U.S. Arms Policy & Sales

February 2011

Press Contact: Jeff Abramson, Deputy Director; (202) 463-8270 x109

After a dip in proposed arms transfers the previous year, in 2010 the Pentagon notified Congress of an estimated $102.5 billion in proposed, government-to-government, conventional arms transfer agreements with 28 countries, setting a new high that surpasses even the $75 billion proposed in 2008. The total amount presented to Congress was nearly four times higher than the 10-year average from 2000 to 2009 ($27 billion), and two and a half times the comparable 2009 and 2007 figures ($39 billion each).  

The United States conducts government-to-government transfers through the Defense Department’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Not all notified sales result in final transactions. Under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, Congress must be notified of proposed sales of “major defense equipment,” as defined on the U.S. Munitions List, that equals or exceeds $14 million; defense articles and services that are not defined as “major defense equipment” which total $50 million or more; and construction or design services amounting to or surpassing $200 million.[1] However, if the proposed sale involves NATO members, Australia, Israel, Japan, South Korea, or New Zealand, the notification thresholds are $25 million for major defense equipment, $100 million for other defense articles and services, and $300 million for construction or design services.[2] Once notified, Congress has 30 calendar days (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Isreal, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) to block a sale by passing a joint resolution of disapproval, though it has never stopped a sale once formally notified.

The total amount in 2010 is heavily influenced by $60.1 billion in proposed arms transfers to Saudi Arabia (see ACT, December 2010) including 84 F15-SA multi-role aircraft, equipment for the upgrade of 70 Saudi F15-S aircraft, 70 AH-64D Block III Apache Longbow helicopters, and 72 UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters, as well as AH-6i and MD-530F light helicopters.  Present in the packages are 300 Sidewinder and 500 AMRAAM missiles, 400 air-launched Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and 600 HARM missiles, plus thousands of Hellfire IIs, and 150 infantry operable Javelin anti-tank missiles. The sale of thousands of laser and GPS guided bombs were also proposed including 1,100 Paveway IIIs and 1,000 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) units, both of the 2,000-pound variety. Included as well were 1,300 units of the CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapon/Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser, a cluster bomb of the type banned by the Convention on Cluster Munitions but which is still sold by the United States as permitted by its own policies. Saudi Arabia last proposed significant FMS purchases in 2008 ($2.9 billion), and had also been the largest proposed recipient of U.S. arms transfers in 2006 ($11.3 billion).

Saudi Arabia was not the only state in the Middle East that sought new arms and armaments in 2010, with the United Arab Emirates ($5.4 billion), Iraq ($4.9 billion), Oman ($3.6 billion), Israel ($2.0 billion), and Kuwait ($1.6 billion) all expressing interest in purchases. Helicopters, their parts, and their servicing constituted a significant proportion of global proposed sales [3]; the U.A.E. followed in its neighbor’s footsteps in ordering 60 Apache Longbows. Iraq proposed new requests for 18 F-16IQ aircraft, ammunition for its M1A1 tanks, and refurbishment of 440 M113A2 Armored Personnel Carriers. Oman likewise sought to reinforce its air force, putting forward plans to buy 18 F16 Block 50/52 aircraft. Israel’s requested package was limited to the purchase of gasoline for its ground forces and jet fuel. As a percentage of overall proposed sales, requests from Middle Eastern states rose from around 68 percent in 2009 to 78 percent in 2010.

Early in the year the proposed sale of 60 UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters along with 114 PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missiles to Taiwan was finally presented to Congress after nearly a decade of negotiations (see ACT, March 2010). The package drew the ire of mainland China, despite the omission of the diesel submarines and F16C/D fighter aircraft originally intended as a core part of the deal. The total value of intended U.S. sales to Taipei amounted to $6.4 billion, matching 2008 figures. Harpoon missiles again featured as they did two years earlier but on a much smaller scale, with only the purchase of a dozen proposed. Two OSPREY class mine-hunting ships were also requested. In reaction to the proposed sale, China cut strategic military dialogue talks with the United States for nearly a year.  

The U.S. government also proposed several large sales to India during the year, amounting to $8.0 billion. 145 units of the M777 155mm light towed Howitzer were requested as part of an extended artillery modernization program, as well as 10 C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft. New Delhi also sought parts and weapons systems for 22 Apache Longbow helicopters and 21 Harpoon Block II anti-ship missiles for the P-8I maritime patrol aircraft. Unlike many other notifications, the proposed sale of Apache helicopters was made in advance of an official letter of request from India. Instead, it was submitted as part of an international competition so that, “in the event that the…[U.S.] proposal is selected, the United States might move as quickly as possible to implement the sale,” according to the notification. As of year’s end, India had not announced whether the U.S. bid was accepted. In 2009, a similar speculative notification was made for Super Hornet fighter aircraft for Brazil, which still had not decided how to proceed as of the end of 2010.

Below are the five countries that sought the highest values in U.S. arms exports in 2010 and some of their specific requests.

Below are all 28 countries that sought U.S. arms exports in 2010 according to FMS notifications and the total value of their identified requests (in billions of U.S. dollars):

Below are the total values of all notified requests each yearfrom 1997 to 2010 in billions of U.S. dollars as compiled each year, in current dollars (unadjusted for inflation):

Xiaodon Liang assisted in the research and writing of this fact sheet.

ENDNOTES
1. The Department of State is also required to report to Congress any commercial sales it approves of “major defense equipment” that amount to $14 million or more, defense articles and services that equal or exceed $50 million, and any items defined as “significant military equipment.” As in the case of FMS sales, Congress can block the sale with a joint resolution of disapproval within 30 calendar days of notification (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea). There are no official compilations of commercial agreement data comparable to the FMS notifications and what exists is often incomplete and less precise than data on government-to-government transactions (Grimmett, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001-2009, Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, September 10, 2010, p. 23). The annual Section 655 report, prepared by the State and Defense Departments for Congress, details commercial licenses approved, but states have four years to act under the licenses. The State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls has final responsibility for license applications for commercial defense trade exports and all issues related to defense trade compliance, enforcement, and reporting.

