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ACA’s journal, Arms Control Today, remains the best in the market. Well focused. Solidly researched. Prudent.

– Hans Blix,
former IAEA Director-General

European Security

Small Arms and Light Weapons: Controlling the Real Instruments of War

One of the dominant features of the global community in the 1990s has been the violent breakdown of civil society in dozens of countries throughout the world. From the socialist states of the former Soviet bloc to Africa and Asia, we have witnessed the outbreak of ethnic, religious, racial, linguistic and other forms of communal strife and the melting away of social norms and government structures that would otherwise contain the violence. Adding to the disorder, in many instances, has been a significant upsurge in armed banditry and criminal violence.

The importance of this "failed state syndrome" during this decade can hardly be overstated. The very nature of conflict has been transformed—from traditional combat between nation-states to inter-communal conflict within states. Such strife typically involves a wide variety of actors, including governments, rebel movements, armed political militias, ethnic and religious groups, tribes and clans, expatriate and diaspora groups, criminal gangs and mercenaries. Common distinguishing characteristics of this type of intra-state conflict include multiple warring parties, blurred lines of conflict, greater involvement of civilians, and the fact that the conflict itself is not fought on traditional battlegrounds but in local communities; indeed, within society itself. Also characteristic of these conflicts is the presence among the warring parties of irregular and paramilitary forces with little or no formal military training and few compunctions about violating the rules of war. All too often, it is children and teenagers who are recruited or forced into these organizations and then made to kill, loot and rampage.

Another defining characteristic of such conflict is the fact that widespread death and suffering result not from the major conventional weapons traditionally associated with war—tanks, aircraft and warships, for example—but from small arms and light weapons. The global proliferation of assault rifles, machine guns, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and other "man-portable" weapons has increased both the frequency and intensity of modern conflict and greatly complicated the task of restoring peace. Such weapons are readily obtainable on international markets, both legal and illicit, and are easily mastered by untrained and unprofessional soldiers, even children. Of the 49 major conflicts that have broken out since 1990, light weapons were the only arms used in 46; only one conflict (the 1991 Gulf War) was dominated by heavy weapons.< 1 >

Since 1990, these conflicts have resulted in the deaths of more than 4 million people and have produced 20 million refugees and 24 million displaced persons.< 2 > The resources of the international community are being overwhelmed by bitter conflicts, large-scale refugee movements and even genocide. In response to these disasters, the international community has spent tens of billions of dollars on emergency relief, refugee care and resettlement, peacekeeping, and direct military intervention. For the United Nations alone, the annual cost of humanitarian assistance and relief for war victims has increased ten-fold, from about $300 million a year in the 1980s to $3 billion a year in the mid-1990s.

In recent years, attention has come to focus on the ways in which the increased availability of low-cost small arms and light weapons contributes to the likelihood, intensity and duration of armed conflict. Although these conflicts often possess deep and complex roots, it is evident that the widespread availability of modern light weapons has emboldened belligerents to pursue their objectives on the battlefield, rather than at the bargaining table.

An analysis of contemporary warfare also reveals that such conflict overwhelmingly takes place in the world's poorest countries. In the 1990s, 30 of the 60 least-developed countries in the world have experienced conflict directly, while another 12 have had to support large refugee populations from neighboring countries in conflict.< 3 > This correlation between conflict and poverty helps explain why these conflicts are generally fought with relatively inexpensive small arms and light weapons. It also explains why the victims of these conflicts are so dependent on assistance from the international community.

 

Advantages of Light Weapons

In recent conflicts, more people have been killed by small arms and light weapons than by major weapons systems. The distinguishing features of these weapons that make them so suitable to contemporary intra-state conflicts include:

Low Cost and Wide Availability. Because the production of small arms and light weapons requires little in the way of sophisticated technology, and because these weapons are manufactured for military, police and civilian use, there are plentiful suppliers around the world. In addition, the existence of many tens of millions of such weapons—whether newly produced, given away by downsizing militaries or recycled from conflict to conflict—leads to bargain-basement prices in many areas around the world.

Lethality. The increasing sophistication and lethality of rapid-fire assault rifles, automatic pistols and submachine guns and their diffusion to non-state actors has given such groups a firepower that often matches or exceeds that of national police or constabulary forces. With such weapons capable of firing up to 300 rounds a minute, a single individual can pose a tremendous threat to society. The incorporation of new technology into shoulder-fired rockets, mortars and light anti-tank weapons has only increased the firepower that warring factions bring to bear in civil conflicts.

Simplicity and Durability. Small arms are easy to use and maintain, require little maintenance or logistical support and remain operational for many years. Such weapons require little training to use effectively, which greatly increases their use in conflicts involving untrained combatants and children.

Portability and Concealability. Small arms and light weapons can be carried by an individual soldier or light vehicle, are easily transported or smuggled to areas of conflict, and can be concealed in shipments of legitimate cargo.

Military, Police and Civilian Uses. Unlike major conventional weapons, which are most often procured solely by national military forces, small arms and light weapons cross the dividing line separating military and police forces from the civilian population. Depending on the gun control laws of a particular country, citizens are permitted to own anything from pistols and sporting guns to fully automatic rifles. In many countries, moreover, there has been a dramatic increase in the number and size of private militias and security firms which, in many cases, are equipped with military-type weapons.

All of these characteristics of light weapons have made them particularly attractive to the sort of paramilitary and irregular forces that have played such a prominent role in recent conflicts. These forces have limited financial and technical means, lack professional military training, and often must operate in remote and inaccessible areas—all conditions that favor the use of small arms and light weapons. At the same time, many states have increased their purchases of these weapons for use in counterinsurgency campaigns against ethnic and political groups and to suppress domestic opposition movements.

 

A Global Diffusion of Small Arms

For many years, the global trade in major conventional weapons has been well documented. By comparison, the global trade in small arms and light weapons has proved much more difficult to track. Few national governments publish statistics on the sale or transfer of light weapons or release information about the sales activities of private companies. Moreover, much of the trade—perhaps 25 percent—is carried on through illicit and black-market channels of one sort or another.< 4 >

In the absence of uniform statistics on the trade in light weapons, researchers must rely on anecdotal information and what little fragmentary data is available from government and trade sources. Fairly reliable estimates of the global trade in such weapons range from $5 billion to $7 billion a year, with some estimates running as high as $10 billion a year.< 5 > And while official statistics indicate that the trade in major weapons systems has fallen sharply with the end of the Cold War, many analysts believe that global transfers of light weapons have increased during this period.

The global spread of small arms and light weapons has been facilitated by the emergence in many states, including a dozen or more developing countries, of a domestic capacity for the manufacture of such weapons. Whereas the fabrication of major weapons systems is highly concentrated, with only a dozen or so states capable of producing modern tanks, planes and warships, some 50 nations now manufacture light weapons and/or ammunition of various types. The production of modern assault rifles, for example, occurs in many of the industrialized nations as well as in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Mexico, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey. Many of these countries produce arms for export as well as domestic use, greatly adding to the number of sources from which a potential belligerent can obtain weapons of war.

The large number of production sites contributes not only to the expansion of national arsenals, but to the spread of arms within societies via theft, bribery and corruption. The multiplicity of trade channels leads to the diffusion of light weapons within societies—extending not only to governments and state-owned entities but also to private armies and militias, insurgent groups, criminal organizations and other non-state actors. Accordingly, any analysis of the trade in light weapons must take into account both the sharp increase in the number of producers and suppliers and how their weapons are being transferred to an ever-expanding array of states and non-state actors in every region of the world.

The following list of legal, illegal and covert methods by which small arms and light weapons are sold, transferred and exchanged underscores the complexity of the problem:

  • Grants or gifts by governments to allied governments abroad;
  • Sales by governments to client governments abroad;
  • Commercial sales by private firms to governments and private dealers in other countries;
  • Technology transfers associated with domestic arms production in the developing nations;
  • Covert transfers by governments to friendly insurgent and separatist groups in other countries;
  • Gifts by governments to armed militias and paramilitary organizations linked to the ruling party or the dominant ethnic group;
  • Black-market sales to the governments of "pariah" countries and to insurgent and separatist forces;
  • Theft of government and privately owned arms by insurgent, criminal and separatist forces; and
  • Exchanges between insurgent and criminal organizations, whether for profit or in pursuit of common political objectives.
  • Although it is impossible to discuss each of these methods in detail, it is useful to look briefly at the major channels.

    Legal Channels. Currently, there are over 300 manufacturers of light weapons and related equipment in 50 countries around the world, a 25 percent increase in the last decade alone.< 6 > Until the end of World War II, the major producers of these weapons were the industrialized nations. In recent decades, however, these established producers have been joined by China, Israel, South Africa and many developing countries. Estimates of some common models produced by these countries in the past few decades show the enormity of the problem: 5 million to 7 million Belgian FAL assault rifles produced in 15 countries; 35 million to 50 million Soviet/Russian AK assault rifles manufactured by Soviet/Russian factories and licensees; 7 million German Heckler & Koch G3 assault rifles made in 18 countries; 8 million U.S. M-16 rifles produced in seven countries; and 6 million Chinese-made AK-type assault rifles.< 7 >

    These numbers, as alarming as they are, do not include the millions of surplus arms that have been sold or given away as the world's major military powers have reduced their forces and/or found themselves with excess production capacity following the end of the Cold War. Because small arms and light weapons have few moving parts and are extremely durable, even weapons that are 10- to 20-years old are often fully operational and as effective as newly produced weapons. Accordingly, countries such as the United States, Russia and Germany (especially with the dismantling of the East German army) have been able to sell or transfer millions of light weapons to their allies and clients abroad.

    Covert and 'Gray-Market' Channels. In addition to legal sales and military assistance programs, small arms and light weapons are disseminated through covert and "gray-market" channels (that is, channels that operate with government support even though in violation of official government policy), most often by government intelligence agencies or private companies linked to such agencies. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the CIA helped to supply some 3 million AK-47 assault rifles (mainly Chinese and Egyptian models) to rebel mujahideen; thousands of these weapons have since turned up in fighting in Kashmir and elsewhere in South Asia, and as far away as Southeast Asia and the Middle East. In addition, the United States and the Soviet Union supplied arms to rebel groups in Central America and sent massive amounts of weapons to various factions in Angola and Mozambique.

    Since the end of the Cold War, Washington and Moscow have discontinued many of these activities. But it is widely believed that military commanders and managers of military factories in Russia and some of the other newly independent states of the former Soviet Union have engaged in large-scale covert sales of weapons to clients in neighboring states and beyond. Government officials in other states have also been accused of smuggling arms to allied groups in other countries, whether for profit or to advance particular political or religious objectives. Officials in Zaire, for instance, reportedly bought large quantities of weapons on the international market and sold them to UNITA forces in Angola for profits running into the hundreds of millions of dollars—most of which is believed to have wound up in the overseas bank accounts of former President Mobutu Seso Seko and his associates.

    Another form of gray-market transfers entails the delivery of weapons from government stockpiles to political entities and ethnic militias associated with the ruling clan or party. Prior to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, for example, the Hutu-dominated government distributed small arms and machetes to government-linked militias. Once the killing began, the Rwandan military sought to crush any organized Tutsi resistance while the militias slaughtered unarmed Tutsis and moderate Hutus. A similar pattern was evident in Haiti in the early 1990s, when the ruling military junta organized and armed the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) to suppress popular support for ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

    Illicit and Black-Market Channels. The third major category of light weapons transfers includes illegal sales through black-market channels, the supply of arms in defiance of international embargoes and other legal sanctions, and the theft of arms from government stocks or private citizens. In recent years, there has been a striking growth in the operations of black-market dealers to satisfy the needs of non-state actors in ethnic and internal conflicts. Because such actors are normally barred from purchases on the legal munitions market, they must acquire their weaponry from illicit sources. The growing number of UN arms embargoes has also produced an increased demand for black-market arms. Although it is impossible to estimate the value or scale of all such transactions, some estimates place 1993 black market sales to the belligerents in Bosnia alone at $2 billion or more.< 8 >

    The black-market trade has been facilitated by the existence of vast stockpiles of surplus arms in the states of the former Soviet bloc—arms which in many cases are guarded by near-destitute soldiers and officers who are all too eager to conspire in their theft by black-market dealers or to enter the illicit trade themselves. Moreover, there are strong linkages between the illegal narcotics trade and black-market arms trafficking. These underground networks have developed sophisticated methods for the procurement, transportation and sale of small arms and light weapons, at times with the connivance of governments or corrupt public officials.

    Finally, theft of weapons from military and police warehouses is a major problem in countries afflicted by civil war or insurgent violence. As civil strife spread across Albania in the spring of 1997, thousands of weapons were looted from military depots by insurgents, criminals and civilians. These weapons not only increased the levels of armed violence in Albania, but reportedly were also being smuggled across the border into the Serbian province of Kosovo, where 2 million ethnic Albanians pose an irredentist challenge to Serbian authority. In South Africa and Colombia, stolen weapons contribute to a culture of violence and criminality that undermines the stability of the state and the cohesion of society.

     

    The Need for Policy Initiatives

    Clearly, the unchecked flow of small arms and light weapons to areas of conflict represents a significant threat to world peace and security. While it cannot be said that such weapons are a primary cause of conflict, their worldwide availability, low cost and ease of operation make it relatively easy for potential belligerents of all kinds to initiate and sustain deadly conflict. Accordingly, policy-makers have begun to highlight the need for new international controls in this area. In a January 1998 message to the UN Conference on Disarmament, Secretary-General Kofi Annan said, "With regard to conventional weapons, there is a growing awareness among member-states of the urgent need to adopt measures to reduce the transfer of small arms and light weapons. It is now incumbent on all of us to translate this shared awareness into decisive action."

    Interest in the trade in light weapons has also been spurred by a growing number of national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), many of which played a key role in the international campaign to ban landmines. Along with UN officials and leaders of interested governments, these groups have led the search for new policy prescriptions.

     

    International Efforts

    In line with the increased attention being focused by the international community on the dangers posed by small arms and light weapons, the United Nations has been engaged in a wide variety of activities to both publicize the problem and initiate steps toward policy controls. The two major efforts undertaken so far by the United Nations are the study conducted by the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms in 1996 and 1997, which analyzed the types of weapons used in contemporary conflicts and the nature and causes of their excessive accumulation,< 9 > and the parallel study of member-states' firearm regulations conducted by the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in the same two-year period.< 10 >

    Operationally, the United Nations has sought to monitor the effectiveness of various international embargoes on the transfer of weaponry into areas of conflict. In 1996, a UN International Commission of Inquiry on Rwanda investigated the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Rwanda, paying particular attention to specific allegations of embargo violations. In their report, members of the commission noted that "[we] could not fail to note the absence of an effective, proactive mechanism to monitor or implement the arms embargo the Security Council had imposed on Rwanda."< 11 > Elsewhere in Africa, the United Nations has supported Mali's path-breaking efforts to collect and destroy firearms internally and to promote a regional moratorium on the trade in small arms and light weapons.

    Other international organizations are also becoming involved in the light weapons issue, particularly as it relates to issues of economic and human development. The World Bank is devoting resources to issues of post-conflict reconstruction, particularly in regard to the demobilization of combatants and their reintegration into civil society. Also, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), through its task force on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, is putting greater emphasis on the need for "timely prevention measures" (such as limiting arms flows in areas of potential conflict) in order to forestall armed violence.

