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“Your association has taken a significant role in fostering public awareness of nuclear disarmament and has led to its advancement.”
– Kazi Matsui
Mayor of Hiroshima
June 2, 2022
April 2021
Edition Date: 
Thursday, April 1, 2021
Cover Image: 

Biden Fills Key Arms Control Posts


April 2021
By Shannon Bugos and Julia Masterson

President Joe Biden continues efforts to fill key positions across his administration that will influence the future of arms control, support nonproliferation objectives, and determine the trajectory of the U.S. nuclear weapons budget, including modernization programs.

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III greets Dr. Kathleen H. Hicks at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., Feb. 9.  (DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Jack Sanders)Biden tapped long-time aide and confidante Antony Blinken to serve as his foreign policy point man. Blinken began his tenure as secretary of state Jan. 26, and the department has since contributed to the official extension of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with Russia.

The president appointed Jake Sullivan, who served as then-Vice President Biden’s national security advisor, as national security advisor. In the first days and weeks after Inauguration Day, Sullivan worked closely with Blinken on the New START extension, and they have led efforts to fulfill Biden’s campaign commitment to restore Iranian compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Biden has nominated Bonnie Jenkins to fill the key position of undersecretary of state for arms control and international security affairs in January and sent her nomination to the Senate for consideration on March 15. If confirmed, one of the main tasks ahead for Jenkins, who is a board member of the Arms Control Association and former coordinator for threat reduction programs at the State Department under the Obama administration, will be overseeing bilateral talks with Russia on strategic stability and nuclear arms control, as well as guiding the U.S. strategy for the upcoming 10th review conference for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The bureaus of arms control, verification and compliance and international security and nonproliferation at the State Department report to the undersecretary. The president has yet to make nominations for either assistant secretary position in those bureaus but has filled the deputy assistant secretary positions. In January, Alexandra Bell, former senior policy director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, became deputy assistant secretary for arms control, verification and compliance. Similarly, Anthony Wier, who previously worked at the Friend’s Committee on National Legislation as the lead lobbyist and director on nuclear weapons policy, took up the deputy position at the international security and nonproliferation bureau.

Biden tapped Robert Malley, who was previously president of the International Crisis Group, to serve as the administration’s Iran envoy. The White House also nominated Jung Pak of the Brookings Institution to the role of deputy assistant secretary of state for east Asian and Pacific affairs. Certain key regional State Department positions remain unfilled, including the assistant secretary for east Asian and Pacific affairs, the assistant secretary for European and Eurasian affairs, and others.

Wendy Sherman, who played a leading role in negotiating the JCPOA as undersecretary of state for political affairs during the Obama administration, is Biden’s nominee for the key deputy secretary of state post. Her nomination was reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 11. She will be the first female deputy secretary of state if confirmed.

Meanwhile, the Senate confirmed Gen. Lloyd Austin, former commander of U.S. Central Command, as defense secretary Jan. 22 making him the first Black defense secretary. Kathleen Hicks, former senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, to serve as deputy secretary of defense Feb. 8.

Due to his former position on the board of Raytheon Technologies, Austin has recused himself from all decisions related to the company. This leaves Hicks to oversee some key nuclear weapons programs involving Raytheon, including the fate of the intercontinental ballistic missile replacement program and the new nuclear-armed, air-launched cruise missile.

According to a Feb. 24 report in Politico, Hicks has launched a review of several programs ahead of the Pentagon’s release of its fiscal year 2022 budget request, including the Department’s nuclear weapons-related programs.

Biden tapped Colin Kahl, who served as his national security advisor when he was vice president, to be undersecretary of defense for policy. The Senate Armed Services Committee held his hearing on March 4, but the future of his nomination remains uncertain.

Another key Pentagon post has been filled by Richard Johnson, who was sworn in as deputy assistant secretary of defense for countering weapons of mass destruction in March. During the Obama administration, Johnson served at the State Department working on the Iranian nuclear issue and on the National Security Council (NSC) as director for nonproliferation. In January, Leonor Tomero, former counsel for the House Armed Services Committee, was tapped to serve as deputy assistant director for nuclear and missile defense programs.

