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“It will take all of us working together – government officials, and diplomats, academic experts, and scientists, activists, and organizers – to come up with new and innovative approaches to strengthen transparency and predictability, reduce risk, and forge the next generation of arms control agreements.”
– Wendy Sherman
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
June 2, 2022
United States

Negotiating the New START Treaty


September 2021

How to Succeed at Arms Control Despite Tough Odds

Negotiating the New START Treaty
By Rose Gottemoeller
(Cambria Press, Amherst, New York, 2021)
244 pages

Reviewed by Linton F. Brooks

In January 2009, Rose Gottemoeller, recently returned from three years heading the Moscow office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was given an impossible assignment by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. She was asked to negotiate the first comprehensive bilateral nuclear arms control treaty in more than a quarter of a century and to do so in less than a year, even though the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) took almost a decade. Compounding the hurdles, Gottemoeller was reliant on a U.S. government whose negotiating expertise had atrophied. She had to work with a Russian government in the early grip of Putinism and well known as a difficult negotiating partner. This fascinating book is her personal account of how she met those challenges.

The seniority and prestige of the six officials who provide blurbs on the back of the book demonstrate the high regard in which the author is held. Their view that the book provides unique insights is amply borne out. In addition to its policy importance, the book is a model of clear, understandable writing on a complex subject.

I have known the author as a professional colleague and personal friend for almost four decades. I am mentioned incidentally three times in her book. In her earlier two tours in government, I was one of a number of people with whom she would occasionally brainstorm. I have tried to write an objective review, but I am in no sense an impartial observer.

My observations focus on a handful of the most important topics and are seen through the prism of Cold War arms control negotiations, particularly those leading to the 1991 START for which I was the last chief negotiator. I hope to make it clear where things have changed and where they have not and thus help readers understand the challenges of the future.

The Main Players: Russia and the White House

As Gottemoeller makes clear, the least surprising thing she faced was the nature of her Russian counterparts. They were willing to play games, sometimes withdrew positions that the United States thought were settled, and were often hierarchal and misogynist. Such characteristics were well known to the author, who has decades of experience with the Russians and speaks the language fluently. They would have been equally easy to identify by any member of a Cold War arms control delegation.

The author correctly points out the advantage of having delegation members who speak Russian. She had far more Russian speakers than I had 30 years ago, Today, the number of U.S. career officials with first-hand Russian experience and often Russian language skills gained through arms control inspection teams and the expanding channels of communication between the United States and Russia is again on the rise. Those skills are a significant advantage that must not be squandered in future negotiations.

As a former negotiator, much of the book felt familiar. I remember the Russians repudiating positions they had previously accepted. I remember arguments over who got to go to high-level meetings and the difficulties resulting when one negotiator attended and the other did not. I remember operating on three hours sleep while trying to remain civil. I remember private discussions with my counterpart, often over lunch, to seek to settle issues.

When it came to relations with the White House, however, I could not relate at all to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Gottemoeller worked for the White House; I did not. That was in part because of President Barack Obama's deep personal involvement with the near-impossible goal he had set. It was also because the government’s capability to negotiate an arms control treaty had completely atrophied. Negotiating the first START took nine years and involved six chief negotiators. By the time I arrived, it was clear that arms control negotiations, like any other negotiations, were a responsibility of the Department of State, and there was a well-established system for providing guidance. My only White House involvement was trying to maximize how many of my delegation could attend the signing ceremony.

Despite the excellent people involved, the Obama White House never seemed to fully comprehend how international negotiations worked. It failed to understand the delegation’s need for time to brainstorm on the best approach. It acted as though the only requirement was to put out a draft proposal and get some comments. Treaties are written in Russian and English with each copy considered equally authentic. It takes immense work to ensure phrasing in both languages have the same meaning. Although the book does not say so explicitly, these weaknesses may have been exacerbated by a White House tendency to micromanage.

One example of the lack of understanding, which Gottemoeller was too gracious to mention, was the White House’s failure during a negotiation that went on for 15 months to give her the rank of ambassador. White House staff seemed oblivious to the fact that, in diplomatic negotiations, rank is viewed as a symbol of whether the negotiator is fully empowered with the status and influence to speak authoritatively for their government. That failure made Gottemoeller’s job even more challenging.

The Working-Level Essential: Backstopping

It is gratifying that Negotiating the New START Treaty gives attention to backstopping, the vital interagency process that produces formal instructions to an arms control delegation. It is designed to ensure that the interests of all major governmental agencies are adequately considered. Ideally, backstopping will result in instructions on which all agencies agree. When that is not the case, as was almost always true with the 1991 START, the process allows for the National Security Council staff to adjudicate disputes.

Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, who negotiated the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia, speaks at a conference in the United Kingdom in 2012. (Photo by David Levenson/Getty Images)Backstopping requires a unique leadership style. The leader must be able to bring about consensus, if possible; recognize when consensus is unlikely; and work to gain an appropriate decision to allow instructions to proceed. Gottemoeller recounts how well the process that supported her worked, largely because of the experience and skill of the chair of the backstopping committee, Lynn Rusten.

