets in the U.S.S.R. The following table, based on his current Defense Posture Statement, tells the tale:

STRATEGIC FORCE COMPARISONS

<u>Strategic Delivery Vehicles</u>	<u>November 1, 1971</u>		<u>Mid-1972</u>	
	<u>USSR</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>US</u>
ICBM Launchers	1520*	1054	1550*	1054
SLBM Launch Tubes	475	656	580	656
Heavy Bombers	140	565	140	531

<u>Deliverable Nuclear Warheads</u>	<u>Mid-1971</u>		<u>Mid-1972</u>	
	<u>2100</u>	<u>4700</u>	<u>2500</u>	<u>5700</u>

*Includes SS-11s at MR/IRBM complexes, which may not be targetted on U.S.

Those commentators who decry a growing U.S. inferiority stress the Soviet buildup in delivery vehicles reflected in the top three lines; but it is the *bottom* line—the growing U.S. lead in deliverable warheads—that counts.

From the above figures, it is clearly misleading to assert, as many of the pessimistic commentaries do, that the Russians are accelerating the strategic arms race while we are standing still. The fact is, as the Secretary of Defense points out, that while the Soviet Union continues building missile-launching submarines and deploying land-based missiles (at a much more modest rate than Secretary Laird has been predicting, incidentally), the United States has managed to outstrip it over the past year by a factor of more than two to one. The Russians will have added 400 deliverable warheads to their arsenal between July 1, 1971 and June 30, 1972, but the United States will have added 1,000. Furthermore, the U.S. advantage will continue to grow as MIRV deployment programs progress. MIRVs are presently being deployed on Minuteman III ICBMs (three per missile) and Poseidon submarine-launched missiles (about ten MIRVs per missile). Both Secretary Laird and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Moorer have acknowledged that the Soviet Union has not yet tested a MIRV and does not have any of them deployed. Recent testimony by Laird and his Research Director, Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., has established that the growth of large Soviet SS-9 missiles, with MIRVs, which had once been feared as a threat to the survivability of the U.S. Minuteman ICBM force, is now not likely to materialize for many years, if ever.

Secretary Laird's figures provide clear evidence that the United States is not falling behind in the arms race; most importantly, they underscore once again the urgency of achieving the means of bringing it to a halt.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTB)

ACA is convinced that a treaty banning all nuclear weapons testing should be given first priority in the current session of the Geneva Disarmament Talks.

At that forum the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have come under increasing criticism for their continued unwillingness to discuss the issue seriously.

ACA believes the time has come for the United States to drop its long-standing insistence on on-site inspection and to acknowledge that a world in which no one is testing is far more secure than one in which this part of the arms race continues.

To facilitate progress toward a test ban ACA further calls upon both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to suspend all nuclear testing while negotiations go forward.

The United States has maintained its insistence on on-site inspection since test ban discussions began in 1958. Although the U.S. position has always been that it supports

an adequately verified nuclear test ban, it has steadily contended that such adequate verification requires on-site inspection, arguing that militarily significant testing could otherwise be conducted in secret by the U.S.S.R. Most experts on test detection and identification disagree, holding that improvements in seismology and other national means of detection now make a comprehensive test ban verifiable without on-site inspection.

In a widely-quoted March 1971 speech ACA Chairman William C. Foster persuasively set forth the case for renouncing the earlier U.S. position. Mr. Foster's remarks have provided important momentum to a reawakening of public and congressional interest in a CTB.

A CTB is highly important now, both because of the significant restraints it will place on the arms race between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and because it will help to remove incentives to non-nuclear countries to undertake nuclear weapons programs of their own.

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 16 ACA Vice President Adrian S. Fisher reviewed the improvements in detection and identification and then went on to say:

But let's put things in proper perspective: verification of a comprehensive test ban has always been only a part of the problem. The main question which existed in 1958 and exists today, 14 years later, is really this one: do we want to continue testing nuclear weapons? Is our overall security better with a comprehensive test ban even though there is some risk of a few small clandestine tests, or without a ban, which allows the Russians to test at all yields, encourages additional nations to acquire nuclear weapons and continues indefinitely the arms race? If we decide that it is in our best interest to ban tests, I do believe that lack of a precise capability to distinguish earthquakes from explosions at very low magnitudes will not stand in the way of our moving toward a comprehensive test ban treaty. We do not need to deploy a single new piece of equipment or await the development of still more data to be in a position to start negotiations.