Laura Holgate was called on to lead a 60-day strategic planning process for the NSC, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, where she is the vice president for materials risk management. Holgate previously served as the senior director for weapons of mass destruction terrorism and threat reduction on the NSC during the Obama administration.

In her new role, Holgate will work closely with Mallory Stewart, who joined the NSC as senior director for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. Stewart was previously deputy assistant secretary of state for emerging security challenges and defense policy during President Barack Obama’s second term.

Overall, nominations and confirmations for positions in the Biden administration are moving at a pace not unusual as compared to the two previous administrations, during which these Senate-confirmed positions took anywhere from one to six months to be filled once a nomination was put forward.

This set of veteran arms control and nonproliferation officials will lead offices in the State and Defense departments and the White House central to U.S. efforts to address the daunting array of nuclear policy challenges now facing the Biden administration.

Some positions are filled but slow pace of appointments could begin to delay administration decisions on some nuclear policy issues.

Syrian Chemicals Stockpile Declaration Still Incomplete


April 2021
By Julia Masterson

Seven years after Syria acceded, under international pressure, to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and allow for the removal of its large chemicals weapons stockpile in the midst of a civil war, top international officials continue to warn that Syria’s declaration is incomplete, suggesting that the regime of Bashar al-Assad has withheld some prohibited items.

A UN-OPCW inspector collects samples on August 29, 2013 where rockets armed with Sarin struck Damascus' eastern Ghouta suburb. The findings helped push Syria to join the CWC and allow for the removal and destruction of the bulk of its deadly chemical weapons stockpile. Since then, chemical attacks resumed and Syria has failed to address lingering questions about the accuracy of its chemical weapons stockpile declaration.  (Photo: Ammar Al-Arbini/AFP via Getty Images)During a March 4 briefing of the UN Security Council, Izumi Nakamitsu, the high representative for disarmament affairs, told the council that only limited progress has been made toward resolving an extensive list of outstanding questions regarding Syria’s chemical weapons dossier.

Nakamitsu’s briefing bore a similar tone to that of Fernando Arias, who heads the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). “At this stage, considering the issues that remain unresolved, the Secretariat assesses that the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete,” the chemical weapons watchdog chief relayed to a March 9–12 meeting of the OPCW Executive Council.

In the years since the UN-OPCW operation in 2013–2016 to remove and destroy the bulk of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal, reports of ongoing chemical weapons attacks attributed to the Syrian government against rebel forces and civilians have raised serious questions about the validity of the initial declaration. The OPCW Declaration and Assessment Team (DAT) was established in 2014 to resolve outstanding issues and verify the completeness and accuracy of Syria’s stockpile declaration.

The DAT has conducted 24 rounds of consultations with Syria in an effort to clarify inconsistencies with its declaration. In a statement on the Syria dossier, Arias told the Executive Council that, as of March 2021, 19 issues with Syria’s declaration remain outstanding, including the “unknown, potentially significant, quantities of chemical warfare agents” that have yet to be declared, as well as “indicators of three undeclared chemical warfare agents found in the samples collected by the DAT.”

One of those outstanding issues pertains specifically to the OPCW’s request that Syria declare its production or weaponization of a nerve agent at a certain chemical weapons production facility omitted from its initial declaration. The production, stockpile, storage, and use of nerve agent is explicitly prohibited by the CWC; although Syria was obligated to declare any such activities to the OPCW in 2013, it did not.

Arias shared that Syria sent a note verbale to the OPCW on March 9 suggesting that discussions were ongoing on that matter and whether chemical weapons were produced or weaponized at the facility in question. But, he said, “the Secretariat has assessed all available information, including explanations provided by the Syrian Arab Republic, to justify the presence of chemical nerve agents at this site.”