At least as portrayed in the book, there were relatively few significant disagreements among departments, a rarity in U.S. arms control history. In addition to ensuring that no relevant considerations are overlooked, good backstopping reduces the chance that those believing their interests were inadequately considered will stir political tensions by feeding their concerns to specific senators, gets instructions to the delegation in a timely fashion, and alerts the White House and State Department to issues that may arise in ratification. Officials with backstopping responsibilities in the future will benefit from this section of the book if they use it as a blueprint for their aspirations.

The Political Necessity: High-Level Reinforcement

Cold War negotiators were implementers, not originators. For example, the central limits of the 1991 START were all agreed during presidential summits or meetings between the U.S. secretary of state and the Soviet foreign minister. That does not mean the negotiators had nothing to do. The central limits of START can be listed on a single page; the implementing details, mostly verification, consume several hundred pages.

The negotiating team for New START faced a different problem. The central limits—1,550 deployed warheads, 700 launchers that contained missiles and an aggregate total of 800 launchers (bombers counted as one unit against each of these totals)—were negotiated by the delegation itself, then ultimately agreed by the two presidents .. Because these limits were primarily a military issue, when the Russians appeared to be stonewalling, Gottemoeller made the excellent decision that she needed negotiating support from a senior military officer rather than a more senior diplomat. She enlisted Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen to come to Geneva and meet his Russian counterpart. Although no decisions were reached, this meeting proved successful in gaining Russian agreement to work the issue seriously, ultimately leading to agreement. Mullen’s presence made it clear that there was U.S. military support for the treaty. That was significant because there appears to have been no senior uniformed officer on the U.S. delegation. Later in Moscow, Mullen was similarly influential in gaining Russian approval for the important concept of unique identifiers.

Although Clinton did not engage in direct negotiations with her Russian counterpart, as was generally true during the Cold War, she consistently supported Gottemoeller against White House criticism. Having a strong champion in Washington is a prerequisite for any successful negotiator, and Gottemoeller was fortunate she had one.

The Ultimate Goal: Ratification

There are countries where ratification of a treaty signed by the president is a pro forma matter. The United States is not one of them. The constitutional requirement that U.S. treaties require the “advice and consent” of the Senate by a two-thirds majority vote fundamentally shapes ratification politics. The United States has a deep commitment to freedom of action and tends to dislike being bound by any treaty, no matter how benign. Thus, it is always an uphill battle to achieve advice and consent.

Ratification has official and unofficial components. The official aspects are well understood. When submitted, the treaty is accompanied by a detailed article-by-article analysis so that the Senate and the executive branch can be clear on what they are approving. Hearings are held, and hundreds, perhaps thousands, of questions for the record are asked and answered. Some questions may embody a deeply held concern that needs to be met by a skillful, nuanced answer. The crucial vote of a single senator could hang on that answer. Because it is difficult to know what questions could be important, immense effort must be put into all answers. The arduous nature of this process is only completely clear to those who have been through it.

Another aspect of ratification is building informal support from outside government. Gottemoeller's book is invaluable in illuminating this process. Working with long-time State Department official Terri Lodge, who performed a similar function with both treaties I negotiated but with far less help from me, Gottemoeller organized a deluge of pro-treaty letters aimed at individual senators, as well as pro-treaty statements from many religious denominations. The purpose was to strengthen support among senators already committed to the treaty and provide those who were still on the fence with further justification for favoring ratification.

The final aspect of ratification, also well described in the book, is to ensure that the resolution of ratification passed by the Senate does not contain any poison pills. The resolution for New START is six pages long. Few non-experts think it is important, and even fewer have read it. It provides some “sense of the Senate” nonbinding language and a long series of actions, ,primarily reports, the executive branch must take prior to ratification. What it does not include and what Gottemoeller and Lodge worked diligently to prevent was any condition requiring action by Russia that could preclude the treaty from coming into force. That is what happened in 1996 when the Senate’s approval of START II, which would have banned all intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, directed that ratification “shall not be interpreted as an obligation by the United States to accept any modification, change in scope, or extension” of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. After the Russian legislature’s ratification law required U.S. ratification of the 1997 ABM Demarcation Agreements as a condition for START II to enter into force, it became impossible to bring the treaty into effect.

The Indispensable Factor: Leadership

The United States prides itself on being a nation of rugged individualists. Yet, most significant accomplishments are made by groups motivated by and directed toward a common purpose. Providing that motivation and direction is the function of leadership. Without Gottemoeller’s consistent leadership, New START would never have been completed. That is true for any negotiation, but Gottemoeller’s style was unique.

Cold War arms control delegations were hierarchal. There were a head of delegation and usually a deputy, the members representing each of the major agencies, and technical experts. The delegation was certainly not run like a military organization, but the hierarchy was clear, and the leadership style was often characterized by top-down direction. By contrast, Gottemoeller worked to create a family atmosphere. She recounts the major effort it took to host a Thanksgiving dinner at her apartment and, later, an Easter dinner. Her book is replete with her concerns for keeping the family happy and functioning. Although she is kind enough to mention the efforts of my late wife when I was the chief START negotiator, we did nothing like this. Readers should also note that whenever she describes a success, she inevitably gives credit to those on her delegation who created that success. Whenever there are problems, she does not speak of individuals but simply acknowledges the problem. That shows graciousness and sound leadership.

