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"I find hope in the work of long-established groups such as the Arms Control Association...[and] I find hope in younger anti-nuclear activists and the movement around the world to formally ban the bomb."

– Vincent Intondi
Professor of History, Montgomery College
July 1, 2020
June 2021
Edition Date: 
Tuesday, June 1, 2021
Cover Image: 

States Finally Settle on Next Leader for CTBTO

June 2021
By Daryl G. Kimball

After an unusually contentious process that lasted for months, representatives from the member states of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) finally agreed to appoint Robert Floyd of Australia to serve as its executive secretary.

After a contentious months-long contest, Robert Floyd, who heads Australia's safeguards and nonproliferation office, will succeed Lassina Zerbo, a geophysicist originally from Burkino Faso, as executive secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission (CTBTO). (Government of Australia)Floyd, who is currently the director-general of the Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office, said in an April 12 statement on Twitter in which he outlined his candidacy that he was “hopeful for new opportunities for the [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)] in 2021, a year marking the 25th anniversary of the treaty’s opening for signature.”

“I am looking forward to opportunities such as the upcoming NPT Review Conference to stress the importance of the CTBT for international peace and security and to move us closer to the goal of entry into force,” he said.

He also stressed the importance of engaging all member states and putting the organization “on firm financial footing in difficult economic times.”

Floyd will become the fourth executive secretary of the organization, succeeding Lassina Zerbo, who was seeking a third term. Zerbo’s second four-year term will expire July 31.

The process for selecting the next executive secretary has been more controversial than in the past, in part because Zerbo was seeking an unprecedented third term. Although there are no rules against that, many states, including the United States, have stressed the general practice of heads of international organizations serving two terms. Some states argued that Zerbo would provide needed continuity through the difficulties created by the COVID-19 pandemic, but others disagreed. (See ACT, October 2020.)

Floyd’s appointment was secured when he won the support of 96 states, exactly two-thirds of the states voting, in a fifth round of balloting held on May 20. Through the earlier rounds of voting, which began May 17, Floyd won the support of more than 60 percent of the member states voting, while Zerbo was supported by less than 40 percent.

The organization, with an annual budget in excess of $100 million, is responsible for maintaining and operating the test ban treaty’s global verification regime, including the International Monitoring System (IMS) and International Data Centre (IDC). It is also responsible for developing and demonstrating on-site inspection capabilities in preparation for the treaty’s entry into force, as well as for promoting entry into force of the agreement.

To date, the CTBT has been signed by 185 states and ratified by 170 states, but the treaty has not entered into force due to inaction by eight holdouts, including the United States and China.

Following an inconclusive voting process in December 2020 involving Floyd and Zerbo that left the Australian just one vote short of securing two-thirds approval (see ACT, January/February 2021), the CTBTO chair for 2020, Faouzia Mebarki of Algeria, set a Feb. 5 deadline for new nominations. 

On Jan. 8, Australia resubmitted Floyd’s nomination. Despite lagging far behind Floyd in the vote totals, Zerbo on Feb. 2 confirmed for a second time his “ability and commitment to continue working and contributing as executive secretary.” Through early 2021, the new CTBTO chair, Ivo Šrámek of the Czech Republic, engaged in intensive informal consultations aimed at reaching consensus on the selection process. 

The CTBTO decided by consensus on March 26 that all member states that had taken part in the December 2020 voting, as well as new CTBT signatories and states that had paid their assessed financial dues, would be invited to cast votes. The member states also authorized Šrámek to facilitate a process leading to a first round of balloting no later than May 17.

Zerbo, a geophysicist originally from Burkina Faso, has made a significant impact on the CTBTO. He first joined the organization in 2004 to head the IDC and was chosen to be executive secretary in 2013. Since then, he has led work to complete the monitoring and verification system by bringing key monitoring stations in China online and strengthening the connections between the CTBTO and the global scientific community. 

Zerbo also improved access to IMS-generated data on seismic events for member states, thus providing real time data for tsunami early warnings, as well as for nuclear detonations. Zerbo and his team provided detailed updates on North Korean nuclear test explosions. He also succeeded in keeping the CTBT in the international nonproliferation conversation despite the slow pace of the treaty’s entry into force.

