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“What's really strikes me about ACA is the potential to shape the next generation of leaders on arms control and nuclear policy. This is something I witnessed firsthand as someone who was introduced to the field through ACA.”
– Alicia Sanders-Zakre
ICAN
June 2, 2022
September 2017
Edition Date: 
Friday, September 1, 2017
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States Hesitate to Sign Nuclear Ban Treaty


By Alicia Sanders-Zakre
September 2017

Many countries that voted in favor of the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons are expected to sign it when it opens for signature on Sept. 20, but several key supporters may not do so.

The intercontinental ballistic missile-class live-test target before launch, May 30, from the U.S. Army’s Reagan test site on Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. (Photo credit: U.S. Department of Defense)The treaty was supported by 122 countries when it was adopted July 7 at the United Nations. Among the parties to the negotiations, only the Netherlands voted against, and Singapore abstained. (See ACT, July/August 2017.) The large number of states supporting the landmark treaty was hailed as remarkable, particularly given the short period of negotiation.

Some states, however, may be unable or unwilling to sign the treaty in September or subsequently, due to possible treaty conflicts, anticipated pressure from nuclear-armed states opposed to the treaty, and concern with the implications of some treaty provisions. They include the Marshall Islands, Sweden, and Switzerland.

The Marshall Islands, the site of 67 U.S. nuclear test explosions and a staunch supporter of nuclear disarmament, may be unable to sign and ratify the nuclear prohibition treaty due in part to its defense agreement with the United States.

The Pacific island nation participated actively in the negotiations, but later clarified that its vote for the treaty “is not to be mistaken for the domestic process to consider joining this treaty.”

Amatlain Elizabeth Kabua, Marshall Islands permanent representative to the UN, explained after voting that her country would “carefully consider this treaty for ratification, taking into account our deep national experience regarding the use of nuclear weapons as well as implications upon the respective provision of our Compact of Free Association with the United States of America, including the defense and security provision” in Title III.

Although the Marshall Islands gained independence in 1986, the United States maintains full responsibility for the defense of the Marshall Islands under its 2003 Amended Compact of Free Association with the United States. In turn, the Marshall Islands cannot take any action that the United States decides is “incompatible with its authority and responsibility for security and defense matters in or relating to the Republic of the Marshall Islands,” as stated in Title III of accord.

Securing approval from the United States may be challenging, given its adamant opposition to the treaty. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States asserted in a joint statement after the treaty’s adoption that it “will not enhance any country’s security” and that it would have the opposite effect. Robert Wood, U.S. ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), has said on Twitter that the treaty has “dangerous flaws” and is “bad for international peace and security.”

Civil society groups favoring the treaty anticipate that the nuclear-armed states will lobby governments not to sign, just as they encouraged states not to participate in negotiations. “The strongest impediment to states signing the treaty is going to be pressure from the nuclear-armed states, or other nuclear-supportive allies,” Ray Acheson, director of Reaching Critical Will, told Arms Control Today in an Aug. 17 email.

Even without U.S. opposition, the Marshall Islands may still be unable to sign and ratify the treaty because of a possible conflict with its provisions. As James Acton, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, noted on July 6 on Twitter, the Marshall Islands leases to the United States 11 islands in the Kwajalein Atoll, where the Minuteman III and Trident D5 missiles are tested.

The Marshall Islands receives $18 million annually from the U.S. Army for use of the Kwajalein Atoll, from where the United States on May 30 launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to test its long-range ground-based interceptor. (See ACT, July/August 2017.)

The new treaty prohibits states-parties from assisting any state with banned activities, which includes testing “nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” If a nuclear-capable missile were to be interpreted as a nuclear weapon or a nuclear explosive device, then the Marshall Islands would be in violation, were it to have signed and ratified the treaty. If not, Acton wrote, it would only be in compliance through a loophole “big enough to fly an ICBM through.”

Sweden and Switzerland also expressed hesitation about the treaty after voting for it. For those two countries and perhaps others, the short negotiating period may lead to a longer review period before political leaders can sign.

