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NATO and Russian Approaches To Adapting the CFE Treaty
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Colonel Jeffrey D. McCausland

Colonel Jeffrey D. McCausland is director of the European Studies program at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA. The idease expressed in this article are the author's own, and are not to be considered the policy of the U.S. government

With the completion of the Madrid summit, NATO has embarked on not only its most significant membership expansion but also a further redefinition of its purpose. It is critical, however, to remember that NATO enlargement is not an objective of Western security. The true objective is to improve overall security in Europe and establish a viable framework of stability for the future. In this context, "enlargement" is a "means" to achieve this greater "objective." While this may strike some as a question of semantics, it serves to place NATO's expansion effort in the proper perspective. It also underscores the fact that enlargement is meant to be an ongoing process that only began with the invitations to Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland to join the alliance. This process must be given careful consideration over the next two years to ensure the ultimate objective of enhanced security is realized and not compromised along the way.

Fundamental in this regard are efforts to assuage Russian concerns about enlargement. Though Western policy makers have attempted to describe enlargement as non threatening, there is no doubt that most, if not all, Russian leaders still disagree. To help overcome Moscow's resistance to NATO's move eastward, the Founding Act signed between Russia and the alliance in May of this year provides for consultations, cooperation, possible joint action and a NATO Russia Permanent Joint Council, though it is still unclear exactly how this council is to operate. There have been other policy recommendations to help Russia through this period, such as a mixed NATO Russian military brigade that would build upon the experience of the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in the former Yugoslavia. But central to meeting Moscow's fears about NATO enlargement will be radical revisions of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

From Russia's perspective, the CFE Treaty provides it with legally binding assurances about the size and deployment of NATO forces that are critical to Moscow's assessment of regional security. Consequently, while adjustments to the treaty were warranted based on the dramatic changes that have occurred in Europe since its signing, the alliance's impending enlargement gives this adaptation process an added significance.

 

The Treaty in Perspective

Signed in November 1990 by the 22 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, the CFE Treaty places numerical limitations on tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), combat aircraft and attack helicopters—known collectively as treaty limited equipment (TLE)—for each alliance or "group" in an area stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. These alliance wide limitations were further circumscribed by a series of geographic zones to prevent the massing of forces in specific regions. Individual limits for each treaty signatory were distributed from the alliance limits among the members of each of the two blocs before the demise of the Warsaw Pact. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, those former Soviet republics within the treaty's area of application (with the exception of the Baltic states) met in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in May 1992 and determined their respective TLE limits from the total allocated to the Soviet Union.

Though the CFE Treaty was signed in November 1990, its implementation was delayed by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the demise of the Soviet Union and problems associated with the removal and transfer of Soviet heavy weapons. In 1989 and 1990 (before the treaty was signed), the Soviet Union had moved a huge number of weapons (estimated at betweaen 50,000 and 70,000) east of the Ural Mountains (outside the treaty's area of application) and had transferred other TLE to naval infantry and coastal defense units, actions which delayed ratification of the accord. Once these issues were settled, the treaty formally entered into force in November 1992 after Belarus became the last state to deposit its instrument of ratification. Despite this delay, by November 17, 1995 (the end of the treaty's 40 month reduction period), over 58,000 pieces of TLE had been eliminated (most through destruction), and approximately 2,700 inspections were conducted to ensure compliance.1 Russia had the greatest burden for eliminating TLE; its reductions represented roughly 20 percent of this total.

Curiously, during this transitional period the inspections may have contributed more to reducing tensions than the actual reductions. For example, under the terms of the agreement, short notice inspections were conducted of U.S. forces in Germany as they were preparing for deployment to the former Yugoslavia in 1995. Also, though the purpose of the treaty was to reduce the possibility of short warning conventional attacks, it proved particularly valuable in responding to Soviet concerns about German reunification and assisting in the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. In fact, the greatest value of the agreement may be that the entire CFE system provides a forum for the major European states to debate, agree and maintain a set of rules about the deployment of conventional military power on the continent.

The treaty has also adapted to other political changes besides the reunification of Germany and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In October 1991, the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were recognized as being outside the CFE area of application once these countries regained their independence. And in January 1993, as part of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the Czech and Slovak republics agreed on the division of the TLE of the former Warsaw Pact member.