Robert Floyd, director-general of the Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office, was chosen to replace incumbent Lassina Zerbo after a contentious process.

New ICBM Interceptor to Cost $18 Billion

June 2021
By Kingston Reif and Shannon Bugos

A new U.S. interceptor intended to counter limited intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) strikes from North Korea or Iran could cost nearly $18 billion over its lifetime, according to the Defense Department’s independent cost assessment office. The new estimate comes amid continued questions about the future of the U.S. homeland missile defense mission and is at least 36 percent more than the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) had suggested. 

The price tag for the Next Generation Interceptor, intended to knock down North Korean missiles in space as part of U.S. homeland defense system, is projected to cost at least 36 percent more than earlier projections. It will replace the cancelled Redesigned Kill Vehicle (shown) program. (Photo: Raytheon)The Pentagon said in April that the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office estimates the cost of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) at $17.7 billion. That figure represents $13.1 billion for up-front costs, including the purchase of 10 developmental interceptors; $2.3 billion for 21 operational interceptors; and $2.3 billion for operations and support costs over the life of the interceptors. 

The average cost to develop and purchase the 31 interceptors amounts to $498 million per interceptor, according to the CAPE office. The cost to purchase the 21 operational interceptors is $111 million per interceptor. 

The Pentagon in March awarded two research and development contracts for the interceptor to Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. (See ACT, April 2021.) The CAPE estimate “reflects the system development acquisition plan to carry two NGI contractor teams through Critical Design Review…at which point the [MDA] will down-select to a single vendor to proceed with the remaining development, testing, and production efforts,” Pentagon spokesperson Christopher Sherwood told Inside Defense in an April 27 statement. 

The NGI emerged after the Pentagon in 2019 cancelled the program to design an upgraded kill vehicle, the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV), for the already existing interceptors that are part of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. (See ACT, October 2019.) The MDA planned to deploy the RKV beginning in 2021 atop 20 new interceptors in Alaska to augment the existing fleet of 44 interceptors there and in California. The RKV was also intended to replace the aging kill vehicles atop the current fleet.

The agency spent a total of $1.2 billion on RKV development at the time the program was cancelled, according to a 2019 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report. 

The Defense Department hopes to begin fielding the NGI in fiscal year 2028 in silos at Fort Greely, Alaska. The department is not currently planning to replace the existing 44 interceptors, which have been plagued by development problems and testing failures, with the NGI but rather to supplement them with 20 of the new interceptors to bring the fleet total to 64 interceptors. 

Independent assessments put the cost to purchase the newest versions of the existing ground-based interceptors at $90–100 million per missile. The CAPE estimate of the NGI cost is higher than the MDA estimate of $11.3 billion for the program, the GAO said in an April 28 report.

The high price tag to acquire the NGI has raised concerns from some members of Congress. Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), citing the shortcomings of the existing 44 interceptors and current plans to field just 21 NGIs, said at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on May 12 that “[i]t’s not at all clear to me that spending billions of dollars on additional interceptors is the right call.” 

The Pentagon is planning to extend the life of the existing ground-based interceptors pending the deployment of the NGI in 2028. MDA Director Adm. Jon Hill said on May 12 that the life extension effort will increase the reliability of the interceptors “to kind of bridge that gap between when we’ll actually deploy the first NGI.”

Meanwhile, the April GAO report highlighted roadblocks to the Pentagon’s plans as of the end of the Trump administration for a new layered homeland missile defense approach that would augment the GMD system with the Aegis system, specifically the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA interceptor, and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which is designed to defeat short- and intermediate-range missiles.

The GAO found that the GMD system’s fire control and engagement planning currently “does not take into account any other interceptor systems” and that managing engagement among multiple interceptor systems requires a “more cohesive integration with overall battle planning” than exists at this time. The agency also found that the existing ground-based interceptor has “hardware constraints that limit communication opportunities with ground systems while in flight.”

The GAO said “more development work is needed for the [Aegis] SM-3 Block IIA to support a layered homeland defense capability” and that this effort “could introduce considerable cost, schedule, and performance uncertainty to a program that has just entered initial production.”