“Despite the complexity of the matter, and the unprecedentedly limited time at our disposal, Sweden has voted in favor of the adoption of this treaty. . . . At the same time, we recognize that there are crucial elements of this treaty that do not meet what my delegation was aiming for,” Eva Walder, Swedish ambassador for disarmament, said in a statement after the vote.

There were just more than four weeks of negotiations before the treaty’s adoption. The president of the negotiating conference, Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gómez of Costa Rica, released the third and penultimate draft of the treaty four days before its anticipated adoption, which diplomats sent back to their capitals for comments. Yet, Whyte Gómez did not accept any substantive changes to that draft, frustrating many diplomats who had expected to resolve their governments’ concerns.

In an Aug. 14 email to Arms Control Today, Walder stated that Swedish political leaders have not decided whether they will sign the treaty in September.

Switzerland also voted for the treaty, but explained it would not sign it on Sept. 20 in order to conduct a comprehensive review of the text. “Switzerland is committed to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, but also sees risks that this treaty may weaken existing norms and agreements and create parallel processes and structures which may further contribute to polarization rather than reduce it,” Sabrina Dallafior, Swiss permanent representative to the CD, said after the vote.

Sweden and Switzerland had advocated for the treaty to require all states to agree to negotiate an additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency in addition to a comprehensive safeguards agreement required by the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Instead, the ban treaty calls for all states that have never possessed nuclear weapons to maintain their current level of safeguards, bringing into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement if they have not already done so.

“Switzerland therefore does not plan to sign the treaty” on Sept. 20, when it will open for signature, said Michael Siegrist, a legal officer for the Swiss Federal Department for Foreign Affairs in an Aug. 14 email to Arms Control Today. “This decision is without prejudice to a later decision following the assessment.”

States Hesitate to Sign Nuclear Ban Treaty

Seven Vie for OPCW Director-General


By Alicia Sanders-Zakre
September 2017

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council plans by October to pick from among seven candidates to succeed Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü, who steps down in July.

Ahmet Üzümcü (R), director-general of the Organisation for the Prohibiton of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), holds the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize at the Oslo City Hall on December 10, 2013. The Nobel was awarded to the OPCW for its extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons. (Photo credit: Daniel Sannum Lauten/AFP/Getty Images)The OPCW, founded in 1997 to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), faces formidable challenges in the coming years, including the recurring use of chemical weapons in Syria.

Several former representatives to the OPCW are vying for the job, as well as two well-known figures in the arms control field: Tibor Tóth, former executive secretary of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, and Kim Won-soo, former UN undersecretary-general and high representative for disarmament affairs. 

Selection Process

At the OPCW Executive Council meeting in July, each nominee gave a 10-minute presentation on priorities, challenges, and the management of the secretariat, followed by questions from the five regional groups.

Sheikh Mohammed Belal of Bangladesh, the council chairman overseeing the process, plans to use “consultations, ‘confessional meetings,’ and, when appropriate, straw polls” to narrow the field of candidates before the next council meeting on Oct. 10–13, according to an Aug. 17 email to Arms Control Today. The council plans to conduct the first straw poll on Sept. 13.

If multiple candidates remain in the race by the October meeting, the council will vote. Subsequently, the full OPCW conference of states-parties, which meets Nov. 27–Dec. 1, must approve the council’s recommendation, which it has always done.

The first candidate is Abdouraman Bary, a chemistry professor from Burkino Faso currently serving as the Waste Regional Coordinator for the Africa Region at the UN Environment Programme. He previously headed Burkina Faso’s CWC National Authority. He is the only candidate with scientific and practical expertise although he lacks many of the other candidates’ diplomatic experience.

The second candidate is Saywan Sabir Barzani, an Iraqi diplomat currently serving as Iraq’s permanent representative to the OPCW and ambassador to the Netherlands. Previously, Barzani was Iraq’s permanent representative to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization.