     

    Regional Efforts

    Particularly in Africa and the Americas, national governments and regional organizations are devising a variety of measures to better regulate the legal trade in light weapons and to combat illicit weapons trafficking. In November 1997, the Organization of American States (OAS) signed a convention on the illicit weapons trade that calls for standardization of national firearms regulations and increased law enforcement and customs cooperation to prevent illicit weapons flows within the Western Hemisphere. The OAS has also developed model regulations that focus on the linkages between the narcotics trade and weapons smuggling. Within the Caribbean sub-region, moreover, Jamaica has proposed that similar efforts be undertaken by the 14-member Caribbean Community.

    Elsewhere, West African governments are working with the United Nations to assess the regional implications of light weapons diffusion and to craft a regional moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of such arms. In Central Africa, the United Nations has established a trust fund with which to remove small arms and light weapons from the region. Similarly, the Southern Africa Development Community has recommended the establishment of a regional database on stolen firearms and the implementation of multilateral police operations to recover such weapons.

    Among European countries, there are increased pressures for controlling both legal and illegal shipments of weapons, particularly to countries experiencing civil strife and human rights abuses. In June 1997, the European Union (EU) agreed to a Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms. In June 1998, the EU formally adopted a "code of conduct" on arms transfers with the goal of preventing such transfers to areas of conflict and internal repression. While useful steps, both measures will require political will in constraining arms transfers and dedicated resources to help affected countries monitor arms shipments and remove excess weaponry.

     

    National Efforts

    Because so much of the light weapons trade takes place illegally, the role of national governments in tightening and enforcing export regulations will be very important. Under pressure from Mexico, the United States has cracked down on illicit gun trafficking on the U.S.-Mexican border and has agreed to stronger export controls in the context of the OAS convention signed last November. Similar efforts are underway in a number of other states, including Colombia, South Africa and EU states.

    In many communities, municipal authorities and NGOs have begun grass roots campaigns to remove small arms from circulation at the local level, and to pressure their national governments to take the light weapons problem more seriously. In South Africa, such initiatives involve bringing various ethnic and tribal groups together to deal with the "culture of violence" plaguing that country. In countries like Britain and Australia that have experienced horrific massacres carried out by automatic weapons—notably the killings in Dunblane, Scotland, and Port Arthur, Tasmania, national groups have come together to lobby for more restrictive gun control laws. Elsewhere, NGOs and grass roots organizations have put the spotlight on their own governments' responsibility for supplying weapons to areas of conflict and persistent human rights abuse.

     

    What Is to Be Done?

    From all that has been learned about the international trade in small arms and light weapons, it is evident that no single set of policy initiatives will suffice to deal with this problem. Unlike the relative simplicity of the landmines issue—where the international community could focus on one particular weapon (anti-personnel landmines) and seek its elimination as a weapon of war—the effort to control the diffusion of light weapons will demand a host of initiatives, extending from the international arena to regional, national and local levels. National governments especially will have to go beyond their support for cracking down on the illegal trade in light weapons and examine their own role in the current legal weapons trade. The following initiatives represent a rough menu of the sort of steps that will be needed to subject light weapons transfers to greater international scrutiny and to reduce the flow of such munitions to areas of conflict.

    Establish International Norms. The first, and perhaps most important, step is to adopt international norms against the uncontrolled and destabilizing transfer of small arms and light weapons to areas of tension and conflict. Although deference must be made to the traditional right of sovereign states to arm themselves, it must be made clear that this right has natural limits and does not extend to the acquisition of arms for the purpose of engaging in genocide or the suppression of opposition political or religious movements. It must become axiomatic, moreover, that the right to acquire arms for self-defense entails an obligation to maintain such weapons under effective government control at all times and to preclude their diversion to illicit purposes.

    While it may take some time to clarify and win support for such norms, the basic groundwork has been provided by the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. In its 1997 report, the panel concludes: "The excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons is closely related to the increased incidence of internal conflicts and high levels of crime and violence," and is, therefore, "an issue of legitimate concern for the international community."< 12 > With this in mind, the report calls on UN member-states to "exercise restraint" with respect to the transfer of such weapons and to take all necessary steps to prevent the diversion of government arms supplies into illegitimate hands.

    Clearly, much work is needed to strengthen these norms and to promote their acceptance by governments. As in the worldwide campaign against landmines, the media can focus public attention on the dangers posed by such weapons, especially to civilians and children. The issue is admittedly complicated by the fact that, unlike anti-personnel landmines, national governments and military and police forces can demonstrate a far greater legitimate need for light weapons for purposes of self-defense and national security. Nonetheless, the frequency with which such weapons are used against civilians and children points to a humanitarian aspect of small arms that is quite similar to that of landmines.

    International norms could also be developed along the lines of the Geneva Conventions, where states-parties would be prohibited from supplying light weapons to any government, group or entity that does not have the resources to treat its wounded or those of the enemy, or has not trained its own personnel in the laws of war. In addition, public sentiment could be mobilized to support constraints on the inhumane or indiscriminate effects of light weapons, in the same way that blinding laser weapons have been banned by the recently adopted protocol to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

    Increase International Transparency. At present, efforts to monitor and control the diffusion of small arms and light weapons are hampered by a lack of detailed information on the production, sale and transfer of such munitions. Few governments provide detailed data on imports and exports of light weapons, and the UN Conventional Arms Register covers major weapons only. To ensure effective international oversight of the legal trade in light weapons, efforts at increased transparency must be made at the national, regional and international level. National governments should be required to publish detailed annual tallies of weapons imports and exports, while regional arms registers covering light weapons should also be encouraged. Finally, at the international level, the UN arms register should be gradually extended to cover all types of munitions, including small arms and light weapons.

    Enhanced international transparency is also necessary to curb the illicit trade in light weapons. In the absence of an effective transparency regime, it is relatively easy for illicit dealers to conceal their operations; as information on legal trade becomes more widely available, it will become more difficult to do this. Increased transparency will also facilitate joint efforts by law enforcement agencies to identify, track and apprehend black-market dealers.

    Increase State Accountability. In the current international milieu, control over the import and export of small arms and light weapons rests with national governments; thus, efforts to better regulate the trade in such munitions will be most effective at the national level.

    Increased governmental accountability is needed in two key areas: first, the establishment of effective oversight over all military-type firearms found within the national territory, so as to prevent their diversion to criminal elements and black-market dealers; and second, strict controls over the import and export of such weapons, so as to preclude their use for any purpose other than legitimate self-defense as sanctioned by the UN Charter.

    Efforts to accomplish the first of these objectives should be guided by the draft proposals of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Particularly effective measures would include a licensing system for manufacturers and gun owners, more effective identification systems to track firearms, more effective record keeping of firearms, and safe-storage measures. An additional measure called for is the promotion of amnesty and weapons turn-in programs that encourage citizens to surrender illegal, unsafe, unwanted and excess weapons. (An Australian buy-back effort, for example, took in more than 600,000 firearms, Governments around the world should be encouraged to incorporate such measures into their national laws and regulations; those states that fail to do so should be barred from receiving arms from those states that do adopt such legislation.

    Similarly, efforts to better control the import and export of small arms and light weapons should be guided by the recommendations found in the report of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. These include the collection and destruction of weapons once conflict has ended; the destruction of surplus weapons no longer needed by a country's military or police forces (as opposed to selling or giving them away); and the exercise of restraint in exporting military and police weapons from one country to another.

    States should also be encouraged to adopt a code of conduct for arms transfers such as those being considered at the regional (EU) and international levels. Such codes would bar the sale or transfer of small arms and light weapons to any state that is ruled by a military dictatorship, that fails to respect the human rights of its citizens, that violates UN arms embargoes, or that cannot ensure the security of the weapons already in its possession.

    Regional and International Efforts. While priority should be given to the development of effective controls at the national level, efforts should also be made to establish systems of oversight and control at the regional and international levels. Action at the regional level is particularly important because light weapons are often circulated by regional networks of illicit dealers, insurgents and permissive government agencies. Moreover, experience suggests that it may be easier to mobilize political support for control systems at the regional level than at the international level.

    At the regional level, policy initiatives could include agreements for the strengthening of import and export regulations, tougher enforcement of laws against illicit trafficking and joint operations against black-market dealers. The OAS effort is one means of fostering increased cooperation between national customs services and law enforcement agencies on a regional basis. Other such efforts could be greatly facilitated by countries like the United States and Japan, which could provide the requisite technologies for computer databases of suspected illicit weapons traffickers. In southern Africa, national governments and intelligence agencies are sharing information and mounting joint operations to uncover and destroy large caches of weapons left over from previous conflicts.

    The Mali moratorium on the manufacture, sale and import of small arms and light weapons is another initiative that can begin to reduce the easy availability of such weapons. As one of the more successful multilateral attempts to control the flow of light weapons both prior to and following periods of civil tension, the Mali initiative might provide a model for other regions. In West Africa, for example, the experiences of Liberia and Sierra Leone demonstrated how even relatively modest numbers of light weapons inflicted horrific casualties on civilians caught in sectarian strife.

    Other regional approaches include the establishment of regional codes of conduct on arms exports similar to that of the EU. Given the particularly troublesome black- market weapons activity in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the OECD or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) should consider adopting codes of conduct. Additionally, economic incentive plans could be devised that would facilitate the closure of excess production capacity in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. For example, Western countries could buy surplus small arms and light weapons from these states and destroy them, much as the United States is purchasing excess Russian nuclear weapons material.

    At the international level, emphasis should be placed on the adoption of measures needed to strengthen the implementation of weapons embargoes agreed to by the United Nations and associated bodies. While such embargoes may never be entirely leakproof, evidence has shown that even a modest number of international observers at airfields, seaports and other points of entry for weapons to an area of conflict can make a difference. When supplemented by stricter national export controls, embargoes can make it far more difficult to deliver significant quantities of modern weapons to areas of conflict.

    The major arms-supplying countries should also establish a mechanism (possibly as part of the Wassenaar Arrangement for conventional arms control) for consultation on arms flows to areas of current and potential conflict, along with provisions for the imposition of a moratorium on weapons transfers to any state or region deemed to be at risk of ethnic slaughter, state failure or genocide. International inspectors should be sent to the region to ensure compliance with these measures and to suggest any other actions that might be taken to reduce the flow of arms.

    Reducing Surplus Weapons. Addressing the problem of surplus weaponry generated by decades of Cold War competition is especially important because many states—particularly former Eastern bloc countries—are eager to sell arms for hard currency with few or no questions asked. Because export controls on surplus arms are generally less strict than those for newly manufactured weapons, black-market dealers find it easier to obtain and sell surplus arms than newly made weapons. The problem of surplus arms is especially acute in areas just recovering from armed conflict, where impoverished ex-combatants may try to sell their weapons for cash rather than turn them over to UN peace-keepers or other designated authorities.

    Measures to reduce global stockpiles of surplus munitions—a critical component of any international effort to constrain the flow of light weapons—can take several forms. States that can afford to do so should agree to destroy the surplus arms and ammunition in their possession and to take all the necessary steps to prevent the leakage of weaponry from government depots and warehouses. An early precedent was set by the Dutch Ministry of Defense, which announced in January 1998 that it would destroy most of its surplus small arms, including 115,000 Uzi submachine guns, FAL assault rifles, Garand rifles, Browning pistols and M-1 carbines.

    For their parts, the United States and Russia should agree to cooperate in locating and reclaiming (or buying back) weapons given by them to insurgent groups during the Cold War. In many regions, these weapons are now being used to fuel internal power struggles and criminal violence. Taking these weapons out of circulation would close one of the most deadly chapters of the Cold War and help promote international peace and security in the current era.

    Post-Conflict Measures. A high priority should be placed on efforts to remove the large quantities of small arms and light weapons that often remain in-country once a particular conflict has ended. Too often, the availability of such weapons facilitates either a renewal of the conflict (as in Angola) or a destabilization of efforts to build a peaceful civil society (as in South Africa). The limited success of disarmament programs in countries like El Salvador, where the country suffers from an appalling rate of criminal violence despite the collection of tens of thousands of weapons, points up the complexity and difficulty of such efforts. Above all, decisions to disarm warring factions and remove light weapons from areas of conflict must be implemented uniformly and comprehensively.

    Moreover, in many countries around the world the possession of arms is deeply embedded in society, so that arms collection efforts may prove futile or not be politically feasible. In such cases, and more generally as well, the primary emphasis should be on economic development and social reconstruction so that ex-combatants and non-combatants have viable options in the civilian economy.

    Recent initiatives on the part of the World Bank and a number of development and humanitarian NGOs to better integrate economic assistance programs with demobilization, destruction of weapons and conflict prevention strategies are a useful step in this direction.

    International Capacity-Building. Ultimately, any regime to control global trafficking in small arms and light weapons will only be as effective as the weakest links in the system. As long as black-market dealers enjoy safe havens in which they can operate with impunity, it will be difficult or impossible to enforce tougher international standards on the light weapons trade. It is therefore essential that the stronger participants in the system assist the weaker elements to establish effective and reliable mechanisms for the oversight of the arms market.

    As part of such efforts, technology should be developed and deployed internationally to help track the flow of small arms and light weapons, identify illicit sources of supply, and improve law enforcement and customs prosecution of illegal suppliers and traders. In addition to developing computer databases and communications systems that can facilitate international cooperation on the light weapons trade, several other technical initiatives have been proposed for helping to increase the transparency of light weapons flows. One such initiative being developed by OAS members is more effective marking and registration of weapons, both at the point of manufacture and when such weapons are legally exported. Such marking will make it easier for law enforcement and intelligence officials to trace the supply routes of weapons originally acquired legally which then entered the black market.

    Other proposals exist for the tagging of ammunition and explosives, and studies on their feasibility are being carried out by the Canadian government and the United Nations. While some of these technical solutions may prove difficult and expensive to implement, the international community has at least begun the process of thoroughly evaluating them.

     

    An Imperative to Act

    By the middle of 1998, there was increased international momentum for taking more decisive action to prevent the continuing global diffusion of small arms and light weapons. In addition to ongoing efforts on the part of the United Nations and regional organizations like the OAS, national governments—including Norway, Canada, Belgium, Mexico, Colombia, South Africa and Japan—had signalled their interest in devoting substantial political and economic resources to deal with the problem. In July 1998, the Norwegian government hosted a meeting of 21 countries, including the United States, that issued a call for stronger measures to deal with both the illicit and legal trade in light weapons.

    The Clinton administration has indicated its willingness to be fully involved in international efforts to dampen the light weapons trade. In August, the administration released a list of the comprehensive initiatives the U.S. government is pursuing—through the United Nations, the OAS and at the national level—to support global efforts for combatting the threat posed by unrestrained trade in light weapons.< 13 > Most of these efforts were aimed at the illicit trade in arms, though some focused on legal sales.

    Clearly, the U.S. and other governments, especially those responsible for the majority of light weapons production and supply, need to do more. At the moment, most countries, including the United States, are putting greater emphasis on the illicit light weapons trade. Yet, it is the continued supply of large amounts of small arms and light weapons, through legal channels, to governments and non-state actors, that is most worrisome. All too often, supplier states continue to give away or sell at a discount hundreds of thousands of surplus light weapons that end up in the wrong hands.