The Pentagon in November 2020 conducted a successful first intercept test of the Aegis SM-3 Block IIA against an ICBM target. (See ACT, December 2020.) “This was not an operational test, however, and it was executed under highly favorable conditions,” the GAO noted.  

Furthermore, the GAO said that “there are a number of significant upgrades and steps to address obsolescence that would be needed to enhance THAAD’s performance and make it capable of performing” as part of the layered homeland defense.

The MDA requested $274 million in fiscal year 2021 to adapt the Aegis missile defense system and the THAAD system, to provide an additional layer of defense against limited ICBMs threats. But Congress poured cold water on the proposal and provided $49 million only for limited concept studies, a decrease of $225 million from the budget request. (See ACT, January/February 2021.)

 

Amid continued questions about the future of the U.S. homeland defense mission, the cost of a new interceptor to counter North Korean and Iranian missiles could cost 36 percent more than expected.

Global Partnership Flags HEU Stocks

June 2021
By Kelsey Davenport

In a further effort to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the United Kingdom is making it a priority to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) around the world in its new role as chair of a multilateral initiative. 

The G7 foreign ministers meeting in London on May 5 was their first face-to-face talks in more than two years on pressing global threats, including fissile material security. (Photo: Ben Stansall/Pool/AFP via Getty Images)HEU contains at least 20 percent of the fissionable isotope uranium-235. Uranium enriched to this level and greater poses a risk because it can be used for nuclear weapons or nuclear terrorism. Twenty-two countries possess at least one kilogram of HEU. 

Efforts to minimize, secure, and dispose of HEU in civil nuclear programs have slowed since 2016, when U.S. President Barack Obama’s six-year-long initiative of convening annual nuclear security summits ended. The summits focused high-level political attention on the threat of nuclear terrorism and efforts to reduce weapons-usable materials worldwide. 

The UK seeks to “reinvigorate” HEU minimization efforts in 2021, according to an official statement laying out the goals for the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Reducing the production and use of HEU “enjoys broad support but requires more solid political support,” the statement said.

The partnership was created by the Group of Eight, now the Group of Seven (G7), in 2002 to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Initially focused on disposing of weapons of mass destruction and dismantling production facilities for those weapons in the former Soviet Union, the partnership has expanded to 31 member states and implements projects worldwide to reduce the risks of nonstate actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The initiative uses a matchmaking process to pair states looking for assistance in mitigating WMD-related threats with states looking to donate funds or relevant expertise.

The partnership is also one of five international initiatives charged with continuing the work of the nuclear security summits. At the 2016 summit, the 52 participating states agreed that the partnership should provide assistance for the “safe, secure and timely consolidation of nuclear materials inside countries, removal of such material to other countries for disposal…and minimizing HEU” where feasible. The state leading the G7 also chairs the Global Partnership and sets yearly priorities for the initiative. 

The G7 affirmed the UK’s decision to prioritize HEU minimization in an April 19 statement, pledging to “accelerate national and international steps to manage the risks posed” by nuclear and radioactive materials and to encourage states with civil stocks of HEU to “further reduce or eliminate them where economically and technically feasible.”

The UK statement did not contain any details about specific projects or activities for 2021, but said the UK hopes to “secure new or increased financial and non-financial contributions for practical programming initiatives.” 

Nickolas Roth, director of the Stimson Center’s Nuclear Security Program and International Nuclear Security Forum, told Arms Control Today in a May 18 email that although “significant hurdles to further progress” on HEU minimization remain, there are things the partnership can do to advance the effort. 

Roth recommended encouraging states to “support and implement INFCIRC 912,” an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) document that advocates reporting the status of HEU national stockpiles and the reduction or disposal of them to the agency. Roth also said the partnership could facilitate dialogue about the “technical and political hurdles to further progress” on minimization. 

One drawback is that the partnership is not currently working with Russia, which has “more nuclear material in more facilities than any other country,” so other initiatives are needed to engage Russia, he stated. 

There are already two ongoing, multiyear projects that address HEU minimization as part of the partnership’s nuclear security working group, according to an annex released in March 2021 that details the initiative’s activities over the prior year. One is a collaborative project among the United States, Japan, Kazakhstan, and four European countries to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels that can be used in research reactors to produce medical isotopes. The project also aims to convert reactors using HEU for that medical purpose into using LEU as an alternative. 