The third candidate is Fernando Arias Gonzalez, currently Spain’s permanent representative to the OPCW and previously Spain’s permanent UN representative.

Candidate Tóth of Hungary was executive secretary of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) for eight years. He also served as Hungary’s permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament and the CTBTO and was involved in the negotiation of the CWC. He chaired an ad-hoc group that tried to add a verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention.

The fifth candidate is Jesper Vahr, a Danish diplomat currently serving as ambassador to Israel who has served as ambassador to Turkey and Azerbaijan and director of the private office of NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

The sixth candidate is Vaidotas Verba, currently the project coordinator in Ukraine for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and previously Lithuania’s permanent representative to the OPCW.

The final candidate is Kim, who just finished a two-year term in December 2016 as UN undersecretary-general and high representative for disarmament affairs. In this role, he oversaw the work of the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) in Syria. 

Üzümcü’s Legacy

During Üzümcü’s two terms as director-general, he implemented institutional reforms and guided the organization through unprecedented challenges.

Üzümcü previously served as Turkey’s representative to NATO and held several posts within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When a candidate for OPCW director-general in 2009, Üzümcü stressed the importance of the OPCW’s multilateralism.

Under Üzümcü’s leadership, the OPCW’s work became more publicly accessible when it developed a larger online presence and a publicity strategy. “Üzümcü deserves much credit for supporting a much more open, transparent, and inclusive process for the CWC and states-parties, even against the reluctance of several states-parties,” Paul Walker, director of Green Cross International’s environmental security and sustainability program, told Arms Control Today in an Aug. 16 email.

The organization’s public image grew after becoming a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013.

During Üzümcü’s tenure, the OPCW met daunting challenges, including the use of chemical weapons by a state-party, Syria, for the first time in the organization’s history and the growing instances of chemical weapons use by nonstate actors. Üzümcü established the JIM and the Declaration Assessment Team to investigate Syria’s chemical weapons declaration and alleged instances of use.

The organization completed the removal of chemical weapons from Libya during 2012–2016 and began to eliminate Syrian chemical weapons in 2013, the first time the OPCW undertook a demilitarization operation in an active war zone.

“Never in the history of our organization have we been called on to verify a destruction program within such short time frames and in an ongoing conflict,” Üzümcü said of his organization’s work in Syria when receiving the Nobel prize. 

Challenges Ahead

The next director-general will also have a challenging portfolio, which includes addressing current chemical weapons use in Syria and shifting future institutional priorities as the organization nears completion of most states’ chemical weapons stockpiles destruction.

“Ensuring institutional impartiality and credibility on the Syria file has been (and continues to be) the biggest challenge” of the current director-general, John Hart, head of the Chemical and Biological Security Project at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute told Arms Control Today in an Aug. 15 email.

In addition, the next director-general will be tasked with working to include the four countries not yet party to the treaty—Egypt, Israel, North Korea, and South Sudan—while strengthening current states-parties’ national implementation.

Still, as the OPCW celebrates its 20th anniversary this year, 95 percent of the world’s declared chemical weapons stockpiles have been destroyed. Looking ahead, the new OPCW leader will need to shift the organization’s priorities from chemical weapons destruction to preventing chemical weapons acquisition.

“[T]he next director-general would need to make the OPCW, with the support of the states-parties, a vanguard against the threat of the re-emergence of chemical weapons and the use of chemical weapons by ‘rouge’ states and non-state actors,” Belal said in an Aug. 17 email to Arms Control Today.

Seven Vie for OPCW Director-General

Australia Ships Uranium to India


By Kelsey Davenport
September 2017

Nearly three years after India signed a controversial civil nuclear cooperation deal with Australia, New Delhi received its first shipment of uranium.

Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop said in a July 15 statement that a small sample of uranium was shipped to India for testing as part of “ongoing commercial negotiations” to export uranium to India for civil nuclear power generation.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (L) gestures while talking with then-Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott before a meeting in New Delhi on September 5, 2014 in which they concluded a civil nuclear cooperation deal. (Photo credit: Prakash Singh/AFP/Getty Images)Australia and India finalized their nuclear cooperation agreement in September 2014, after India ratified its additional protocol. The Australian parliament passed the final legislation required to allow the export in December 2016. (See ACT, October 2014.) Prior to commencing negotiations with India, the then-Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard spearheaded an effort in 2011 to lift Australia’s ban on uranium sales to India. (See ACT, January/February 2012.)

Australia is one of the world’s largest exporters of uranium ore, but exports to India were banned because the country is not party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and developed nuclear weapons. As a party to the 1986 Treaty of Rarotonga, which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific, Australia is obligated to ensure that nuclear technology and materials are exported only to countries subject to safeguards required by the NPT.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), of which Australia is a member, also generally prohibits nuclear exports to countries outside of the NPT. The NSG is a voluntary group of 48 states that agreed to a set of guidelines for nuclear-related exports to help control proliferation. Despite not being a part of the NPT, India received an exemption from the NSG in 2008, which allows member states to export nuclear materials and technologies to India.

India did negotiate a limited safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2008 and ratified an additional protocol to enhance its safeguards agreement in 2014. These steps, which India agreed to take to enhance its bid for an NSG exemption, mean that the IAEA has access to some but not all of India’s nuclear facilities. 

Despite India’s safeguards and the Australian parliament’s approval of the civil nuclear pact in 2014, the decision to sell uranium to India remains controversial. Concerns remain that the uranium exported to India could be used for its nuclear weapons program.

Aiden Warren, senior lecturer in international relations at RMIT University in Melbourne, said in an Aug. 15 email to Arms Control Today that the uranium-supply deal with India, which is Australia’s first with a state that is not an NPT member, “poses some very distinct ramifications in undermining Australia’s very own NPT obligations” and has the potential to “broadly weaken nonproliferation norms.”

When the Australian-Indian nuclear cooperation agreement was finalized, the Australian government said that the conditions for sale were consistent with Australia’s international obligations and standards for safeguarding and accounting for transferred nuclear materials.

Bishop has argued that India has “adhered to its non-proliferation assurances” and then-Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott made a similar point in 2014 when the agreement with India was finalized. Abbott said that India has an “impeccable” nonproliferation record and was committed to use Australian uranium only for civilian purposes.

Warren said that conservative Australian governments have attempted to “placate concerns by reassuring the international domestic community that the deal is ‘safe’ and a reliable long-term opportunity” for contributing to India’s expanding energy needs. He noted that, during the 2014 parliamentary hearings over ratification of the deal with India, the IAEA expressed trepidation about India’s safeguards.

When India finalized its additional protocol, the document was broadly criticized as weak and setting a bad precedent. It omits many of the key provisions found in the IAEA Model Additional Protocol. It also does not include complementary access provisions for IAEA inspectors, which allow visits to undeclared sites under certain conditions. (See ACT, April 2009.)

Warren said it is imperative that Australia “reassesses the ramifications of exporting uranium to India.” Given Australia’s long history in “meeting and adhering to its non-proliferation obligations,” the agreement with India is a “watershed for the Australian state and clearly undermines non-proliferation norms—if not logistically, then definitely in spirit,” he said.

He also raised concerns that the uranium sales to India could increase tensions and destabilize the region, given regional animosity between India and Pakistan. —KELSEY DAVENPORT

 

Australia Ships Uranium to India

Court Dismisses Marshall Island Case

U.S. courts cannot find the United States in breach of the 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in a 3–0 decision dismissing a case filed by the Marshall Islands. The Pacific island country filed suit in 2014, alleging that the United States failed to fulfill obligations under Article VI of the NPT to pursue negotiations in good faith toward nuclear disarmament. The appeals court, upholding the federal district court’s original February 2015 dismissal, found that the NPT is not “judicially enforceable.” Judge Margaret McKeown wrote, “Asking the federal court to order the United States to negotiate in ‘good faith’ on ‘effective measures’ for nuclear disarmament puts the judiciary in the role of nanny to the executive.”

