In 2003, European states, shaken by their inability to unite around a common strategy toward Iraq, determined to forge a common and independent approach to dealing with proliferation threats. Five years later, the EU's hopes of being an independent power broker on arms control and nonproliferation issues have only been partially realized, with both external pressures and internal fissures and constraints limiting Brussels' heft on the international stage.
In October 2003, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom ignored protests from the United States and reached an agreement with Iran to work toward a resolution of the crisis regarding Tehran's nuclear program. In December of that year, European Union (EU) member states adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the associated EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which called for effective policies to strengthen multilateral regimes and to address the root causes of instability and proliferation in cooperation with the United States and other key partners.
Since 2003, the EU has played a leading role in the ongoing effort to curb Iran's uranium-enrichment program, but its ability to make progress has been limited by the recalcitrance of Iran and the United States, and its negotiating role has been eclipsed at times by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Russia. Internal fissures, including differences between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states and the failure to approve an EU constitution, have limited Brussels' ability to carve out an independent stance on such issues as missile defense, nuclear disarmament, and the future of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
To be sure, leadership change in the United States and the streamlining of the EU's foreign policy bureaucracy offer the prospect that Brussels in the next few years could come closer to the goals the EU set for itself five years ago. Yet, given the experience of the past five years, there is widespread skepticism that these opportunities will be seized.
In October 2003, more than a year after Iran's clandestine nuclear program was publicly revealed, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the so-called EU-3) negotiated a deal with Iran in which Tehran vowed to declare past nuclear activities and promised improved cooperation with the IAEA. In return, the EU-3 prevented referral of Iran to the UN Security Council, which Washington supported. In November 2004, Iran and the EU-3 signed the Paris agreement, in which Iran pledged to voluntarily suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities until a long-term agreement had been worked out. Although Washington continued to discourage negotiations between the European states and Iran, the move deflated U.S. pressure for a Security Council referral.
As the war in Iraq increasingly commanded U.S. political attention, Washington's opposition toward EU negotiations became less pronounced. After President George W. Bush traveled to Europe in February 2005, Washington for the first time backed some incentives offered by Europe to Iran, such as support for Iran's membership in the World Trade Organization and the supply of spare parts for civil aircraft if Iran were to halt its enrichment program and other fuel cycle-related activities. Yet, at nearly the same time that Washington was relaxing its pressure, Iranian attitudes began to harden, particularly following the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iranian president in August 2005.
Since that election, the EU has sought to keep the negotiating process alive. In June 2006, the EU-3 plus China, Russia, and the United States (the "EU-3+3") offered a new package of incentives to Iran. The offer came after Iran had resumed certain nuclear activities and the UN Security Council for the first time had imposed sanctions on Iran, in February 2006.
Throughout this period, EU officials have sought to maintain a united stance against what they see as Iranian efforts to chip away at these sanctions without giving up its nuclear ambitions. Since last fall, Iran has carried out a work program with the IAEA to address some of the past questions that had raised international concerns about whether it truly intended its nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes. Yet, Tehran has still moved forward with its uranium-enrichment program, despite calls from the Security Council to suspend it.
The IAEA's efforts have drawn criticism from European diplomats who fear that agency director-general Mohamed ElBaradei would allow the Iranians to sidestep the UN sanctions and the EU-3+3 negotiations and issue Iran a clean bill of health. A senior official from an EU member state on April 14 argued that it was not possible "to close Iran's nuclear file" even if the program of work agreed between the agency and Iran is completed. He said that, in addition to resolving questions related to past Iranian activities, it was also necessary to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's current nuclear program.
European officials also have said that the recent U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) did not justify backing away from UN sanctions. In December 2007, a U.S. NIE concluded that Iran had halted its nuclear weaponization efforts by 2003, further undermining the hard-line approach taken by the Bush administration. In response to a parliamentary inquiry on the NIE launched by the Green Party in the Bundestag, the German government on January 10 maintained that the NIE had "confirmed the international community's justified doubts about the peaceful character of the Iranian nuclear program" and simply refused to answer any questions about the validity of the NIE's findings, citing confidentiality concerns.