Roth said the partnership can advance this effort by “identifying opportunities for international collaboration that can speed up the process for converting research reactors” to run on LEU fuel.

There are 72 research reactors that still use HEU fuel worldwide, according to the IAEA. Seventy-one others have already been converted to use LEU fuel, and 28 were shut down. 

A second multiyear project is a collaboration among the United States, Japan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to dispose of weapons-usable nuclear materials. 

As chair of the multilateral initiative in 2020, the United States focused on enhancing chemical security and building capacity to respond to biological incidents. (See ACT, July/August 2020.) According to the project annex released by the United States in March 2021, the partnership spent $669 million to implement 245 projects in 2020, several of which supported efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Canada, for instance, provided support for South Africa to acquire the necessary laboratory equipment to rapidly process COVID-19 tests and for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to acquire personal protective equipment to help respond to the pandemic in 2020, according to the project annex. 

The UK said the second major priority for the Global Partnership in 2021 will be biosecurity. Specifically, the partnership will look to build on a project proposed by Canada to work with the Africa Centers for Disease Control to mitigate biological threats, according to the UK statement. 

 

As the new chair of a multilateral initiative, the United Kingdom is trying to refocus international attention on minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium.

Inspectors Find New CW Agent in Syria

June 2021
By Julia Masterson

International inspectors found an undeclared chemical warfare agent in Syria during a September 2020 visit, according to a monitoring report released April 23. The report, issued by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), suggests that Syria may still be producing chemical weapons despite being censured by the group for repeated chemical weapons use. 

An April 2021 report issued by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) says inspectors found an undeclared chemical warfare agent in Syria during a September 2020 visit. (Photo: Koen Van Weel/ANP/AFP via Getty Images)As a state-party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Syria is expressly prohibited from producing, stockpiling, or using chemical weapons. Syria joined the treaty in 2013, but reports of chemical weapons attacks by Syrian forces have emerged since the UN-OPCW operation in 2013–2016 to remove and destroy the country’s declared chemical weapons arsenal, raising questions about the validity of Syria’s initial stockpile declaration. 

To resolve outstanding issues and verify the completeness and accuracy of that declaration, the OPCW established the Declaration and Assessment Team (DAT) in 2014, but Syria has repeatedly refused to cooperate with the team’s work. Together with the findings of the April report, the OPCW so far has recorded and is investigating 20 outstanding issues pertaining to Syria’s initial declaration. 

Of chief concern is whether Syria is continuing to produce chemical warfare agents and expand its arsenal in blatant defiance of the CWC. Izumi Nakamitsu, the UN high commissioner for disarmament, briefed the Security Council on the discovery of the new Syrian chemical agent on May 6 and said the nature of the agent, “inside storage containers of large volume at a previously declared chemical weapons facility,” could imply undeclared and ongoing chemical weapons production activities. The disarmament chief neglected to name the new chemical warfare agent, but Syria has already declared its production of nerve agents sarin and VX, as well as sulfur mustard. 

In March, OPCW Director-General Fernando Arias told the global chemical weapons watchdog’s Executive Council that “unknown, potentially significant quantities of chemical warfare agents” had yet to be declared by Syria. The OPCW reportedly also called on Damascus to declare its production or weaponization of a nerve agent at an unnamed chemical weapons production facility. For these and other reasons, according to a March briefing by Nakamitsu, “the declaration submitted by [Syria] cannot be considered accurate and complete.” (See ACT, April 2021.) 

It is not clear whether the newly discovered chemical warfare agent pertains to the OPCW’s call that Syria declare its production or weaponization of a nerve agent. The April report does not provide any specifics on the agent, only that it is “neat,” meaning complete and undiluted. The OPCW Technical Secretariat informed the Syrian government on April 16 that a new outstanding issue would be opened and discussed by the DAT in mid-May. 

Syria’s chemical weapons program will remain a matter of principal concern for the OPCW Executive Council until the program is verifiably eliminated, Vidmantas Purlys, Lithuania’s ambassador to the OPCW, said during an interview on May 18 with Arms Control Today. Purlys is serving as a vice chair of the council alongside permanent representatives to the OPCW from Ecuador, Germany, and Iran and council Chairperson Abdelouahab Bellouki of Morocco. 

