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– Marylia Kelley
Tri-Valley Communities Against a Radioactive Environment
June 2, 2022

CFE Parties Outline Adapted Treaty; Limits to Allow NATO Growth

Wade Boese

DESPITE MOSCOW'S anger at NATO air strikes in Yugoslavia, as well as continued opposition to NATO expansion, Russia joined the United States and the 28 other states-parties to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty on March 30 in signing a preliminary agreement for adapting the Cold War-era treaty to the current security environment. The agreement is not legally binding, but will guide negotiations within the Vienna-based Joint Consultative Group (JCG)—the treaty's implementing body—for replacing the treaty's bloc-to-bloc structure with a system of national and territorial limits.

Though both Moscow and Washington welcomed the agreement, a Russian Foreign Ministry statement cautioned that the "decision does not cover the entire spectrum of problems of adaptation." Russia, which has sought through CFE adaptation to blunt some of the ill effects of NATO expansion, had demanded that talks conclude before the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland formally joined NATO (which occurred March 12). The adaptation negotiations, on-going since January 1997, are now expected to be wrapped up by November.

Signed in 1990, the CFE Treaty capped the number of tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), heavy artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters—referred to as treaty-limited equipment (TLE)—that NATO and the now-defunct Warsaw Pact could deploy between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. To prevent conventional force buildups in the center of Europe, the treaty employed a concentric zone structure that permitted larger TLE deployments the farther one moved away from the fault line between the two alliances.

Under an adapted treaty, there will be 30 separate national limits, each covering all five TLE categories, rather than two balanced bloc limits. Each country will also have a territorial ceiling capping the total amount of ground TLE, both national and foreign, allowed within its borders. For countries in the flank zone—created to limit the amount of ground TLE in the northern and southern flanks of Europe—territorial ceilings will be set equal to national ceilings. Therefore, if any flank country wants foreign forces on its territory, its actual TLE holdings must be lower than its national limits by at least an amount equivalant to the foreign TLE. A Russian proposal for territorial ceilings on combat aircraft and attack helicopters failed, as NATO argued that such equipment is too mobile to be verified on a territorial basis.

As part of the March 30 accord, all CFE parties agreed to prospective national limits except Azerbaijan, which claimed it was unable to declare such limits at this time. The sum of the proposed national limits for NATO's 19 members is lower than the their current entitlements (roughly 80,000 compared to 89,026) but much higher than their actual holdings of 64,091. Therefore, NATO will not have to remove or destroy TLE to meet the projected limits.

The United States proposed a TLE limit of 7,590, far below its current entitlement of 13,088 but more than twice its actual TLE holdings of 3,465. Germany undertook the second-largest NATO reduction in TLE (963), while Canada, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Turkey offered no TLE cuts. For its part, Russia proposed a reduction of 385 TLE from its current entitlement of 28,601.

States-parties agreed that territorial ceilings may be exceeded for notified military exercises and peacekeeping missions sanctioned by the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. These "basic temporary deployments" cannot exceed 153 tanks, 241 ACVs and 140 artillery pieces in any one country.

Countries outside the treaty's flank zone will in times of crisis be permitted "exceptional temporary deployments" of up to 459 tanks, 723 ACVs and 420 artillery pieces above territorial ceilings. In the event of any temporary deployments larger than the "basic" level, a conference of states-parties will be convened within seven days for the host and stationing countries to explain the deployment. Simultaneous exceptional temporary deployments will be permitted.

Russia, eager to limit the NATO presence in new alliance members, had opposed exceptional temporary deployments, but pledges by the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to lower TLE ceilings eased some of Moscow's concerns. By the end of 2003, the territorial ceilings for the three new NATO members (covering both national and foreign equipment) would be smaller than their current national entitlements. In a reciprocal move, Russia pledged not to increase TLE holdings in its northern flank and in the Kaliningrad Oblast.

Since CFE's entry into force in 1992, Russia has pressed for larger TLE limits in—or abolition of—the flank zone, where Moscow claims serious security concerns, particularly after the war in Chechnya. According to the March 30th agreement, however, the flank zone will be retained in an adapted treaty.

Though none of the 12 flank countries will be allowed to increase its overall TLE flank limit, Moscow did secure an increase in an ACV sub-limit. In accordance with a May 1996 agreement that will enter into force this May, Russia's ACV total for the original flank zone was set at 3,700, of which 1,380 could be located in a "reduced flank zone." Under the March 30 agreement, that smaller limit is proposed to grow to 2,140. In return, Russia cannot temporarily deploy any ACVs in the reduced flank zone and must reduce Russian TLE stationed in Georgia, as well as withdraw Russian TLE from Moldova.

The agreement emphasizes the need for host country consent for stationing of any foreign TLE. Nevertheless, to guard against unwanted foreign TLE stationing, Moldova renounced its right to temporary deployments.

The CFE Treaty currently limits the amount of TLE that can be deployed in active units, with the remainder confined to Designated Permanent Storage Sites. (Both active and stored TLE count against overall limits.) Under the adaptation agreement, states may shift TLE from storage sites to active units but must eliminate four pieces of TLE for every one moved to active units.

To keep track of all the above activity, the parties agreed to adopt an "enhanced regime of verification and information exchange." Under an adapted treaty, the number of annual inspections that a country must permit on its territory will rise from 15 to 20 percent of its Objects of Verifications—military units and other sites with TLE. The parties will also negotiate specific transparency and verification measures for temporary deployments.

Negotiators at the JCG will return to work on April 12. Outstanding issues include clearing up a discrepancy of approximately 2,100 TLE between the total amount of equipment that the eight successor states to the Soviet Union committed to eliminate and the amount that the Soviet Union would have had to eliminate based on Soviet data at the signature of the treaty. Much of the unclaimed TLE is thought to be derelict or not under government control.