In his introductory statement to the council that day, Arias affirmed that “a review of all the information and other materials gathered by the DAT since 2014, including samples, indicates that production or weaponisation of chemical warfare nerve agents took place at this facility.”

Apart from the matter of Syria’s incomplete stockpile declaration, Arias also informed the council that the OPCW’s mandate for certain monitoring activities in Syria expired in 2020. A July 2014 council decision mandated that the chemical weapons watchdog install remote monitoring systems at several former chemical weapons production facilities in Syria. After inspectors made their final visit to those locations in November 2020, the OPCW advised Syria that those facilities should remain sealed pursuant to Syria’s chemical weapons destruction plan and the spirit of the CWC.

Syria’s noncompliance with the CWC and its failure to cooperate with ongoing OPCW investigations threaten to further weaken the global norm against chemical weapons use, but new efforts are underway to hold Syria to account.

The OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), which was established in 2019 to attribute instances of chemical weapons use in Syria, will issue its second report before this summer, Arias informed the council. Furthermore, in October and November 2020, the OPCW shared material for the first time with the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism (IIIM), which is a UN subsidiary mandated “to assist in the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for the most serious crimes under international law committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011.”

The partnership between the IIT and the IIIM was established in July 2020, when the Executive Council welcomed a memorandum of understanding between the OPCW and the UN body, which is responsible for collecting and conveying information that may be relevant for national or international courts and tribunals. (See ACT, September 2020.)

In February, a German court sentenced two former Syrian military officials responsible for committing crimes against humanity during the Syrian civil war. The landmark conviction could set a precedent for prosecuting Syrian government officials for the ongoing, illegal use of chemical weapons. Continued coordination between the OPCW and the IIIM could help to support those efforts.

Also, CWC states-parties may vote to take a number of steps to hold Syria accountable for the use of chemical weapons in violation of the treaty, to which it acceded in 2013. Citing Damascus’ failure to come clean on its stockpile declaration, most recently after being called to do so no later than October 2020, Arias told the council that, “on the basis of the information provided, it is up to you, states-parties, to decide how you wish to proceed.”

States convened Nov. 30–Dec. 1, 2020, at The Hague for the first session of the 25th conference of CWC states-parties. (See ACT, January/February 2021.) They will meet again April 20–22, where the Syria dossier is expected to feature in the discussions.

CWC states-parties may consider steps to hold Syria accountable for use of chemical weapons in violation of the treaty.

U.S. Sanctions Russia for Chemical Weapons Use


April 2021
By Julia Masterson

The United States imposed sanctions to punish Russia for the chemical poisoning of Kremlin critic Alexei Navalny. The Biden administration did so in accordance with the U.S. Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, which mandates that the White House impose a detailed series of diplomatic and economic measures against states implicated in the use of a chemical or biological weapon.

Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny and his wife Yulia are seen arriving at Moscow's Sheremetyevo airport on January 17, from Germany where he recovered from his August 2020 poisoning with a nerve agent. Russian police detained him shortly after he landed for alleged parole violations. (Photo: Kirill Kudryavtsev / AFP via Getty Images) According to a State Department press release on March 2, certain sanctions will be imposed against Russia after a 15-day congressional notification period, pursuant to the act. Those include a termination of foreign assistance to Russia under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, a termination of certain arms sales to Russia, and a denial to Russia of any credit or financial assistance from the U.S. government, among other things.

The sanctions are to remain in place for a minimum of 12 months and can only be removed after that period if the White House certifies to Congress that Russia has met the conditions prescribed by the act, including by “providing reliable assurances that it will not use chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law and will not use lethal chemical or biological weapons against its own nationals.”

Although the attack on Navalny occurred in August 2020, the Trump administration chose not to trigger the act upon reasonable determination that a chemical agent was used and that Russia was responsible. Navalny was poisoned using a Soviet-era Novichok nerve agent on a domestic flight in Russia and was taken for medical treatment to Germany, where doctors and independent laboratory assessments confirmed the cause of his ailment. (See ACT, November 2020.)