    In some cases, such as Somalia, these weapons are then used against U.S. peace-keeping forces that are sent to restore civil order. In other cases, such as Bosnia, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the United States and the international community will spend billions of dollars in peace-keeping and economic reconstruction when a more restrictive policy on light weapons transfers might have prevented or diminished the intensity of civil conflict in these countries.

    As the international community is beginning to recognize, the humanitarian and development benefits of cutting the link between light weapons availability and civil conflict would be substantial. For the United States, the economic benefits of the light weapons trade are exceedingly minor compared to the ultimate costs of having to rescue "failed states," provide for millions of refugees, and reconstruct societies torn apart by genocide and ethnic strife. The savings inherent in preventing or greatly limiting conflict in even one Rwanda, Bosnia or Liberia would greatly outweigh the minimal political and economic benefits of being an indiscriminate light weapons supplier.

    In sum, increased attention to the lethal effects of easily available small arms and light weapons on the part of humanitarian relief agencies, national governments, international organizations and the media is translating into a greater public appreciation of the need to better control the production, supply and diffusion of these weapons.

    Admittedly, the problem is incredibly complex and policies to control and regulate these weapons will not come easily. Nonetheless, the scale of death and injury caused by light weapons is such that the international community must continue to search for effective means of controlling and reducing the lethal commerce of small arms and light weapons around the world.


    NOTES

    1. Major wars are those with at least 1,000 deaths per year, though most of these conflicts have resulted in far more fatalities and wounded. See 1996 Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute, Stockholm: SIPRI, 1996.

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    2. See "Small Arms and Light Weapons: The Epidemic Spread of Conflicts," Conversion Survey 1997, Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 1997.

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    3. Steven Holtzman, "Post-Conflict Reconstruction," Environmental Department, Work in Progress, The World Bank, Social Policy and Resettlement Division, 1996, p. 1.

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    4. See The Economist, May 16, 1998, p. 47.

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    5. Keith Krause, "Constraining Conventional Arms Proliferation: A Model for Canada," Multilateral Approaches to Non-Proliferation, Andrew Latham, ed., Toronto: York University, 1996, p. 57.

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    6. Swadesh Rana, Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts, New York: United Nations, 1995, p. 4.

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    7. See Virginia Hart Ezell, "Small Arms Proliferation Remains Global Dilemma," National Defense, January 1995, pp. 26–27.

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    8. See Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed, eds., Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995, p. 9.

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    9. "Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms," Report #A/52/298, from the Secretary General to the UN General Assembly, August 27, 1997.

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    10. "Measures to Regulate Firearms for the Purpose of Combatting Illicit Trafficking in Firearms," United Nations Economic and Social Council, Vienna, July 28, 1998.

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    11. UN Report in response to Security Council Resolution 1013, September 7, 1995, pp. 18–19; see also the "Interim Report of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda)," S/1998/777, August 19, 1998.

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    12. "Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms," August 27, 1998.

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    13. See "Factsheet: ACDA Outlines U.S. Policy on Small Arms Issues," August 11, 1998, Washington, DC.

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    Jeffrey Boutwell is director of international security studies at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Michael Klare, a member of the Arms Control Association Board of Directors, is director of the Five College Program in Peace and World Security Studies at Hamphire College in Amherst, Massachusetts. This article is adapted from the authors' chapter in Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence, Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael Klare, eds., forthcoming from Rowman & Littlefield, spring 1998.

    Additional States to Follow EU 'Code of Conduct'

    In an August 3 statement, the European Union (EU) welcomed the joint declaration by 13 European states to "align themselves to the criteria and principles" of the recently approved (June 8) EU code of conduct on arms exports. Under the code's eight general criteria, EU members pledged to deny arms exports to states that may use the weapons for internal repression or aggressively against other states and to consider an importer's human rights record before approving an arms sale.

    Of the 13 non-EU states (Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia), all but Iceland and Norway have applied for EU membership; the declaration enables these states to align their arms export policies with those of the EU. Four of the 13, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), ranked among the top thirty arms suppliers for the period 1993–1997: the Czech Republic (13th), Norway (21st), Poland (22nd) and Slovakia (24th).

    The 13 states declared that the non-legally binding code would "guide them in their national export control policies." However, they will not take part in the key operative provisions of the code, such as circulating notices of arms export denials and consulting with other states over controversial sales. EU countries want the notification process to remain limited to protect sensitive information.

    Britain Releases Defense Review Calling for a 'Minimum Deterrent'

    Craig Cerniello

    ON JULY 8, Britain released a new Strategic Defence Review (SDR), the Labor government's first comprehensive assessment of British security requirements through 2015. Released as a "white paper" (a policy document), the review concluded that while there is "no direct military threat to the United Kingdom or Western Europe," the country's "minimum deterrent remains a necessary element of [its] security." But, the paper stated, "We have concluded that we can safely make further significant reductions from Cold War levels, both in the number of weapons and in our day-to-day operating posture."

    Currently, the Royal Navy's fleet of three Vanguard-class (Trident) ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) comprises the country's nuclear deterrent force. (In March, the Royal Air Force withdrew from service the last of its WE-177 nuclear gravity bombs.) According to the review, Britain will maintain four SSBNs, the same force envisioned by the previous government. The HMS Vanguard, HMS Victorious and HMS Vigilant are now in service; the fourth boat, HMS Vengeance, is expected to be commissioned around the year 2000. Britain expects that the Trident force will meet its nuclear deterrence requirements for the next 30 years.

    The SDR concluded that Britain needs a nuclear stockpile of less than 200 operationally available warheads—some 100 fewer than the maximum level proposed by the previous Conservative government led by Prime Minister John Major. The new level represents more than a 70 percent reduction in the explosive power of Britain's operational force since the end of the Cold War. The SDR also determined that Britain does not need more than the 58 Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that have already been delivered or ordered (seven fewer than the Major government proposed). Finally, the review also announced that only one SSBN will be kept on patrol at any given time (the United States keeps between eight and 11 of its 18 SSBNs on patrol), and that it will be armed with 48 warheads rather than the 96 announced by the previous government.

    During the Cold War, British SSBNs had the capability to fire nuclear weapons within minutes of receiving authorization. Under the new SDR, SLBMs will be "detargeted" and the submarines will be prepared to fire within a period of days. More advanced dealerting measures, such as taking submarines off at-sea patrol and removing warheads from their missiles, were examined during the SDR but rejected. "Ending continuous deterrent patrols would create new risks of crisis escalation if it proved necessary to sail a Trident submarine in a period of rising tension or crisis. The further step of removing warheads from missiles would also add a new vulnerability to our deterrent posture. This is a particular concern given our reduction to a single nuclear system," the report said.

    In the SDR, Britain became the first nuclear-weapon state to disclose the total composition of its defense fissile material stocks, declaring a stockpile of 7.6 metric tons of plutonium, 21.9 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and 15,000 metric tons of other forms of uranium. Although the United States has provided a more detailed breakdown of its plutonium stocks, it has not yet declared its stocks of HEU.

    CFE Compliance Report Issued; Treaty Adaptation Talks Continue

    Wade Boese

    RUSSIA, UKRAINE, Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan are not in compliance with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, according to an administration report submitted June 22 to Congress. Violations range from holdings of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) in excess of CFE ceilings to denial of full access during treaty inspections. The report, however, concludes that the compliance issues are not "militarily significant." Russia and Ukraine, which have the largest holdings among the Eastern bloc of countries, remain within their overall treaty limits.

    The 1990 CFE Treaty imposed equal numerical limits on five categories of heavy conventional weapons—tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), large-caliber artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters—that NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries could deploy and store between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. Countries derived national limits from their respective group limit, and a concentric-zone structure further restricted where TLE could be deployed. Although the accord's original bloc limits remain, the current 30 states-parties are seeking to adapt the treaty to Europe's post-Cold War security environment.

     

    Non-Compliance Findings

    According to the annual compliance report, mandated by the Senate, Russia has never included equipment held by the Presidential Guard Regiment, which the United States claims is covered by the treaty, in data exchanges. Under the treaty, even if a military unit is considered an internal security force, any tanks, artillery and armored infantry fighting vehicles (a sub-limit within the ACV category) it holds should be counted against a country's TLE limits. Moreover, Russia excluded over 180 ACVs from its July 1997 data exchange by marking the equipment as ambulances.

    Although Russia and Ukraine are "well below" limits on TLE held by naval infantry and coastal defense forces, the two states have failed to fulfill a separate June 1991 commitment by the Soviet Union—which they have assumed—to reduce 933 tanks, 1,725 ACVs and 1,080 artillery pieces. To date, Russia has completed over half of this shared reduction obligation, and with the November 1997 division of the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet assets between Russia and Ukraine, it is expected that the pledged reductions can now be completed.

     

    Former Soviet Equipment

    Ukraine has also declared an increasing amount of TLE as "awaiting export" (from 0 in 1992 to over 700 items in 1997), a category that exempts arms from treaty limits. The report called the increase a "trend that bears watching," but noted that it does not appear that Kyiv is using the equipment as a stockpile for replacement and modernization. Meanwhile, Belarus claimed almost 300 tanks as "awaiting export" in 1996 and then exchanged almost 150 for those in active units, thereby raising questions as to whether the equipment is actually intended for export. Minsk, along with Russia, also denied full access during some inspections of its TLE holding sites.

    Azerbaijan had exceeded its overall CFE limits by 316 items, according to its own December 1997 data submission, and is cited by the report as having never declared a reduction liability despite acknowledging receipt of weapons from Russia and Ukraine that would imply responsibility for reductions of at least 1,000 TLE items. Baku also suspended CFE-mandated notifications for changes of 10 percent or more in TLE assigned to units. Until the conflict over the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh is resolved, Azerbaijan maintains that it will not begin "disarmament."

    A Russian investigation in 1997 disclosed that Armenia illegally received 84 tanks, 50 ACVs and 116 artillery pieces from Russia that neither country reported in its CFE data. Although claiming to have reduced all excess TLE, Armenia did not carry out the reductions according to verifiable CFE provisions and has been accused by Azerbaijan of holding undeclared TLE in Nagorno-Karabakh.

    The issue of unclaimed equipment remains a significant factor in resolving a difference of approximately 2,100 TLE items between what the Soviet Union would have had to declare as its reduction liabilities and what the eight former Soviet republics now party to the CFE Treaty have notified. This and other compliance issues have been brought before the Vienna-based Joint Consultative Group (JCG), the governing body of the treaty, for discussion.

     

    NATO Offers Proposal

    In July 1997, CFE parties agreed to replace the treaty's bloc and concentric zone structures with a system of national and territorial ceilings. National ceilings would limit a country's TLE holdings in all five categories of weaponry, while territorial ceilings would limit the amount of ground-based TLE (both national equipment and that stationed by other states) permitted on a country's territory. The parties also agreed to negotiate provisions allowing territorial ceilings to be exceeded for notified military exercises, temporary deployments and United Nations or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) peace-keeping operations.

    On June 23, NATO put forward a proposal at the JCG that would limit temporary deployments within the treaty's so-called "flank" zone, where Russia claims serious security concerns. (See ACT, May 1997.) Under the proposal, Russia and the other "flank" states would be limited to 153 tanks, 241 ACVs and 140 artillery pieces, while states-parties outside of the zone would be permitted temporary deployments of up to 459 tanks, 723 ACVs and 420 artillery pieces in excess of territorial ceilings. There would be no time restrictions on temporary deployments, but any exceeding zone ceilings would be subject to additional transparency measures and an enhanced notification requirement. NATO also advanced measures for adapting the verification regime. While Russia made no formal response or counter-proposal at the JCG before a summer recess (which began July 25), a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman on July 7 called the proposals "very one-sided," according to a Reuters report.

    Negotiations to adapt the CFE Treaty have been underway in the JCG since January 1997. In the past, states-parties indicated they would like to see an adapted treaty in place before NATO's expected acceptance of new members in April 1999, but U.S. officials caution that there is no need to rush completion for any "artificial deadlines." The recently released British Strategic Defence Review noted that the negotiations are "likely to last well into 1999."

    Britain, France Propose EU Code of Conduct

    European Union (EU) members began consideration of a proposed arms sales code of conduct within the EU Council of Ministers' working group COARM on February 17. The proposal, drafted by Britain and France, lists eight broad criteria which EU members should take into account when making arms export decisions.

    Under the proposed code, members are expected to refuse an export request for military equipment or dual-use goods (when the end user is suspected to be the armed forces or internal security forces) if the request is "inconsistent" with international obligations such as arms embargos and treaty commitments and if there is a risk that the equipment might be used for "internal repression," prolonging an existing conflict, used "aggressively" against another country or re-exported to a third country. A requesting country's human rights record is to be considered, as well as economic factors such as external debt and economic and social development.

    EU members are to inform all other members of an export denial and its underlying rationale. If another member decides to make an "essentially identical" export within three years of a refusal, that member must only notify and consult the state that issued the original refusal.

    Although the code claims to have the aim of "setting high common standards for arms exports," the code would not be legally binding and the final export decision would remain a matter of national discretion.

    U.S. Buys Moldovan Aircraft to Prevent Acquisition by Iran

    THE UNITED STATES purchased 21 MiG 29 fighter aircraft from Moldova during October, pre empting Iran's efforts to acquire potential delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. The capability of 14 of the Russian made aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons, although disputed by Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, allowed the acquisition to be carried out under the Defense Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program.

    Under an agreement finalized on October 10, the United States acquired 14 MiG 29Cs, described by U.S. officials as wired to permit delivery of nuclear weapons, six MiG 29As, one MiG 29B, 500 air to air missiles and all the spare parts and diagnostic equipment present at the Moldovan air base where the aircraft were stationed. In return, Moldova will receive a cash payment, humanitarian assistance and non lethal excess defense articles such as trucks. Although the value of the package was not disclosed, Reuters reported on November 5 that Moldovan Finance Minister Valeriu Chitan said the cash payment equaled about $40 million. New aircraft of comparable capabilities cost approximately $20 million to $25 million apiece.

    The MiG 29Cs would have qualitatively improved Iran's air force by providing it with a more advanced fighter than its older model MiG 29s, a goal Tehran has sought since the Gulf War. With about 30 Russian made Su 24s, a sophisticated low altitude bomber, and both Scud and Scud variant missiles, Iran already possesses other systems more suited to deliver nuclear weapons than the MiG 29Cs.

    Moldova informed the United States in late 1996 of Iranian inquiries regarding the availability of the fighters and subsequently of an Iranian inspection of the aircraft. The Clinton administration, which considers Tehran to be vigorously pursuing the acquisition and development of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, initiated negotiations with Moldova in February 1997 to prevent the sale.

    Secretary of State Madeleine Albright certified Moldova (along with the former Soviet republics of Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) on March 4, 1997, as eligible for the CTR program, which provides assistance to states of the former Soviet Union in implementing denuclearization initiatives, securing fissile materials and preventing proliferation. The United States and Moldova concluded on June 23 a CTR "umbrella" agreement authorizing future cooperative activities.

    According to a report in Ria Novosti, a Russian newspaper, Sergeyev claimed that the Soviet military had removed the "hardware" permitting delivery of nuclear weapons in 1989. The difference between the U.S. and Russian definitions of "nuclear capable" is apparently largely semantic, reflecting whether the appropriate arming hardware has to accompany the necessary connecting wiring for the equipment.