Did this leadership style contribute to her success? That is inherently an unanswerable question, but she undoubtedly succeeded, and her unique leadership style pervades the book. Indeed, students of leadership may wish to read this book entirely to understand a leadership style that is uncommon in government.

Although most of Gottemoeller’s decisions struck me as correct, I do have two quibbles. I was surprised that, faced with the imminent expiration of START, she suggested that the two presidents sign the new treaty along with a protocol containing major verification provisions while leaving detailed technical verification annexes for a subsequent agreement. In the Cold War, such a proposal would have enraged conservatives who believed that verification deserved equal prominence with actual limits. Indeed, for the 1991 START, conservatives insisted that each of the seven annexes that dealt with verification be signed by the presidents individually to avoid any impression that verification was secondary. Because the Obama White House did not accept Gottemoeller’s idea, we will never know if modern conservatives would have had the same reaction.

I could find only one, understandable error. During the end of negotiations, the White House directed two senior State Department officials to visit Geneva to “assist” the delegation. When the delegation interpreted this as a lack of confidence, Gottemoeller sought to reassure them by claiming that an even larger group had been sent during the endgame of the first START. Although this was doubtless reassuring, it is incorrect. There was no one from Washington sent to Geneva in the final days of the 1991 negotiations.

The book’s last full chapter is a collection of lessons learned, each discussed in thoughtful detail. Readers who cannot spare the time for the whole book should read at least this final chapter.

At the same time, these are lessons for negotiating a bilateral arms control treaty, and they should not be misinterpreted. Although Gottemoeller is justly proud of what she and her team accomplished, it would be a mistake to assume her approach will be adequate for negotiating the follow-on to New START. Because the U.S. and Russian presidents made clear the limitations of what they were seeking to accomplish, Gottemoeller could insist, for example, that ballistic missile defense was not a subject for discussion. That is unlikely to be the case in the future.

The negotiations that will soon begin on what follows New START will be more complex and challenging. The two sides will need to deal with ballistic missile defense, with what the Russians call “conventional strategic strike,” and with the implications of space and cyberspace, as well as unmanned vehicles and artificial intelligence.

As China increases its strategic forces, it will be necessary to determine how that country influences bilateral negotiations with Russia. Although it is doubtful China will soon or perhaps ever join the United States and Russia in formal arms control negotiations, many topics, including space, could and should be discussed in separate multilateral negotiations.

The United States will have to be much better prepared for the follow-on negotiations. That will entail rebuilding the capability that used to exist within the government's career force, especially at the State Department. It will mean using the recently initiated Strategic Stability Dialogue to revitalize the interagency process and to develop procedures for backstopping. The government must integrate experts in space, cyberspace, and other disciplines with those traditionally involved in nuclear negotiations. It must bring new experts with fresh ideas into the career civil and foreign services. Only then will the country be ready to build on the significant accomplishments that New START represents.

This is a forward-looking and optimistic book, as reflected in the author’s last two sentences: “Despite deep differences between Washington and Moscow…we must continue to make progress in controlling and limiting nuclear weapons. It is our responsibility to humanity.”

I read those words as a public skeptic, having argued that New START would be the last bilateral nuclear arms control treaty.1 Yet, the notion of our responsibility to humanity, and to our grandchildren, is a powerful one. There is no doubt Gottemoeller is right in the long term. The question is whether she can be right in the few years left before 2026, when New START expires for good.

In her prologue, Gottemoeller says one of her aims in writing the book was “spurring people young and old to think about the opportunities and challenges in the field. In particular, my wish is that this book will inspire new negotiators to enter the game.” She adds that “negotiating a nuclear treaty…requires a clear-eyed sense of where U.S. national interest lies. Then, we must negotiate so that the treaty serves that interest.”

If arms control has a future, it will be because a new generation has taken up her challenge and embraced the optimism of her prologue. No matter how the challenges of the future are ultimately resolved, those trying to shape them will benefit from reading and rereading this remarkable book.

ENDNOTES

1. Linton Brooks, “The End of Arms Control,” Daedalus, Vol. 149, No. 2 (April 2020): 84–100.

 


Linton F. Brooks has over six decades of experience in national security. He served from July 2002 to January 2007 as administrator of the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, responsible for the U.S. nuclear weapons program and for the department’s international nuclear nonproliferation programs. In the early 1990s, he was the chief U.S. negotiator for the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Currently, he is a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a distinguished research fellow at the National Defense University.

A veteran U.S. arms control expert analyzes how the author led the delegation that negotiated the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).

Biden Administration Begins Nuclear Posture Review


September 2021
By Kingston Reif

The Biden administration has formally begun a review of U.S. nuclear weapons policy against the backdrop of several competing pressures. These include President Joe Biden’s desire to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy and put the emphasis on a more holistic and integrated view of deterrence, concerns about increasingly aggressive Russian and Chinese nuclear behavior, the growing cost of the U.S. nuclear modernization program, and divisions in Congress about the future of U.S. nuclear policy.