Signatories and States Parties to the 1997 Ottawa Landmine Convention

State - Signature/Ratification State - Signature/Ratification State - Signature/Ratification
Algeria 12/03/97 Andorra 12/03/97 Angola 12/04/97 Antigua and Barbuda 12/03/97 Argentina 12/04/97 Australia 12/03/97 Austria 12/03/97 Bahamas 12/03/97 Barbados 12/03/97 Belgium 12/03/97 Belize 02/27/98 Benin 12/03/97 Bolivia 12/03/97 Bosnia and Herzegovina 12/03/97 Botswana 12/03/97 Brazil 12/03/97 Brunei Darussalam 12/04/97 Bulgaria 12/03/97 Burkina Faso 12/03/97 Burundi 12/03/97 Cambodia 12/03/97 Cameroon 12/03/97 Canada,12/03/9712/03/97 Cape Verde 12/04/97 Chile 12/03/97 Colombia 12/03/97 Cook Islands 12/03/97 Costa Rica 12/03/97 Cote d'Ivoire 12/03/97 Croatia 12/04/97 Cyprus 12/04/97 Czech Republic 12/03/97 Denmark 12/04/97 Djibouti 12/03/97 Dominica 12/03/97 Dominican Republic 12/03/97 Ecuador 12/04/97 El Salvador 12/04/97 Ethiopia 12/03/97 Fiji 12/03/97 France 12/03/97 Gabon 12/03/97 Gambia 12/04/97 Germany 12/03/97 Ghana 12/04/97 Greece 12/03/97 Grenada 12/03/97 Guatemala 12/03/97 Guinea 12/04/97 Guinea-Bissau 12/03/97 Guyana 12/04/97 Haiti 12/03/97 Holy See,12/04/9702/17/98 Honduras 12/03/97 Hungary 12/03/97 Iceland 12/04/97 Indonesia 12/04/97 Ireland, 12/03/9712/03/97 Italy 12/03/97 Jamaica 12/03/97 Japan 12/03/97 Kenya 12/05/97 Lesotho 12/04/97 Liechtenstein 12/03/97 Luxembourg 12/04/97 Madagascar 12/04/97 Malaysia 12/03/97 Malawi 12/04/97 Mali 12/03/97 Malta 12/04/97 Marshall Islands 12/04/97 Mauritania 12/03/97 Mauritius, 12/03/9712/03/97 Mexico 12/03/97 Moldova 12/03/97 Monaco 12/04/97 Mozambique 12/03/97 Namibia 12/03/97 Netherlands 12/03/97 New Zealand 12/03/97 Nicaragua 12/04/97 Niger 12/04/97 Niue 12/03/97 Norway 12/03/97 Panama 12/04/97 Paraguay 12/03/97 Peru 12/03/97 Philippines 12/03/97 Poland 12/04/97 Portugal 12/03/97 Qatar 12/04/97 Romania 12/03/97 Rwanda 12/03/97 Saint Kitts and Nevis 12/03/97 Saint Lucia 12/03/97 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 12/03/97 Samoa 12/03/97 San Marino 12/03/97 Senegal 12/03/97 Seychelles 12/04/97 Slovakia 12/03/97 Slovenia 12/03/97 Solomon Islands 12/04/97 South Africa 12/03/97 Spain 12/03/97 Sudan 12/04/97 Suriname 12/04/97 Swaziland 12/04/97 Sweden 12/04/97 Switzerland 12/03/97 Tanzania 12/03/97 Thailand 12/03/97 Togo 12/04/97 Trinidad and Tobago 12/04/97 Tunisia 12/04/97 5.) Turkmenistan, 12/03/97 01/19/9 Uganda 12/03/97 United Kingdom 12/03/97 Uruguay 12/03/97 Vanuatu 12/04/97 Venezuela 12/03/97 Yemen 12/04/97 Zambia 12/12/97 124.) Zimbabwe 12/03/97

 UN Secretary-General (depositary), February 27, 1998. States in bold are states parties, with signature date in italics.

The Ottawa Convention: Signatories and Ratifiers

On March 1, six months after its ratification by the 40th state, the Ottawa Convention banning the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines (APLs) will enter into force. Sixty-seven states out of 135 signatories have now ratified or acceded to the treaty. European countries account for nearly one-third of the ratifications, while 16 African and 15 Latin American and Caribbean states have ratified the treaty.

By September 1999 and annually thereafter, the first 40 states to have ratified the treaty (shown below in bold) must report to the UN Secretary-General their total APL stockpiles, the technical characteristics of their APLs, the location of all mined areas and the status of APL destruction programs. For all other states that ratify, the treaty will become legally binding six months after ratification or accession. State-parties will have four years to destroy all stockpiled APLs and ten years to eliminate all APLs, including those currently planted. Countries, however, may request a renewable ten-year extension to complete the task.

The treaty will enter into force without signature by some major producers and users of landmines, including the United States, China and Russia. Washington pledged to sign in 2006 if it can identify and field "suitable alternatives" to replace its APLs and mixed systems (combination of anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines). At the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the United States and other nations are seeking to negotiate a transfer ban on the import and export of APLs, but the 61 members have thus far failed to reach consensus on starting the negotiations.

The U.S. State Department, in its 1998 report, Hidden Killers, estimates that more than 70 countries are plagued with a total of 60 million to 70 million landmines, while some mine clearance groups contend that the number is significantly lower. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimates that 26,000 people are killed or injured by APLs every year. —For more information, contact Wade Boese.

Country Signature Ratification/
Albania 9/8/98  
Algeria 12/3/97  
Andorra 12/3/97 6/29/98
Angola 12/4/97  
Antigua & Barbuda 12/3/97  
Argentina 12/4/97  
Australia 12/3/97 1/14/99
Austria 12/3/97 6/29/98
Bahamas 12/3/97 7/31/98
Bangladesh 5/7/98  
Barbados 12/3/97 1/26/99
Belgium 12/3/97 9/4/98
Country Signature Ratification/
Belize 2/27/98 4/23/98
Benin 12/3/97 9/25/98
Bolivia 12/3/97 6/9/98
Bosnia & Herzegovina 12/3/97 9/8/98
Botswana 12/3/97  
Brazil 12/3/97  
Brunei Darussalam 12/4/97  
Bulgaria 12/3/97 9/4/98
Burkina Faso 12/3/97 9/16/98
Burundi 12/3/97  
Cambodia 12/3/97  
Cameroon 12/3/97  
Canada 12/3/97 12/3/97
Cape Verde 12/4/97  
Chad 7/6/98  
Chile 12/3/97  
Colombia 12/3/97  
Cook Islands 12/3/97  
Costa Rica 12/3/97  
Cote d'Ivoire 12/3/97  
Croatia 12/4/97 5/20/98
Cyprus 12/4/97  
Czech Republic 12/3/97  
Denmark 12/4/97 6/8/98
Djibouti 12/3/97 5/18/98
Dominica 12/3/97  
Dominican Republic 12/3/97  
Ecuador 12/4/97  
El Salvador 12/4/97 1/27/99
Equatorial Guinea 9/16/98 9/16/98
Country Signature Ratification/
Ethiopia 12/3/97  
Fiji 12/3/97 6/10/98
France 12/3/97 7/23/98
Gabon 12/3/97  
Gambia 12/4/97  
Germany 12/3/97 7/23/98
Ghana 12/4/97  
Greece 12/3/97  
Grenada 12/3/97 8/19/98
Guatemala 12/3/97  
Guinea 12/4/97 10/8/98
Guinea-Bissau 12/3/97  
Guyana 12/4/97  
Haiti 12/3/97  
Holy See 12/4/97 2/17/98
Honduras 12/3/97 12/3/97
Hungary 12/3/97 4/6/98
Iceland 12/4/97  
Indonesia 12/4/97  
Ireland 12/3/97 12/3/97
Italy 12/3/97  
Jamaica 12/3/97 7/17/98
Japan 12/3/97 9/30/98
Jordan 8/11/98 11/13/98
Kenya 12/5/97  
Lesotho 12/4/97 12/2/98
Liechtenstein 12/3/97  
Lithuania 2/26/99  
Luxembourg 12/4/97  
Country Signature Ratification/
Macedonia, FYR 9/9/98 9/9/98
Madagascar 12/4/97  
Malaysia 12/3/97  
Malawi 12/4/97 8/13/98
Maldives 10/1/98  
Mali 12/3/97 6/2/98
Malta 12/4/97  
Marshall Islands 12/4/97  
Mauritania 12/3/97  
Mauritius 12/3/97 12/3/97
Mexico 12/3/97 6/9/98
Moldova 12/3/97  
Monaco 12/4/97 11/17/98
Mozambique 12/3/97 8/15/98
Namibia 12/3/97 9/15/98
Netherlands 12/3/97  
New Zealand 12/3/97 1/27/99
Nicaragua 12/4/97 11/30/98
Niger 12/4/97  
Niue 12/3/97 4/15/98
Norway 12/3/97 7/9/98
Panama 12/4/97 10/7/98
Paraguay 12/3/97 11/13/98
Peru 12/03/97 6/17/98
Philippines 12/3/97  
Poland 12/4/97  
Portugal 12/3/97 2/19/99
Qatar 12/4/97 10/13/98
Romania 12/3/97  
Rwanda 12/3/97  
Country Signature Ratification/
St. Kitts & Nevis 12/3/97 12/2/98
St. Lucia 12/3/97  
St. Vincent &