Washington last triggered the act in 2018 in response to the poisoning of Sergei Skripal, a former Russian intelligence officer, and his daughter Yulia in Salisbury, United Kingdom, after toxicology reports revealed the Skripals were poisoned using a Novichok agent. Before that, the act was invoked only two other times: against Syria in August 2013 for the large-scale use of chemical weapons during the Syrian civil war and against North Korea in 2018 for the assassination of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s half-brother, Kim Jong Nam, using a lethal nerve agent.

In a March 2 press release, the Treasury Department announced that the Office of Foreign Assets Control would sanction seven Russian government officials believed to have been involved in Navalny’s poisoning. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen remarked, “[T]he Kremlin’s use of chemical weapons to silence a political opponent and intimidate others demonstrates its flagrant disregard for international norms.” In doing so, the United States joined the European Union and UK, who imposed sanctions against those Russian officials and an involved Russian state research institute in October 2020.

As a state-party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Russia is prohibited under international law from producing, stockpiling, or using chemical weapons. The treaty’s monitoring body—the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)—has undertaken a series of steps since Navalny’s poisoning to definitively determine responsibility for the attack in order to hold perpetrators accountable. The OPCW corroborated external analyses proving that a Russian Novichok agent was used against Navalny.

When Moscow requested technical assistance on Oct. 5 to support its own investigation into the incident, OPCW Director-General Fernando Arias told Moscow that the OPCW Secretariat was ready to deploy a team of experts to Russia “on short notice.”

Arias relayed the saga to the OPCW Executive Council, which met March 9–12. He said in his opening statement to the council that after alerting Moscow of three outstanding issues impeding a technical assistance visit by the OPCW, Russia sent a Dec. 16 letter concluding that the mission “no longer seemed relevant.”

The council comprises 41 member states charged with promoting implementation of and compliance with the CWC. Council membership rotates on a biannual basis.

During the March meeting, a group of 16 member states, led by Lithuania, released a joint statement condemning the use of a nerve agent against Navalny. Their statement reiterated that “the poisoning of Mr. Navalny using a chemical weapon is a matter of grave concern” for all CWC states-parties. They called on Russia “to disclose the full circumstances surrounding this confirmed use of a chemical weapon” and demanded that “the perpetrators of this attack must be held to account.” According to Vidmantas Purlys, Lithuania’s permanent representative to the OPCW, an additional 29 CWC states-parties not currently on the council pledged their support for the statement.

Arias did not confirm to the council whether the investigation into Navalny’s poisoning is still active, but the OPCW appears committed to appropriately addressing instances of chemical weapons use.

During a Nov. 30, 2020, session of the CWC conference of states-parties, Arias affirmed that according to the CWC, “the poisoning of an individual through the use of any nerve agent is a use of a chemical weapon.”

Poisoning of Kremlin-critic with Novichok nerve agent prompts censure.

New Work Underway at Israeli Nuclear Site


April 2021
By Sang-Min Kim

Satellite imagery analyzed by experts at the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) in February 2021 shows significant new construction underway in the southwest portion of Israel’s main nuclear weapons complex near the city of Dimona.

The construction activity at the Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center (NNRC) is within the immediate vicinity of the buildings that contain the facility’s heavy-water nuclear reactor and reprocessing plant, which have been used to produce plutonium for the country’s nuclear weapons arsenal. Israel does not publicly acknowledge possessing nuclear weapons and has not provided an explanation about the construction activities underway.

According to a Feb. 19 update of the original IPFM blog post analyzing the satellite imagery of the site, the new construction likely began in late 2018 or early 2019, but the exact intention of the newly cleared parcel, measuring 140 meters by 50 meters of excavated land, remains unclear.