An EU official explained that the EU is now pursuing a dual-track approach for Iran. "The first one-pressure through sanctions and readiness to start negotiations-is aimed at convincing Iran to stop its controversial nuclear activities. The second one is aimed at keeping [the] unity of the EU-3+3."
Some EU members, particularly France, have called for the union to take more aggressive measures on its own. In September, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said "We have to prepare for the worst, and the worst is war." Kouchner also called for tougher EU sanctions above and beyond those agreed to by the UN Security Council. His calls have met with little support, with Europeans opting to follow the German preference for a gradual increase of pressure through the adoption of moderate and reversible UN Security Council sanctions.
With presidential elections in the United States in November 2008 and in Iran in 2009 ahead, European efforts to resolve the nuclear crisis in Iran are effectively in suspension.
After the last direct contact with Iranian lead nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili on November 30, 2007, Javier Solana, the EU's high representative on foreign policy, stated his disappointment. "I had expected more from the talks with the Iranian delegation." According to Iranian statements, both sides have not been in contact since then. On March 16, Solana was quoted by the Chinese news agency Xinhua that a next meeting might take place in "30 days to 90 days."
The EU official also said that an improved package of incentives to be offered to Iran now under consideration is aimed only partly at kick-starting negotiations and also has to be seen against the background of keeping the EU-3+3 unity. "This is more a matter of presentation than of substance," he explained.
Despite the lack of success in convincing Iran to limit its nuclear program, some decision-makers judge the EU's effort at resolving the nuclear crisis as a success. "It is true, we have not been able to convince Iran to improve international confidence by suspending critical nuclear activities" the EU official stated. "However, after initially being skeptical of Europe's involvement, Washington is now fully supportive of a negotiated agreement along the lines proposed by the EU," he argued.
Grzegorz M. Poznanski, deputy director of the Department for Security Policy at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, concurred on April 17. "The EU involvement in the talks with Iran is an example for the union's ambition to become involved in big issues and [that it] has the teeth to do just that," he said. "This is not the EU's fault that there has been no success so far in resolving the nuclear crisis with Iran."
EU Versus NATO
For most Europeans, NATO is responsible for their collective defense, although the EU has increasingly expressed a desire for greater autonomy on defense issues since 1999. Thus, the EU is now in charge of several peacekeeping operations, and institutionally the European Defense Agency is supposed to oversee and coordinate procurement of military hardware.
Despite these aspirations and in spite of the fact that it will have a serious impact on European security, the EU has remained all but mum on a recent headline issue: the planned deployment of U.S. missile defense facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic. The issue has instead been left to NATO, where differences between Europeans persist. Although some countries call for a stronger link to NATO or even an integration of U.S. missile defense capabilities into an alliance-wide defense, Warsaw and Prague have so far not been willing to give other NATO members a say on the timing, scope, and content of bilateral agreements under negotiation with Washington. That dispute was not resolved at the April 2-4 NATO summit in Bucharest, which gave basic support for a missile defense system but left details to be resolved.
Early on, Solana, who had been head of NATO before becoming the EU's foreign policy chief, decided that the EU should not become involved in the issue. Initially, Solana argued that the EU lacked the capability to develop its own missile defense system and therefore was not able to take a position on the bilateral agreements under negotiation between the United States and two EU member states. On April 3, Solana presented the Romanian newspaper Adevarul with another reason for European lack of action by stating that, "under the Treaty of the European Union, the EU is developing a foreign and security policy which does not extend for the time being to territorial defense. This aspect falls under national responsibility and, for some of our member states, this means through NATO."