the Grenadines

Samoa 12/3/97 7/23/98
San Marino 12/3/97 3/18/98
Sao Tome & Principe 4/30/98  
Senegal 12/3/97 9/24/98
Seychelles 12/4/97  
Sierra Leone 7/29/98  
Slovakia 12/3/97 2/25/99
Slovenia 12/3/97 10/27/98
Solomon Islands 12/4/97 1/26/99
South Africa 12/3/97 6/26/98
Spain 12/3/97 1/19/99
Sudan 12/4/97  
Suriname 12/4/97  
Swaziland 12/4/97 12/23/98
Sweden 12/4/97 11/30/98
Switzerland 12/3/97 3/24/98
Tanzania 12/3/97  
Thailand 12/3/97 11/27/98
Togo 12/4/97  
Trinidad & Tobago 12/4/97 4/27/98
Tunisia 12/4/97  
Turkmenistan 12/3/97 1/19/98
Uganda 12/3/97 2/25/99
Ukraine 2/24/99  
United Kingdom 12/3/97 7/31/98
Uruguay 12/3/97  
Country Signature Ratification/
Vanuatu 12/4/97  
Venezuela 12/3/97  
Yemen 12/4/97 9/1/98
Zambia 12/12/97  
Zimbabwe 12/3/97 6/18/98

Germany Raises No-First-Use Issue at NATO Meeting

DEFYING OUTSPOKEN U.S. opposition, the new German coalition government raised the issue of a nuclear no-first-use policy at the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels on December 8, while Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy challenged NATO to question its nuclear policy. Berlin indicated, however, that it does not want a break with NATO as the alliance approaches its 50th anniversary and the unveiling of a revised strategic concept in April 1999.

The current strategic concept, adopted in 1991, reaffirmed the long-standing NATO policy that nuclear weapons, and implicitly the threat of their first use, make "the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable" by denying potential aggressors any certainty about the "nature of the Allies' response to military aggression." Most alliance members view the nuclear elements of the strategic concept as untouchable. Yet the new German government, which advocates a nuclear-free world, has voiced concerns that the nuclear powers' failure to take steps toward disarmament or reducing the role of nuclear weapons will reduce the incentive for non-nuclear-weapon states to forgo the nuclear option.

November statements by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer supporting discussions on no-first-use within NATO surprised the United States, even though an October 20 coalition agreement between Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's Social Democrats and Fischer's Green Party called for renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons and lowering their alert status. Washington had been reassured by Schroeder, elected September 27, that his coalition government would pursue "continuity" with the foreign policy of the conservative Christian Democrats of Helmut Kohl, who led Germany for 16 years.

At the Brussels meeting, Fischer broached no-first-use and argued that no issues should be forbidden in alliance discussions. A German official later stated, "We [Germany] take no-first-use seriously and will continue to pursue it with alliance consensus in an appropriate timeframe and not in an isolated way." Because NATO operates by consensus, all 16 (soon to be 19) members would have to sign on to any policy change.

For its part, Washington stirred up NATO allies with proposals for the new strategic concept that would broaden NATO's core mission from defending common territory to defending common interests outside NATO borders and, reportedly, allow NATO to use force without UN approval. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright also called on NATO to combat threats posed by chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. But many European allies remain leery of granting NATO blanket authority for "out-of-area" missions.


NATO Reactions on No-First-Use

No other NATO capitals have publicly endorsed the German position, although the idea of no-first-use is widely supported throughout the Canadian government, including by Foreign Affairs Minister Axworthy. In remarks to the Brussels meeting, Axworthy said that the alliance needs to "address the evident tension between what NATO allies say about proliferation and what we do about disarmament" and called nuclear weapons "far less important to Alliance strategy than they were in the 1980s and early 1990s." He also cautioned that NATO should be "circumspect about the political value we place on NATO nuclear forces, lest we furnish arguments proliferators can use to try and justify their own nuclear programs."

A Canadian parliamentary report released on December 10, Canada and the Nuclear Challenge, called on Ottawa to "argue forcefully within NATO" for re-examining the alliance's nuclear policy. The report recommended that Canada endorse the de-alerting of all nuclear weapons and work toward reducing the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons.

As for NATO's nuclear powers, Britain and France strongly oppose revising NATO's nuclear policy. A French government official said that a no-first-use policy "would not be compatible with deterrence," while a British government official contended that NATO is "better served by the current policy because it maintains an important degree of uncertainty in the minds of potential aggressors."

U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, responding on November 23 to Fischer's remarks in the German magazine Der Spiegel supporting no-first-use, similarly rejected a NATO no-first-use policy. Cohen claimed that the option of first use is "integral to the NATO strategic doctrine" and contributes to security by "keeping any potential adversary who might use chemical or biologicals unsure of what our response would be."(Emphasis added.)

Cohen's statement appears to go beyond current U.S. nuclear policy. Speaking for President Clinton, then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher declared in 1995 that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) unless such states attacked the United States, its forces or its allies "in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State." Discussing the November 1997 presidential decision directive (PDD-60), Robert Bell, senior director for defense policy and arms control at the National Security Council, broadened Christopher's statement to include the option of responding with nuclear weapons to attacks by non-nuclear states-parties to the NPT that are not in "good standing," such as Iraq and North Korea. Other U.S. officials, however, have claimed at times that all options are open in responding to chemical and biological attacks.

China, the only nuclear-weapon state with a no-first-use policy, has pushed the other nuclear powers to adopt one in the UN Conference on Disarmament negotiations on negative security assurances. Russia opted in 1993 not to reaffirm a Soviet pledge of no-first-use. In view of the deteriorating state of its conventional forces, Moscow declared in 1997 that it would reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in a conflict.