Laurie Ashton, lead lawyer for the Marshall Islands, called the decision “very disappointing,” arguing that “there has never been a more critical time” to enforce the treaty. The United States conducted 67 nuclear test explosions in the Marshall Islands from 1946 to 1958. The Marshall Islands filed similar cases against the nuclear-armed states at the International Court of Justice, all of which were dismissed last fall on procedural grounds. (See ACT, November 2016.)—ALICIA SANDERS-ZAKRE

Court Dismisses Marshall Island Case

China Advances Ballistic Missile Defense

China is advancing a new ballistic missile interceptor, the HQ-19, according to an annual U.S. Defense Department report, in a development that may indicate progress toward a deployed missile defense system. As of May 2016, the missile was still undergoing testing to intercept ballistic missiles having a range of 3,000 kilometers. An operational HQ-19 interceptor would be armed with a kinetic kill vehicle and be able to target ballistic missiles and satellites in lower-earth orbit. The HQ-19 is a significantly updated variant of the HQ-9, a long-range surface-to-air missile that has a limited capacity to hit short-range ballistic missiles up to 500 kilometers in range.

China has successfully intercepted ballistic missiles with ground-based interceptors in tests in 2010 and 2013, but experts remain uncertain whether China intends to deploy a missile defense system. If so, China would likely deploy a limited number of point-based missile interceptors to protect key strategic targets, such as its intercontinental ballistic missiles, according to 2013 blog post by Li Bin, senior fellow at the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.—ALICIA SANDERS-ZAKRE

 

China Advances Ballistic Missile Defense

India, Japan Nuclear Deal Implemented

A civil nuclear partnership deal between India and Japan entered into force July 20following an exchange of diplomatic notes. The agreement had been announced at a joint press conference Nov. 11 by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe after six years of negotiations. (See ACT, December 2016.) The deal paves the way for an ambitious expansion of India’s civilian nuclear power program through purchases of material and technologies from Japan. New Delhi plans to nearly double its current nuclear energy capacity by 2022. “The agreement seeks to promote full cooperation. . . in the development and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” according to a spokesperson at the Indian External Affairs Ministry.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (L) and his Japanese counterpart, Shinzo Abe, make a toast during a banquet at Abe’s official residence in Tokyo on November 11, 2016. (Photo credit: Kiyoshi Ota/AFP/Getty Images)The deal marks the first agreement between Japan and a state that has not ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Although not an NPT member, India received a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2008 allowing it to conduct nuclear commerce for peaceful purposes. (See ACT, October 2008.) Multiple measures have been put in place under the deal to ensure nuclear transfers are channeled to peaceful purposes. New Delhi’s nuclear material and technology purchases will be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, and the deal can be nullified if India were to conduct a nuclear test. Further, in the event of such a test, Tokyo can require that any material or technology sales resulting from the deal be returned.—TYLER RODGERS

India, Japan Nuclear Deal Implemented

OPCW-UN Investigating Team Visits Syria

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) visited Syria in late August as part of its ongoing investigation to determine the group responsible for the April 4 chemical weapons attack in Khan Sheikhoun. A Syrian man prays July 12 at a cemetery in Khan Sheikhoun, a rebel-held town in Idlib province, 100 days after the alleged sarin nerve-gas attack by Syrian government forces that was reported to have killed more than 90 people, including women and children. (Photo credit: Omar Haj Kadour/AFP/Getty Images)U.S. intelligence agencies allege that Syrian government forces carried out the attack, while Syrian President Bashar al-Assad called the incident a “fabrication” shortly after it occurred and has since denied responsibility. “We will offer [the JIM] all facilitations needed for the investigation and to help it arrive to the place where the alleged chemical attack took place,” Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad was quoted as saying in an Aug. 12 report in The Washington Post.