    In late October, U.S. crews partially dismantled the fighters and transported them aboard C 17 cargo jets to Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, where the fighters will be reassembled, analyzed and used for training purposes. The MiG 29Cs are the first ever obtained by the United States and U.S. officials expect these models will provide additional insights into the capabilities of the MiG 29 class, which remains an important element in the active air forces of many former Eastern bloc nations and their client states.

    Moldova retained six MiG 29C fighters, but intends to sell them to a state not considered "rogue" by the United States, thereby eliminating its entire air force in an effort to cut costs. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies' The Military Balance 1997/98, the states of the former Soviet Union (not including Russia) currently have 284 MiG 29s in their active forces, but a Defense Department (DOD) official estimated that the newer model MiG 29Cs number in the "tens." DOD officials said the United States is not starting a MiG buying spree, but will continue to take steps to prevent rogue states from buying advanced weapons.

    United States Remains on Top Of UN Conventional Arms Register

    AS IN PREVIOUS years, the 1996 UN Register of Conventional Arms, released on October 17, continued to be hampered by a lack of participation and inconsistencies in national submissions. Prior to the release of the final 1996 declarations, the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on the UN Register highlighted the regime's shortcomings in a report endorsed by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, but proposed few solutions to remedy the register's ills.

    The register, designed to promote transparency in armaments, publishes information voluntarily submitted by states on their imports and exports in seven categories of conventional weapons—battle tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), large caliber artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers. States are also invited to provide additional data on their military holdings and their procurement through national production, but less than one third (largely European countries) of the 90 reporting states volunteered information beyond the seven categories.

    The 26 members of the GGE, selected by the UN Center for Disarmament Affairs to review the register's operation and explore its future development, met for three 1997 sessions (March 3 7, June 16 27 and August 4 15), but failure to achieve consensus on substantive changes to the register limited it to reporting its observations.

    Participation in the register declined to 90 states from 96 in 1995. The GGE noted that at least 90 countries have participated each year and during the first five years of the register's operation 138 states have submitted at least one report, while 49 countries have never participated. As in past years, the leading exporters submitted reports while key importing states of the Middle East did not; only Israel and Iran participated from the Middle East. Exporting states claimed that 2,568 weapons were delivered to non participating states in the region in 1996, of which the overwhelming amount went to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.

    The United States retained the distinction of being the top exporter, although its 1996 exports amounted to only 48 percent of 1995's. U.S. exports in 1996 totaled 2,342 pieces of equipment as opposed to the previous year's total of 4,843. (See table below. [Not available in web form at this time, please contact ACA for more information]) A 1995 transfer of 2,208 missiles and missile launchers to Greece accounted for much of the discrepancy between the two years.

    Russia and Germany, the second and third leading exporters, respectively, in 1995, also reported fewer exports in 1996. Russia's total exports declined from 708 total items in 1995 to 544 in 1996, while Germany's total exports dropped 50 percent to 187. The United Kingdom surpassed Germany, more than doubling exports to 509 in 1996. China and France also increased their exports from 1995, but their reported exports were still relatively low at 137 and 136 items, respectively, in 1996. Other notable changes from 1995 involved an increase of 614 items exported from the Netherlands, of which 590 were ACVs to Egypt, and Turkmenistan's transfer of 1,271 pieces of equipment (mostly tanks and ACVs) to Russia, which Russian data did not confirm.

    A total of 26 countries noted exports of 6,489 weapons, while 38 countries claimed imports totaling 3,720 weapons in the 1996 register. A mere 32 percent of the transactions were reported by both parties involved. For example, Hungary reported receiving 520 missiles and missile launchers from Russia, and Pakistan noted accepting 526 from the United States, but neither exporter declared these transactions. The GGE attributed such inconsistencies to the lack of a common definition of a transfer and differing national practices in reporting and processing transfers. In order to diminish inconsistencies between national submissions, the GGE recommended that each nation establish a point of contact to clarify and facilitate reporting and that the deadline for reporting be moved back from April 30 to May 31 to allow states more time to submit information.

    Resolving the major discrepancies will require greater participation, a goal the GGE characterized as of "paramount importance." However, the League of Arab States contends the register does not "adequately meet their security needs" and is "neither balanced nor comprehensive" in its present form. Arab states demand an expansion of the register's categories to include weapons of mass destruction and "high technology with military applications" to provide a more accurate portrayal of world military forces. Other developing states have lobbied for including small arms categories or at least an expansion of the existing categories, such as lowering the caliber of artillery systems from 100 millimeter to 75 millimeter to capture lighter weapons, which they consider more relevant to their security concerns. The GGE explored these proposals, but disagreed over whether to recommend such changes as feasible or useful.

    Egypt later presented, on October 27, a resolution to the UN First Committee calling for an expansion of the register to include weapons of mass destruction.

    The Debate Over NATO Expansion: A Critique of the Clinton Administration's Responses to Key Questions

    With the Senate Foreign Relations Committee scheduled to begin hearings October 7 on NATO's planned expansion, the debate over the rationale, implications and wisdom of the alliance's decision to enlarge is now formally underway. On September 10, the Clinton administration provided written responses to questions on U.S. NATO policy contained in a June 25 letter to President Clinton from Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R TX) and 19 Senate colleagues. Following the release of the administration's responses, a number of former U.S. officials and foreign policy experts, who earlier had signed an open letter to President Clinton opposing NATO's move eastward, released a critique of the responses. (See ACT, June/July 1997.) The authors of the critique (Jonathan Dean, Susan Eisenhower, Michael Mandelbaum, Jack Mendelsohn, Richard McCormack, John Rhinelander and John Steinbruner) plan to submit their comments to the full Senate sometime in October. Printed below are the questions contained in Senator Hutchison's letter, the administration's responses to the questions and a critique of each response.

    1. What is the military threat that NATO expansion is designed to counter? How does expansion increase the security of Europe and the American people?

    Administration's Response: Europe's security is a vital American interest, as we have seen through two world wars and the Cold War. Over the past half century, NATO has been our primary shield to protect that interest. With the Cold War over, NATO remains the foundation of trans Atlantic security. A larger, stronger NATO that includes Europe's new democracies will be even better able to provide for Europe's security and make America safer. It will help deter future threats, expand our collective defense capability to address traditional and non traditional security challenges and secure the historic gains of democracy in Europe. It is a key part of our strategy to build an undivided, democratic, peaceful Europe for the first time in history.

    NATO's very existence is an important reason its current members and prospective new members face no imminent threat of attack. By adding new members to its strength, the world's most effective deterrent force will be even better able to prevent conflict from arising in the first place.

    Enlargement will help NATO address the security challenges that do arise. It will make NATO more effective in meeting its core mission: countering aggression against its member states. In addition, rogue states, the poisoned appeal of extreme nationalism, and ethnic, racial and religious hatreds continue to threaten trans Atlantic security—as we know from Bosnia. A larger, increasingly cohesive community of trans Atlantic states able to combine their security resources will be better able to address whatever contingencies arise.

    Enlargement will help guard against non traditional security threats from outside Europe that threaten NATO members, such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction and long range delivery systems. None of us can deal effectively with such threats alone. Enlargement will help broaden and intensify multinational coordination through NATO—one of our most effective instruments to counter these problems.

    The alliance must be prepared for other contingencies, including the possibility that Russia could abandon democracy and return to the threatening behavior of the Soviet period, although we see such a turn as unlikely. Through our policy of engaging Russia we seek to provide strong incentives to deepen its commitment to democracy and peaceful relations with its neighbors. These efforts, combined with the process of NATO enlargement and the NATO Russia Founding Act, increase the likelihood that Russia will continue on the path of democratic and peaceful development.

    Finally, enlargement will help secure the historic gains of democracy in Europe and erase Stalin's artificial dividing line. For 50 years, NATO has helped prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy and create stable environment for prosperity. Each previous instance of enlargement—Greece and Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982—strengthened democracy and stability within the new member states and added to the alliance countries committed to defend the trans Atlantic community. Now, enlargement can do for Europe's East what it did for the West. Already, the prospect of membership has helped consolidate democracy in Central Europe, strengthen free market reform and encourage NATO aspirants to settle disputes with their neighbors.

    Critique: The administration admits NATO faces "no imminent threat of attack" [emphasis added], and claims a larger NATO will be "better able to prevent conflict from arising in the first place" and better able to address "rogue states, the poisoned appeal of extreme nationalism, and ethnic, racial and religious hatreds," such as Bosnia. The administration does not explain how NATO might actually accomplish this. Would a larger NATO have prevented Bosnia or Chechnya or Nagorno Karabakh? Does the administration mean that, at a time when we are wavering in our commitment to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, the United States would be more willing to lead a larger NATO into additional peacekeeping activities? The Bosnia experience suggests that expanding NATO will not affect the willingness or reluctance of national capitals to deal with "ethnic, racial and religious" problems.

    The administration argues that expansion "will help guard against non traditional security threats from outside Europe that threaten NATO members, such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and long range delivery systems." NATO expansion is irrelevant to the spread of WMD and ballistic missiles outside of Europe, whereas cooperation with Russia on such issues as arms control, arms sales and dealings with "rogue" states is clearly critical. NATO expansion actually makes more complicated the problem of "guarding" against external threats should they arise. An expanded NATO will have more area to defend, static resources to defend it with and will require a major modernization program to integrate outdated, Soviet trained militaries.

    The administration then notes that the alliance must be prepared for "the possibility that Russia could...return to the threatening behavior of the Soviet period, although we see such a turn as unlikely." [Emphasis added.] The administration claims that "our policy of engaging Russia...the process of NATO enlargement and the NATO Russia Founding Act, increase the likelihood that Russia will continue on the path of democratic and peaceful development." In reality, NATO enlargement has undercut Russian democrats, hampered efforts to reduce and make more secure Russia's nuclear arsenal, and made President Boris Yeltsin's political life much more difficult. The Founding Act has been equally controversial; it has been vigorously attacked by the right in the United States (for providing too much influence to Russia) and in Russia (for not providing Russia with enough influence), and its basic meaning is in dispute.

    The administration's final point is that NATO expansion "will help secure the historic gains of democracy in Europe and erase Stalin's artificial dividing line." [Emphasis added.] A military alliance is not the preferred means for extending democracy in Central Europe—that task should fall to the European Union (EU). But that organization, primarily for economic reasons, has identified potential new members but is not expected to extend them membership until at least the middle of the next decade. NATO can do little, if anything, to affect the political processes in its potential new members; those are more dependent on economic (privatizing, markets, aid) and social developments (standard of living, freedom of expression, civil rights). It is worth recalling that the Marshall Plan, not NATO, helped Germany become economically strong and politically stable.

    If, as the administration claims, NATO is a democratizing influence, then presumably Russia should be among the first nations invited to join. Finally, NATO expansion will not "erase" Stalin's dividing line—it was lifted by the collapse of communism. But NATO expansion could well draw another line in Central Europe, between the "ins" and the "outs," with far reaching implications.

    2. How will NATO expansion strengthen stability in Europe when the nations that face the greatest potential threats to their own security, including the Baltic states and several other nations, will not be included in the first NATO expansion?

    Administration's Response: NATO enlargement will enhance stability throughout Europe and improve the security of all Europe's democracies, not just those admitted first. This is true for a number of reasons.

    First, NATO enlargement is not a one time event, but a process that will continue after the first round. The Madrid communique specifically notes that NATO will "maintain an open door to the admission of additional alliance members in the future." States that are credible candidates for future admission to the alliance will benefit from the knowledge that the alliance is attentive to their security.

    Second, NATO is taking a range of direct steps to improve the security of states that will not be initially admitted, from enhancements to the Partnership for Peace program to creation of the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council and the completion of a NATO Ukraine Charter.

    Finally, as it has in the past, NATO will continue to promote stability and cooperation beyond the borders of its members. The prospect of enlargement has already prompted major progress in resolving disputes and tensions within Central and Eastern Europe, and encouraged many of the new democracies to contribute in tangible ways to promoting long term security, as seen by their participation in the NATO led Stabilization Force in Bosnia.

    Enlargement had to start with the strongest candidates or else it would not have started at all. The Baltic states understand that NATO enlargement, as a process which extends stability toward their own borders, increases their security even though they have not yet been invited to become alliance members. They have expressed support for our policy and have publicly endorsed the decisions taken at the Madrid summit. Ukrainian leaders have taken a similar position, seeing the presence of prospective NATO members on their western borders as a contribution to Ukraine's long term security.

    Critique: If NATO expansion is not a one time event, but an open door, then the United States and its allies will eventually be obligated, for example:

    to defend the Baltics from an external threat (that is, Russia), a commitment that can only be carried out by the substantial deployment of troops backed up by threat of the use of nuclear weapons. (Neither policy has been discussed by the administration.);

    to protect Ukraine, whose population is one third Russian, from Russia; and

    to intervene between Romania and Hungary, whose ethnic quarrels have a very long history.

    Moreover, Russia has made it absolutely clear that it considers unacceptable the admission to NATO of any former Soviet republic and that such a move would render the Founding Act a dead letter. Thus, if the Baltics or Ukraine are actually incorporated into NATO (and Russia is not), we risk re militarizing Europe.

    Consequently, if the United States were to press to bring the Baltics into NATO, it is almost certain that our major European allies would not support that stark a challenge to Moscow. The allies have already indicated they prefer to seek the admission of Slovenia and Romania to NATO.

    As a result, the United States has endorsed an "open door" policy through which only a few additional states are likely to enter. But the issue of Baltic state membership will remain the focus of active controversy inside the alliance and between the alliance and Russia.

    3. Are we creating a new dividing line that will breed instability and friction in Europe?

    Administration's Response: No. We are erasing the old, artificial dividing line and fostering integration and partnership in its place. Because NATO enlargement has been designed as an ongoing process rather than a one time event, states not initially invited into the alliance have no reason to believe they are permanently excluded. On the contrary, the Madrid summit sent a direct message to them that any European democracy remains eligible for membership, and that the NATO leaders will consider the next steps in the process of enlargement before the end of this decade. Moreover, the alliance's outreach to the East—through the Partnership for Peace, the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council and the NATO Russia and NATO Ukraine relationships—is designed precisely to promote an undivided European security system and ensure that no new dividing lines are created.

    Virtually all neighbors of those states invited to become members, including states that have not applied for membership, support the alliance's enlargement. Indeed, after Madrid the president and Secretaries Albright and Cohen were met with enthusiastic crowds and warm receptions in Romania, Slovenia, the Baltics, Ukraine and other states in the region that will not be in the first round of new members.

    One reason for the lack of tension between states that will and will not initially be admitted to the alliance is that NATO has no offensive aims or record of aggression. Moreover, states in the region understand that the distinction between those invited and not invited for membership is based on various objective factors—such as a state's present ability to contribute to NATO's military and strategic goals, and the depth and durability of its democratic and military reforms. The distinction between those invited and not invited is unlike the arbitrary line that would divide Europe if NATO stood still and declined to enlarge. And those not invited understand they have a stake in the successful integration of the first new members, whose success will contribute to the overall process.

    That is why the bigger danger of instability and friction would come from a failure to enlarge NATO. That course would represent an abandonment of NATO's founding principle, reaffirmed by allied leaders at their 1994 and 1997 summits, that alliance remains open "to any other European State in a position to...contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area." A failure to enlarge would set Stalin's dividing line in stone, and subject Europe's new democracies to double jeopardy—punished first by being under Soviet domination, and punished again by being barred from membership in NATO for reasons that have nothing to do with present day circumstances. With the process of enlargement that NATO has begun, no European democracy is permanently excluded; without NATO enlargement, every new European democracy would be permanently excluded.