As a candidate, President Joe Biden said the United States does not need new nuclear weapons. Whether he plans to act on that rhetoric will be reflected in the Nuclear Posture Review, which is intended to examine the size, role, and capability of the country's nuclear arsenal. (Photo by U.S. Air Force)“The Nuclear Posture Review [NPR] is currently underway,” Lt. Col. Uriah Orland, a Defense Department spokesman, told Arms Control Today on Aug. 13. “The review started in early July, and it will be finalized in conjunction with the National Defense Strategy early next year.”

The review will be the fifth since the end of the Cold War. The Trump administration’s review, conducted from 2017 to 2018, sought to expand the role and capability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal amid what the administration believed was a deteriorating nuclear threat environment. (See ACT, March 2018.)

Biden criticized his predecessor’s nuclear weapons policies during the presidential campaign. He told the Council for a Livable World in responses to a 2019 candidate questionnaire that the United States “does not need new nuclear weapons” and that his “administration will work to maintain a strong, credible deterrent while reducing our reliance and excessive expenditure on nuclear weapons.”

Biden also expressed his belief that “the sole purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be deterring—and, if necessary, retaliating against—a nuclear attack” against the United States and its allies.

The 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, released by the White House in March, stated that the administration would seek to “re-establish [its] credibility as a leader in arms control” and “take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in [U.S.] national security strategy.”

But it remains to be seen whether Biden will order any adjustments to the policies and programs he inherited. The administration’s first budget request, released in May, would continue the expensive and controversial nuclear weapons sustainment and modernization efforts pursued by the Trump administration pending the outcome of the Nuclear Posture Review. (See ACT, July/August 2021.)

In June, Melissa Dalton, the acting assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans, and capabilities, told the House Armed Services Committee that the NPR “will consider and assess U.S. strategy, posture, and policy adjustments and consider program execution risk—all with a goal of maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, ensuring strategic stability, and reducing risks of mistake and miscalculation in crisis and conflict.”

“This process will be informed by the 21st century security and fiscal environment,” she added.

Colin Kahl, the undersecretary of defense for policy, told the 2021 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference in June that the administration seeks “to make sure that the [NPR] does not stand on its own in its own silo…but is rather integrated into the analysis” of the National Defense Strategy.

It is unclear if the conclusions of the NPR will be published in a stand-alone report, as has been the case for past reviews.

“We will determine whether to integrate the findings into the [National Defense Strategy] or publish a stand-alone review,” Orland told Arms Control Today.

The commencement of the NPR comes as the Biden administration, like the Trump administration, has expressed growing concern about the nuclear behavior of Russia and China. The two countries are modernizing their arsenals and developing new weapons capabilities and, according to U.S. intelligence estimates, are projected to increase the size of their nuclear warhead stockpiles over the next decade.

“We are witnessing a strategic breakout by China,” Adm. Charles Richard, the head of U.S. Strategic Command, said at the Space & Missile Defense Symposium in Alabama on Aug. 12.

“The explosive growth and modernization of its nuclear and conventional forces can only be what I describe as breathtaking,” he added.

In addition to a more challenging international security environment, the administration must also confront the rapidly rising price tag of the U.S. nuclear sustainment and modernization effort, which has jumped to a projected $634 billion over the next decade, according to the Congressional Budget Office. (See ACT, June 2021.)

Kahl said the administration has “concerns about the cost and scheduling issues” presented by the modernization program, but expressed confidence that “we can deliver the current modernization plan on cost and on schedule.”

He also noted that given that the NPR may not be complete until early 2022, after the release the fiscal year 2023 budget request next February, certain decisions about force structure and modernization will be accelerated during the review process to inform the next budget submission.

Meanwhile, members of Congress continue to debate whether the administration should use the review to adjust U.S. nuclear policy.

In a July 21 letter, the co-chairs of the bicameral Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group—Sens. Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) and Ed Markey (D-Mass.) and Reps. Don Beyer (D-Va.) and John Garamendi (D-Calif.)—and 18 other lawmakers urged Biden to “reject a 21st century arms race and make bold decisions to lead us towards a future where nuclear weapons no longer threaten all humanity.” The U.S. should forgo new nuclear weapons, they said.

Similarly, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith (D-Wash.) advised the president in a letter on Aug. 9 “to ensure the nuclear deterrent is safe, secure, reliable, affordable, and…balanced across the full spectrum of integrated deterrence.”

As part of the review, Smith also called on Biden “to take a hard look at whether every ongoing and planned [modernization] effort is necessary” in light of concerns about “affordability and executability.”

Republicans, on the other hand, have continued to urge the administration to plow full steam ahead with current policies and consider whether increases to the arsenal may be necessary given the threat posed by Russia and China.

“We have known that China has been undergoing a crash nuclear buildup for some time, and now it has been laid bare for all the world to see,” Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.), the ranking member on the House Armed Services Committee, said on July 27 in response to reports that China is building new silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles.

“We need to have a serious discussion about what it truly means to have to deter two near-peer nuclear adversaries at the same time,” he noted. “It is abundantly clear that we must also rapidly modernize our nuclear infrastructure and bring our deterrent into the 21st century.”