An OPCW fact-finding mission confirmed the Khan Sheikhoun attack and identified the weapon used as sarin gas in a June 29 report, but it did not assign blame, which is the JIM’s task. German media reported an increase in chemical weapons attacks in Syria in July after a brief respite in May and June. Local groups documented at least seven chemical weapons attacks in and around Damascus in July.—ALICIA SANDERS-ZAKRE

OPCW-UN Investigating Team Visits Syria

Nigeria Sale Proposed Despite Concerns

The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress on Aug. 2 of a proposed $593 million foreign military sale to Nigeria of up to 12 A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft, along with associated weapons, training, and spare parts. The sale is intended to bolster Nigerian troops in their fight against Boko Haram and Islamic State group extremists. President Barack Obama had blocked this sale in the final days of his administration in response to the January bombing of a displaced persons camp by the Nigerian military that reportedly resulted in about 236 deaths. In June, U.S. Sens. Cory Booker (D-N.J.) and Rand Paul (R-Ky.) wrote a letter to Secretary of State Rex Tillerson urging the State Department to withhold approval of the sale until Nigeria implements measures to ensure it observes international human rights and humanitarian law.

The notification said the sale includes “special training on the law of armed conflict and humanitarian rights, and air-to-ground integration to minimize civilian harm in air operations.” Still, former State Department official Dan Mahanty, a senior adviser at the Center for Civilians in Conflict, said in an Aug. 11 email to Arms Control Today that “training is a necessary but rarely sufficient step in avoiding civilian harm. It’s a promising sign that the Defense Department has committed to training in air-to-ground integration. Training has to be reinforced by leadership, policy, doctrine, and most importantly, accountability. It’s also important that the Defense and State departments focus more attention on the way weapons are used, and the consequences of use, as a part of end-use monitoring.”

This sale notification follows the potential sale of precision-guided missiles to Saudi Arabia, a deal that was also blocked by Obama over humanitarian concerns and then approved by the Trump administration.—SARA SCHMITT

Nigeria Sale Proposed Despite Concerns

Anti-Nuclear Campaigner Tony de Brum Dies

Tony de Brum, the three-time foreign minister of the Marshall Islands and lifelong advocate for nuclear disarmament, died Aug. 22 at his home in Majuro at age 72.

Tony de Brum in 2013 (Photo credit: Giff Johnson/AFP/Getty Images)At age nine, while fishing with his father, he witnessed the massive 1954 “Castle Bravo” test explosion of a hydrogen bomb on Bikini Atoll, which unleashed 1,000 times more destructive force than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The United States conducted 67 nuclear test explosions over the Marshall Islands from 1946 to 1958.

“I have seen with my very own eyes nuclear devastation and know, with conviction, that nuclear weapons must never again be visited upon humanity,” de Brum said while accepting the 2015 Right Livelihood Award. De Brum and the Marshall Islands also were recognized with the 2016 Arms Control Person(s) of the Year Award, and he was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2016.

“The Marshall Islands lost a national hero today,” Marshall Islands President Hilda Heine said in an Aug. 22 statement citing de Brum’s contributions to the nation’s independence, nuclear disarmament, and climate justice.

Under de Brum’s leadership in 2014, the Marshall Islands launched two legal cases to push nuclear-weapon states to fulfill legal obligations under the 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to pursue nuclear disarmament, one within U.S. courts and another at the International Court of Justice.

Although both courts declined on technical grounds to rule on the cases, John Burroughs, executive director of the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy and a member of the Marshall Islands legal team, said at the Arms Control Association annual meeting June 2 that “simply bringing the cases raised to world attention the failure of the nuclear powers to fulfill the obligation to negotiate and reach a global elimination of nuclear weapons.”

De Brum also played a key role in the Paris climate negotiations, forging a coalition of about 100 diverse nations, the “high-ambition coalition,” which successfully pushed for a global warming limit of 1.5 degrees Celsius.—ALICIA SANDERS-ZAKRE

Anti-Nuclear Campaigner Tony de Brum Dies

Don’t Abandon the Iran Nuclear Deal


September 2017
By Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director

Although his administration is already struggling with one major nonproliferation challenge—North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities—President Donald Trump soon may initiate steps that could unravel the highly successful 2015 Iran nuclear deal, thereby creating a second major nonproliferation crisis.