The senior official from an EU member state backed Solana by arguing for a pragmatic course of action. "When thinking about whether to discuss an arms control issue in the EU or in NATO, you have to consider where you can make most progress," he cautioned. "On missile defense, little would be gained by raising the issue in the EU."
Ondrej Liska, deputy chairman for foreign affairs of the Green Party, who is the junior partner in the Czech government, offered a different view. "There are provisions in the Treaty on the EU that could have been used to initiate such a debate [on missile defense,] but the member states have not found the courage and the will to get rid of their old protective mentalities," he wrote. Liska argued that "the U.S. intentions are to have lasting and profound impacts on the foreign and security policy of the EU."
Early attempts to explore possibilities for a joint position on missile defense within the EU apparently did not get very far. Poznanski said that "Poland has informed its European partners about its plans concerning missile defense, both bilaterally, and ad hoc in the EU Council, when EU partners have requested such briefings." To date, the EU Council has not taken a stance on the issue.
Privately, EU officials admit that the EU could have played a more active role on missile defense, and some argue it should have been more assertive. Concerns about the lack of official EU involvement are also widespread among members of the European Parliament. Karl von Wogau, Conservative chairman of the European Parliament's Security and Defense Subcommittee, argued that it would have been "desirable" if the planned deployment of missile defense components in the Czech Republic and Poland "would have been agreed at the European level."
The debate is taking place against renewed fears that Europe might once again find itself in the uncomfortable middle between Russia and the United States. Wogau points out that the European Parliament wants to ensure that "Europe is not separated into zones with different levels of security." Wogau argues that NATO "has to take into account specific European security interests" in setting up a future missile defense system's infrastructure and command structure. He believes that NATO has now accepted this point of view because the communiqué of the April 2-4 Bucharest summit reaffirms "the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security as well as NATO solidarity."
Asked about the dangers of renewed conflict between the East and West in Europe, Poznanski replied that he does not believe "that there is a possibility of going back to the Cold War in Europe. There are several institutionalized dialogues on strategic issues taking place between the EU, Russia, and the United States, including the NATO-Russia dialogue. The EU can play an important role as a partner to both the United States and Russia. This should be seen as an opportunity to be seized, rather than as a risk to be faced."
The EU's lack of a coherent position on missile defense is lamented by many, but its silence on another key European security crisis, Russia's suspension of the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), is widely accepted. Solana has repeatedly called the CFE Treaty a "cornerstone of European security," but the treaty's demise has not been an issue for the EU as a whole, primarily because NATO has historically coordinated its member states' positions on conventional arms control. Thus, a French diplomat highlighted the fact that the EU "is at an disadvantage" vis-à-vis NATO because the alliance has a long track record of dealing with issues such as the CFE Treaty and missile defense.
With review conferences on the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions recently concluded, the next diplomatic nonproliferation challenge for the EU will be to develop a strong common position for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Common positions are binding agreements adopted by the EU Council and designed to make cooperation more systematic and improve its coordination.
Many EU officials remain concerned about the stalemate on strategic nuclear arms control between Russia and the United States. In a statement to the European Parliament on April 8, Solana warned of "the difficulties that we may be facing in 2009 and 2010 when all the major agreements on disarmament will come up for renewal." The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) will expire at the end of next year and the NPT review conference will take place just a few months later. Solana stated that "it will be important for the EU and its citizens to have the possibility of avoiding a vacuum between now and then" and urged the United States and Russia to "renew" START and reaffirm past unilateral pledges on nuclear disarmament, which he described as "fundamental pillars of our strategic security."
Hopes for a more active EU arms control policy have been fueled by recent British and French statements on nuclear disarmament. Each country continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal but both recently announced cuts in their numbers of operational warheads. The French diplomat insisted that President Nicolas Sarkozy in his March 21 speech on nuclear deterrence had made "unprecedented gestures" for a nuclear-weapon state, for example by publicly announcing that the fact the force de frappe now maintains fewer than 300 nuclear warheads. He called the nuclear disarmament section of the speech "innovative."