Avner Cohen, a leading expert on Israel’s nuclear history and senior fellow at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies, posted on Facebook on Feb. 25 that the construction may be for a new reactor or a high-energy proton accelerator system that is used to create the high neutron fluence that leads to tritium. He said the construction activities are more likely for the modernization of “existing capabilities (while rebuilding the infrastructure)” rather than the expansion of nuclear weapons capabilities.

According to the Associated Press on Feb. 27, other experts said that the purpose of the new construction activities may be related to extending the life of the reactor to allow for the continued production of tritium gas, which is used in advanced nuclear weapon designs to boost the explosive yield. Tritium must be replaced more often than the fissile material in a nuclear warhead, and the Dimona reactor, which was built in 1963, may be nearing the end of its lifespan. The AP obtained additional satellite images from Planet Labs Inc. that confirm construction at the site is ongoing.

Initially slated for closure around 2023, Israeli Tourism Minister Yariv Levin announced plans in 2017 to extend the reactor’s operations through 2040. At the time, that announcement prompted pushback from other Israeli officials who cited concerns about the safety of extending the reactor’s lifespan.

According to the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), the official purpose behind the facility is to expand and deepen basic knowledge in the nuclear sciences and its related fields and to provide an infrastructure and foundation for the practical and economic use of nuclear energy. The facility’s history began in the 1950s with clandestine assistance from the French government, and the basic architecture of the Dimona complex has mostly remained unchanged until recent developments.

The NNRC is mainly known for the production of nuclear weapons-grade fissile material, but experts assess that Israel is not currently producing fissile material using the Dimona reactor to expand its nuclear weapons program.

The Federation of American Scientists estimates that Israel has produced enough fissile material for about 200 weapons and has assembled around 90 nondeployed nuclear warheads, which were designed for delivery by its Jericho ballistic missiles and aircraft. Israel may also have modified its Dolphin-class submarines purchased from Germany to establish a sea-based nuclear strike capability.

Satellite imagery shows construction at facility near Dimona.

U.S. Largest Seller in Flat Arms Market


April 2021
By Jeff Abramson

The United States accounts for an increasing share of global trade in major conventional weapons, according to the annual arms transfer survey by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The SIPRI report reviewed global conventional arms transfers through the end of 2020 and before the arrival of the Biden administration.

Missiles manufactured by Lockheed Martin are displayed during the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Annual Meeting and Exposition in Washington, DC, October 13, 2014. (Photo: Jim Watson/AFP via Getty Images)The volume of exports last year was exceptionally low in part due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but Pieter D. Wezeman, one of the report co-authors, said in a March 15 statement accompanying the report that “[i]t is too early to say whether the period of rapid growth in arms transfers of the past two decades is over.”

SIPRI researchers measured the volume of trade with a trend-indicator value, a metric based on actual deliveries of major military equipment rather than purchasing announcements, and analyzed trends spanning the past decade. It found that the volume of international trade had decreased by 0.5 percent during 2016–2020 compared to five years earlier, but was 12 percent higher compared to 2006–2010.

United States accounted for 37 percent of exports over the past five years, which is an increase from 32 percent during 2011–2015, with identified exports of major arms to 96 states. Russia and China saw their respective shares of the global arms trade decline. Russia provided 20 percent of global arms, down from 26 percent in the previous period, with declines in transfers to India accounting for the major difference between these two periods. Russia accounted for 13 percent of arms supplied to states in the volatile Middle East region.

China, which is the fifth-largest arms supplier, was responsible for 5.2 percent of global arms transfers in 2016–2020, down slightly from its 5.6 percent share during 2011–2015. Pakistan accounted for more than one-third of the volume of China’s arms exports among Beijing’s 51 clients in the past five years.

SIPRI once again reported that Saudi Arabia continues to be the largest importer of major conventional weaponry, a position it has held for the past several years. The United States accounted for 79 percent of Riyadh’s weapons imports over the past five years, with Washington providing more than half of all weapons that were sold to states in the Middle East during that period. Ongoing policy reviews by the Biden administration concerning arms sales to nations where there are significant human rights concerns, including on multibillion-dollar sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, could affect U.S. arms transfers to these states in the future. (See ACT, March 2020.)