Full and final compliance with the CFE Treaty was, however, endangered in late 1995 due to Moscow's insistence that it could not comply with limits on its forces in the accord's so called "flank" zone—an area that includes both Russia's Leningrad Military District in the north and the North Caucasus Military District in the south, where Russia had amassed a large force in its conflict with Chechnyan separatists. As the November 1995 deadline for final reductions approached, it became clear that Russia would be in compliance with its overall limits, but would not meet the flank limits. At the 11th hour, the 30 states parties agreed to a framework for resolving this issue, and a final compromise was achieved at the first CFE Treaty review conference in May 1996 in Vienna. Under that formulation, Russia is permitted higher force levels in the original areas of the flank zone and an extension from 1995 to 1999 to come down to these new levels. In addition, the original flank limits apply to a flank zone reduced in area. (This compromise was ratified by the U.S. Senate in May 1997.)

During the May 1996 review conference, NATO members indicated their willingness to consider further adjustments to the CFE Treaty, and CFE parties agreed to discuss ways to "enhance the viability and effectiveness" of the agreement. On December 1, one day before the opening of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) summit in Lisbon, CFE parties approved a document outlining the "scope and parameters" for the adaptation talks, which were to begin at the Vienna based Joint Consultative Group (JCG) in January 1997.

 

NATO's Approach to Adaptation

The original CFE mandate sought a stable balance of conventional forces at fixed, lower levels and the elimination of alliance capabilities for launching surprise conventional attacks. The "Final Document" from the review conference noted the achievement of these objectives and, consequently, the focus now must be to cement these gains and build upon them. Furthermore, it seems logical that political goals now have greater salience than the military objectives that were fundamental to the original negotiations.

NATO countries agree that four essential aspects of the agreement must be maintained: ceilings on the five categories of TLE; the inspection regime; regular information exchange between treaty signatories; and a treaty structure that allows for political change. Members also accept the need for progress in these discussions to parallel the NATO enlargement process, although they oppose direct linkage or artificial deadlines.

In February 1997, NATO presented its proposal to adjust the CFE Treaty and reflect the dramatic changes that had taken place in Eastern and Central Europe since its signing. NATO proposed replacing the existing bloc to bloc and zonal limits on TLE with "national" and "territorial" limits. This change is intended to reflect the passing of the Warsaw Pact and the emergence of a new European security architecture. Every country would declare its national limits for each equipment category with the goal of reducing overall force levels. Countries also would be allowed to host "stationed forces" (the forces of another state party on its soil), but the total of a nation's own equipment plus permanently stationed hardware would be limited by the new territorial ceiling. In the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, territorial limits would be set at or below current entitlement levels and, consequently, these nations, without reducing their own forces, would not be able to permanently station significant amounts of TLE from other NATO countries on their territories. (See Table 1.)

As with the treaty's current zonal limits, these stationed forces restrictions would, however, apply only to the three categories of ground based TLE (tanks, artillery and ACVs); they would place no limit on the number of combat aircraft or attack helicopters that NATO could deploy on the territories of new members (due to the rapid mobility of these weapons systems). All CFE parties would have to agree that the declared national and derived territorial levels were acceptable before being codified in an adjusted treaty.

Provisions on stationed forces would have an impact on the United States, all of whose forces are stationed (primarily in Germany). U.S. forces are allowed under the current treaty based on the United States receiving an entitlement as a treaty signatory. The adjusted treaty text would have to specify territorial totals for each signatory that included U.S. forces, and each state on whose territory U.S. forces are stationed would have to continue to agree to their presence. It is also important to consider that non German NATO forces are currently not allowed to be stationed in the territory of the former German Democratic Republic as part of the "Two Plus Four" agreement that resulted in German reunification.

The NATO proposal would also insert a clear definition of so called "temporary deployments" for military exercises and create a new stabilizing zone— encompassing the four Visegrad states (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), Russia's Kaliningrad oblast (administrative district), Belarus and western Ukraine—where greater restrictions would apply for stationed forces. Under the proposal, territorial ceilings for ground based equipment could not be set any higher than current individual maximum levels, additional information would be provided on stationed forces or temporary deployments, and special inspection quotas would apply to certain sites.

Western signatories recognize that the introduction of an "accession clause" to allow other European states to join the CFE regime is appropriate. This could have positive ramifications for both the Baltic and Balkan regions. The exclusion of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from the treaty was primarily an issue of sovereignty. Baltic leaders argued that they were neither signatories to the original agreement nor successor states to the Soviet Union, and they refused to participate in the May 1992 Tashkent conference. It seems logical that entry into the CFE regime now as new members would underscore their respective sovereignty, offer additional security reassurances and could be viewed as a prerequisite to future entry into NATO.