The United Kingdom recently announced a 20 percent cut in the number of operational warheads, and unusual for any nuclear-weapon state, British Defense Secretary Des Brown in a statement before the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament on February 5 recognized that nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation are connected, implying that continued reliance on nuclear deterrence may fuel proliferation.
EU officials express caution about the significance of the shifts in British and French nuclear policies. The EU official described the two countries' statements in favor of progress on nuclear disarmament as helpful but warned that "it is too early to tell" whether they reflect a substantive shift, enabling a more proactive EU policy on some nuclear arms control issues. Poznanski pointed out that the United Kingdom's position on nuclear disarmament is "not surprising" because its work on nuclear arms control verification "has been going on for several years." He also stated that there is "a possibility of a French change of mood on nuclear arms control. This would potentially raise the lowest common denominator on nuclear arms control in the EU, especially in the light of 2010 NPT Review Conference."
The EU also has a problem in forging common positions on other issues on the nuclear nonproliferation agenda, such as the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal. Annalisa Giannella, Solana's personal representative on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), has repeatedly warned that preferential treatment for India will undermine the EU's efforts to bring third countries to accept and implement tougher export control standards. Giannella has also voiced concerns about the deal's overall impact on the nonproliferation regime. Thus, she stated at a conference in Madrid in November that "only when solutions are discussed and agreed in a multilateral framework [are they] felt as legitimate and have a chance to be fully respected." Giannella went on to state that this is why "the nuclear deal with India has raised and continues to raise so many questions from the point of view of the credibility of the NPT. We have here a case where a country is rewarded without adhering to all the rules subscribed by the vast majority."
These isolated warnings, however, do not necessarily reflect the consensus among member states. The EU official conceded that early attempts to develop a joint position among the 27 EU members on the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal have not been conclusive so far and have been abandoned because of significant differences among member states.
Nuclear-weapon states France and the United Kingdom openly support the agreement while many other EU members remain opposed.
The development of a coherent European position on the spread of proliferation-sensitive technologies is also complicated by France's desire to boost exports from its powerful nuclear industry, particularly to the Middle East. Since Sarkozy was elected president in May 2007, Paris has concluded bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with Algeria, Libya, and the United Arab Emirates and is preparing such agreements with Jordan, Morocco, and Qatar. No attempt has apparently been made to coordinate these potentially proliferation-sensitive sales through the EU. For this, France has been criticized by one of its closest partners, Germany. Asked about Sarkozy's policy to promote nuclear energy exports to the Middle East, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier told the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung December 17, 2007, that he "cannot recommend to view nuclear energy as the solution to the world's energy problems and to spread nuclear reactor across the world and in regions where there is no guarantee that this technology will be handled competently and where no sufficient certainty exists regarding political stability."
Different interests and backgrounds complicate the creation of a united EU position on the multilateralization of nuclear fuel cycle activities. Officially, the EU supports efforts to establish safe fuel-supply mechanisms that fulfill four criteria. According to a joint EU paper submitted to the 2007 NPT Preparatory Committee, these factors should be proliferation resistance, assurance of supply, a balance of rights and obligations, and market neutrality. In reality, member states have now put forward a variety of proposals that are not necessarily complementary. Thus, the four supplier states, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, initially all supported the six-nation Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel, submitted in June 2006.
Germany, which has a national policy of phasing out nuclear energy, also has submitted its own proposal on a "Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project," which calls for the establishment of a new enrichment facility in a special area under control of the IAEA. Notably, Germany is the only nuclear fuel supplier that is not a partner country of the U.S. Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, which some in Berlin view as not sufficiently taking into account the interests of potential recipient states.
Austria, which is not using nuclear energy for electricity production, also has introduced its own proposal on a gradual multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the United Kingdom is pursuing its idea of issuing "enrichment bonds" as a means of guaranteeing enrichment services.