Parties Aim to Complete CFE by November 1999

At the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) December 2–3 foreign ministers meeting in Oslo, the United States, Russia and the other 28 parties to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty committed themselves to completing adaptation of the 1992 treaty by next year's OSCE summit in Istanbul, scheduled for November 14–15. The adaptation negotiations, ongoing since January 1997, aim to replace the Cold War bloc-to-bloc and concentric zone structure of the CFE with national and territorial limits for each state.

To meet this goal, the states-parties noted that "outstanding key issues" will have to be resolved and drafting of the adapted treaty started within the first months of 1999. (The key issues include whether to apply territorial limits to combat aircraft and attack helicopters, temporary deployment limits, future of the so-called flank-zone, equipment limits for states in Central Europe and mechanisms for revising and exceeding limits.) Although Moscow endorsed the timetable, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov reiterated Russia's long-standing demand that negotiations conclude before April 1999, when the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland join NATO.

On December 8, NATO moved to mollify Russian concerns about NATO's future military presence in new members by repeating a March 14, 1997 pledge that the alliance will pursue collective defense through "ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces." NATO also declared that "exceptional temporary deployments" will not be used for permanent stationing of combat forces, will not be "routine" and will not be directed against any specific country.

Russia, however, has sought quantitative limits rather than reassurances and remains opposed to NATO's exceptional temporary deployment proposal. That proposal would permit states outside of the flank zone temporary deployments of 459 tanks, 723 armored combat vehicles (ACVs) and 420 artillery pieces, whereas states within the flank zone, such as Russia, would be limited to temporary deployments of 153 tanks, 241 ACVs and 140 artillery pieces. The flank zone, which will be retained in the adapted treaty, limits the tanks, ACVs and artillery in the northern and southern flanks of Europe, where Russia claims serious security threats.

The CTB Treaty: Signatories and Ratifiers

The Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty was opened for signature at the United Nations on September 24, 1996. On that day, 71 countries, including all five of the declared nuclear-weapon states, signed the treaty. As of October 31, 1998, 151 states have signed and 21 have ratified the treaty.

The CTB Treaty will formally enter into force 180 days after 44 designated states have deposited their instruments of ratification with the secretary-general of the United Nations. These 44 states include the five declared nuclear-weapon states, India, Israel, Pakistan and 36 other states that are participating members of the Conference on Disarmament and recognized by the International Atomic Energy Agency as possessing nuclear power and/or research reactors.

Of the 44 states that must deposit instruments of ratification for formal entry into force, 41 (identified in bold in the roster below) have signed the treaty. The other three states are India, Pakistan (both of which have indicated they will sign by September 1999) and North Korea. The list below identifies the states that have signed and ratified (ratifiers are identified in italics) the CTB Treaty as of October 31, 1998.

Country Signature
Albania 9/27/96
Algeria 10/15/96
Andorra 9/24/96
Angola 9/27/96
Antigua and Barbuda 4/16/97
Argentina 9/24/96
Armenia 10/1/96
Australia 9/24/96

(Ratified 7/9/98)

Austria 9/24/96

(Ratified 3/13/98)

Azerbaijan 7/28/97
Bahrain 9/24/96
Bangladesh 10/24/96
Belarus 9/24/96
Belgium 9/24/96
Benin 9/27/96
Bolivia 9/24/96
Country Signature
Bosnia and Herzegovina 9/24/96
Brazil 9/24/96

(Ratified 7/24/98)

Brunei Darussalem 1/22/97
Bulgaria 9/24/96
Burkina Faso 9/27/96
Burundi 9/24/96
Cambodia 9/26/96
Canada 9/24/96
Cape Verde 10/1/96
Chad 10/8/96
Chile 9/24/96
China 9/24/96
Colombia 9/24/96
Comoros 12/12/96
Congo 2/11/97
Congo Republic1 10/4/96
Cook Islands 12/5/97
Costa Rica 9/24/96
Cote d'Ivoire 9/25/96
Croatia 9/24/96
Cyprus 9/24/96
Czech Republic 11/12/96

(Ratified 9/11/97)

Denmark 9/24/96
Djibouti 10/21/96
Dominican Republic 10/3/96
Ecuador 9/24/96
Egypt 10/14/96
El Salvador 9/24/96

(Ratified 9/11/98)

Equatorial Guinea 10/9/96
Estonia 11/20/96
Ethiopia 9/25/96
Country Signature
Fiji 9/24/96

(Ratified 10/10/96)

Finland 9/24/96
France 9/24/96

(Ratified 4/6/98)

Gabon 10/7/96
Georgia 9/24/96
Germany 9/24/96

(Ratified 8/20/98)

Ghana 10/3/96
Greece 9/24/96
Grenada 10/10/96

(Ratified 8/19/98)

Guinea 10/3/96
Guinea-Bissau 4/11/97
Haiti 9/24/96
Holy See 9/24/96
Honduras 9/25/96
Hungary 9/25/96
Iceland 9/24/96
Indonesia 9/24/96
Iran 9/24/96
Ireland 9/24/96
Israel 9/25/96
Italy 9/24/96
Jamaica 11/11/96
Japan 9/24/96

(Ratified 7/8/97)

Jordan 9/26/96

(Ratified 8/25/98)

Kazakhstan 9/30/96
Kenya 11/14/96
Kuwait 9/24/96
Kyrgyzstan 10/8/96
Laos 7/30/97
Country Signature
Latvia 9/24/96
Lesotho 9/30/96
Liberia 10/1/96
Liechtenstein 9/27/96
Lithuania 10/7/96
Luxembourg 9/24/96
Macedonia 10/29/98
Madagascar 10/9/96
Malawi 10/9/96
Malaysia 7/23/98
Maldives 10/1/97
Mali 2/18/97
Malta 9/24/96
Marshall Islands 9/24/96
Mauritania 9/24/96
Mexico 9/24/96
Micronesia 9/24/96

(Ratified 7/25/97)

Moldova 9/24/97
Monaco 10/1/96
Mongolia 10/1/96

(Ratified 8/8/97)

Morocco 9/24/96
Mozambique 9/26/96
Myanmar (Burma) 11/25/96
Namibia 9/24/96
Nepal 10/8/96
Netherlands 9/24/96
New Zealand 9/27/96
Nicaragua 9/24/96
Niger 10/3/96
Norway 9/24/96
Panama 9/24/96
Country Signature
Papua New Guinea 9/25/96
Paraguay 9/25/96
Peru 9/25/96

(Ratified 11/12/97)

Philippines 9/24/96
Poland 9/24/96
Portugal 9/24/96
Qatar 9/24/96

(Ratified 3/3/97)

Romania 9/24/96
Russia 9/24/96
Saint Lucia 10/4/96
Samoa 10/9/96
San Marino 10/7/96
Sao Tome and Principe 9/26/96
Senegal 9/26/96
Seychelles 9/24/96
Slovakia 9/30/96

(Ratified 3/3/98)

Slovenia 9/24/96
Solomon Islands 10/3/96
South Africa 9/24/96
South Korea 9/24/96
Spain 9/24/96

(Ratified 7/31/98)

Sri Lanka 10/24/96
Suriname 1/14/97
Swaziland 9/24/96
Sweden 9/24/96
Switzerland 9/24/96
Tajikistan 10/7/96

(Ratified 6/10/98)

Thailand 11/12/96
Togo 10/2/96
Country Signature
Tunisia 10/16/96
Turkey 9/24/96
Turkmenistan 9/24/96

(Ratified 2/20/98)

Uganda 11/7/96
Ukraine 9/27/96
United Arab Emirates 9/25/96
United Kingdom 9/24/96

(Ratified 4/6/98)

United States 9/24/96
Uruguay 9/24/96
Uzbekistan 10/3/96

(Ratified 5/29/97)

Vanuatu 9/24/96
Venezuela 10/3/96
Vietnam 9/24/96
Yemen 9/30/96
Zambia 12/3/96

1. The Democratic Republic of The Congo, formerly Zaire. [Back to table]

Sources: UN, ACDA, and ACA.