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CONVENTION SIGNED

On April 10, in concurrent ceremonies in London, Moscow, and Washington, representatives of seventy nations signed a convention outlawing biological weapons. The agreement also calls on its signatories to destroy all existing stocks of such weapons. It is the first disarmament agreement in modern times to call for actual weapons destruction.

The convention leaves unresolved the problem of control

of chemical warfare. Chemical weapons are already in the stockpiles of many nations, they have been used in warfare on a large scale, and there is considerable disagreement concerning the applicability of the existing Geneva Protocol and proposed additional restrictions to various chemical agents such as herbicides and tear gas.

The new biological convention commits its parties to work toward a comparable agreement covering chemical warfare, however. The Soviet Union in late March submitted to the Geneva Disarmament Conference a draft convention proposing a complete ban on the use of chemical weapons and their destruction, paralleling the provisions of the biological warfare convention. While the Soviet draft has not met with approval, pressures can be expected to mount for further progress toward controlling chemical warfare programs on a broad scale.

HELP WANTED

We need your help in answering the shrill cries of the American Security Council, the Institute for American Strategy, and others who are claiming, in print and over the airwaves, that America's security is in danger (see *Backlash*, page 4.) One of the most effective ways to counter exaggeration and falsehood is to answer back quickly and convincingly with authoritative facts. ACA's Directors and its many members with solid credentials in arms control and foreign policy-making are doing so, in guest editorials, letters-to-the-editor, and radio and television interviews. If you are aware of a "security scare" campaign in your community, please let us know, sending clippings and identifying radio or television broadcasts. And please use whatever information in this newsletter that you may find appropriate to reply directly yourself.

JOINT ACA-CARNEGIE UNDERTAKING

The Arms Control Association is receiving valuable support from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. As part of a cooperative agreement worked out with the Endowment, on January 1 ACA moved into new quarters in the Endowment's Washington office at 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Under this cooperative arrangement the Endowment will participate in a number of joint ventures with the Arms Control Association.

ACA ACTIVITIES

The first three months of the Arms Control Association's full operations have been devoted principally to organization. The Board of Directors has met a number of times. During this time ACA representatives have testified twice on Capitol Hill. On January 27 Herbert Scoville testified in support of the Seabed Arms Control Treaty in hearings before the Arms Control Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. On March 16 Adrian Fisher testified in support of a proposal to expand the budget of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (see box).

Within the next month ACA plans to initiate a series of informal Washington seminars involving representatives of the executive and legislative branches, the press, and others interested in arms control and disarmament. The subject of the first such seminar, held in mid-April, was the comprehensive test ban treaty.

In conjunction with the Carnegie Endowment ACA is beginning plans for an arms control summer school, hopefully to begin in 1973, to which teachers of undergraduates from a number of American colleges and universities would be invited for a two-week course on the development of the strategic arms race and the role of arms control and disarmament over the last 25 years.

Routinely, ACA Directors and other spokesmen will be publishing articles, letters, and guest columns in news media throughout the country, speaking at conferences and symposia and otherwise working to promote broader public understanding of the role of arms control and disarmament in a balanced national security policy. As ACA programs expand, we will of course report them to you.

ACA MEMBERSHIP DRIVE

Now that the Arms Control Association has been granted tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, an expanded membership drive can get under way. From the outset ACA has made clear that it is as interested in obtaining the support of committed individuals willing to work in their communities to promote understanding and support for arms control and disarmament initiatives, as it is interested in raising funds to support its programs. In this election year we recognize that there will be more than the normally high degree of competition for funds. Nevertheless, we hope that ACA members will find the time now to seek out and interest others in joining the Association. A membership form for this purpose is included on Page 3. If you would like additional copies of this newsletter we would be happy to provide them.

The **ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION**
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Suite 503 • Washington, D.C. 20036

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