    Critique: If the "open door" process stumbles, which is likely, there will be another dividing line in Europe—actually two lines—between the NATO "ins" and the NATO "outs," and between NATO and Russia. Membership cannot be selectively extended and then defined as creating an undivided Europe.

    If expansion continues—and that is a very big if—then the main dividing line in Europe will be between NATO and Russia and relations between them will in all likelihood be confrontational.

    If Russia is brought into NATO, which no one—least of all Moscow—believes will happen, NATO will be so fundamentally changed that none of these arguments will be relevant.

    It is unclear how "a bigger danger of instability and friction" could come from not enlarging NATO. The reality is just the reverse: The biggest danger to Europe would come if enlargement drives Russia away from the West, away from democratization, away from continuing its involvement in nuclear and conventional arms control, and into a confrontational policy.

    In any case, failure to expand NATO would not set Stalin's dividing line in stone. That dividing line no longer exists: Germany has been united; the Warsaw Pact is no more; the Baltics, Ukraine and Belarus are independent; Russia accepts NATO's presence; and "no imminent threat" exists. Now is the time for the alliance to encourage the abandonment of any adherence to Stalin's dividing line rather than create a new division.

    If the new democracies are being punished by the West, it is by the failure of the European Union to integrate them into the existing pan European economic and political structures, not by the failure of NATO to integrate their military forces into the alliance.

    4. Under Article V of the treaty, NATO's security guarantees will extend to all new NATO members. U.S. troops will be committed to respond to conflicts involving any of the new member nations of Central Europe. Is a border dispute involving one or several of the new NATO members so vital a national security threat to the United States that we are willing to risk American lives?

    Administration's Response: Article V states that members will consider an attack against one to be an attack against all. It does not define what actions would constitute "an attack" or prejudge what alliance decisions might then be made in such circumstances. Member states, acting in accordance with established constitutional processes, are required to exercise individual and collective judgment over this question.

    While it is not possible to delineate in advance what NATO's response would be to a "border dispute" involving a NATO member, we do know that NATO enlargement makes such disputes less likely by creating an incentive—namely, membership in or partnership with NATO—for countries to resolve their problems peacefully. Already, we have seen 10 major accords in the region settling old border and ethnic disputes: Each of these achievements was driven, at least in part, by the desires of the states involved to demonstrate their credentials for membership in NATO and, more broadly, for fuller integration into the Western community of liberal democracies. These accords include:

    The 1991 Border Agreement between Poland and Germany;

    The 1991 Good Neighborliness and Cooperation Treaty between Poland and Germany;

    The 1992 Good Neighborly Relations and Mutual Cooperation Treaty between Poland and Ukraine;

    The 1994 Good Neighborly Relations and Military Cooperation Agreement between Poland and Lithuania;

    The 1996 Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between Hungary and Slovakia;

    The 1996 Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement between Hungary and Slovenia;

    The 1996 Bilateral Friendship Treaty between Hungary and Romania;

    The 1996 Associate Agreement with the European Union between Slovenia and Italy;

    The 1997 Joint Declaration on Czech German Bilateral Relations;

    The 1997 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Romania and Ukraine.

    It is important to remember that no NATO nation has ever been attacked, and during its half century of existence NATO has never once had to fire a shot in anger in order to fulfill the security guarantees in the Washington Treaty of 1949. Bringing Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO will make it less likely, not more likely, that American troops might be drawn into another war in Europe.

    Critique: Joining NATO may be an incentive for peaceably solving problems with other members, but even that argument has been sorely tested by Greece and Turkey (which have not gone to war, but neither have they resolved their dispute over Cyprus). The question is more applicable to disputes between NATO and non NATO nations, such as Hungary and Romania over minorities in Transylvania or Romania and Ukraine over Bukovina. Clearly, the potential for encountering border disputes increases as NATO moves east. But such disputes, unless they involve Russia, are not likely to pose a vital security threat to the alliance and therefore NATO will be very reluctant—if not politically unable—to intervene. As a result, an expanded NATO is just as likely to be stuck with an old set of unresolved problems on its agenda than it is to create new incentives for their resolution.

    In any case, the administration does not answer the last part of Senator Hutchison's question at all—whether these disputes are so vital to U.S. security that we would risk our troops. Instead, they list a number of friendship and cooperation treaties in Central Europe—including at least three concluded before NATO expansion was even announced—as evidence NATO expansion has brought a new standard of international conduct to the region.

    Despite these treaties, local distrust of neighbors still runs high and deep in Central and Eastern Europe. In its September 1996 report on public opinion on NATO enlargement, the U.S. Information Agency showed that 55 percent of Hungarians polled had "unfavorable" opinions toward Romanians, and 42 percent of Romanians (and the same percentage of Slovaks) had unfavorable opinions of Hungarians.

    5. The nations of Central Europe have a long history of border, ethnic, nationalist and religious disputes. What guidelines will NATO establish to resolve these types of disputes or other problems that may well arise among the new member nations? What would be the impact of extending coverage of the U.S. nuclear umbrella to them?

    Administration's Response: The process of NATO enlargement will make such disputes less likely and increase the chances that they will be peacefully resolved. While the alliance's core mission is collective defense, NATO's normal operation also functions as a conflict prevention mechanism. In part, this is because states must settle disputes with their neighbors as a precondition for entry into NATO. The three states NATO has decided to invite to begin accession talks—Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic—already have settled all outstanding border and ethnic disputes with their neighbors.

    Once states join NATO, their ongoing participation in the alliance will give them a powerful incentive to resolve any future problems with their neighbors peacefully. Constant consultation in the North Atlantic Council and other NATO structures will provide members with a means to resolve any disputes. For this and other reasons, NATO has tended to moderate those tensions that do arise among its members, such as between Greece and Turkey.

    While it is true that there have been many strands of conflict within Central and East European history, it would be a mistake to think of this condition as either unique or immutable. Western Europe also had a long history of border, ethnic, nationalist and religious disputes, and none of these flared during the half century of NATO's existence—in part, because NATO has helped its members transcend them. There is nothing in the historical record to suggest that current Central and East European disputes are more deep rooted or violent than, say, past disputes between France and Germany.

    If disputes ever were to occur within Central and Eastern Europe, once again the alliance and its members would need to exercise their judgment on a case by case basis in formulating the appropriate response. NATO has never operated through mechanistic guidelines, and it should not.

    The benefits that would accrue to these states would be the same that have accrued to all other members of NATO: enhanced security and the assurance of U.S. commitment to their security. The supreme guarantee of the security of the allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the United States. During the Cold War, U.S. nuclear forces provided the principal means by which NATO deterred conventional and nuclear attack by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Despite the absence of an overwhelming threat today, they still fulfill an essential role in preserving peace and preventing coercion of any kind.

    Critique: After arguing earlier that expanding NATO will help "counter aggression against its member states," the administration in the response to this question backs away and notes, correctly, that no preordained response exists for dealing with disputes in Central and Eastern Europe. But it is very misleading to suggest that "all outstanding border and ethnic disputes" have been settled.

    The administration also makes the case against "historicism," noting that while "there have been many strands of conflict within Central and Eastern Europe, it would be a mistake to think of this condition as either unique or immutable." A valid argument, of course, but the same analysis should then apply to the possibility for democratization and liberalization in Russia.

    It is true that France and Germany have been reconciled after 85 years and three disastrous wars. But this fundamental change stemmed from Germany's close association after World War II with its "traditional" enemies, not from its exclusion from European institutions. If Franco German relations set the precedent for how to change a "unique or immutable" condition, then NATO should incorporate, not isolate, Russia.

    The basic question is not whether the states of Central Europe can rise above their history, but whether it strengthens NATO or weakens it and whether it is the U.S. interest to have this historical drama played out within the alliance or apart from it.

    The administration's response also entirely ignores the effects that NATO expansion would have on the disposition of nuclear weapons. A NATO commitment to defend countries directly bordering on Russia would have a significant effect on nuclear weapons deployments, including tactical nuclear weapons whose overall management is of particularly serious concern. Most immediately, Russia would predictably increase its reliance on these weapons as a counterweight to NATO's unquestionably superior conventional force capabilities. Over the longer term, NATO itself might be driven in this direction in response to Russia's reaction and to any significant future investment in Russia's own conventional forces. The dangers inherent in these interactions have the potential to swamp any of the claimed benefits of NATO expansion.

    6. In the administration's February 1997 "Report to Congress on the Enlargement of NATO," you assumed that the United States would pay only 15 percent of the direct enlargement costs, with the new members paying 35 percent of the bill, and the current (non U.S.) members paying 50 percent. Will the new members or the current members pay these amounts? Will you make the cost sharing agreement part of the expansion negotiations? If not how will yours and future administrations handle shortfalls?

    Administration's Response: The cost estimates in the administration's February 1997 report to Congress relied in part on standard NATO cost sharing arrangements. Under these procedures, each country pays the cost of maintaining its own national military. The February report assumed that countries would pay for their own direct enlargement enhancements, except for those programs that would qualify for common funding. As a result, the Department of Defense estimated that about 40 percent of direct enlargement enhancements could be nationally funded and 60 percent could be common funded. Out of a total estimated cost of $9 billion to $12 billion, this would mean that new members would pay for approximately 35 percent ($3 billion to $4.5 billion total through 2009, or about $230 million to $350 million per year) of direct enlargement enhancements; current (non U.S.) members would pay about 50 percent ($4.5 billion to $5.5 billion over the period, or around $350 million to $425 million per year); and the United States would pay its 24 percent share of the common funded enhancements (about 15 percent of the total direct enlargement bill, or approximately $1.5 billion to $2 billion over the 2000 to 2009 timeframe), averaging between $150 million and $200 million per year.

    In addition to the direct costs of enlargement, individual allies will need to continue to improve their capabilities for force projection, consistent with their commitments under the alliance's new strategic concept adopted in 1991. Force projection capabilities will take on increased importance as NATO enlarges, in view of the allies' conclusion that the defense of new members' territory will be based primarily on reinforcement in times of danger rather than through the permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. Because the United States already possesses substantial force projection capabilities, the United States will not bear a significant portion of this category of costs. We will continue, through the NATO collective force planning process, to encourage our European allies to continue to develop their force projection capabilities.

    Past estimates of enlargement costs, including those produced by the administration, have necessarily been notional. Now that NATO has decided which states to invite to begin accession talks, it will be possible to assess more precisely their security needs and assets, and to define the implications for NATO's budgets. This process will begin immediately and will be tied closely to the accession process. While each of the three invited states has indicated its willingness to contribute to the NATO funded and national costs of membership, the accession talks will help to clarify those obligations and commitments.

    Enlargement will not be cost free. However, it is affordable for both current and prospective members. In light of the enormous benefits which enlargement will bring to both Europe and the United States, it represents extraordinary value for the money.

    Critique: The administration's response is disingenuously worded so that the reader concludes that "out of a total estimated cost of $9 billion to $12 billion" the United States would pay no more than $1.5 billion to $2 billion over the first 10 years. The February report actually estimates that the total costs of NATO expansion will be between $27 billion and $35 billion, of which the U.S. share, $1.5 billion to $2 billion by the administration's calculations, would be no more than 6 percent.

    The administration's cost study was reportedly based on at most four countries joining NATO but eight are actually in line: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in the first tranche; then Slovenia, Romania and the three Baltic states (all have been named in the NATO communique issued at the Madrid summit.) Moreover, the administration's cost estimates assume no new troop deployments. But forces would have to be deployed forward if NATO intends to guarantee the security of the Baltics.

    The leaders of Britain, France and Germany, our key NATO allies, declared after the Madrid summit either that they do not intend to pay 1 cent for NATO expansion or that they expect their defense budgets to shrink. The new member states, which under the administration's most optimistic projections will have to spend $10 billion to $13 billion from 1997 to 2009, simply do not have the money for modernization. For Hungary, the $900 million cost of 30 new fighter planes must come out of a government budget that totalled $21 billion in 1995.

    It is almost certain that NATO expansion will precipitate a bitter row over sharing the defense burden among the allies. In the end, either the United States will pay most of the expansion costs or NATO will be saddled with second class militaries until well into the next century.

    7. Many of us view the principal threat confronting the 12 nations seeking NATO membership as less a military threat than a struggle for economic stability. Fierce competition exists among these 12 states. By conferring NATO membership on a few nations now, those nations will have a distinct advantage over their neighbors in the competition to attract new business and foreign investment. This type of economic competition and imbalance could well breed friction and instability in Central Europe. Will NATO be obligated to step in and resolve the very conflicts that could be caused by the NATO selection process? Would European Union membership be a better option to achieve the economic stability NATO aspirants are seeking?

    Administration's Response: Economic challenges do remain critical for Central and East European states. Most of these states need to advance and deepen aspects of reform—from privatization, to improved regulatory regimes, to efforts against corruption. This is one reason we support enlargement of the European Union to include Central and East European states.

    While the role of the EU is critical, there is no reason to insist on a choice between EU enlargement and NATO enlargement. Both are important. Both make independent contributions to European prosperity and security. EU enlargement alone, however, is not sufficient to secure our nation's security interests in post Cold War Europe. Unlike NATO, the EU lacks a military capability. Military capability remains the heart of NATO's strength and continues to be needed to preserve European security.

    As free markets take root in Central and Eastern Europe, it is certainly reasonable to expect that economic competition among the region's states will intensify, just as it has in Western Europe and other parts of the world. There is no historical evidence, however, that would suggest NATO membership will become a meaningful distinction in economic competition within Central and Eastern Europe. NATO membership was never used over the past half century to draw foreign investment from, say, Sweden to Norway.

    What matters most to firms and investors are economic fundamentals. Central and East European states will attract business through privatization, sound management of their budgets and money supply, and efforts to create a talented workforce and reduced unemployment. For those European states that are economically less developed today, the right answer for them is to deepen such reforms, and the prospect of NATO membership gives them some additional incentive to do so. In addition, NATO enlargement, together with closer security cooperation through the Partnership for Peace and the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council, will help stability take root throughout Central and Eastern Europe—in member states and non member states alike—making all of its countries more attractive to investors. Conversely, a failure of NATO to enlarge could undermine the business climate for the entire region. While firms are unlikely to invest in a country solely because it is a NATO member, they might well invest less heavily in a region such as Central and Eastern Europe if its security future were called into question.

    Critique: The administration admits that "the role of the EU is critical" and that such economic fundamentals as "sound management of...budgets and money supply" matter most in attracting investment. In fact, EU membership is the most logical means of assuring continuing economic and political reform in Central and Eastern Europe, and EU enlargement negotiations will begin next year with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. These countries will probably ultimately enter the EU, even though the EU has not been in a rush to offer membership to these countries because of the cost (in agricultural and infrastructure support) and the constraints placed on EU member budgets by the Maastricht criteria for a common currency.

    The administration's call for "sound budget management" rings hollow when its own cost projections for expansion place a multi billion dollar defense burden (about 37 percent of the total cost) on the new members. The potential new members have themselves cut way back on their defense expenditures to provide for social welfare and capital investment: the Czech Republic's defense expenditures are running at one fifth those of Czechoslovakia in the late 1980s and the defense budgets of Hungary and Poland have taken similar cuts (one sixth and one fifth, respectively).