 

The exercise will influence the future role, size and capabilities of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

Pentagon Raises Concerns About NNSA Budget


September 2021
By Kingston Reif

The Nuclear Weapons Council, which coordinates planning for the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, certified in July that the Energy Department’s fiscal year 2022 budget request is adequate to sustain and modernize the country’s nuclear warheads and supporting infrastructure.

Sen. James Inhofe (R-Okla.), the top Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, is among those who agree with the Pentagon's Nuclear Weapons Council in arguing for more spending on nuclear weapons. (Photo by Stefani Reynolds/Getty Images)But the council also warned that the request “injects risk into the longer-term schedule required to ensure modernization of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.”

The certification letter to Congress, which is required annually by law, raises further questions about the affordability and executability of the modernization plans of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) as the Biden administration begins its Nuclear Posture Review, a comprehensive assessment of U.S. nuclear strategy and capabilities.

The letter said the proposed 2022 funding level “contains minimally sufficient immediate investment to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.” It added that members of the council “express unanimous and grave concern that accepting increased programmatic risk” within the nuclear weapons activities of the NNSA, a semiautonomous agency of the Energy Department, “will further increase operational risk at a time when [the Energy and Defense departments] are executing the nuclear modernization program of record.”

The administration is requesting about $15.5 billion for nuclear weapons activities at the NNSA in 2022, an increase of $139 million above the 2021 level appropriated by Congress, but a decrease of about $460 million from the Trump projection of $15.9 billion for 2022. (See ACT, July/August 2021.) The request did not continue any projected spending levels beyond 2022.

The council cautioned in its letter that “additional growth beyond a two percent assumed inflation rate in the [NNSA] budget may be necessary to fully fund and successfully execute modernization of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.”

The weapons activities request for 2022 is the first decrease from a prior-year request since fiscal year 2013 and from a prior-year projection since fiscal year 2016, albeit from a much larger baseline. Last year, Congress provided approximately $15.4 billion, a mammoth increase of $2.9 billion above the fiscal year 2020 appropriation. (See ACT, January/February 2020.)

Overall, spending on NNSA weapons activities grew by nearly 70 percent during the Trump administration. The agency revealed last December that the projected 25-year cost of its warhead and infrastructure sustainment and modernization plans rose from $392 billion to $505 billion between 2019 and 2020. (See ACT, April 2021.)

In a July 27 statement publicizing the council’s letter, Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.) and Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.), the ranking members on the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, said they agreed with the council’s warnings.

“It’s irresponsible that this White House…put forward a budget that puts our nation in such a dangerous position,” they said.

But House Armed Service Committee Chairman Adam Smith (D-Wash.) said the growth in the NNSA budget in recent years demands greater oversight.

The NNSA “has had an increasing number of requirements levied upon it, not only by [the Defense Department], but also Congress,” Smith wrote in an Aug. 9 letter to President Joe Biden.

“In nearly every instance, NNSA programs have seen massive cost increases, schedule delays, and cancellations of billion-dollar programs,” he said. “This must end.”

“As we near the budgetary heights of the ‘nuclear modernization mountain’ we can ill afford further delays and cost overruns,” Smith added.

A Pentagon council that oversees the U.S. nuclear stockpile raises new doubts about the affordability of the nuclear modernization plans, terms funding for fiscal year 2022 “minimally sufficient.”

New Cruise Missile Cost Rises


September 2021
By Kingston Reif

The projected cost of the U.S. Air Force’s program to build a new fleet of nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) has risen to between $14.2 billion and $16.2 billion as the service begins the main development phase for the weapons.

An AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile, shown here during a 2014 training exercise after being released from a B-52H Stratofortress over the Utah Test and Training Range. (Photo by U.S, Air Force)The updated cost projection is an increase of 30–50 percent from the Air Force’s earlier estimate of $10.8 billion for the program, known as the long-range standoff (LRSO) weapon, in 2016. (See ACT, September 2016.) Both the new and previous estimates include the impact of inflation.

Bloomberg was the first to report on the updated cost estimate for the LRSO system. The cause of the projected increase is unclear.

The latest projection does not include the upgraded warhead for the missile, dubbed the W80-4, which is expected to cost an additional $11 billion.

The new missile estimates were prepared by the Air Force and the Pentagon’s independent cost-estimating office ahead of the program’s Milestone B decision, a landmark for major Pentagon acquisition programs because it is considered the program’s official start.

Following the Milestone B decision, the Air Force in July awarded a $2 billion development contract to the Raytheon Co. for the program.

In a press release announcing the LRSO award, the Air Force wrote, “Raytheon provided the best overall value to the warfighter and taxpayers based on the selection process’ evaluation factors.”

The award of the contract to Raytheon did not come as a surprise.

The service had already decided in April 2020 to continue developing the missile with Raytheon as the sole contractor, citing the company’s superior design. (See ACT, May 2020.)

In August 2017, the Air Force awarded Raytheon and Lockheed Martin Corp. each a $900 million contract to proceed with development of the LRSO system. (See ACT, October 2017.) The contracts were intended to cover a 54-month period of development after which the Air Force would choose one of the contractors to complete development and begin production.