Arms Control in 1998: Congress Maintains the Status Quo

The year 1998 was a status quo year for arms control and national security issues in the 105th Congress. There was neither major progress nor significant backsliding. Although the Senate overwhelmingly approved the expansion of NATO, there was no breakthrough in securing Senate approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty. Congress also refused to appropriate the billion-plus dollars required to pay the U.S. debt to the United Nations.

On the other hand, where things could have gotten much worse, they did not. The Senate did not vote to cripple or abrogate the 1972 ABM Treaty. Congress turned back Republican-led efforts to mandate deployment of a national missile defense (NMD) system. B-2 proponents finally gave up hunting for funds to build more than 21 bombers. Congress appropriated just enough money to avoid the loss of the U.S. vote in the UN General Assembly. House Republicans failed to decimate Nunn-Lugar security assistance funding to punish Russia for alleged bad behavior (such as selling advanced weaponry and nuclear-related technology to Iran).

The last major bill adopted by Congress as it headed out the door—the $520 billion omnibus appropriations bill—provided some good news and some bad news. While the bill included more funding to deal with nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union and to implement the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework, Congress also added billions of dollars to the military budget and to ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs in particular.

Considering the lengthy arms control agenda facing Congress, however, 1998 should be judged on opportunity costs; that is, another year lost in which there was scant progress toward reducing or eliminating weapons of mass destruction.


Assault on the ABM Treaty

Republican hopes to cripple or kill the ABM Treaty were thwarted when the Clinton administration refused to submit a series of agreements between the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine clarifying the "demarcation line" between permitted theater missile defense systems and limited strategic missile defenses, and enumerating the successor states to the Soviet Union to which the ABM Treaty applies. The administration held off submitting the agreements to the Senate until after the Russian Duma considered START II, which U.S. officials hope will be before the end of the year.

In 1998, Republicans resumed their push for NMD deployment. They had been wary of the issue since December 1995, when they precipitated a Clinton veto of the fiscal year (FY) 1996 defense authorization bill, which included language mandating deployment of a multiple-site NMD system (intended to protect all 50 states) by 2003. In 1996 and 1997, the administration and Congress reached a tacit compromise on the NMD issue: while avoiding recorded votes, Congress added money to the administration's budget request for NMD but did not try to force the administration's hand on deployment.

In March 1998, Senator Thad Cochran (R-MS) launched a new campaign by introducing the "American Missile Protection Act of 1998." The bill declared: "It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible, an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate)." Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) brought up the legislation in May as an independent measure in order to avoid another veto of a defense bill, but the bill's supporters fell one vote short in their attempt to force a floor vote.

On May 13, the Senate voted 59-41 (60 votes are needed for a motion of cloture) to end debate and bring the bill before the full Senate. All 55 Republicans voted for the motion, as did four Democrats: Daniel Akaka (HI), Ernest Hollings (SC), Daniel Inouye (HI) and Joseph Lieberman (CT). Lott brought up the measure a second time on September 9 in a vain ploy to inject the issue of missile defense into the upcoming congressional elections, but the motion of cloture was rejected by an identical 59-41 vote.

The House of Representatives never voted on the issue of NMD deployment. On August 5, Representatives Curt Weldon (R-PA) and John Spratt (D-SC) introduced a bill with 49 co-sponsors from both parties stating "That it is the policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defense." However, that measure was never put to a vote. Hard-line Republicans, hoping to sharpen the differences between the two parties for the mid-term elections, pushed an alternative measure mandating NMD deployment by a date certain. The split among Republicans over the best strategy was never resolved, and the House ran out of time to schedule a vote.

Congressional Republicans did succeed, as in past years, in pumping more money into missile defenses than the administration had requested. After appropriating $3.7 billion in the defense appropriations bill for national and theater defenses (close to the administration's request), Congress added another billion dollars in supplemental appropriations as part of the omnibus appropriations bill passed in October before the 105th Congress adjourned. The exact allocation between national and theater missile defense programs was left to the Pentagon.


The Debate Intensifies

Ironically, the administration's victory on BMD policy and the Republican win on BMD funding—an outcome identical to the previous three years—came despite a series of major developments in 1998 that fueled the debate over missile defense policy. In February, an independent panel of missile defense experts appointed by the Pentagon and headed by retired General Larry Welch, former Air Force chief of staff, issued a study that was highly critical of the flight test programs involving four "hit-to-kill" missile defense systems, including the NMD program. Their report concluded that the programs suffer from a "rush to failure" because of efforts to rapidly deploy the systems without thorough flight testing. The Welch Panel said it was "highly unlikely" that the administration would meet its current goal of developing an NMD system in three years and, should a deployment decision be made, of fielding the system three years later.

On May 12, the day before the Senate voted on the Cochran bill, the U.S. Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system failed its fifth consecutive test, again calling into question the technological viability of the Pentagon's most advanced BMD system. The test failure of THAAD (one of the four programs analyzed by the Welch Panel) underscored a key contention of missile defense opponents: after more than 30 years of research, development and testing, intercepting warheads still remains a major technological hurdle. Any workable NMD system will have to incorporate similar but more sophisticated technology than that used in THAAD and other theater missile defense systems.

Next, on July 7, Senators Carl Levin (D-MI) and Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) released a General Accounting Office (GAO) report that reviewed the costs and risks involved in the NMD program, and concluded that the program's schedule and technical objectives remain "high risk." The report cast further doubts on Republican plans to accelerate deployment.

Finally, on July 15, a report from a panel headed by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld—including experts across the arms control spectrum—warned that a long-range missile threat to the United States could develop much earlier than had been anticipated. The Rumsfeld Commission's conclusion was reinforced by Iran's test only one week later of an intermediate-range missile capable of hitting much of the Middle East, and an August 31 North Korean launch of a Taepo Dong-1 missile that demonstrated some aspects of ICBM development, most notably multiple-stage separation.

In response to the Rumsfeld Commission report, the CIA stood by its conclusion that no country other than Russia, China and North Korea could develop ICBMs capable of threatening the United States before the year 2010. And on August 24, the Joint Chiefs of Staff—much to the chagrin of missile defense hawks—weighed in against speeding up NMD deployment. The controversy over the immediacy of the ballistic missile threat to the United States continued to the end of the year.