The council plays a pivotal role in enforcing compliance with the CWC. In April 2020, following publication of a damning OPCW report attributing a series of chemical weapons attacks to the Syrian government, the council called on Syria to declare the entirety of its stockpile to the OPCW. (See ACT, May 2020.) 

Syria failed to meet that deadline, and in April 2021, CWC states-parties voted to adopt an unprecedented resolution co-sponsored by Lithuania to temporarily revoke Syria’s rights and privileges under the CWC until it declares its stockpile and returns to compliance with the treaty. (See ACT, May 2021.)

“It was an important demonstration by the international community that there would be no impunity for the use of chemical weapons,” Purlys said, voicing his hope that “Syria will listen and constructively respond to this important message of the international community.”

Purlys urged the international community to continue pushing Syria to comply fully with its CWC obligations and to cooperate with the OPCW. “Use of chemical weapons is [a] grave violation of international law and those responsible for their use must be held accountable and brought to justice,” he said. 

The Executive Council will meet again on July 6–9 at The Hague.

A new report suggests Syria may still be producing chemical weapons despite being censured by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for repeated CW use.

EU Confident in Iran Deal Restoration

June 2021
By Kelsey Davenport

Talks to bring the United States and Iran back into compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal appear to be gaining momentum, as a number of negotiators believe that an understanding is within reach.

Josep Borell, European Union Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and his team report that “an agreement is shaping up” in talks on a U.S. return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and lifting of related sanctions, in conjunction with the resumption of nuclear commitments under the deal by Iran. (Photo:  Thierry Monasse#51SY ED/Getty Images)Enrique Mora, the lead negotiator for the European Union and coordinator of the indirect talks between the United States and Iran, said on May 19 that he is “quite sure there will be a final agreement” that restores the nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). 

Speaking to reporters in Vienna, he said that the talks are “on the right track.”

The Trump administration withdrew from the nuclear deal in May 2018 and reimposed sanctions on Iran in violation of the accord. Beginning the following year, Iran began to take a series of retaliatory steps to breach its commitments under the nuclear deal. The two countries are now engaged in indirect talks to restore the multilateral agreement. The other parties to the deal—China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom—are also participating in the Vienna talks. 

Mikhail Ulyanov, Russian ambassador to international organizations in Vienna, tweeted on May 19 that significant progress was made and the parties to the deal all believe an agreement is “within reach.” He expressed hope that the next round of talks “will be final.”

Iranian negotiators also struck a positive tone. Abbas Araqchi, Iran’s lead negotiator, told Iranian state TV on May 19 that “the framework and structure of the agreement has been defined” but certain clauses are still being discussed. 

Other diplomats struck a less optimistic tone. In a May 19 statement, France, Germany, and the UK said that there are still “very difficult issues ahead” and warned against underestimating those challenges. 

U.S. State Department spokesperson Jalina Porter said in a May 19 press briefing that the fourth round of talks “helped to crystalize choices that may be made by Iran, as well as by the United States,” to return to mutual compliance.

Although the United States and Iran have expressed support for returning to compliance with the nuclear deal, certain technical details have proved challenging.

Iran, for instance, has insisted that all sanctions imposed by the Trump administration after the United States withdrew from the deal in May 2018, including the non-nuclear sanctions, be lifted. That is necessary, Iran has argued, for Tehran to receive sanctions benefits envisioned by the deal. Critics of the nuclear deal in the United States have opposed lifting these measures. 

On May 20, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said on state television that the “main” sanctions issues “have been wrapped up,” including those affecting the oil, petrochemical, shipping, and banking sectors.

Another challenge has been the future of Iran’s advanced centrifuges. In response to the U.S. decision to reimpose sanctions in violation of the nuclear deal, Iran has introduced into use hundreds of advanced centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium, in excess of the nuclear deal’s limits. 

Advanced centrifuges pose a proliferation risk because they enrich uranium more efficiently. The machines can be dismantled or destroyed to bring Iran back into compliance with the nuclear deal’s limits, but Iran has gained knowledge from operating these machines that cannot be reversed. 