    In brief, this is a poor time to oblige these three countries, which are struggling to modernize, stabilize and humanize their economies and societies, and to prepare for EU membership, to increase their defense expenditures in order to carry out a modernization program which the administration estimates will cost $10 billion and other analyses conclude will be considerably higher. NATO membership will, in fact, make countries less attractive to investors if their budgets are stressed by the demands of NATO modernization and if they lose the support of international financial institutions.

    8. Does NATO membership by the new Eastern European democracies force them to spend money for arms, when expenditures for the infrastructure critical to economic growth are more pressing?

    Administration's Response: The new NATO members will need to invest in order to upgrade their militaries. But these states were already planning to make substantial improvements in their militaries, quite apart from their possible membership in NATO. These investments were needed because these states emerged from the Warsaw Pact with military forces that were poorly structured and inadequately equipped for modern warfare. The impact of NATO membership will not be so much to increase Central and East European defense budgets as to ensure that anticipated increases result in greater compatibility with NATO defense plans and equipment.

    Moreover, alliances save money over the long term. Many leaders in the region have said their states might well spend more on their militaries if they were not included in NATO, because then they would feel less secure outside the alliance's collective defense structure. States that have remained outside of NATO in the past have not necessarily enjoyed lower defense budgets. Sweden, for example, has higher per capita defense expenditures than many of its NATO neighbors.

    Central and East European countries will face difficult decisions between defense and domestic spending, as does the United States and all of our current allies. Yet the necessary investments needed to participate in the alliance do not need to take place overnight. The Defense Department's analysis foresees a gradual process of modernization, with new members attaining a "mature capability" over a period of about a decade. Moreover, projected real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates in Central and Eastern Europe as high as 4 to 5 percent suggest that the new members will be able to make needed defense investments without damaging their domestic economies and social efforts. In fact, the Defense Department has urged these countries to concentrate first on personnel, training, communications, logistics and infrastructure improvement needed to make them compatible with NATO before devoting large sums to purchase new weapons systems.

    Critique: The major nations of Western Europe are having difficulty sustaining their domestic economies and social efforts, and have made it absolutely clear they do not intend to increase their spending for NATO enlargement. The Czech Republic and Poland already equal or exceed the rates of NATO's European members for military expenditures as percentage of gross national product (GNP) and percentage of central government expenditures (CGE). The administration is, at best, unrealistic when it claims that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which have much larger economic and social needs, can make additional investments in defense "without damag[e]." Secretary of Defense William Cohen has said that "the bulk of the costs will be borne by the three new member countries. They...will have to measure up. There is no free lunch."1

    Paying the enlargement bill will not be easy for the new members. With per capita GNPs of under $10,000, the Czech Republic and Poland (but not Hungary) are already spending at or above the rate of current NATO members. According to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,2 in 1995:

    NATO Europe had $184 billion of military expenditures which represented 2.4 percent of GNP and 5.6 percent of CGE;

    the Czech Republic had $2.4 billion of military expenditures which represented 2.8 percent of its GNP and 6.9 percent of CGE;

    Hungary had $1 billion of military expenditures which represented 1.5 percent of GNP and 4.6 percent of CGE; and

    Poland had $4.8 billion of military expenditures which represented 2.3 percent of GNP and 5.4 percent of CGE.

    9. Do Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic have the military capabilities to make a positive contribution to the security of NATO, or will they be net consumers of security for the foreseeable future?

    Administration's Response: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have all take significant steps to reform their militaries, upgrade their military capabilities, and contribute to European security beyond their borders. The Defense Department estimates that they can achieve a "mature capability" within about a decade after joining the alliance. The new members will be expected to contribute to the range of NATO security functions and missions.

    Even today, the three states bring significant assets to NATO's security work. Together, they bring over 300,000 troops to the alliance. All three have firmly established civilian control of their militaries. Their initial defense reform efforts have focused on low cost, high return enhancements to interoperability to allow effective near term security contributions. Over time, they will increase their ability to operate with NATO forces in their own countries and elsewhere.

    Moreover, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have demonstrated their readiness to contribute to security beyond their borders. Both Poland and the Czech Republic contributed forces to the Gulf War coalition. Poland has been a leader in its region, helping Lithuania and Ukraine develop their armed forces and creating joint units with both countries. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic now provide over 1500 troops to the NATO led [SFOR] mission in Bosnia Herzegovina, and Hungary provides the base from which U.S. forces deploy into Bosnia. Through individual efforts and participation in numerous Partnership for Peace exercises, the three states have begun to improve their abilities to work with NATO forces.

    Each of the states will need to pursue an active and sustained program of reform and modernization in order to achieve a higher level of NATO interoperability and broader military capabilities over the next decade. Leaders from all three states have stated their willingness to do so and have demonstrated that their countries will become net security producers over time as full members of NATO.

    Critique: While the administration claimed earlier that expanding NATO will make it stronger, in the response to question eight it notes that "these states emerged from the Warsaw Pact with military forces that were poorly structured and inadequately equipped for modern warfare." The administration also notes that it will take at least a decade for the military forces of the new members to achieve a "mature capability."

    Unless the United States is prepared to foot most of the bill, it is certain that modernization of the forces of these three countries will take longer than a decade. In addition, since the administration claims the NATO expansion process is an "open door," much greater costs will be associated with some of the potential second tranche members such as Romania and the Baltics, (not to mention Ukraine).

    Thus, for the foreseeable future, NATO expansion is likely to stress the alliance by adding sub standard forces and increasing the amount of territory and length of borders to defend. On the other hand, some would argue that, with the possible exception of Germany, most of the members of NATO are already "consumers" of security and adding three to eight more nations will not alter this condition.

    10. When one looks at the threats to American national security interests, foremost among these is Russia's substantial nuclear arsenal. Considerable progress has been made to lessen nuclear tensions through dramatic arms reductions in the past decade. And, for the moment, the current leadership in Russia is becoming reconciled to the likelihood of NATO expansion. But what of tomorrow's Russian leaders? By expanding eastward, are we not creating an incentive for Moscow to withhold its support for further strategic arms reductions and perhaps even develop an early first use nuclear policy?

    Administration's Response: The objective of our trans Atlantic security policy is an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe. NATO enlargement is an important part of that strategy. So is our effort to support the development of a Russia that is democratic, prosperous, at peace with its neighbors, and cooperating with us and other states on a range of security challenges, including mutual reductions in our nuclear arsenals. So also is our effort, which bore fruit in May in the signing of the NATO Russia Founding Act, to institutionalize a broad and cooperative relationship between the alliance and Russia.

    President Yeltsin and other Russian leaders oppose NATO enlargement, reflecting in part a lingering misperception among many Russian political leaders that the alliance poses a threat to Russia's security. That is an issue on which we have decided to disagree, while working together to manage that disagreement. But, judging by the evidence, it is unlikely that NATO enlargement will undermine Russian reform or strengthen Russian hardliners. Those who suggest this would be the case see Russian democracy as far more fragile than has proven the reality over the last few years. NATO enlargement is not a significant concern for most of the Russian public, which understandably remains far more concerned about wages, pensions, corruption and other domestic issues.

    Over the past year, against the backdrop of NATO enlargement, Russian reform and security cooperation have continued to advance. President Yeltsin was re elected. He brought new officials into the government who are committed to economic modernization and integration with Western and global structures. He brought in a new defense minister who supports the START II nuclear arms reduction treaty. At the Helsinki summit in March, President Yeltsin agreed to press for Duma ratification of START II, and to pursue a START III treaty with further reductions once START II has entered into force. And of course, Russia joined with NATO in May to conclude the Founding Act. Indeed, as NATO enlargement has gone forward, Russia has drawn closer to the West.

    These recent positive developments call into question the theory that NATO enlargement erodes Russian reform and security cooperation. In any case, it would be counterproductive to make our NATO policies hostage to Duma intransigence on START II. Doing so would send a message to the Duma that we will hold up NATO enlargement as long as they hold up START II. In that case, we likely would get neither.

    Critique: The administration recognizes that "President Yeltsin and other Russian leaders oppose NATO enlargement," but it rather off handedly dismisses Russian opposition as based on a "misperception" of NATO as posing a threat to Russia's security. The origins of this "misperception" about NATO expansion are left unanalyzed by the administration, but they are not difficult to discern. The administration itself points out that enlargement would "make NATO more effective in meeting its core mission: countering aggression against its member states." And one of the principal, and undisguised, reasons the Central and Eastern European countries seek to join NATO is protection against aggression by Russia.

    Another possible source of this Russian "misperception" about NATO expansion is the administration position that "the alliance must be prepared for...the possibility that Russia could abandon democracy and return to the threatening behavior of the Soviet period." Although the administration, to its credit, considers this possibility to be "unlikely," other well known political figures, such as Henry Kissinger, argue that NATO expansion must be undertaken to "encourage Russian leaders to interrupt the fateful rhythm of Russian history and discourage Russia's historical policy of creating a security belt of important and, if possible, politically dependent states around its borders."3 [Emphasis added.]

    It is too early to tell whether NATO expansion has "created an incentive for Moscow to withhold its support for further strategic arms reductions," but expansion has certainly delayed Duma ratification of START II. It has also negatively affected the views of the Russian political elites on long term prospects for arms control. And expansion has complicated Yeltsin's political fortunes and made it much more difficult for the reformers to deal with the nationalists and communists. Indeed, Yeltsin has already made it absolutely clear that, although he signed the Founding act—which Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of Russia's Communist Party called "a complete and unconditional surrender"—he is "categorically against" NATO offering membership to any former Soviet republic and has threatened that such a move would "fully undermine" relations with Russia.

    The administration's response to this question ducks the issue of nuclear use entirely. The fact is, NATO expansion comes at a moment when Russia, sensing its deteriorating security situation, has abandoned its long standing nuclear "no first use" policy and is in the midst of a debate over whether, given the deplorable state of its conventional forces, its lack of budgetary resources and NATO's creep toward its borders, it should increase its reliance on tactical nuclear weapons. In the worst case, Russian re emphasis on nuclear weapons could well be mirrored eventually by NATO policies.

    11. What have we given up in terms of NATO's own freedom of action to deploy forces throughout the expanded area of the alliance in order to obtain Russian acquiescence to the expansion plan?

    Administration's Response: The NATO Russia Founding Act was not an effort to buy Russian acquiescence to enlargement. It was instead driven by our judgment—and that of the alliance—that a robust NATO Russia relationship could make an important contribution toward the goal of a peaceful and undivided Europe.

    The Founding Act institutionalizes this relationship and provides the basis for increased cooperation. At the same time, NATO equities remain fully protected. The North Atlantic Council remains the supreme decision making body of the alliance. The Founding Act, in establishing a Permanent Joint Council between NATO and Russia, provides for consultation, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, joint decision making and action. The Founding Act is equally clear, however, that NATO retains its independence of decision making and action at all times. The Permanent Joint Council offers Russia a forum in which to express its views and, where possible, to facilitate cooperation between NATO and Russia. But there is not now and will not be a Russian veto over NATO decisions or any restriction on NATO's freedom of action.

    If Russia adopts a constructive approach to its relationship with NATO, there is enormous potential for cooperation on a wide range of issue, from non proliferation to humanitarian assistance. If Russia chooses not to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the Founding Act, no impediment has been created. NATO retains its strength, autonomy and ability to act.

    Nothing in the Founding Act restricts NATO's ability to station troops, deploy weapons or carry out any of its missions. The final section of the act contains restatements of unilateral NATO policy that existed prior to the Founding Act about how the alliance intends to act "in the current and foreseeable security environment." In its 1995 enlargement study, NATO concluded that enlargement did not require a change to the alliance's nuclear posture; on this basis, NATO declared in December 1996 that NATO members "have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspects of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy." The Founding Act also restates NATO's March 1997 unilateral declaration that it "will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces." Moreover, none of NATO's unilateral statements regarding military policy cited in the Founding Act restricts the alliance's ability to conduct exercises, establish headquarters or build and maintain infrastructure. Indeed, the Founding Act acknowledges that NATO will "have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with [these] tasks," given that NATO's strategy now revolves around the ability of states to receive reinforcements.

    The Founding Act reflects alliance policy in the current and foreseeable security environment. Should we see an unexpected change for the worse, NATO retains the prerogative to reconsider its policies with regard to nuclear and conventional deployments, and the Founding Act would in no way constrain that. It is our hope and expectation, however, that the recent very positive trends within Europe will continue and that the Founding Act will provide a vehicle for greatly expanded cooperation between NATO and Russia.

    Critique: The administration response is accurate as far as it goes. It fails, however, to acknowledge that a number of ambiguities surround the Founding Act. Specifically, there is obviously a difference of views between officials and observers in Washington and Moscow over whether the act is legally binding or not, whether it gives Russia a "voice" or a "veto" within NATO, and whether it has "bought off" Russia for just the first tranche of three new alliance members or whether it represents a go ahead for NATO's "open door" expansion policy throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

    In the long term, Russian "acquiescence" to the first tranche of NATO expansion depends on how these ambiguities are resolved. Russia is not likely to acquiesce to the "open door," however. Thus, with or without the Founding Act, NATO expansion is putting us on a track toward isolating Russia and orienting its foreign, domestic and security policy in an unfavorable and unaccommodating direction.

    NOTES

    1. See Susanne M. Schafer, "Cohen Cautions NATO's New Trio," The Washington Times, October 3, 1997, p. A15.

    2. See "Table I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1985 1995," World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996, ACDA: Washington, DC, July 1997, pp. 49 98.

    3. See Jesse Helms, "New Members, Not New Missions," The Wall Street Journal Europe, July 9, 1997.

    The Post Cold War Settlement in Europe: A Triumph of Arms Control

    Michael Mandelbaum

    On March 26, Michael Mandelbaum, Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, addressed the annual luncheon meeting of the Arms Control Association (ACA). Mandelbaum, who is also director of the Project on East West Relations at the Council on Foreign Relations, spoke on the impact of arms control advances on European security. As one of the leading critics of NATO enlargement, he focused on the implications of the expansion policy for future arms control agreements. Mandelbaum delivered his remarks only days after the Helsinki summit meeting between President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

    Mandelbaum has written and edited several books on U.S. foreign policy, including The Dawn of Peace in Europe (Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996), and has taught at the U.S. Naval Academy and Harvard University. Mandelbaum earned a B.A. from Yale University, an M.A. from Cambridge University and a Ph.D. from Harvard University. The text is an edited version of his luncheon speech.


    If a cure for cancer were discovered, what would be the response? There would be admiration for the discoverers and celebration of the discovery. It would be a great, triumphal public event.

    For the political equivalent of cancer, a cure has been discovered. The greatest scourge of our century is war. The worst and most destructive wars—World Wars I and II—have begun and been fought in the heart of Europe. The Cold War began and ended there. The danger of a major war in Europe was the central obsession of the American government for much of the 20th century, and rightly so. But that danger is now at its lowest level in decades, perhaps in all of Europe's modern history.

    What is the reason for this? What is the equivalent, for war in Europe, of a cure for cancer? It is, among other things, arms control. The post Cold War settlement now in place in Europe is a triumph of arms control. That statement raises three questions. First, how and why could this statement be true? Second, if it is true, why has this achievement been so little appreciated? And third, why does it matter whether this achievement is appreciated?