As regards the Balkans, the December 1995 General Framework Agreement on Peace for Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton peace accord) calls for confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) and force reductions which mirror the CFE agreement. The resulting treaties were signed in the spring of 1996. Inspections consistent with the established measures are occurring, and reductions are being monitored. Another portion of the Dayton agreement also calls for future sub regional discussions with the goal of establishing a regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia. These negotiations would likely include not only the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now comprising Serbia and Montenegro), Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Austria and Slovenia. The talks might also include other states in the region that are already CFE signatories such as Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. A CFE accession clause would offer signatories to the Bosnian peace accords the opportunity to enter the CFE regime once they had achieved their required residual levels, which could obviate the need for separate negotiations.

NATO has also called for lower TLE entitlements throughout the area of application, and made a commitment that the total of alliance ground based equipment entitlements under an adjusted treaty will be "significantly" less than what the current NATO members are allowed. The alliance has attempted throughout these discussions and elsewhere to emphasize the view that NATO poses no threat to Russia. Despite this fact, many Russian leaders continue to view NATO with great suspicion, especially in light of its enlargement plans. In their view, a reduction in NATO entitlements would diminish not only the numerical disparity between NATO and Russian forces (which is currently greater than 2:1 in some categories), but might also serve to reduce Moscow's security anxieties. A large portion of NATO's reductions would likely be drawn from U.S. TLE entitlements, bringing these entitlements closer to what is actually present in the treaty's area of application and requiring very little actual equipment destruction. (See Table 2.)

NATO members also agree on two other issues. First, they seek an improved flow of information to all signatories and enhancements to the CFE verification regime. This must include changes to the allocation of inspection quotas engendered by the elimination of the treaty's original bloc to bloc structure. During their negotiations, original CFE NATO countries agreed that there was no need for one NATO country to inspect another. Since the demise of the Warsaw Pact, however, its former members have frequently requested so called "East on East" inspections. This has reduced the available inspection quotas for NATO countries, and several states (most notably Russia) have complained that it is especially burdensome. Second, the negotiations to achieve a compromise over Russian force levels in the flank zone were both difficult and divisive; all NATO members agree that this issue must not be reopened in the adaptation talks.

Overall, the NATO proposal seeks to respond to Russian concerns by forgoing a dramatic expansion of the alliance's collective arsenal with weapon systems from new members, and the proposed stabilizing zone in Central Europe would preclude the concentration of forces on the territories of the new NATO members. An adjusted treaty consistent with this proposal should not engender significant supplementary costs because the requirement to destroy additional equipment will be low. Finally, relatively minor adjustments to the verification regime will ensure that the opportunities to cheat—and the resulting advantages—are also low.

 

The Russian Position

Moscow presented its initial ideas for CFE modification during the May 1996 review conference, and Russian officials complained throughout the remainder of the year (with some good reason) that NATO's failure to respond suggested a lack of political willingness. The ideas put forward by Moscow included a shift toward national ceilings and the accession of new members, among other things. A formal Russian proposal, presented in March 1997 at the JCG, reflected many of Moscow's early ideas and demonstrated some areas of agreement with NATO's proposal. For example, Russia supported shifting from group to national totals, the addition of an accession clause, and disposition of separate counting rules for equipment placed in storage. The Russian proposal also included:

  • limits on stationed forces that would largely preclude NATO from placing any equipment on the territories of new members;
  • the elimination of the flank zone;
  • exemptions for equipment assigned to forces involved in peacekeeping operations (as in Chechnya, for instance); and
  • a "sufficiency rule" that would place a limit on the amount of TLE any alliance (that is, NATO) could have.

Russian negotiators have also suggested the addition of new pieces of equipment to the "combat aircraft" category (such as electronic warfare, refueling and transport aircraft), and limitations on infrastructure improvements (including airfields, harbors and railways). Obviously, some of these proposals will be difficult for NATO to accept, but there are areas of conceptual agreement.

Russian officials argue that the full implementation of the CFE Treaty and the demise of the Warsaw Pact have resulted in an asymmetry in the balance of forces. This is the basis of their recommendations for an alliance sufficiency rule and restraints on stationed forces on new members' territories. Moscow maintains that under the treaty Russia is currently allowed less TLE than NATO, and this disparity would only grow if NATO expands eastward.