Human rights concerns, as well as arms purchases from Russia, may factor into future U.S. arms sales to other states in the region. Shortly after notifying Congress of a potential $197 million sale of 168 RAM Block 2 ship-defense missiles, Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed concerns to Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry about Cairo’s possible procurement of Su-35 fighter aircraft from Moscow. Blinken has also indicated the Biden administration would make human rights central to U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relations. Egypt was the world's third-largest arms importer over the past five years, according to SIPRI.

In 2019 the United States suspended Turkey’s participation in the F-35 fighter program over its planned acquisition of Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems. In December 2020, Washington imposed sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) for procuring the systems after Congress required it to do so in the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act. Partly due to the halted F-35 deliveries, as well as increases in its own defense production, Turkey moved from being the world’s sixth-largest arms importer to its 20th largest.

India’s possible acquisition of the Russian S-400 systems is also raising concerns among some U.S. lawmakers. In his March 20 press conference during a visit to counterparts in New Delhi, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said he did address concerns about possible Indian acquisition of the S-400 system, but said that “the issue of sanctions is not one that's been discussed” since the weapons had not yet been acquired.

Shortly before the visit, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) sent a letter to Austin urging him to address possible CAATSA sanctions should India purchase S-400s, as well as the country’s anti-democratic activities. In the letter, Menendez said, “I strongly encourage you to make clear that in all areas, including security cooperation, the U.S.-India partnership must rest on adherence to democratic values.”

Report finds U.S. accounted for 37 percent of global arms transfers from 2011–2015.

U.S. Advocates for Binding Rules on Behavior in Space


April 2021
By Nicholas Smith Adamopoulos

A U.S. space commander announced in February that officials from the State and Defense departments were in the process of drafting proposed language for a binding resolution regarding responsible behavior in space.​

“We’re going to prepare what we believe will be proposal language that will go to the UN and hopefully result in a binding resolution,” Maj. Gen. DeAnna Burt, commander of U.S. Space Command’s combined force space component, told Space News on Feb. 24. The United States is working with Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom on the proposal, she said.

The language is being drafted in response to UN General Assembly Resolution 75/36, which was proposed by the UK and approved in December. The resolution seeks to define responsible behavior in space and produce mechanisms for holding parties accountable for their violations, including for space debris that may result from destruction of objects in space. The United Nations is gathering input from member states until May 3 for inclusion in a report to the General Assembly on the subject.

According to Burt, a successful international agreement would need to define hostile behavior and improve the transparency of future space missions, particularly for dual-use technologies. The United States is not seeking to ban specific weapons, she said.

“The Chinese and the Russians have already put weapons in space. So, I think we’re way past having a conversation about regulating them per se, which is why we focus on norms of behavior,” said Burt.

Moscow and Beijing proposed in 2008 and again in 2014 a draft treaty on the prohibition of weapons in outer space.
The United States has repeatedly refused to engage on the proposal, in part because the Russian-Chinese proposal would not specifically limit terrestrially based anti-satellite (ASAT) systems. (See ACT, May 2020.)

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty bans the stationing of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in outer space, prohibits military activities on celestial bodies, and details legally binding rules governing the peaceful exploration and use of space. That treaty does not address other types of weapons that might be used to destroy space objects, including orbiting satellites.

Over the past year, U.S. Space Command has become increasingly concerned by ASAT weapons tests it asserts were conducted by Russia. Moscow, the command says, held tests in May and December 2020, as well as an alleged test of a different type of space-based weapon in July. (See ACT, May and September 2020.)

In response to UNGA resolution, U.S. plans to forward proposals for a multilateral agreement.

State Reviews Plans for New Tech Bureau


April 2021
By Shannon Bugos

Secretary of State Tony Blinken is in the midst of reviewing the mission and responsibilities of a new bureau for cybersecurity and emerging technology at the department that was approved by the Trump administration in January.