    In my book, The Dawn of Peace in Europe, I argue that there is a new security order in place in Europe, one that differs from the two most familiar ways of organizing security: balance of power politics and world government. Balance of power politics has been the source of such stability as Europe has enjoyed for most of its recorded history, including during the Cold War years. World government is a utopian dream that has been envisioned and advocated but never implemented, and that might not be a source of celebration if it were implemented, which it almost surely will not be.

    The theme of The Dawn of Peace in Europe is that, in the wake of the Cold War, Europe has established a third method for achieving security, which I call common security and that owes something to the concept of cooperative security that was developed at the Brookings Institution. Within this common security regime, Europe is still made up of sovereign states. There is no supranational authority. The states of Europe are still armed. But peace in Europe does not depend—as it has for most of Europe's recorded history—on a finely balanced hostility between and among the most powerful European nations. The new common security order has dramatically reduced both the incentives and the capabilities for war.

    The incentives have been reduced by the great political changes of 1989 and 1991. It is important to understand the events of those years as not only liberating the people involved, from whom the yoke of communism was lifted, but also as reducing substantially the threat of war. Communism itself, and the imperial domination that came with it in Europe, were standing causes of war. As long as communism and a communist European empire lasted, those oppressed would struggle to break free and those of us who were already free would struggle against the threat that communism posed.

    Not only the end of communism, but also the beginnings of democracy contributed to peace in Europe. For democracy is associated with peace. There is, of course, no iron law that democracies are necessarily and always peaceful. And the most problematical country in Europe for the purposes of European security, Russia, is not fully democratic. Nonetheless, there has been since 1989 and 1991, a marked and remarkable surge of democratization across formerly communist Europe, and that contributes to the unprecedentedly peaceful character of relations between and among sovereign states there.

    The military capabilities of the countries of Europe are also less threatening now than in the past, and this has been accomplished by arms control. Specifically, it has been accomplished by the remarkable series of accords that were signed beginning with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces [INF] agreement of December 1987, and culminating with the START II accord of January 1993. These arms control agreements are similar in appearance to those of the earlier part of the Cold War, but as I argue in The Dawn of Peace in Europe, they differ in content in two truly revolutionary ways.

    First, the later series of arms reduction agreements is characterized by "defense dominance." That is, they have reshaped military arsenals to make them more useful for defense than for offense in the case of conventional forces, and more useful for deterrence than for actual war fighting in the case of nuclear armaments. Country "X" will be concerned, of course, about the capabilities of its neighbor, Country "Y" no matter what "Y" says about its own intentions. Country "X" will be least concerned about Country "Y" if Country "Y" has no weapons at all. But the nations of Europe have not laid down their arms completely, and are unlikely to do so.

    The next best circumstance, from the point of view of peace, is if Country "X" does not feel threatened by the armaments of Country "Y" because those armaments are suitable for self defense and not for attack. That is now the status quo in Europe thanks to arms control.

    Country "X" will also want to know that Country "Y" is abiding by the limits to which it has agreed, and that what Country "Y" is actually doing with the armaments that it legally has is not threatening. The later arms control in Europe fulfills both conditions. The 1987 to 1993 agreements, that is, provide for both "static" and "operational" arms control.

    The second revolutionary feature of the post 1987 arms agreements, both conventional and nuclear, is that they establish transparency. That is all the countries of Europe and North America now can know what armaments all the other states have, what they are doing with them, and whether they are violating the agreed limits—and they can know this at all times. This is an important development.

    Verification did not, of course, begin in 1987. "Verifiability" has been a necessary condition for almost all arms control accords into which the United States has entered since 1945. The issue of verification has been a major theme of the nuclear age. Verification would be available even without formal agreements, through what have come to be known as "national technical means"—that is, satellites.

    But verification under the auspices of the later arms agreements is more comprehensive and more intrusive than what was available previously and what would be available in the absence of these agreements. And it is significant that verification is mandated by treaty. This makes violations plainly illegal, which means that it is more likely that countries that detect violations by others will act on them. The reason surprise attacks succeed, as Richard Betts has written, is not that the country being attacked lacks warning, but rather that it lacks the political will to respond. It is easier to muster the requisite political will when the violation is unambiguously illegal. Under the later series of arms control agreements, this would be the case.

    To summarize: A balance of power system rests on deterrence. A world government, should it ever exist, would rest on unchallenged authority. Common security, however, the system of security now in place in Europe, rests on confidence. The entire system of security—including changes of regime, changes of borders and changes in the military balance—can be seen as one large confidence building measure. Together, these measures have generated more confidence than ever before in modern history that there will be no war in Europe, and for good reason. Where security is concerned, Europe now enjoys the best of all possible worlds.

    This is surely cause for celebration: yet it is not being celebrated. Why's this so? I believe that the sweeping, comprehensive—indeed, revolutionary—arms control accords now in place have been overlooked for the same reason that made them possible in the first place.

    Historically, arms control has been tied to, has depended on and has been subsumed by international politics. Arms control is, to use a term common in social science, a dependent variable, and the independent variable on which it has depended has been the status of East West relations. For most of the Cold War, East West relations were hostile and frozen. They were marked by disagreement on fundamental issues. Neither side would budge on these issues and neither dared try to budge the other, which would have been extremely dangerous.

    In this context, early arms control took on a symbolic role. It was a form of reassurance. It demonstrated that both sides understood the dangers of the nuclear age and would keep their rivalry within bounds. Arms control in the 1970s and in the 1980s did not, could not, indeed was not intended to, end the East West rivalry. Because this was so, arms accords affected the instruments of that rivalry, namely, armaments—with the notable exception the ABM Treaty—only marginally.

    If the effects on actual deployments were marginal, arms control was still important because the rivalry that it addressed was a real one. Arms control riveted the eyes of the world because the world needed reassurance about the rivalry between the two great nuclear powers. Peace rested on prudence, not on the absence of any reason to go to war. Arms control did not cause the prudence that preserved the peace, but it did signal that both sides would practice that prudence.

    Then, with the changes set in motion by Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, the political differences at the core of the East West rivalry disappeared. They disappeared because the Soviet Union gave up the goals to which the West had been opposed. This was the meaning of 1989 and 1991. Under these new political circumstances, the role of arms control changed. It was no longer marginal to actual military deployments; it became central. It was no longer a symbolic but, rather, a substantive matter. Instead of making small adjustments to large arsenals for political effects, arms control came to involve the wholesale restructuring of armaments on both sides with sweeping military effects.

    These revolutionary changes in arms control, however, were little noticed because of the absence of political conflict between East and West, which, as I've suggested, was precisely what made them possible in the first place. People turned out to be uninterested in what happens to weapons they do not expect or fear will be used against them. That, I believe, is the reason for the lack of appreciation for what is a remarkable historic achievement.

    Yet, both American political parties have reason not only for interest but for pride in what has been achieved. Democrats, after all, were the champions of arms control in the 1970s and 1980s. They considered it central to East West relations. But now that they are in power, they seem to have all but forgotten about arms agreements that exceed in scope what were once their fondest wishes.

    Republicans tended to be skeptical about arms control in the latter stages of the Cold War. Indeed, President Ronald Reagan entered office opposed to it, claiming that it was "bad medicine." He said that, had he been in charge in the 1970s, where negotiations with Moscow were concerned he would have done things differently. And in office he proceeded to do things differently. The current accords—the ones to which first the Soviet Union and then Russia agreed—were designed in and by his administration, based on its criticisms of what had gone wrong previously. The post 1987 arms treaties are, in effect, Republican agreements and are among the most important diplomatic achievements in the history of the United States.

    If the common security regime now in place endures, the arms treaties will be the pillars of the post Cold War order, even as the Marshall Plan and NATO were the pillars of the West's Cold War policy. This is no small achievement. Yet, these agreements get less respect than they deserve. But this raises the third question I mentioned at the outset: Does this lack of interest really matter? After all, these treaties have been negotiated and signed. Those that have been implemented are doing their work. It is a historical commonplace that what once seemed miraculous quickly becomes routine. The world does not celebrate Jonas Salk's birthday, despite the importance of the Salk vaccine for polio. Every day, millions of people unthinkingly cross bridges, the construction of which was once regarded as an engineering miracle. That's progress. Isn't this true of arms control as well?

    Unfortunately, it is not quite true. The significance of these achievements does matter because the achievements are not secure. They are not irreversible. Indeed, I believe they are threatened by the prospect of NATO expansion to Central Europe. They are threatened in two ways.

    First, the arms treaties are threatened. For example, START II, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons aimed at the United States and is therefore of some interest to Americans, has been held hostage in the Russian Parliament, the Duma, to the prospect of NATO expansion. In Helsinki in March, President Yeltsin promised to try to get the Duma to ratify this treaty. He's promised this before.

    There is an even larger problem with NATO expansion. It puts the entire post Cold War settlement, in which the post 1987 arms agreements are embedded, in jeopardy. That settlement is extraordinarily favorable to the United States. It was tailored to our specifications. The liberation of Eastern Europe in 1989 was something we had demanded since 1945. Indeed, the liberation of Eastern Europe removed the basic cause of the Cold War. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 was an event so favorable to the West that we never imagined that it was possible. And it is crucial that all of these changes were voluntary; first the Soviet Union and then Russia agreed to them. Thus, the post Cold War settlement has a certain legitimacy in Russian eyes. Because this settlement is so extraordinarily favorable to us, that legitimacy is a priceless asset for the West. But with NATO expansion we are in danger of squandering it.

    The post Cold War settlement rests on three principles, all of which NATO expansion would violate. The first is the principle of consensus, according to which changes will be made with the acquiescence of everyone. NATO expansion, however, is the first major change in the security architecture of Europe to be made over the objections of Russia.

    The second principle underlying the post Cold War settlement is inclusion, meaning that Russia will be welcomed into the international community in general, and into specific international organizations to the extent that it is willing and able to join them. But NATO expansion is an act of exclusion. It draws a new line of division in Europe where none existed before, and places Russia—and not only Russia—on the far side of that line.

    The third principle is embedded both in the common security order as a whole and in the arms treaties that are so important to it: transparency. NATO expansion is the opposite of transparent. The American government has asserted that expansion will be open ended and that there will be further expansions after the first one, but it has refused to say where, when, or by what criteria this further expansion will take place.

    What is the danger in all this? It is not that Russia will be able to stop the expansion. Russia is too weak to do so. Nor, I think, is there an immediate danger that the Russians will break out of the constraints of the arms treaties that they have signed. They're too poor to do that now. Rather, the danger that NATO expansion poses to the post Cold War settlement arises over the long term. The risk is that in the eyes of the Russian political class—and therefore ultimately in the eyes of ordinary Russians—NATO expansion will delegitimate the entire settlement, and make it a central goal of Russian foreign policy in the 21st century to overturn what has been put in place.

    This is not, to say the least, a desirable outcome. If it should come to pass—if we should return to a Europe of military blocs, balances of power and political hostility—no doubt the United States and its allies could hold their own. We could once again deter Russia if we had to. But this would not necessarily be easy, it would not necessarily be cheap, and it would certainly not be free of risk. One thing, however, it certainly would be: If, 25 years from now, we look back at this period as a turning point, the moment when the common security order dissolved and Europe returned to the kind of balance of power arrangements so familiar in history, one point will be beyond dispute: this need not have happened.

     

    Questions and Answers

    Q: In one of the joint statements from the Helsinki summit, President Clinton cites the unprecedented progress in arms control during the past four years. Is it really unprecedented? Are we making more progress now than we made four years before?

    Mandelbaum: From a historical perspective, the years from 1987 to 1993 constitute the great period of arms control. The task of this administration was and is to build on and consolidate what was achieved then. It has certainly made an effort to do so, but NATO expansion will hinder, not consolidate, it.

    Q: If at one end of the spectrum you have world government, I assume that on the opposite end there is anarchy, and in between balance of power. In your remarks, you didn't mention collective security. Is there a difference between common security and collective security?

    Mandelbaum: As Humpty Dumpty said, a word means what I choose it to mean; no more, no less. In The Dawn of Peace in Europe, I define collective security in such a way that it doesn't belong on that spectrum. By my definition it refers to two things: alliances, which are perfectly compatible with a balance of power and were at the core of the balance during the Cold War; and a regional or world police force, in which countries band together to deal with trouble spots. I devote a chapter to this subject in The Dawn of Peace in Europe.

    Such a police force, I argue in that chapter, is undoubtedly desirable, but it is not feasible. The political will to pay a significant price to calm trouble spots around the globe is lacking in the United States and in other countries that might contribute to such a force.

    Q: Administration officials are saying that NATO enlargement is a done deal, and I know you don't agree. They also say that attempts to block enlargement will destroy U.S. leadership in the world and particularly in Europe. Can you respond to both these points?

    Mandelbaum: It is certainly not too late to stop NATO expansion unless the Constitution of the United States has been repealed. The Constitution provides that the Senate must ratify treaties by a two thirds majority.

    As for the argument that terrible consequences would follow if expansion were stopped—an argument that will drown out all others if NATO does formally opt to invite new members this summer—this is an artifact of the Cold War. It has a certain resonance because it had a certain plausibility during the Cold War, which created a set of conditions that no longer exists.

    Then, the United States was confronting a militant, militarized, hostile adversary around the world. It was reasonable to fear that pulling back in one area would invite aggression elsewhere. This was, after all, the reason the U.S. fought in Korea. The Korean Peninsula was of no strategic significance to the United States in 1950, but President Truman and his advisers believed that a failure to respond in Korea would produce trouble in Europe. This was also the reason for standing firm in West Berlin—an enclave that was militarily indefensible except by nuclear weapons. It was the reason for fighting—possibly even after 1968—in Vietnam.

    Whatever one may think of the way this argument was applied during the Cold War, at least it had some plausibility. There was, after all, a Cold War. There was a Soviet Union. Now there is neither. So the question arises: What would be the consequences of stopping expansion now? What would be the consequences of postponing the decision, of taking another course? Is it really imaginable that the Soviet army would be in West Berlin the next day? There is no Soviet army; there is no divided Berlin. The world is now safe for the United States to admit and correct its mistakes in foreign policy. This is a mistake. We ought to admit it and then correct it.

    Q: The thrust of your argument is that Russia is going to, with NATO expansion, set as its goal for the next century the overthrow of the post Cold War settlement. Assuming NATO enlargement stops short of drawing in the republics of the former Soviet Union, even in Russian eyes, won't the forces of economic growth and expansion be much more powerful forces in shaping Russia's long term views of its security and foreign policy goals?

    Mandelbaum: I would hope that this would happen. But your premise is that NATO will not expand to the former Soviet republics. However, this administration has already effectively promised that expansion to some former Soviet republics—notably the Baltic states—will take place. Those former Soviet republics believe that they have been promised eventual NATO membership, in which case the danger of a nationalist backlash in Russia would be greater.

    There are many powerful forces at work in Russia and on Russia, pushing Russia toward the kind of internal organization and international conduct that is desirable. NATO expansion to Central Europe would not necessarily and automatically override these forces. But expansion lends support to countervailing forces.

    Q: If NATO expansion is such a bad idea, what is the right idea for including the Eastern and Western European security objectives, and what is the right future for NATO?