Such analysis is, however, flawed in several ways. First, from a legal perspective, NATO is not a party to or signatory of the CFE Treaty. Certainly, the alliance has been involved in the treaty's negotiation and implementation and is mentioned a number of times in the actual treaty text, but the treaty is still based on the participation of 30 sovereign states. Second, Moscow's balance of force comparisons are based on a Cold War security environment—pitting alliance against alliance—which no longer exists. In the new era of cooperative security, as is clearly stated in the NATO Russian Founding Act, "NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries." Third, this perspective ignores NATO's stated desire—contained both in its proposal and the Founding Act—to negotiate lower force levels as an objective of the adaptation talks. Fourth, NATO currently maintains force levels that are far below its entitlements in every TLE category. It is certainly true that total entitlements for all NATO members would increase with the addition of new members, but the sum of the current holdings of NATO members plus the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland would still be far below the alliance's entitlement prior to enlargement. (See Table 3.)Moreover, given the current economic conditions and budgetary pressures in NATO countries, it is difficult to imagine them expanding their arsenals so actual holdings more closely approximate actual entitlements. Fifth, Russia currently maintains lower force levels than it is allowed under the ceilings established for each category of TLE. Furthermore, the CFE Treaty only applies to Russian conventional forces west of the Ural Mountains; it has no impact on weaponry deployed outside the treaty's area of application. Russia can (if it desires) significantly increase its TLE holdings under the current treaty either by expanding its force structure in the area of application or transferring units now deployed east of the Ural Mountains. Finally, Russian officials are quick to portray their position as one of total isolation, compared to NATO's 16—and soon to be 19—members. This, however, ignores the close relations that exist between Russia and Belarus, plus the sizable CFE entitlement for the Belarusan military. (See Table 4.)

Basic Elements' for Adaptation

On July 23, the 30 states parties to the CFE Treaty announced agreement on certain "basic elements" for treaty adaptation (referred to informally as the "Basic Elements Document"), thus fulfilling one of the objectives undertaken by NATO and Russia in the Founding Act. In the Basic Elements Document, all states parties agreed that the CFE Treaty's original bloc to bloc structure was outmoded and should be replaced by national limits for all TLE categories. They also agreed that:

  • national limits should not exceed existing allocations for each country;
  • rules governing TLE in storage must be changed;
  • stabilizing measures to preclude force concentrations were required;
  • each state should adopt a territorial ceiling that equaled the total of national and stationed forces;
  • rules governing "temporary deployments" must be clarified; and
  • an accession clause should be added to the treaty.

It is clear that the Basic Elements Document represents a "lowest common denominator" agreement based on NATO's and Russia's respective proposals, and a final, adjusted treaty will require difficult negotiations. Both sides had already indicated their willingness to move toward national totals and to constrain stationed forces through the imposition of additional territorial limits. NATO and Russia had both also proposed the addition of an accession clause for new signatories. Other "elements" contained in the document simply clarify those areas that must be addressed in the adaptation talks (for example, rules for temporary deployments, stabilizing measures and new rules for stored equipment). But the "devil remains in the details" of how this effort will translate into an adjusted treaty all 30 parties can agree upon.

The true significance of the Basic Elements Document may be more political in nature, demonstrating the progress made in the adaptation process since the Madrid summit in July. Russia appears to have dropped for now its insistence on an overall alliance sufficiency rule and accepted several aspects of NATO's approach to treaty adaptation. Moscow has also suggested that it may be possible to achieve a framework agreement in time for the OSCE summit in Copenhagen in December.

Nevertheless, Russia was far more cautious in its response to this development than many in the West. Russian negotiators may well accept that these elements must be in the adjusted treaty text, but that may not mean they have fully given up on other issues such as an alliance sufficiency rule, removal of the flank limitation or expanding the definition of "combat aircraft." Furthermore, Russia continues to insist on greater limits on the deployment of NATO forces on the territories of new members, and geographic limits for aircraft and ground based TLE. Moscow may have also accepted the need for stabilizing measures, but it is very unlikely to embrace the proposed "stabilizing zone" in its current form. Finally, Russian officials appear to believe that they have made most of the concessions so far in the adaptation process, and it is now up to the West to respond.