Technical Support for Nonproliferation
Because progress on many major arms control issues has largely eluded the EU, it has shifted attention to other topics, such as monetary support for international arms control bureaucracies, strengthening of export control regimes, and better national implementation of nonproliferation commitments.
Since the European Security Strategy was adopted, the EU has adopted a dozen joint actions to support multilateral regimes and institutions involved in tackling nonproliferation and disarmament issues, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the 1540 Committee. Joint actions are coordinated actions by EU member states involving the mobilization of resources in order to attain specific objectives set by the EU Council.
Most recently, it adopted two such actions on April 14, one giving 7.7 million euros to support the IAEA's work on nuclear security and verification and one appropriating 2.1 million euros to support the World Health Organization's biosafety and biosecurity programs. The bulk of European nonproliferation funding still goes toward Global Partnership programs, aimed at dismantling and securing the WMD legacy in Russia and other post-Soviet states. In addition to pledges by member states, the EU has promised $1.4 billion toward the Global Partnership. Yet, some member states, particularly France and Italy, have been slow in implementing their pledges.
In other cases, EU nonproliferation goals sound ambitious but get bogged down in bureaucratic infighting. EU arms control policies have long been hampered by competition between the European Commission (the executive body and main bureaucracy of the EU) and the Council of the European Union, which includes individual representatives from each of the EU member states.
For example, the EU Council in December 2006 endorsed a concept paper written by Giannella in cooperation with the European Commission on the creation of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Monitoring Center. The goal was to establish a cooperative working method for the EU Council Secretariat, the European Commission, and member states "to work together and ensure better synergy in the fight against the proliferation" of weapons of mass destruction, according to the EU's website. Yet, a WMD center still does not exist, and the idea seems not to have moved beyond discussions on the issue. As Poznanski explains, "Reaching agreement on some of the big, strategic issues is not so easy when you work on the basis of the lowest common denominator, as we do in the EU. Therefore, the focus of the EU nonproliferation and arms control policies is often more on technical issues, where agreement can be reached more easily."
What Impact Will the Lisbon Treaty Have?
So far, the EU's ambition to become a more effective global actor on nonproliferation and arms control has been only partly realized. As the senior official from an EU member state admitted, "The EU's room [to] maneuver is limited on issues where member states' positions are too far apart, such as missile defense and the planned nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and India." Nonetheless, an institutional streamlining of the EU's foreign policy, a possible reassessment of its arms control goals, and a redefinition of its relationship with NATO may all lead to a more energetic EU approach to arms control and nonproliferation issues in the future.
Progress on urgently needed institutional reforms was delayed for several years by the 2005 failure of an effort to win approval from some member states for a constitutional treaty that would have strengthened the union's foreign and security policy apparatus. The December 2007 Lisbon Treaty, which copies most of the constitution's provisions on foreign and security policy issues, could help make the EU's foreign policy more efficient and effective. That treaty still must be ratified by most EU member states but is expected to enter into force as early as January 1, 2009. Among the most visible changes in the foreign policy sphere will be the new posts of EU president, to be elected for two and a half years, and high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, effectively the union's foreign minister. The high representative will be "double-hatted," meaning that he or she will act in personal union as vice president of the European Commission and as the EU Council's representative on foreign policy, a potentially difficult combination. "This will be a mission impossible," the EU official warned.
The future role of the high representative will likely depend on his or her personality as well as interaction with the EU president. Potentially, the high representative could take the lead in representing EU member states collectively in arms control negotiations, such as in the talks with Iran.
According to press reports, Solana will continue to serve as high representative at least during an interim period when the Lisbon Treaty is being put into practice, which some say could last from months to a few years.