CTB Treaty

A summation of Senate progress on the CTB Treaty can be short: there was almost no movement whatsoever. While President Clinton submitted the treaty to the Senate in September 1997 and promised to make ratification a top priority in 1998—at least after the Senate voted on NATO expansion—Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-NC) ignored the treaty and the president never followed through on his pledge to make the treaty a top priority.

The president started the year on a high note, with a ringing affirmation of the CTB Treaty in his January State of the Union address and a letter from four former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsing the treaty. In February, the president toured the Los Alamos National Laboratory and received a helpful endorsement by the directors of the nation's three major nuclear weapons laboratories of U.S. efforts under the test ban to maintain a robust nuclear weapons force.

Helms, however, had made his views crystal clear at the beginning of the year. In a January 21 letter to the president, Helms said his committee would only consider the CTB Treaty after the president had submitted the ABM Treaty-related agreements and the Kyoto Protocol on global warming to the Senate for prior action. Lott backed up the powerful chairman. True to his word, Helms never held a single hearing on the CTB Treaty all year.

Arms control advocates vainly hoped that after the Senate vote on NATO enlargement at the end of April, the president would make the test ban treaty his top priority and lean on the Senate to act. However, the administration's decision not to submit the ABM Treaty-START II package to the Senate until after the Russian Duma approved START II further stalled consideration of the CTB Treaty. The Duma refused to cooperate by not approving START II, and the administration had no alternative plan.

When Secretary of State Madeleine Albright delivered a comprehensive arms control speech to the Henry L. Stimson Center on June 10, she said that all Senator Helms had to do was to whistle and she would be glad to testify on behalf of the treaty. Helms never whistled and the administration turned its attention to fresh crises in Bosnia, North Korea, Iraq and Kosovo.

Even after India and Pakistan conducted their nuclear tests in May, the drift continued. Test ban advocates from the president on down argued that the CTB Treaty was more important than ever. The South Asian nuclear developments, they argued, should serve as a wake-up call for the United States and the world. Treaty critics Helms and Lott, on the other hand, suggested that developments in South Asia rendered the test ban irrelevant, citing the failure of the U.S. intelligence community to anticipate the Indian tests and the likelihood that New Delhi would never sign the test ban treaty. Lott went so far as to argue that the Indians tested nuclear devices because of the administration's support for the CTB Treaty.

While most Senate Republicans, unsure if the test ban will ever be brought up for a vote, have declined to take a position on the treaty, Republican Senator Arlen Specter (PA) was motivated by events in South Asia to endorse the treaty. Working with Democrat Joseph Biden (DE), Specter tried to force the issue by offering an amendment to restore the administration's $28.9 million request for FY 1999 funding for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission, which the Senate Foreign Operations Appropriations subcommittee had failed to endorse. The CTBTO's International Monitoring System will allow the United States to significantly improve its worldwide nuclear weapons test monitoring capabilities.

On September 1, the Senate approved the Specter-Biden amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill by a vote of 49-44. Not surprisingly, there were two very different interpretations of the vote. CTB advocates pointed to the success of the Specter-Biden amendment, while treaty opponents suggested that the "success" instead showed how far short CTB supporters were of the 67 votes needed for advice and consent to ratification. In the end, this vote will have little long-term significance. Specter pushed the vote while expending little effort to sway colleagues, and although Lott persuaded most Republicans to oppose the amendment, several senators who voted "nay" privately conceded that their vote did not foretell their final position on the treaty.

In the meantime, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott engaged in a series of separate negotiations with Indian and Pakistani officials to defuse the rising nuclear tensions on the sub-continent. Congress cooperated by giving President Clinton the authority to ease U.S. sanctions imposed on both countries after their May tests. In November, after modest progress in the Talbott negotiations, the president announced a relaxed sanctions policy.


Chemical Weapons Convention

In October 1998, a year and a half after the Senate approved the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Congress finally passed legislation conforming U.S. law to all treaty obligations. This "implementation legislation" became a last-minute insert into the huge omnibus appropriations bill. On April 24, 1997, the Senate had voted 74-26 to give its advice and consent to ratification of the CWC, which entered into force five days later. In May 1997, the Senate approved implementation legislation for the CWC, which the House adopted in November but which was linked to unrelated legislation imposing sanctions on Russian companies accused of selling missile parts and technology to Iran. House International Relations Committee Chairman Ben Gilman (R-NY) sought a trade-off: the CWC legislation, which the administration favored, in return for the Russian sanctions bill the administration opposed and had threatened to veto. A deadlock ensued for the next year and a half, and the administration never made the issue a high priority. Republicans, for their part, were more interested in political gamesmanship.

Throughout that period, the United States was in "technical violation" of the CWC because it had not declared treaty-related activities at U.S. commercial facilities. Both the House and the Senate approved the sanctions legislation (the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act) to which the CWC implementing legislation had been attached, but President Clinton vetoed the legislation on June 23. For a time, it appeared that an overwhelming congressional majority would override the veto, but in mid-July Clinton announced the imposition of trade sanctions against nine Russian companies that had been aiding Iran's missile program. The Republican leadership decided against an override vote.

As the 105th Congress completed its work in October, it appeared that the CWC implementing legislation would have to be reconsidered in 1999. However, a last-minute miracle occurred. With pressure from the Chemical Manufacturers Association and the administration, Representative David Obey of Wisconsin, the ranking Democrat on the Appropriations Committee, with the acquiescence of incoming House Speaker Bob Livingston (R-LA), managed to include the legislation in the omnibus appropriations bill. However, the implementing legislation contains a number of disputed provisions, including one that gives the president the authority to block "challenge" inspections in this country on national security grounds and a second that prevents the transfer outside the United States of samples from U.S. facilities for analysis. The bill's controversial provisions are likely to be revisited in 1999.


ACDA's Merger

In 1995, then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher proposed merging the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Agency for International Development (AID) and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) into the Department of State. Although these agencies fought the merger and won early bureaucratic battles within the Clinton administration, Helms ran with the idea, having long wanted to abolish the independent arms control agency. In April 1997, the administration announced that it would agree to merge ACDA and USIA into the State Department. That plan, after negotiations with Helms and Biden, was inserted into the fiscal years 1998-99 State Department authorization bill in the summer of 1997. As part of the bargain, Helms agreed to payment of the U.S. debt to the United Nations. The legislation stalled, however, when House Republicans insisted on adding anti-abortion restrictions on international family planning funding to the State Department authorization bill. The president had made it clear that he would not jeopardize his support among women by compromising on this issue.

The bill languished through the remainder of 1997 and most of 1998. ACDA, which had engaged in an extensive planning process for the expected merger, was left in limbo. In April 1998, the bill—including the anti-abortion language—cleared Congress, but it was not sent to the president for another six months. Republicans hoped to build pressure on the president to sign the legislation. That tactic failed; on October 21, Clinton vetoed the bill.