The Air Force later in 2020 decided to accelerate the Milestone B decision for the program to the spring of 2021, about nine months earlier than planned.

The Biden administration supported the acceleration of the program in its first budget request. The Pentagon is asking for $609 million for the LRSO program in fiscal year 2022, an increase of $250 million more than the Trump administration was planning to seek. (See ACT, July/August 2021.)

It is not clear whether the unplanned increase reflects the growth in the projected acquisition cost for the program, the acceleration of certain program activities, or both.

Current Air Force plans call for the procurement of about 1,000 new nuclear-capable missiles to replace the current fleet of AGM-86B missiles that have been operational since 1986. The service says a new ALCM is needed because the existing missiles are becoming increasingly difficult to maintain and are losing their ability to penetrate sophisticated air defenses. The new missile will be compatible with the B-52H and planned B-21 bombers.

The new missile will be dubbed the AGM-181 when it becomes operational.

The cost projection for a new long-range standoff weapon has increased 30–50 percent from the U.S. Air Force’s earlier estimate.

Key Arms Control Officials Confirmed


September 2021
By Shannon Bugos and Julia Masterson

The Biden administration made progress over the past two months in filling key arms control and national security posts within several departments.

Bonnie Jenkins, a former Arms Control Association board member with decades of experience as an arms control and nonproliferation expert, is the new undersecretary of state for arms control and international security. She is among the unusually high number of women named to national security positions by President Joe Biden. (Photo by U.S. Mission-Geneva)Bonnie Jenkins was sworn in on July 25 as undersecretary of state for arms control and international security. Just three days later, she led the U.S. delegation, alongside Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, in a round of the U.S.-Russian strategic stability dialogue in Geneva.

“I am committed to reduce the risk of nuclear war by effective arms control, limit Russian and [Chinese] nuclear expansion, strengthen biosecurity, and pursue accountability for the use of chemical weapons,” Jenkins posted on Twitter following her swearing-in ceremony.

The Senate confirmed Jenkins on July 21 by a vote of 52–48. Biden nominated her for the post in March. (See ACT, April 2021.)

Jenkins, a former board member of the Arms Control Association and former coordinator for threat reduction programs at the State Department under President Barack Obama, will oversee bilateral talks with Russia on strategic stability and nuclear arms control, as well as guide U.S. strategy for the upcoming 10th review conference for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

In addition, Biden nominated Mallory Stewart on July 2 to become assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification, and compliance, a position that reports to Jenkins. Stewart currently serves as a special assistant to the president and senior director for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation on the National Security Council. She previously served as deputy assistant secretary of state for emerging security challenges and defense policy during Obama’s second term.

Stewart’s confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has yet to be scheduled.

Also among the Obama administration alumni tapped to join the Biden team is Laura Holgate, who was nominated July 27 to be the U.S. representative to the Vienna office of the United Nations and to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Holgate previously served as U.S. ambassador to the IAEA from July 2016 until January 2017.

At the Pentagon, Biden nominated Sasha Baker as deputy undersecretary of defense for policy and Deborah Rosenblum as assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical, and biological defense. Baker is now the White House’s senior director for strategic planning at the National Security Council and served as deputy chief of staff to Defense Secretary Ash Carter during the Obama administration. She was nominated Aug. 10, and her confirmation hearing has yet to be scheduled.

Rosenblum, an executive vice president at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a nongovernmental organization, previously held multiple senior positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Following her nomination April 27, she was confirmed by a voice vote of the Senate on July 29, and Pentagon spokesperson John Kirby said on Aug. 10 that the department recently welcomed her to its ranks.

With a bipartisan vote of 79–16, the Senate confirmed Jill Hruby on July 22 as undersecretary of energy for nuclear security and administrator at the NNSA, a semiautonomous agency at the Energy Department. Biden nominated Hruby, a former director of Sandia National Laboratories, in April.

Hruby will “lead our efforts to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent and protect our national security,” said Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm following Hruby’s confirmation. “She is a brilliant leader, a model public servant, and an inspiration to engineers and rising stars everywhere.”

Frank Rose was sworn in Aug. 2 as NNSA principal deputy administrator. Rose, nominated in April, previously served in Obama’s State Department as assistant secretary for arms control, verification, and compliance and deputy assistant secretary for space and defense policy.

Biden also announced on Aug. 4 his nomination of Corey Hinderstein as deputy administrator for defense nuclear nonproliferation at the Energy Department. She previously served as senior coordinator for nuclear security and nonproliferation policy affairs in that office and currently is the NTI vice president of international fuel-cycle strategies.

“If confirmed, she would lead our nonproliferation work and help keep our nation and our world safe from nuclear threats,” Granholm said about Hinderstein’s nomination.

 

Bonnie Jenkins, the new undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, is among the officials recently confirmed by the Senate.

Lawsuit Targets Arms Flows to Mexico


September 2021
By Jeff Abramson

The Mexican government took a novel approach to curtailing illegal gun trafficking into its country by filing suit against U.S. gun manufacturers and distributors in a Massachusetts federal district court.