Another novelty under the Lisbon Treaty is the European External Action Service (EEAS), which will consist of EU Council and European Commission staff as well as diplomats seconded from member states. The EEAS will assist the high representative but potentially also represent the EU as a whole abroad and in international organizations, including nonproliferation regimes. Although many details of the service's funding, role, and composition remain to be worked out, it is likely to create at least some bureaucratic pressure toward a more coherent EU foreign and security policy. An early indication of the bureaucratic hurdles to be overcome is the fact that the European Council Secretariat and the European Commission are preparing separate proposals on the EEAS. Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty will also help to consolidate the complex EU funding structure on arms control and nonproliferation, although the European Commission and the EU Council will continue to operate separate budgets.
Meanwhile, some unlikely connections appear between entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and arms control. Liska indicated that there have been signals from elements of the Czech Conservative coalition party that it would link ratification of the Lisbon Treaty to the ratification of the bilateral agreement between Washington and Prague on the construction of a missile defense radar site. "I personally would consider that as a form of unacceptable blackmail," Liska said.
A New Security Strategy?
Against the background of the upcoming fifth anniversary of the ESS, EU member states are currently considering whether to update Europe's security strategy. The idea of revising the ESS had originally been put forward in August 2007 by Sarkozy, who wanted to push for a "bolder" EU. On December 14, 2007, the EU Council asked Solana "to examine the implementation of the [ESS] with a view to proposing elements on how to improve the implementation and, as appropriate, elements to complement it, for adoption by the European Council in December 2008."
That process, which could likely result in an annex to the ESS, is ongoing. According to the EU official, several proposals have been floated following Sarkozy's statement, but member states have not formally agreed on any specific course of action. The official also stated that no concrete preparations are currently taking place for an updated WMD strategy. Decisions on a revision of an ESS, including a possible update of the WMD strategy, are likely to be taken under the French EU presidency during the second half of 2008.
Several decision-makers support such a review, echoing the point made by Poznanski that "a review or an update of the [ESS] might be opportune because we will have a new institutional setting for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Strategy after the Lisbon Treaty comes into force, with the new position of high representative for foreign affairs and security policy and the [EEAS]." Such a review, however, may not necessarily lead to a more ambitious text. The senior official cautioned that a revision may not be in the interest of those that support the goals in the ESS because discussions may not result in a more ambitious document.
A New Division of Labor With NATO?
The EU's role on arms control issues will also be influenced by the future division of labor between NATO and EU. The relation between the two Brussels-based organizations on foreign and defense issues has always been competitive. A new push to realign the two institutions may be facilitated by the intention of the French government to rejoin NATO's integrated military structure. Given the interest of some within NATO to give the alliance a stronger role in nonproliferation and counterproliferation issues, such a development may also force the EU to reassert its role on nonproliferation and arms control issues.
So far, attempts to raise NATO's arms control profile seem not to have borne fruit. On December 7, Steinmeier and his Norwegian counterpart Jonas Gahr Støre called in a bilateral statement for NATO countries "to do more for disarmament." In reaction, the NATO council launched a review, of which the Bucharest summit took note. Yet, NATO leaders merely tasked the NATO council to keep the alliance's contribution to arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation "under active review." The goal apparently is to prepare another report on arms control for NATO's 60th anniversary summit next year.
During that summit, NATO is also expected to launch a long-planned review of its 1999 Strategic Concept. A new Strategic Concept would have to address the role of nuclear deterrence in alliance strategy, a topic with implications also for European nonproliferation policies. Not only would the two European nuclear-weapon states have to be part of such an agreement, the United States still deploys nuclear weapons in three EU non-nuclear-weapon states-Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands. Liska argues that this is an issue where Europe should act. "The EU should go ahead with disarmament initiatives even alone and set an example to the rest of the world," he said. "It should negotiate the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from its territory and start reducing its own arsenal."
In the end, Europe's ability to become a more effective actor on nonproliferation and disarmament will depend first on overcoming internal divisions and reducing the role of nuclear deterrence. Second, the EU will have to develop joint arms control agendas with Russia and most importantly with the United States. As a new administration takes over in Washington, the old diplomatic chestnut that the EU will have to become more effective and the United States more multilateral will gain new urgency.