ACDA has remained in limbo for two years—neither independent nor a part of the State Department. Administration lines of authority on arms control issues have become even more blurred than usual. ACDA Director John Holum was designated acting under secretary for arms control but held his original post as well. Thus, when Republicans at the last moment attached the State Department reorganization measure to the omnibus appropriations bill—minus the UN funding, which was still linked to the abortion issue—even devoted supporters of ACDA felt that an unsatisfactory solution was better than none at all. The merger is to be completed no later than April 1999.


NATO Expansion

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO grappled uncertainly with its mission. The military alliance established to confront the communist menace had to find a new role for itself. Nevertheless, NATO decided to expand the alliance to include former Warsaw Pact members in Central and Eastern Europe. The enlargement process was moving at a rather languid pace until the 1996 presidential campaign when President Clinton, under pressure from Bob Dole, promised to expedite NATO's expansion. In December 1996, NATO adopted an accelerated timetable for enlargement, and in July 1997 designated the first three countries to be invited into the venerable institution: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. In December 1997, NATO formally agreed to accept those three countries, subject to approval by the 16 current members, including a two-thirds vote in the U.S. Senate.

Many arms control advocates opposed NATO expansion on the grounds that it undermined the goal of safeguarding and reducing weapons of mass destruction in an increasingly chaotic former Soviet Union. Partly in response to NATO's decision to expand, which is opposed by Russians of all ideological stripes, the Russian Duma has held up approval of START II for three years. In addition, drawing Russia into closer economic, political and military relationships with the West could help reduce the likelihood of military confrontation in Europe—confrontation that could lead to the use of weapons of mass destruction. The United States chose this path with Germany and Japan after World War II. In contrast, the expansion of NATO served to drive Moscow away from the West, drawing a new dividing line in Europe with struggling Russia on the other side of the line.

The debate over NATO expansion became heated, but only as the Senate approached an April 30 vote on the issue. The Clinton administration had significant advantages in its pursuit of ratification. It was unusually well-organized and highly focused on the NATO issue, having appointed a government-wide coordinator many months before. Moreover, key Republicans such as Helms and Lott agreed with the administration's policy and worked with it to win Senate approval.

In addition, few senators were willing to invest time and energy in the fight against NATO enlargement early, when it would have been most effective. Most senators are reluctant to focus on an issue that is many months away from a vote. By the time senators closely examined NATO expansion, any doubts they may have had were overridden by concerns that it was too late to stop a train that had long since left the station. In other words, first, it was too early; then it was too late. In 1997, only Senator John Warner (R-VA) had publicly declared his opposition to NATO enlargement.

In April 1998, NATO expansion opponents offered a series of amendments to crack the pro-enlargement coalition, but failed. The closest vote, which lost 41-59, came on an amendment offered by Warner to delay further expansion of NATO for at least three years. On April 30, the Senate voted 80-19 to approve the new members. The bipartisan majority included 45 Republicans and 35 Democrats. Opposition too was bipartisan, with the "nay" votes spanning the political spectrum from Paul Wellstone (D-MN) on the left to John Ashcroft (R-MO) on the right.

In April 1999, the 50th anniversary of the founding of NATO, the United States will host a NATO summit in Washington, DC, at which the three countries formally will join the alliance. NATO enlargement opponents hope that the concerns raised in early 1998 will lead NATO to avoid hasty moves to add more Central European countries, and particularly to avoid the flashpoint of admitting the three Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.


Military Spending

A White House-congressional deal cut in 1997 capped military spending budget authority at $271 billion for FY 1999. That cap was first loosened and then eviscerated completely. Early in the year, the president permitted the Pentagon to retain about $21 billion in extra funding over five years due to savings from lower-than-anticipated inflation rates. Then Congress played budget games to give the Pentagon an additional $3.5 billion in FY 1999 spending. Finally, the omnibus appropriations bill added another $8.3 billion in "emergency" funding for Pentagon programs. The final budget authority total for the Department of Defense comes to about $279 billion. These increases came while many members of Congress, along with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, launched a lobbying campaign to persuade President Clinton to include another large hike in the new defense budget to be presented in February 1999.


>North Korea

A number of members of Congress, such as Senator John McCain (R-AZ), threatened to cut off all U.S. funding for North Korean oil purchases due to a raft of stories about possible nuclear weapon-related activities in the North and the country's continuing sales of ballistic missiles. The oil purchases are a key element in the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework, by which the administration is seeking to persuade Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons pretensions. At the end of the year, a compromise was reached: the omnibus appropriations bill included $35 million for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the international consortium leading the implementation of the nuclear deal, but the funds will become available only after March 1999 and only if North Korea makes progress in ending its weapons of mass destruction programs.


Nuclear Security Issues

Congress endorsed and even exceeded the administration's funding requests to deal with the problem of unsecured nuclear materials and weapons in the former Soviet Union. At the beginning of the year, the administration requested $442 million for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program (the Nunn-Lugar program) in the defense bill. Congress appropriated all but $2 million of that amount. In the omnibus appropriations bill, thanks to efforts by Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM), Congress approved $200 million toward the disposal of 50 tons of excess Russian weapons-derived plutonium, and $325 million to permit the Department of Energy to pay Moscow for some of the costs it incurred in 1997 and 1998 for down-blending highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium for sale to the United States under the 1993 HEU deal.


UN Funding

Congress narrowly avoided a loss of U.S. voting rights in the UN General Assembly by approving a little less than $300 million for the United Nations' regular budget and another $231 million for UN peace-keeping activities. Nonetheless, the United States still owes the United Nations more than $1.3 billion in unpaid dues. A deal at the end of the 105th Congress to fund a substantial portion of those arrears ultimately floundered on the linked anti-abortion issue.


A Peek Ahead to 1999

The 106th Congress, which will be sworn in on January 6, 1999, will look remarkably like the 105th Congress. The Senate will continue to have a ratio of 55 Republicans to 45 Democrats. While the Democrats picked up five seats in the House, Republicans retained control of that body as well. Nonetheless, Democrats have been emboldened and Republicans chastened by a worse-than-expected electoral performance by Republican candidates. Senate Democrats early in the year had been wary of a filibuster-proof, 60-seat Republican majority that would limit their influence in the Senate. Avoiding that train wreck means that Democrats remain in a strong position to push their priority issues.

In 1999, the two parties will have to negotiate in both the House and Senate to enact any legislation. That result, and a possible favorable Russian Duma vote on START II, are good news for the CTB Treaty during the next Congress. Democrats will have an opportunity to force this treaty onto the Senate agenda despite Helms' continued objections.

There is one major unknown at this point that could have a significant impact on the 106th Congress. If the Duma approves START II, the administration is expected to send to the Senate a package of five agreements related to the ABM Treaty in the face of stiff Republican opposition to the 1972 agreement limiting strategic missile defenses.

However, the administration has been gradually giving ground in the face of the onslaught. In October, Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre agreed with Republican questioners that the ABM Treaty would not be permitted to block NMD deployment if the United States deems deployment necessary. As part of its deliberations in December over the budget to be presented in February, the administration has to decide whether to include deployment funds in its five-year Pentagon spending plan. It is also considering an approach to the Russians to propose changes in the treaty to reflect eventual missile defense deployment.