 

Prospects in Vienna

The Vienna adaptation talks, as is true with any arms control negotiations, will not occur in a vacuum and will therefore be affected by other aspects of the Euro Atlantic security environment. For instance, some CFE Treaty signatories were upset over the manner in which the flank problem was resolved at the treaty review conference. Many observers, particularly in Europe, believe the United States became frustrated with NATO's inability to achieve consensus on a compromise and subsequently conducted bilateral negotiations with Russia. The resulting agreement was then forced on the alliance and other treaty signatories.2 There is concern in Europe that Washington might adopt this approach again if progress in the adaptation negotiations stalls. Serious disagreements among NATO members during the Madrid summit over which states should be offered NATO membership and over adjustments to the alliance's command structure are further indicators of strains within NATO.

Relations between Russia and Ukraine are also key to the achievement of an adaptation agreement. Moscow and Kiev were deadlocked over a final treaty on the Black Sea Fleet for over five years. While the military value of the TLE associated with the fleet's coastal defense and naval infantry forces is suspect, a final settlement remained a serious sovereignty issue, particularly in terms of the stationing of Russian forces on Ukrainian soil. A compromise agreement was achieved in the spring of 1997, but its final implementation will be of critical importance for Russian Ukrainian relations and prospects in Vienna. If approved by both national parliaments, the agreement could signal a new Russian policy toward the former Soviet republics.

Serious questions have also been raised by other CFE parties which might affect the Vienna talks. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland accepted NATO's adaptation proposal with no complaints due largely to their desire to obtain an invitation to join the alliance. These states remain somewhat skeptical, however, of the proposed stabilization zone that would place them in a separate category from other NATO members and could largely preclude the alliance from stationing forces permanently on their territories. It remains to be seen if they will continue to support NATO's proposal now that an invitation has been extended. In addition, Azerbaijan has raised repeated objections to the presence of Russian forces in Georgia and Armenia following their independence from the Soviet Union. In recent months, Azerbaijani officials have also accused Moscow of providing weapons to Armenia without announcing such transfers in accordance with existing CFE Treaty rules on data exchanges.

Finally, time itself could still become an issue. Though there is no direct link between CFE Treaty modernization and NATO enlargement, achieving an adapted treaty before the three proposed members actually enter the alliance in April 1999 is certainly a goal. Many Western officials had hoped that the framework of an adapted accord could be achieved prior to the Madrid summit, but this did not occur due largely to intense efforts to resolve many outstanding issues surrounding the NATO Russian Founding Act. While Russia did make significant concessions from its initial position for the Founding Act, some experts believe that the act would not have been concluded had Moscow not viewed CFE adaptation as the "escape valve" for any demands not satisfied. Rather than supposing that NATO negotiators will continue to say "no," Russian officials may instead believe that this increased pressure on the adaptation process will result in the sides settling their "unfinished business."

 

The Task Ahead

NATO enlargement remains a means to improve European security and not an objective by itself. In this context, efforts to adjust the CFE Treaty are simply a policy tool in this overall process and not a panacea. This endeavor is not based on Western altruism, because NATO remains in a position of strength from strictly a military perspective. Rather, it is based on the view that the foundations of European security have been inextricably altered. The NATO communiqué from the January 1994 Brussels summit that announced the alliance's enlargement clearly suggests this goal, stating: We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole. (Emphasis added.) From the perspective of NATO enlargement, CFE adaptation can make a positive contribution to the consolidation of European security if it fulfills the following requirements:

 

  • ease, to some degree, Russian concerns about NATO enlargement;
  • consider how adjustments will affect relations between NATO and its new members;
  • take into account the security concerns of the Eastern and Central European states not invited to apply for NATO membership, particularly the Baltic states and Ukraine;and
  • enhance alliance cohesion while fostering public support for enlargement.
Adjusting the CFE Treaty is critical to reducing Russian concerns over NATO enlargement. It would be a serious error to interpret Moscow's acceptance of the NATO Russian Founding Act as support for NATO enlargement. Russia's political and military elites continue to be firmly opposed to enlargement, and it remains to be seen whether the country's populist leaders will continue to trumpet their opposition as a means to broaden their support. If handled properly, an adapted agreement can offer greater security not only for Russia but for all CFE parties. Treaty revisions that consider Russia's security concerns are crucial, and must be accompanied by a coordinated effort to breathe life into the NATO Russian Founding Act as well as the agreement between the alliance and Ukraine.