Blowing up the 2015 agreement between Iran and six world powers and the European Union, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, would be irrational and counterproductive, but it can be prevented.

Senators Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) and Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), the two top members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, attend a hearing on July 29, 2014, on the nuclear talks with Iran. (Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)If Trump backs out of the accord and tries to reimpose nuclear-related sanctions absent clear evidence of Iranian violations, the United States would be blamed, international support for new sanctions would be soft or non-existent, and Iran could choose to exceed the limits set by the deal.

Members of Congress and parties to the agreement can and should be prepared to head off such an outcome, which could unfold in one of two ways.

First, Trump is clearly pushing his advisers to find a reason to deny certification that Iran is in compliance with the agreement under the terms of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act. Under that law, the administration must certify every 90 days that Iran is fully implementing the nuclear deal and that suspension of sanctions is “appropriate and proportionate” to the measures taken by Iran. Failure to issue the certification would open the door for Congress, under expedited procedures, to introduce legislation to reimpose nuclear sanctions on Iran.

In July, Trump said that “if it was up to me, I should have had [Iran] noncompliant 180 days ago.” He said he would be “surprised” if Iran was in compliance at the next certification deadline in mid-October.

Thus far, however, reporting from the U.S. intelligence community, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the other parties to the agreement make it clear that Iran is meeting its many commitments. But given that the certification involves subjective judgments outside the four corners of the nuclear deal, Trump may choose, for political reasons, not to make the certification.

Before enabling any Trump move to undermine the nuclear deal by advancing legislation to reimpose sanctions, Congress must demand to see the evidence behind any allegation of Iranian noncompliance, consider whether the intelligence community concurs, and, if there is a true compliance dispute, call on the White House to use the eight-member body known as the Joint Commission to exhaust all options to resolve the matter quickly.

If Trump cannot produce solid evidence of an Iranian violation, Congress does not have to and should not vote to reimpose nuclear sanctions.

Even if Congress takes the bait, the other parties should continue to abide by their commitments under the agreement. On Aug. 27, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, said if Washington withdraws but the five other parties remain committed, Tehran would remain committed. European entities, which would be subject to secondary U.S. sanctions, can and should take precautions to insulate their commercial and financial dealings from such U.S. penalties.

Second, the United States is pressing the IAEA to demand inspections at sensitive sites in the hope of provoking a refusal that would justify a finding of noncompliance. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley is already insinuating that because the IAEA has not inspected “numerous undeclared sites,” we cannot be sure Iran is not already violating the agreement.

Under the agreement, the IAEA can request access to any site if there is a specific concern about illicit or undeclared materials and activities. If the IAEA requests information or access and remains unsatisfied with Iran’s response, five of the eight members of the Joint Commission can vote on actions to resolve the concern, including authorizing access that Iran would be required to provide.

It is essential that the IAEA continue to be vigilant, and Iran should cooperate fully with all IAEA requests for information and access in a timely manner. But given Trump’s stated opposition to the agreement, the new push by Washington for the agency to seek access to undeclared sites should be treated with special caution.

The Iran nuclear deal is a clear net plus for U.S. and global security. It has dramatically reduced the proliferation risk posed by Iran’s nuclear program and mandates unprecedented monitoring and transparency measures to deter and promptly detect any violation. It promises to block Iran’s pathways to development of nuclear weapons for a decade or more. There is no realistic option for scrapping the agreement and negotiating a “better deal.”

The smarter approach would be to continue to implement and vigorously enforce the multilateral nuclear deal and seek to build global support for the widespread adoption of its most innovative verification and nonproliferation measures.


The monthly “Focus” editorials from Arms Control Today are available for reprint on a non-exclusive basis
with permission from the Arms Control Association and link to the original publication online.

 

If Trump cannot produce solid evidence of an Iranian violation, Congress does not have to and should not vote to reimpose nuclear sanctions.

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