A second major uncertainty is a Senate impeachment trial of President Clinton. For arms control proponents, 1999 offers more than the usual unknowns.

John Isaacs is president and executive director of the Council for a Livable World in Washington, DC.

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Additional States to Follow EU 'Code of Conduct'

In an August 3 statement, the European Union (EU) welcomed the joint declaration by 13 European states to "align themselves to the criteria and principles" of the recently approved (June 8) EU code of conduct on arms exports. Under the code's eight general criteria, EU members pledged to deny arms exports to states that may use the weapons for internal repression or aggressively against other states and to consider an importer's human rights record before approving an arms sale.

Of the 13 non-EU states (Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia), all but Iceland and Norway have applied for EU membership; the declaration enables these states to align their arms export policies with those of the EU. Four of the 13, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), ranked among the top thirty arms suppliers for the period 1993–1997: the Czech Republic (13th), Norway (21st), Poland (22nd) and Slovakia (24th).

The 13 states declared that the non-legally binding code would "guide them in their national export control policies." However, they will not take part in the key operative provisions of the code, such as circulating notices of arms export denials and consulting with other states over controversial sales. EU countries want the notification process to remain limited to protect sensitive information.

UN Reports on Yugoslav Arms Embargo

On August 5, more than four months after the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan informed the Security Council that the UN has failed to establish a monitoring regime for the embargo due to lack of funding. At the same time, he warned that the situation in Kosovo, where ethnic Albanians are battling Serb forces, "continues to deteriorate" and that the "attitudes of the two sides appear to be hardening."

Annan said that the UN, as he originally reported in April, did not have the funds to establish a comprehensive regime to monitor the March 31 embargo and that the resources pledged by other regional organizations, such as the European Union and NATO, fell short of the amount needed. With no regime in place, measuring the impact of the embargo has proved difficult, particularly between Albania and Kosovo, where arms continue to flow and there is little border control.

CFE Compliance Report Issued; Treaty Adaptation Talks Continue

Wade Boese

RUSSIA, UKRAINE, Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan are not in compliance with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, according to an administration report submitted June 22 to Congress. Violations range from holdings of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) in excess of CFE ceilings to denial of full access during treaty inspections. The report, however, concludes that the compliance issues are not "militarily significant." Russia and Ukraine, which have the largest holdings among the Eastern bloc of countries, remain within their overall treaty limits.

The 1990 CFE Treaty imposed equal numerical limits on five categories of heavy conventional weapons—tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), large-caliber artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters—that NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries could deploy and store between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. Countries derived national limits from their respective group limit, and a concentric-zone structure further restricted where TLE could be deployed. Although the accord's original bloc limits remain, the current 30 states-parties are seeking to adapt the treaty to Europe's post-Cold War security environment.


Non-Compliance Findings

According to the annual compliance report, mandated by the Senate, Russia has never included equipment held by the Presidential Guard Regiment, which the United States claims is covered by the treaty, in data exchanges. Under the treaty, even if a military unit is considered an internal security force, any tanks, artillery and armored infantry fighting vehicles (a sub-limit within the ACV category) it holds should be counted against a country's TLE limits. Moreover, Russia excluded over 180 ACVs from its July 1997 data exchange by marking the equipment as ambulances.

Although Russia and Ukraine are "well below" limits on TLE held by naval infantry and coastal defense forces, the two states have failed to fulfill a separate June 1991 commitment by the Soviet Union—which they have assumed—to reduce 933 tanks, 1,725 ACVs and 1,080 artillery pieces. To date, Russia has completed over half of this shared reduction obligation, and with the November 1997 division of the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet assets between Russia and Ukraine, it is expected that the pledged reductions can now be completed.


Former Soviet Equipment

Ukraine has also declared an increasing amount of TLE as "awaiting export" (from 0 in 1992 to over 700 items in 1997), a category that exempts arms from treaty limits. The report called the increase a "trend that bears watching," but noted that it does not appear that Kyiv is using the equipment as a stockpile for replacement and modernization. Meanwhile, Belarus claimed almost 300 tanks as "awaiting export" in 1996 and then exchanged almost 150 for those in active units, thereby raising questions as to whether the equipment is actually intended for export. Minsk, along with Russia, also denied full access during some inspections of its TLE holding sites.

Azerbaijan had exceeded its overall CFE limits by 316 items, according to its own December 1997 data submission, and is cited by the report as having never declared a reduction liability despite acknowledging receipt of weapons from Russia and Ukraine that would imply responsibility for reductions of at least 1,000 TLE items. Baku also suspended CFE-mandated notifications for changes of 10 percent or more in TLE assigned to units. Until the conflict over the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh is resolved, Azerbaijan maintains that it will not begin "disarmament."

A Russian investigation in 1997 disclosed that Armenia illegally received 84 tanks, 50 ACVs and 116 artillery pieces from Russia that neither country reported in its CFE data. Although claiming to have reduced all excess TLE, Armenia did not carry out the reductions according to verifiable CFE provisions and has been accused by Azerbaijan of holding undeclared TLE in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The issue of unclaimed equipment remains a significant factor in resolving a difference of approximately 2,100 TLE items between what the Soviet Union would have had to declare as its reduction liabilities and what the eight former Soviet republics now party to the CFE Treaty have notified. This and other compliance issues have been brought before the Vienna-based Joint Consultative Group (JCG), the governing body of the treaty, for discussion.


NATO Offers Proposal

In July 1997, CFE parties agreed to replace the treaty's bloc and concentric zone structures with a system of national and territorial ceilings. National ceilings would limit a country's TLE holdings in all five categories of weaponry, while territorial ceilings would limit the amount of ground-based TLE (both national equipment and that stationed by other states) permitted on a country's territory. The parties also agreed to negotiate provisions allowing territorial ceilings to be exceeded for notified military exercises, temporary deployments and United Nations or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) peace-keeping operations.

On June 23, NATO put forward a proposal at the JCG that would limit temporary deployments within the treaty's so-called "flank" zone, where Russia claims serious security concerns. (See ACT, May 1997.) Under the proposal, Russia and the other "flank" states would be limited to 153 tanks, 241 ACVs and 140 artillery pieces, while states-parties outside of the zone would be permitted temporary deployments of up to 459 tanks, 723 ACVs and 420 artillery pieces in excess of territorial ceilings. There would be no time restrictions on temporary deployments, but any exceeding zone ceilings would be subject to additional transparency measures and an enhanced notification requirement. NATO also advanced measures for adapting the verification regime. While Russia made no formal response or counter-proposal at the JCG before a summer recess (which began July 25), a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman on July 7 called the proposals "very one-sided," according to a Reuters report.

Negotiations to adapt the CFE Treaty have been underway in the JCG since January 1997. In the past, states-parties indicated they would like to see an adapted treaty in place before NATO's expected acceptance of new members in April 1999, but U.S. officials caution that there is no need to rush completion for any "artificial deadlines." The recently released British Strategic Defence Review noted that the negotiations are "likely to last well into 1999."

CFE Compliance Report Issued; Treaty Adaptation Talks Continue


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