The fears of prospective new members must also be considered. These countries must feel that they are entering NATO as "full" and not "second class" members. Consequently, the alliance must protect the right to deploy forces on their territories (at least for exercise purposes) while underscoring the fact that the West sees no need for the permanent stationing of large scale forces. It is important, however, to remind these states that while the collective defense guarantee is still an essential part of the alliance, the NATO of 1997 is far different from the NATO of 1987. Treaty adaptation, in concert with other efforts, will help to reshape NATO as it considers new problems of conflict prevention and cooperative security.

Obviously, an adaptation agreement is impossible absent the support of those states which do not intend or are not allowed to join NATO in the near future. Their support will be based on how well the revised treaty will improve their individual security. For the Baltic nations—and potentially the Balkan states—the possibility of acceding to the treaty will not only provide modest security assurances, but must be considered an essential preliminary step toward joining NATO in future. The move toward territorial ceilings in reality makes every country a "zone," and therefore reduces the possibility of collective large scale force concentrations in one state that are threatening to its neighbor. This move must be coupled with a mechanism to address the tough issue of stationed forces, as many former Soviet republics fear the creation of any legal basis for the potential presence of Russian troops on their territories. Furthermore, enhanced transparency measures and data exchanges should further the security of all.

Alliance cohesion throughout the adaptation process is a prerequisite as well as an objective. NATO has shown in many ways surprising solidarity in the initial eight months of the negotiations and formulation of the alliance's agreed position. Whether this cohesion will remain as the pace of the negotiations intensifies and alliance members begin to explain the logic of enlargement to their respective populations is less certain. Ultimately, the success of this process can only be measured in how well the alliance satisfies these conflicting requirements and sets a course for the future.

NOTES

1. "Final Document of the First Conference to Review Operations of the CFE Treaty and the Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength," Vienna, Austria, May 15 31, 1996, p. 2.

2. Paul A. Goble, "Outflanked: How Non Russian Countries View the Proposed CFE Flank Modifications," testimony prepared for a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 29, 1997.

 


Table 1: CFE Treaty Entitlements/Holdings (E/H) for NATO Invitees1

Country Tanks Artillery ACVs Helicopters Aircraft
E H E H E H E H E H
Czech Republic 957 952 767 767 1,367 1,367 50 36 230 144
Hungary 835 797 840 840 1,700 1,300 108 59 180 141
Poland 1,730 1,729 1,610, 1,581 2,150 1,422 130 94 460 384
Total 3,522 3,478 3,217 3,188 5,217 4,109 288 189 870 669
1. Actual holdings as of January 1, 1997

Source: derived from individual national data contained in Dorn Crawford, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements," Washington, DC: ACDA, January 1997

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Table 2: U.S. CFE Treaty Entitlements/Holdings

  Entitlements Holdings1
Tanks 4,006 1,115
Artillery 2,492 612
ACVs 5,372 1,849
Helicopters 431 126
Aircraft 784 220
Total 13,085 3,922
1. Actual holdings as of January 1, 1997

Source: derived from individual national data contained in Dorn Crawford, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements," Washington, DC: ACDA, January 1997

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Table 3: NATO & Russian CFE Treaty Entitlements/Holdings (E/H)1

  NATO Russia NATO+32
E H E H E H
Tanks 20,000 14,101 6,400 5,541 23,522 17,579
Artillery 20,000 14,101 6,415 6,011 23,217 17,198
ACVs 30,000 21,464 11,480 10,198 35,217 25,573
Helicopters 2,000 1,221 890 812 2,288 1,410
Aircraft 6,800 4,218 3,416 2,891 7,760 4,887
Total 78,000 55,014 28,601 25,453 91,914 66,647
1. Actual holdings as of January 1, 1997

2. Sixteen NATO members plus the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland

Source: derived from individual national data contained in Dorn Crawford, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements," Washington, DC: ACDA, January 1997

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Table 4: Belarusan CFE Treaty Entitlements/Holdings

  Entitlements Holdings1
Tanks 1,800 1,778
Artillery 1,615 1,533
ACVs 2,600 2,518
Helicopters 80 71
Aircraft 294 286
Total 6,389 6,186
1. Actual holdings as of January 1, 1997

Source: derived from individual national data contained in Dorn Crawford, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements," Washington, DC: ACDA, January 1997

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Posted: August 1, 1997