    Mandelbaum: A number of second and third order issues in European security ought to be addressed. Further reductions in nuclear and non nuclear arms are desirable. Kaliningrad ought to be demilitarized. The independence of Belarus ought to be put on a formal basis. But the basic structure of the optimal European security order is, I believe, in place. What will improve it is something that by definition cannot be rushed: time. Over time the security order will become more normal, more deeply rooted and more legitimate.

    As for the future of NATO, I believe it ought to be maintained. It is important to have an American commitment to Europe for modified versions of the original reasons: "To keep the Americans in, to keep the Russians out and to keep the Germans down." We need NATO to relieve the Germans of the need to conduct an independent security policy, something that the Germans themselves do not wish to do. In addition, NATO ought to be sustained because if things go wrong in Russia, as they might, the Atlantic alliance would form the basis of an opposing coalition, just as it did during the Cold War. But if things do go wrong in Russia, they won't go wrong in a hurry. The Russians won't be in a position to threaten anybody for years; there will be plenty of advance warning.

    How many troops are now needed in Europe? That depends on the magnitude of the threat. Now it is not great. If all goes well, it will diminish further over time. In that case it would be possible to bring troop levels down further. At some point, under the best case scenario, no American troops would remain in Europe. In that case NATO would have reverted to what it was intended to be in the first place: a guarantee pact. What began simply as a treaty, only became an integrated military force on the European continent in response to the outbreak of the Korean War.

    Moreover, I believe that there is enough political support in the United States to sustain the NATO we need. But I do not believe that there will be domestic political support to sustain an expanded NATO which is not needed.

    Indeed, if there is a backlash in the United States against the costs of an expanded NATO—and those costs, in political and economic terms, are likely to be considerably higher than the administration is claiming—it will call into question not just simply NATO expansion but the American commitment to Europe itself.

    Q: If Russia views NATO as an alliance that opposes it, would European security be vastly increased by allowing Russia also to join NATO? Why are we precluding Russia from joining NATO?

    Mandelbaum: I'm lukewarm, at best, to the idea of including Russia in NATO, but the prospect now seems to me less implausible than it once did, for four reasons. First, it is a better idea than the one this administration is proposing to carry out. Second, it preserves one of the fundamental principles on which the Cold War was ended: inclusion. Third, it might give the United States some leverage on the issue that matters most to us: Russian nuclear weapons. If Russia were part of NATO, it would be easier to reduce and control weapons that can strike North America. Fourth, if NATO does expand to Central Europe, it will then face three choices: to stay where it is, thus establishing in perpetuity a "grey zone" between NATO and Russia, the countries of which—Ukraine and the three Baltic states—would thereby become vulnerable in a number of ways; to expand to include this grey zone, which the Russians have suggested they would regard as akin to an act of war; or to expand to include Russia itself. Under those circumstances, the last option might be the least worst one.

    Q: If the administration were to turn around and all of the sudden say: "Fine, no more NATO expansion," or if the Madrid summit were to be canceled, what do we tell those countries that have now had false expectations of protection under the NATO umbrella?

    Mandelbaum: The countries that are expecting admission aren't threatened. None has a border with Russia. So none would be in a worse position where its security is concerned.

    I also think it's a myth that there is powerful sentiment in favor of joining NATO in the prospective new member states. This is true of Poland; none of the surveys of opinion that I have seen show very much public enthusiasm in the Czech Republic or in Hungary. If membership in a Western international organization is necessary for the well being of these countries, the proper organization for them to join is the European Union, not NATO.

    Q: What combination of inside politics and appeal to American public opinion do you see as most likely to bring about a change in the administration's policy on NATO expansion, and in what time frame?

    Mandelbaum: There are deep reservations about NATO expansion in the foreign policy community and among those few members of Congress who follow the issue closely. I also believe that, to the extent that this issue is publicly discussed, support drops away. This is one of those issues about which people, when they first hear about it, think, "Oh, that's a good idea. Let's take them in." Then, when the details and the contingencies and the dangers are probed, support plummets.

    The further the debate goes, the more unease there's going to be, which is why I believe that the administration will increasingly fall back on the argument: "It's too late. Maybe we made a mistake, but you—the Congress and the public—have to back us up because if you don't the whole world will collapse." But this argument, too, is specious.

    Joint Statements of the Helsinki Summit

    Joint Statement on Parameters On Future Reductions In Nuclear Forces

    Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin underscore that, with the end of the Cold War, major progress has been achieved with regard to strengthening strategic stability and nuclear security. Both the United States and Russia are significantly reducing their nuclear forces. Important steps have been taken to detarget strategic missiles. The Start I Treaty has entered into force, and its implementation is ahead of schedule. Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine are nuclear weapon free. The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended on May 11, 1995 and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed by both the United States and Russia on September 24, 1996.

    In another historic step to promote international peace and security, President Clinton and President Yeltsin hereby reaffirm their commitment to take further concrete steps to reduce the nuclear danger and strengthen strategic stability and nuclear security. The Presidents have reached an understanding on further reductions in and limitations on strategic offensive arms that will substantially reduce the roles and risks of nuclear weapons as we move forward into the next century. Recognizing the fundamental significance of the ABM Treaty for these objectives, the Presidents have, in a separate joint statement, given instructions on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, which will allow for deployment of effective theater missile defenses and prevent circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

    With the foregoing in mind, President Clinton and President Yeltsin have reached the following understandings.

    Once Start II enters into force, the United States and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a Start III agreement, which will include, among other things, the following basic components:

    Establishment, by December 31, 2007, of lower aggregate levels of 2,000 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads for each of the parties.

    Measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads and any other jointly agreed technical and organizational measures, to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads.

    Resolving issues related to the goal of making the current START treaties unlimited in duration.

    Placement in a deactivated status of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under START II by December 31, 2003, by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other jointly agreed steps. The United States is providing assistance through the Nunn Lugar program to facilitate early deactivation.

    The Presidents have reached an understanding that the deadline for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under the START II Treaty will be extended to December 31, 2007. The sides will agree on specific language to be submitted to the Duma and, following Duma approval of START II, to be submitted to the United States Senate.

    In this context, the Presidents underscore the importance of prompt ratification of the START II Treaty by the State Duma of the Russian Federation.

    The Presidents also agreed that in the context of START III negotiations their experts will explore, as separate issues, possible measures relating to nuclear long range sea launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, to include appropriate confidence building and transparency measures.

    Taking into account all the understandings outlined above, and recalling their statement of May 10, 1995, the Presidents agreed the sides will also consider the issues related to transparency in nuclear materials.


    Joint Statement Concerning The Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty

    President Clinton and President Yeltsin, expressing their commitment to strengthening strategic stability and international security, emphasizing the importance of further reductions in strategic offensive arms, and recognizing the fundamental significance of the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for these objectives as well as the necessity for effective theater missile defense (TMD) systems, consider it their common task to preserve the ABM Treaty, prevent circumvention of it, and enhance its viability.

    The Presidents reaffirm the principles of their May 10, 1995 Joint Statement, which will serve as a basis for reaching agreement on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, including:

    The United States and Russia are each committed to the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability.

    Both sides must have the option to establish and to deploy effective theater missile defense systems. Such activity must not lead to violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

    Theater missile defense systems may be deployed by each side which (1) will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and (2) will not be tested to give such systems that capability.

    Theater missile defense systems will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other.

    The scale of deployment—in number and geographic scope—of theater missile defense systems by either side will be consistent with theater ballistic missile programs confronting that side.

    In this connection, the United States and Russia have recently devoted special attention to developing measures aimed at assuring confidence of the Parties that their ballistic missile defense activities will not lead to circumvention of the ABM Treaty, to which the Parties have repeatedly reaffirmed their adherence.

    The efforts undertaken by the Parties in this regard are reflected in the Joint Statement of the Presidents of the United States and Russia issued on September 28, 1994, as well as in that of May 10, 1995. Important decisions were made at the United States Russia summit meeting on April 23, 1996.

    In order to fulfill one of the primary obligations under the ABM Treaty¾the obligation not to give non ABM systems capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles and not to test them in an ABM mode¾the Presidents have instructed their respective delegations to complete the preparation of an agreement to ensure fulfillment of this requirement.

    In Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) negotiations on the problem of demarcation between TMD systems and ABM systems, the United States and Russia, together with Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine, successfully finished negotiations on demarcation with respect to lower velocity TMD systems. The Presidents note that agreements were also reached in 1996 with respect to confidence building measures and ABM Treaty succession. The Presidents have instructed their experts to complete an agreement as soon as possible for prompt signature on higher velocity TMD systems.

    Neither side has plans before April 1999 to flight test, against a ballistic target missile, TMD interceptor missiles subject to the agreement on demarcation with respect to higher velocity TMD systems. Neither side has plans for TMD systems with interceptor missiles faster than 5.5 km/sec for land based and air based systems or 4.5 km/sec for sea based systems. Neither side has plans to test TMD systems against target missiles with MIRVs or against reentry vehicles deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles.

    The elements for the agreement on higher velocity TMD systems are:

    The velocity of the ballistic target missiles will not exceed 5 km/sec.

    The flight range of the ballistic target missiles will not exceed 3500 km.

    The sides will not develop, test, or deploy space based TMD interceptor missiles or components based on other physical principles that are capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles.

    The sides will exchange detailed information annually on TMD plans and programs.

    The Presidents noted that TMD technology is in its early stages and continues to evolve. They agreed that developing effective TMD while maintaining a viable ABM Treaty will require continued consultations. To this end, they reaffirm that their representatives to the Standing Consultative Commission will discuss, as foreseen under the ABM Treaty, any questions or concerns either side may have regarding TMD activities, including matters related to the agreement to be completed on higher velocity systems, which will be based on this joint statement by the two Presidents, with a view to precluding violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty. These consultations will be facilitated by the agreed detailed annual information exchange on TMD plans and programs.

    The Presidents also agreed that there is considerable scope for cooperation in theater missile defense. They are prepared to explore integrated cooperative defense efforts, inter alia, in the provision of early warning support for TMD activities, technology cooperation in areas related to TMD, and expansion of the ongoing program of cooperation in TMD exercises.

    In resolving the tasks facing them, the Parties will act in a spirit of cooperation, mutual openness, and commitment to the ABM Treaty.


    Joint U.S. Russian Statement On European Security

    Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin discussed the present security situation in the Euro Atlantic region. They reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of building a stable, secure, integrated and undivided democratic Europe. The roles of the United States and Russia as powers with worldwide responsibilities place upon them a special requirement to cooperate closely to this end. They confirmed that this cooperation will be guided by the spirit of openness and pragmatism which has increasingly come to characterize the U.S. Russian relationship in recent years.

    Recalling their May 1995 Joint Statement on European Security, the Presidents noted that lasting peace in Europe should be based on the integration of all of the continent into a series of mutually supporting institutions and relationships that ensure that there will be no return to division or confrontation. No institution by itself can ensure security. The Presidents agreed that the evolution of security structures should be managed in a way that threatens no state and that advances the goal of building a more stable and integrated Europe. This evolution should be based on a broad commitment to the principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, the Budapest Code of Conduct and other OSCE documents, including respect for human rights, democracy and political pluralism, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security.

    The Presidents are convinced that strengthening the OSCE, whose potential has yet to be fully realized, meets the interests of the United States and Russia. The Presidents expressed their satisfaction with the outcome of the Lisbon Summit of the OSCE and agreed on the importance of implementing its decisions, both to define further the goals of security cooperation and to continue to devise innovative methods for carrying out the growing number of tasks the OSCE has assumed.

    They underscored their commitment to enhance the operational capability of the OSCE as the only framework for European security cooperation providing for full and equal participation of all states. The rule of consensus should remain an inviolable basis for OSCE decision making. The Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to work together in the ongoing OSCE effort to develop a model for security in Europe which takes account of the radically changed situation on the eve of the 21st century and the decisions of the Lisbon Summit concerning a charter on European security. The OSCE's essential role in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its ability to develop new forms of peacekeeping and conflict prevention should also be actively pursued.

    In their talks in Helsinki, the two Presidents paid special attention to the question of relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation. They continued to disagree on the issue of NATO enlargement. In order to minimize the potential consequences of this disagreement, the Presidents agreed that they should work, both together and with others, on a document that will establish cooperation between NATO and Russia as an important element of a new comprehensive European security system. Signed by the leaders of the NATO countries and Russia, this document would be an enduring commitment at the highest political level. They further agreed that the NATO Russia relationship, as defined in this document, should provide for consultation, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible where appropriate, joint decision making and action on security issues of common concern.

    The Presidents noted that the NATO Russia document would reflect and contribute both to the profound transformation of NATO, including its political and peacekeeping dimension, and to the new realities of Russia as it builds a democratic society. It will also reflect the shared commitment of both NATO and Russia to develop their relations in a manner that enhances mutual security.

    The Presidents recalled the historic significance of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] in establishing the trust necessary to build a common security space on the continent in the interest of all states in Europe, whether or not they belong to a military or political alliance, and to continue to preclude any destabilizing build up of forces in different regions of Europe.

    The Presidents stressed the importance of adapting the CFE Treaty. They agreed on the need to accelerate negotiations among CFE parties with a view to concluding by late spring or early summer of 1997 a framework agreement setting forth the basic elements of an adapted CFE Treaty, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Document on Scope and Parameters agreed at Lisbon in December 1996.

    President Yeltsin underscored Russian concerns that NATO enlargement will lead to a potentially threatening build up of permanently stationed combat forces of NATO near to Russia. President Clinton stressed that the Alliance contemplates nothing of the kind.

    President Yeltsin welcomed President Clinton's statements and affirmed that Russia would exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.

    President Clinton also noted NATO's policy on nuclear weapons deployments, as articulated by the North Atlantic Council on December 10, 1996, that NATO members have "no intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of states that are not now members of the Alliance, nor do they foresee any future need to do so. President Clinton noted NATO's willingness to include specific reference to this policy in the NATO Russia document. President Yeltsin spoke in favor of including such a reference in the document.

    The Presidents agreed that the United States, Russia and all their partners in Europe face many common security challenges that can best be addressed through cooperation among all the states of the Euro Atlantic area. They pledged to intensify their efforts to build on the common ground identified in their meetings in Helsinki to improve the effectiveness of European security institutions, including by concluding the agreements and arrangements outlined in this statement.


    Joint U.S Russian Statement On Chemical Weapons

    President Clinton and President Yeltsin discussed issues relating to the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. They stressed the commitment of the United States and Russia to full and effective accomplishment of the tasks and objectives of the convention.

    The Presidents reaffirmed their intention to take the steps necessary to expedite ratification in each of the two countries. President Clinton expressed his determination that the United States be a party when the Convention enters into force in April of this year, and is strongly urging prompt Senate action. President Yeltsin noted that the Convention had been submitted to the Duma with his strong recommendation for prompt ratification.

    Mindful of their special role and responsibility in the matter of chemical disarmament, the United States and Russia understand that their participation in the Convention is important to its effective implementation and universality.

    The Presidents noted that cooperation between the two countries in the prohibition of chemical weapons has enabled both countries to enhance openness regarding their military chemical potential and to gain experience with procedures and measures for verifying compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Parties will continue cooperation between them in chemical disarmament.

    The United States will seek appropriation of necessary funds to build a facility for the destruction of neuroparalytic toxins in Russia as previously agreed.

    For more information contact Spurgeon M. Keeny Jr. or Jack Mendelsohn

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