Officials did not comment on whether this issue has been resolved.

The E.U. reports an agreement is shaping up to return the U.S. and Iran to their 2015 deal.

U.S. Will Not Rejoin Open Skies Treaty

June 2021

The Biden administration has officially notified Russia that the United States will not seek to rejoin the 1992 Open Skies Treaty.

A U.S. OC-135 reconnaissance aircraft. (Photo: Department of Defense)Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman informed Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov of the administration’s final decision on May 27, the Associated Press reported. A State Department spokesperson later confirmed the news and attributed the decision to “Russia’s failure to take any actions to return to compliance” with the treaty.

Washington had raised concerns that Moscow is in violation of the treaty because it has limited the distance for observation flights over the Kaliningrad region to no more than 500 kilometers from the border and prohibited missions over Russia from flying within 10 kilometers of its border with the conflicted Georgian border regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Ryabkov criticized the U.S. decision as “another political mistake, inflicting a new blow to the European security system” in remarks on Friday to the Russian news agency Tass. “We gave them a good chance, but they failed to take it. They continue to circulate fallacies about Russia’s alleged violations of the treaty, which is completely absurd,” Ryabkov said.

When the Trump administration withdrew the United States from the accord in November 2020, President-elect Joe Biden condemned the withdrawal and expressed support for the treaty, although he stopped short of committing to reenter the agreement. Once he took office, the Biden administration opened a review of “matters related to the treaty” and held consultations with U.S. allies and partners earlier this year. (See ACT, March 2021; December 2020.)

Moscow, meanwhile, launched domestic procedures in January for withdrawing from the treaty. The State Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament, approved legislation supporting the move May 19; the upper house, the Federation Council, is expected to vote on the bill June 2. The bill will require Russian President Vladimir Putin’s signature. Once submitting official notice to states-parties, Moscow would kick-start the six-month period before the withdrawal takes place.

Entering into force in 2002, the Open Skies Treaty permits each state-party to conduct short-notice, unarmed observation flights over the others’ entire territories to collect data on military forces and activities.—SHANNON BUGOS

The Biden administration has officially notified Russia that the United States will not seek to rejoin the 1992 Open Skies Treaty.

Biden, Putin to Meet in June

June 2021

U.S. President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet on June 16 in Geneva, the two countries have announced.

“The leaders will discuss the full range of pressing issues, as we seek to restore predictability and stability to the U.S.-Russia relationship,” said White House press secretary Jen Psaki on May 25. “We expect they will spend a fair amount of time on strategic stability, where the arms control agenda goes following the extension” of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), she said.

The Kremlin statement also emphasized that the two will discuss “problems of strategic stability.”

Washington and Moscow agreed in February to extend the treaty for five years. (See ACT, March 2021.)

Biden expressed in April his hope that, after the two leaders meet, “the United States and Russia could launch a strategic stability dialogue to pursue cooperation in arms control and security” that would build on the New START extension. 

The United States will pursue “arms control that addresses all Russian nuclear weapons, including novel strategic systems and nonstrategic nuclear weapons,” Robert Wood, U.S. representative to the Conference on Disarmament, told the conference on May 11. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov commented the same day that discussions must “consider the problems of strategic stability, taking into account all factors and systems without exception, offensive and defensive, which have a direct influence on this strategic stability.”

Biden first proposed the idea of a summit with Putin in April. (See ACT, May 2021.) A May 19 meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Lavrov in Reykjavik and a May 24 meeting between National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev in Geneva helped pave the way for the official summit announcement.—SHANNON BUGOS 

U.S. President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet on June 16 in Geneva, the two countries have announced.

Iran Agrees to Extend Inspections of Nuclear Sites

June 2021

Iran has agreed to extend a critical temporary monitoring arrangement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for one month, the agency reported May 24. The agreement will expire June 24, leaving 30 days for Iran and the other members of the 2015 nuclear deal to restore that accord. 