Oliver Meier is the Arms Control Association's international representative and correspondent based in Berlin and a researcher with the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.
1. See Oliver Meier and Gerrard Quille, "Testing Time for Europe's Nonproliferation Strategy," Arms Control Today, May 2005, pp. 4-12.
2. In the EU-3+3 talks, negotiators representing the EU's three largest countries (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) plus the EU's high representative on foreign policy have been negotiating on behalf of the EU together with permanent Security Council members China, Russia, and the United States.
3. Senior official from an EU member state, telephone interview with author, April 14, 2008.
4. "U.S.-Geheimdienstbericht zum iranischen Atomprogramm," Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Fraktion BÜNDNIS90/Die Grünen, Printed matter 16/7702, January 10, 2008.
5. EU official, telephone interview with author, April 14, 2008.
6. "France Warning of War with Iran," BBC News, September 17, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6997935.stm.
7. "Brief Remarks by Javier Solana," European Council Press Release S348/07, November 30, 2007.
8. "Solana Hopes to Meet Iranian Negotiator for Talks," Xinhua, March 16, 2008.
9. Grzegorz M. Poznanski, telephone interview with author, April 17, 2008.
10. "HR Solana Interview for Adevarul," April 3, 2008, www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/sghr_int/99717.pdf.
11. Ondrej Liska, e-mail communication with author, April 22, 2008.
12. Karl von Wogau, e-mail communication with author, April 16, 2008.
13. "Bucharest Summit Declaration," NATO Press Release 2008(049), April 3, 2008.
14. See, for example, "Speech by Javier Solana at the 44th Munich Conference on Security Policy," Munich, February 10, 2008.
15. French diplomat, interview with author, April 4, 2008.
16. "Address by Javier Solana," Council of the European Union, S129/08, April 8, 2008.
17. "Speech by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the French Republic at the Presentation of Le Terrible in Cherbourg," March 21, 2008.
18. Des Browne, "Laying the Foundations for Multilateral Disarmament," Speech at the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, February 5, 2008.
19. "EU Aide Worried by Calls to Drop India WMD Clause," Reuters, March 2, 2007; Council of the European Union, "Speech by Mrs. Annalisa Giannella at a Seminar on Nuclear Proliferation," Madrid, November 6, 2007.
20. "Das deutsch-französische Verhältnis pflegen wir nicht aus bloßer Tradition," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 17, 2007 (interview with German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier).
21. Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, "Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle/Guarantees of Access to the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy," NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.61, May 9, 2007.
22. "Communication Dated 31 May 2006 Received from the Permanent Missions of France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America," IAEA, GOV/INF/2006/10, June 1, 2006.
23. "Communication Received from the Resident Representative of Germany to the IAEA With Regard to the German Proposal on the Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle," IAEA, INFCIRC/704, May 4, 2007.
24. Oliver Meier, "News Analysis: The Growing Nuclear Fuel-Cycle Debate," Arms Control Today, November 2006, pp. 40-44.
25. See Paul Walker, "Looking Back: Kananaskis at Five," Arms Control Today, September 2007, pp. 47-52.
26. "EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of WMD," Council of the European Union, 16694/06, December 12, 2006.
27. See Mark Beunderman, "EU Faces Raft of Open Questions Over Diplomatic Service," EUobserver.com, November 27, 2007.
28. John Thornhill, "Sarkozy in Drive to Give EU Global Role," FT.com, August 28, 2007.
29. "Brussels European Council 14 December 2007 Presidency Conclusions," Council of the European Union, 16616/1/07 REV 1, February 14, 2008.
30. "Germany and Norway Call for NATO Disarmament Initiative," Federal Foreign Office Press Release, Berlin, December 7, 2007.
31. "Bucharest Summit Declaration."