The Biden administration vowed to “lead in promoting shared norms and forge new agreements” on emerging technologies and cyberspace.  (Photo: Alastair Pike/AFP via Getty Images)Blinken “has affirmed his support to expand the department’s capacity to address cyberspace security and emerging technology policy issues,” a State Department spokesperson told Arms Control Today on March 16. “The department is committed to establishing a bureau following a review process that examines its mission, scope of responsibility, and placement.”

The State Department first notified Congress in June 2019 of its intent to create the Bureau of Cyberspace Security and Emerging Technologies. “In considering the growing national security challenge presented by cyber space and emerging technologies, the Department has determined that its efforts in these areas are not appropriately aligned or resourced,” said the notification document according to a June 4 report by The Hill.

In October 2020, Christopher Ford, assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, said that the State Department’s decision to create the bureau stemmed from “the idea that in addition to the need to ensure that the department is fully staffed and prepared for the ongoing challenges of cyberspace security diplomacy, we also need full-time specialist expertise to address the security challenges presented by rapid developments” in areas of emerging technology. Such areas, he said, include artificial intelligence and machine learning, quantum information science, nanotechnology, biological sciences, hypersonic systems, outer space, additive manufacturing, and directed energy.

But the State Department’s move to create this new bureau met resistance in June 2019 from House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Eliot Engel (D-N.Y.), who put a hold on the notification to Congress. He argued that the bureau would focus too narrowly on cybersecurity and that its creation would go against “repeated warnings from Congress and outside experts that our approach to cyber issues needs to elevate engagement on economic interests and internet freedoms together with security.”

Nevertheless, on Jan. 7, 2021, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo approved the bureau’s creation. The bureau is critical in efforts to meet “the challenges to U.S. national security presented by China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and other cyber and emerging technology competitors and adversaries,” Pompeo said in a statement.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a Jan. 28 report, however, that concluded that, “as of the date of this report,” the State Department had not established the bureau. This report followed one from September 2020, which found that the State Department had not involved other federal agencies in plans to develop the new bureau.

“Without involving other agencies on its reorganization plan, [the State Department] lacks assurance that it will effectively achieve its goals for establishing this bureau, and it increases the risk of negative effects from unnecessary fragmentation, overlap, and duplication of cyber diplomacy efforts,” the GAO found in its Sept. 2020 report.

According to the GAO reports, the State Department plan includes appointing a coordinator and ambassador at large to lead the new bureau, who would report to the undersecretary of state for arms control and international security affairs. The bureau would have a projected budget of $20.8 million and a staff of 80 full-time employees, who would come from the Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues and the Office of Emerging Security Challenges within the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance.

Meanwhile, President Joe Biden appointed Anne Neuberger, former cybersecurity director at the National Security Agency, to serve as the first deputy national cybersecurity adviser for cyber and emerging technology.

The Biden administration’s interim national security strategy guidance released on March 3 emphasizes the threats posed by emerging technologies, which “remain largely ungoverned by laws or norms designed to center rights and democratic values, foster cooperation, establish guardrails against misuse or malign action, and reduce uncertainty and manage the risk that competition will lead to conflict.” The Biden administration vowed to “lead in promoting shared norms and forge new agreements” on emerging technologies and cyberspace.

New administration seeks to promote shared norms and new agreements on emerging technologies and cyberspace.

China Flight-Tests Missile Interceptors


April 2021

Since the U.S. departure from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, several countries have accelerated efforts to develop or acquire missile defense technology, particularly theater-range interceptors, as a means of protection from other states’ offensive ballistic missiles. China is no exception and has continued efforts to develop and test anti-ballistic missile capabilities, even though it has objected to similar U.S. efforts.

On Feb. 4, China announced that it was able to successfully use missile defense technology against a ballistic missile in its midcourse phase in early February. This is the fifth publicly announced, land-based missile interceptor flight test conducted by China.