Rafael Mariano Grossi (R), Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi (L). (Photo: /POOL/AFP via Getty Images)Iran suspended implementation of the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement on Feb. 23, marking an escalatory step in its scheme to intensify activities in violation of the nuclear deal. Iran is obligated to implement the additional protocol in accordance with the deal, known formally as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). But it decided to suspend compliance pursuant to a December 2020 Iranian law designed to pressure the United States to deliver on sanctions relief. Tehran has demanded that Washington reverse all sanctions imposed since the United States unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018. (See ACT, January/February 2021.) 

An additional protocol is a voluntary arrangement that allows IAEA inspectors increased access to sites and information related to a country’s nuclear program. The aim is to verify that nuclear materials are not diverted for malign purposes. 

The special monitoring arrangement reached by Iran and the IAEA on Feb. 21 preempted Tehran’s suspension of its additional protocol and alleviated mounting concerns over the possibility of losing visibility into Iran’s nuclear activities. 

Under the temporary technical understanding, Iran agreed to continue recording and collecting certain information and committed to transfer that data to the IAEA once sanctions are eased. But the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran said in a Feb. 21 statement that all recorded and collected data would be completely erased if the JCPOA sanctions were not removed by the May 21 deadline. (See ACT, March 2021.)

Although the arrangement has now been extended, the original deadline weighed heavily on diplomats in Vienna, who are entrenched in negotiations toward restoring the JCPOA. Originally agreed for three months, the arrangement was intended to provide diplomatic space so parties to the nuclear deal could reach consensus on the steps needed for a complete return to JCPOA compliance by Iran and the United States. For Iran, those steps would include a recommitment to its additional protocol, thus negating the need for the temporary monitoring arrangement. 

The IAEA will regain access to all information collected since Feb. 23 once the JCPOA is restored and sanctions are lifted. Certain details regarding Iran’s decision to extend the arrangement remain private, but it does not appear there was any gap in monitoring between the May 21 expiration and May 24 extension of the temporary agreement. 

Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia’s representative to international organizations in Vienna, commended the extension on May 24, tweeting that “it will help maintain businesslike atmosphere at the Vienna talks . . . and facilitate a successful outcome of the diplomatic efforts to restore the nuclear deal.”

As the May 21 deadline drew near, the European members of the deal—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—emphasized the importance of extending the monitoring arrangement. “IAEA access will of course be essential to our efforts to restore the [JCPOA], as the deal cannot be implemented without it,” they said. 

Iran implicitly pledged under the extended monitoring arrangement to continue implementing its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which it is required to uphold as a state-party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Despite a modest decline in inspector presence resulting from the suspension of Iran’s additional protocol and the unique parameters of the temporary monitoring agreement, regular safeguards on Iran’s nuclear program have continued without disruption. 

Regular monitoring reports by the IAEA provide transparency into Iranian nuclear activities and assurance that, despite its violations of the JCPOA, Iran’s nuclear program remains entirely peaceful in nature.—JULIA MASTERSON

Iran has agreed to extend a critical temporary monitoring arrangement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for one month, the agency reported May 24.

UN: Biological, Chemical Agents Tested on Iraqi Prisoners

June 2021

The Islamic State group tested biological and chemical agents on Iraqi prisoners, some of whom died, according to a May 2021 UN report.

Although the existence of the extremist group’s rudimentary chemical weapons program has been known for several years, the report by the UN Investigation Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD) revealed previously unknown experiments on human subjects.

Evidence collected by the investigation team showed that the Islamic State group “tested biological and chemical agents and conducted experiments on prisoners…causing death,” the report said. It added that “[w]eaponized vesicants, nerve agents and toxic industrial compounds are suspected to have been considered under the programme.”

A UN press release said thallium and nicotine were identified as two of the toxic lethal compounds that proved fatal when used on live prisoners in the tests, which took place after the Islamic State group seized control of Mosul in 2014. 

UNITAD obtained evidence from Islamic State electronic devices that led to the opening of the new investigation into the development, testing, and deployment of the group’s indigenous chemical and biological weapons program, said Karim Asad Ahmad Khan, who heads the team, at a UN Security Council briefing on May 10. 

Preliminary findings of that investigation, which is still ongoing, were published in the May report and “confirmed the repeated deployment of chemical weapons by [the Islamic State group] against civilian populations in Iraq between 2014 and 2016, as well as the testing of biological agents on prisoners.”