In the unusual lawsuit filed in August, Mexico alleged that a number of major firearms manufacturers and wholesalers “design, market, distribute, and sell guns in ways they know routinely arm the drug cartels in Mexico.” It said the named companies sell about 340,000 of an estimated half million guns that illegally flow each year from “Massachusetts and other U.S. states to criminals south of the border.”

The suit draws particular attention to semiautomatic firearms, also known as assault weapons, that can easily be converted to fully automatic versions and are “weapons of choice” for drug cartels. Mexico calls for a range of measures to force the companies to curtail illegal arms flows and is reportedly seeking at least $10 billion in damages, although that amount is not explicitly enumerated in the lawsuit.

The case relies to a large degree on U.S. law, with Mexico arguing that it “does not challenge or question the law, policy, or actions of the United States” but instead “seeks to hold accountable and stop the reckless actions of private companies that foreseeably send their guns into Mexico.” Efforts to hold U.S. firearms manufacturers liable for the misuse of their products are made difficult by the U.S. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which provides U.S. manufacturers with special immunity from certain liability. Mexico contends that the PLCAA only extends to harm within the United States and does not shield the U.S. manufacturers in this case.

How the Biden administration reacts to this case could be significant. Although the U.S. government is not named in the suit, the administration has called for Congress to repeal the PLCAA and championed a domestic assault weapons ban.

The case also may draw fresh attention to a Trump-era rule change that removed export oversight of semiautomatic assault weapons from the State Department, which administers the U.S. Munitions List, and transferred it to the Commerce Department, which oversees the Commerce Control List. The switch means the process is less transparent because Congress does not receive notifications of potential sales. (See ACT, March 2020.) President Joe Biden promised during his campaign to reverse this change, but his administration has not yet acted.

Notably, the lawsuit does not address the legal trade in firearms between the United States and Mexico, which is conducted through the Mexican military. Firearms ownership in Mexico is tightly regulated by the government, with just one centralized gun store issuing fewer than 50 licenses per year, according to the suit.

But the Mexican military has been implicated in numerous civilian deaths in Mexico, either directly or through the weapons it transfers to police forces. Despite this, the Biden administration notified Congress in July of a potential sale of nearly $5.5 millionworth of Sig Sauer fully automatic rifles to the Mexican navy and marines.

Sig Sauer is not named in the lawsuit, but is one of a number of German companies that arms trade watchers suggest has established production facilities in the United States in order to legally export weapons to Latin American countries under U.S. contracts that would not be approved if the sales had originated in Germany.

 

Other Lawsuits on U.S. Arms Transfers

Across the globe, there is a growing trend of legal challenges to the arms trade, including a number of cases in U.S. courts. The lawsuit filed by Mexico is unique in that the plaintiff is a foreign country and it seeks to address illicit arms trade rather than that approved by the U.S. government, but two other cases, recently filed in U.S. district court in Washington, are aimed at stopping weapons from being transferred from the United States.

Nigeria. In late July, the Indigenous People of Biafra filed a case against the U.S. Defense and State departments seeking a halt to future transfers of Super Tucano aircraft to Nigeria and the return of those already transferred, citing violations of the so-called Leahy Law, which prohibits transfers to military units that have been credibly accused of gross human rights violations. The sale of 12 aircraft was put on hold at the end of the Obama administration, but moved forward by the Trump administration in 2017 (See ACT, September 2017), with the first six aircraft delivered this summer. The case is in the early stages, and it is unclear whether it will be heard. Media reports say that members of Congress, citing human rights concerns, have quietly put holds on the sales of additional attack helicopters after being informally notified of possible sales by the State Department.

United Arab Emirates. At the end of 2020, the New York Center for Foreign Policy Affairs, now joined by others, including individuals harmed by the conflict in Libya, filed a case against the State Department challenging $23 billion in arms sales to the United Arab Emirates, citing violations of the Arms Export Control Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. Following a motion to dismiss by the State Department, the court has yet to rule whether the case will proceed. The Biden administration has indicated it is working to go ahead with the sales in the coming years. (See ACT, May 2021.)

The Mexican government has sued U.S. gun manufacturers and retailers in a Massachusetts federal district court.

U.S. Hypersonic Glide Vehicle Test Fails Again


September 2021

The U.S. Air Force’s air-launched hypersonic boost-glide vehicle, known as the Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), failed another flight booster test in July after a failure three months earlier.

Air Force crew prepare for a test of the AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon at Edwards Air Force Base, California, in 2020. The hypersonic weapon travels at five times the speed of sound. (Photo by U.S. Air Force)The rocket motor for the ARRW test missile did not ignite after the missile “cleanly separated” from a B-52 bomber and “successfully demonstrated the full release sequence” during the July 28 test over Point Mugu Sea Range near southern California, the Air Force said in a July 29 statement. During a booster test in April, the test missile failed to complete the launch sequence. (See ACT, May 2021.)

“Developing first-of-its-kind missiles is difficult business, and this is why we test,” said Brig. Gen. Heath Collins, the Air Force’s program executive officer for weapons, after the test.