In an official statement, a Chinese Defense Ministry official said, “China conducted a successful test of its ground-based midcourse defense system. The missile interception test was defensive in nature and is not targeted at any country.”

China tested this capability for the first time in February 2018. U.S. officials said in July 2020 they estimate that China will not likely achieve an initial operating capability against intermediate-range ballistic missiles and long-range ballistic missiles until
the late-2020s.

In addition, earlier this month, the EurAsian Times reported that China has brought their HQ-19 missile interceptor into operation. The HQ-19 system is designed to intercept medium-range ballistic missiles, with a range of 1,000-3,000 kilometers, in the midcourse phase of their trajectory, when the incoming missiles are outside the atmosphere.

The HQ-19 system is similar to the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which is currently deployed in South Korea. Even though the United States declared that THAAD was in South Korea as a defensive measure against North Korean missiles and not to counter China, Chinese officials objected to the THAAD installation in part because that deployment also included an advanced radar system that China worries could be used to monitor its military activities.

China also has other ballistic missile defense capabilities, including the Russian-made S-300 SAM and the S-400 SAM, which are capable of intercepting medium-range ballistic missiles.—CHELSIE BOODOO

China Flight-Tests Missile Interceptors

Congress Mandates Studies on Nuclear War


April 2021

Congress has mandated a new assessment from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine on “the potential environmental effects of nuclear war” to be completed within 18 months. This study requirement, which was included in the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), follows a less ambitious requirement on related issues that was tucked into the fiscal year 2020 version of the defense bill.

The new study mandate from Congress calls for “an evaluation of the non-fallout atmospheric effects of plausible scenarios for nuclear war, ranging from low-quantity regional exchanges to large-scale exchanges between major powers.” The study is to assess current models of nuclear explosions with respect to fires, atmospheric transport of gases from nuclear war-related explosions, and the consequences of soot and other debris on weather, agriculture, and long-term ecosystem viability.

The law requires that the secretary of defense and director of national intelligence provide the study group with information relating to relevant nuclear war scenarios and that the final report be submitted in an unclassified form with an optional classified annex.

The new report would be among the most significant of its kind by the National Academies since its 640-page examination The Medical Implications of Nuclear War, published in 1986.

In response to a separate study mandate in the 2020 NDAA, the National Academies has begun to convene an ad hoc committee of experts on a report on nuclear war risks.

The task of this study group is to “identify risks associated with nuclear terrorism and nuclear war” and “examine the assumptions about nuclear risks that underlie the national security strategy of the United States.” The committee will issue an unclassified interim report and a final report, which may include findings and recommendations supported by classified information.—DARYL G. KIMBALL

Congress Mandates Studies on Nuclear War

UK Finalizes New Safeguards


April 2021

The United Kingdom’s new safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) entered into force in December, ensuring that certain nuclear activities and materials will remain subject to international monitoring.

IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi told the agency’s Board of Governors on March 1 that the UK’s new voluntary safeguards agreement and the more intrusive additional protocol entered into force Dec. 31. Grossi said that the prior safeguards agreement between the UK and Euratom and the IAEA was terminated.

IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi delivers his remarks at the opening of the Board of Governors Meeting held at the Agency headquarters in Vienna, Austria on March 1. (Photo: Dean Calma / IAEA)As a recognized nuclear-weapon state under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the UK is not required to implement a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. But all five of the recognized nuclear-weapon states have voluntary safeguards arrangements and additional protocols in place for nonmilitary nuclear materials and facilities.

The UK’s voluntary safeguards were applied through its membership in Euratom, the European nuclear energy community that coordinates nuclear research, energy, and safeguards. The UK’s withdrawal from the European Union included an exit from Euratom, necessitating the negotiation a new arrangement with the IAEA. (See ACT, July/August 2017.)

The new agreement with the IAEA will allow the UK to continue certain civil-nuclear cooperation agreements that require agency safeguards.—KELSEY DAVENPORT

UK Finalizes New Safeguards

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