The investigation is centered on the 2014 Islamic State takeover of the University of Mosul, the 2016 attack against the Mishraq sulfur field and processing facility, and the 2016 attack on the town of Taza Khurmatu. After the university takeover, the Islamic State group repurposed the university’s laboratories for its chemical weapons program. According to Khan, domestic and international scientists and medical professionals initially worked to weaponize chlorine from water treatment plants seized by the militants. 

Islamic State laboratories also developed a “sulfur mustard production system that was deployed in March 2016 through the firing of 40 rockets at the Turkman Shia town of Taza Khurmatu,” Khan said. According to the report, these attacks “resulted in civilian deaths and injuries, including by asphyxiation and other chemical and biological weapons-related symptoms.” 

In 2017, Iraqi security forces regained control of the university, driving the Islamic State group from the campus. 

The investigation team is relying on a range of evidence from battlefield records, detainee and victim testimonies, satellite imagery, remote sensing techniques, and analysis of other related materials and videos. Since 2017, UNITAD has worked with Iraq on efforts to hold the Islamic State group accountable and deliver justice for the victims and survivors of its crimes. 

The report was published against the backdrop of the increasing use of chemical weapons worldwide. From assassination attempts in Malaysia, Russia, and the United Kingdom to repeated chemical weapons attacks in Syria, the global norm against chemical weapons use is eroding. Much has been done to eliminate declared national stockpiles, but experts say preventing the reemergence of chemical weapons as a tool of war by state and nonstate actors is becoming more challenging.—LEANNE QUINN

The Islamic State group tested biological and chemical agents on Iraqi prisoners, some of whom died, according to a May 2021 UN report.

Two of Three Missile Defense Tests Fail

June 2021

Two out of three flight tests, which aimed to integrate the Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile systems, failed because of software problems, according to a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report published in April. 

A THAAD anti-missile battery. (Photo: Lockheed Martin via Getty Images)The Patriot weapons system is an air and missile defense system that can intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in their terminal stage at low altitudes. The THAAD system is a mobile ground-based system that can defend against short-, medium-, and certain intermediate-range ballistic missile attacks at the end of their midcourse and terminal flight stages, thereby allowing interceptors to engage their targets at higher altitudes than the Patriot system would allow.

This integration has important implications for regional security, the United States, and its allies. The United States has been attempting to improve its THAAD batteries around the world, including one deployed to South Korea to deter threats from North Korea, by adding advanced radar and integrating the system with Patriot missiles. 

The flight tests, conducted jointly in October 2019, February 2020, and October 2020 by the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Army, were intended to support what the MDA called an “an urgent regional capability called Patriot Launch-on-Remote (THAAD).” The aim was to launch the Patriot’s interceptor using THAAD radar tracking data before the Patriot system uses its own radar, which catches missiles at a lower altitude than the THAAD radar, to execute the interception. This capability would increase the coverage area of the Patriot batteries. 

The first two tests, labeled FTX-39 and FTP-27 Event 2, received “no test” and failed marks, respectively. The GAO diagnosed the problem as software related. A third test, the FTP-27 Event 1, which took place in October 2020, performed successfully by having Patriot interceptors use THAAD radar data. 

The Patriot Launch-on-Remote capability would allow the Army to use the “right missile for the right threat at the right time against North Korean submarine-launched ballistic missiles” and is supported by operational need, according to Army Gen. Robert B. Abrams, the commander of combined Korean-U.S. forces.

Although South Korea and the United States have argued that the THAAD system’s purpose is purely defensive against the threat of North Korean missiles, China has consistently opposed THAAD deployment in South Korea, arguing that the weapon undermines China’s nuclear deterrence and regional security through enhanced early detection. In retaliation for the THAAD deployment, China imposed sanctions on South Korea, targeting major industries and entitles such as the Lotte Group conglomerate, for 14 months until the two countries renormalized relations.

The THAAD system remains controversial in South Korea, where local residents and civic activists staged a sit-in on April 28 and tried unsuccessfully to block vehicles heading into the base with the system.—SANG-MIN KIM

Two out of three flight tests, which aimed to integrate the Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile systems, failed because of software problems, according to a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report published in April. 

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