The Air Force has said that the ARRW system is designed to provide the ability to destroy high-value, time-sensitive targets and will expand the capabilities of precision-strike weapons systems by enabling rapid response strikes against heavily defended land targets. The service’s fiscal year 2022 budget request included $238 million for continued research and development and $161 million for initial procurement of the hypersonic system. (See ACT, July/August 2021.)

The Air Force plans to begin deploying the ARRW system in 2022, but that date may be pushed back. Collins told reporters on Aug. 4 that figuring out what went wrong with the test “may impact our ability to meet our next test window as we go forward.” The hypersonic system must successfully complete booster and all-up-round test flights before a contract is awarded to manufacturer Lockheed Martin so production can begin.

The July booster test followed the first detonation of an ARRW warhead earlier in the month, which the Air Force dubbed as successful in a July 7 statement. The missile will be armed with what is known as a fragmentation warhead, according to a July 16 Aviation Week report, which would limit the ARRW system to destroying soft targets.—SHANNON BUGOS

U.S. Hypersonic Glide Vehicle Test Fails Again

Pentagon Issues First Memo on Space Norms


September 2021

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has issued a memo mandating that the Pentagon follow a set of guidelines regarding responsible space operations and adherence to international space norms. This is the first time that the department has taken this kind of official step, rather than less formal verbal commitments, to set norms of behavior in space, although experts say the guidelines represent only a first step.

The July 7 memo specifies five “tenets of responsible behavior,” which include calls for ensuring safety, limiting the release of long-lasting space debris, avoiding harmful interference, maintaining safe separation from other humans or objects, and maintaining communication.

The guidelines apply only to Defense Department space operations, but are intended to contribute to a broader dialogue involving civilian, commercial, and other organizations that conduct space-related business, according to John Hill, acting assistant defense secretary for space policy. “We will make more progress through efforts to share views on what we think are the best practices and encourage each other to adopt those best practices,” Hill told Space News on July 16.

A majority of experts welcomed Austin’s memo, reported Breaking Defense, which first broke the news on July 19. “I think it’s actually a pretty good start to identifying and formalizing what [the Pentagon] sees as norms of behavior,” remarked Victoria Samson, head of Secure World Foundation’s Washington office.

The guidelines may be part of a larger Pentagon effort to set the agenda on space norms. In February, a U.S. space commander announced that officials from the State and Defense departments were in the process of drafting proposed language for a binding resolution regarding responsible behavior in space. (See ACT, April 2021.)—HOLLIS RAMMER

Pentagon Issues First Memo on Space Norms

New Report Released on the Allure and Risks of Hypersonic Weapons

Sections:

Body: 

For Immediate Release: Sept. 14, 2021

Media Contacts: Shannon Bugos, research associate, [email protected], and Kingston Reif, director for disarmament and threat reduction policy, [email protected]

(WASHINGTON, DC)—A new report from the Arms Control Association details the growing allure but also the risks of the aggressive pursuit of hypersonic weapons by the United States amid a renewed emphasis on military competition with China and Russia. The report also proposes action items for Congress to better understand the Defense Department’s plans for the weapons and mitigate strategic stability risks.

The debate concerning hypersonic weapons has gained increased attention in recent years as the United States has poured billions of dollars—and plans to pour billions more—into accelerating the development of hypersonic weapons and as China and Russia make headway in developing and deploying their own such weapons. The Pentagon is funding no less than eight prototype hypersonic weapons programs with the aim of fielding an initial capability of at least some of those by 2022.

“[T]he U.S. rush to field hypersonic weapons merits a more critical examination by the Biden administration and Congress given the many unanswered questions about their rationale, technical viability, cost-effectiveness, and escalatory risks,” write Shannon Bugos, a research associate, and Kingston Reif, the director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association.

“It is time—in fact, past time—for Congress to demand these answers before the military begins fielding the weapons in great numbers,” they say.

The report, Understanding Hypersonic Weapons: Managing the Allure and the Risks, outlines the scope of the unanswered questions about the case for hypersonic weapons, details the underappreciated risks to stability posed by the weapons, assesses the viability of arms control as a tool to reduce these risks, and suggests recommended action items for Congress to better its understanding about the Pentagon’s plans for the weapons, eliminate potential redundancies in weapons capabilities, and mitigate stability risks.

The full report is available for download at ArmsControl.org/Reports.

Description: 

This new report details the growing allure—and risks—of hypersonic weapons being pursued by the United States amid a renewed emphasis on military competition with China and Russia. The report also proposes action items for Congress to better understand the Defense Department’s plans for the weapons and mitigate strategic stability risks.

Country Resources:

Raisi Pledges Return to Nuclear Talks

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi pledged to pursue “smart engagement” in order to lift sanctions on Iran during his Aug. 5 inauguration speech. Raisi characterized the U.S. sanctions as oppressive and said his government would support “a diplomatic plan that achieves this goal,” likely referring to efforts to restore U.S. and Iranian compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). He also said that Iran’s nuclear program is “completely peaceful” and reiterated the official line that “Iran has placed a religious ban on nuclear weapons.” Talks to...

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