2. Congress approved the higher notification thresholds for NATO members, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand in legislation passed in September 2002. South Korea was added to this list in 2008, and Israel was added in 2010.

3. Helicopter related (units, engines, parts, support, electronics, and training) requests were proposed by Australia, Colombia, Denmark, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Sources: Congressional Research Service, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and Department of State.

This profile summarizes the major arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that the United States subscribes to and those that it does not. It also describes the major weapons programs, policies, and holdings of the United States, as well as its proliferation record. This profile is one of a series focused on the arms control record and status of key states, all of which are available on the Arms Control Association’s website at http://www.armscontrol.org.

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Member.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Member.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Member.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: Signed in 1998, entered into force in January 2009.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Co-founder with Russia.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Founder.

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673: The United States has filed reports on its activities to fulfill the resolutions and volunteered to provide assistance to other states.

Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:
In the early 1970s, the United States destroyed its entire stockpile of biological weapons, which had been developed between 1943 and 1969. In recent years, the United States has steeply increased funding for biodefense programs, which some independent analysts argue could also lend themselves to offensive weapons research and development. [4]

In 2001, the Bush administration  opposed and killed an effort dating back to 1995 to augment the Biological Weapons Convention with a legally binding verification protocol. U.S. officials said the protocol would be too burdensome on legitimate governments and private biodefense programs, while at the same time failing to deter cheaters. The Obama administration has not changed this basic position.

Chemical Weapons:
Behind Russia, the United States declared the second-largest stockpile of chemical agents. In October 2010, the United States announced that it had destroyed 24,488 tons of chemical materials, representing 80% of its original stockpile. However, due to environmental concerns requiring that materials at certain facilities be neutralized rather than incinerated, the United States does not expect to complete destruction until 2021, nine years after the Chemical Weapons Convention deadline.

Missiles:

• Ballistic Missiles: As of April 2010, the United States possesses 450 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), with three warheads deployed on each. In its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released that same month, the Obama administration announced its plans to “de-MIRV” the existing missiles so that each will carry only one warhead.

The United States’ other long-range missile system is the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The U.S. Navy currently has fourteen Ohio-class submarines, 12  of which are  outfitted with 24 Trident II  SLBMs.

Under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the United States is barred from possessing ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. In October 2007, the United States and Russia called upon other countries to forswear missiles banned by the INF Treaty.

• Cruise Missiles: The United States deploys ship-, submarine-, and air-launched cruise missiles. The Harpoon missile is an anti-ship system, while the Tomahawk, which can be armed with a nuclear warhead, is a land-attack missile. In 2010, the United States announced that it would retire all Tomahawk missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. The United States is currently in the process of retiring its nuclear-armed AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles and trimming its fleet of AGM-86 Air-Launched Cruise Missiles, which can be armed with conventional or nuclear payloads, to 528 missiles.

Nuclear Weapons:
In President Barack Obama’s April 2009 speech in Prague, he declared that it was the policy of the United States “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”

In May 2010, for the first time, the U.S. government revealed the size of its nuclear stockpile. It announced that, as of September 30, 2009, it possessed 5,113 nuclear warheads, including tactical, strategic, and nondeployed weapons. This total does not include retired warheads that are awaiting dismantlement, which are estimated to be about 4,500 warheads.

In the 2010 NPR, the United States announced that it “will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.” It reserved the right to make any adjustments to this assurance “that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat.” It was not prepared to make a declaration that the “sole purpose” of its nuclear weapons was to deter a nuclear attack, but added that it would “work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted.”

The United States has conducted 1,030 total nuclear tests, which is more than any other state—indeed, it’s more than all other states combined. The first test occurred July 16, 1945, and the most recent test took place Sept. 23, 1992.

The United States is the only nation to have used nuclear weapons against another country, dropping two bombs (one apiece) on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

The United States has publicly declared that it no longer produces fissile material for weapons purposes. The United States halted the production of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons in 1964 and ceased plutonium separation for weapons in 1992. Current U.S. fissile stockpiles for weapons total about 54 declared metric tons of plutonium and 250 declared metric tons of HEU. [5] Under an agreement finalized in 2000 with Russia, the United States is committed to disposing of 34 metric tons of excess plutonium. The project was delayed for several years, but in April 2010 the United States and Russia signed a protocol that amended and updated the 2000 agreement. Both countries now aim to begin actual disposition in 2018.

In April 2010, the United States hosted the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC. Participants included 47 countries, 38 of which were represented at the head of state or head of government level, and the heads of the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the European Union. At the summit, the participants unanimously adopted the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material in the next four years.

Conventional Weapons Trade:
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the world’s preeminent conventional arms seller. A 2009 Congressional Research Service study reported that, over the previous eight years, the United States agreed to $166.3 billion in global arms sales. This is more than double that of the second-largest exporter, Russia, which agreed to arms sales worth $74 billion over the same time period. [6]

Proliferation Record

A close relationship exists between the U.S. and British nuclear weapons programs, including U.S. supply of the Trident SLBM to the United Kingdom.

The United States is also the only nation known to station its nuclear weapons in other countries. Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey all host U.S. tactical nuclear gravity bombs as part of NATO nuclear sharing agreements. These estimated 200 weapons remain under U.S. custody during peacetime, but some could be released to U.S. allies for delivery in times of war.

Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

In 2002, the United States and Russia concluded the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). Under SORT, the two countries agreed to reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear forces to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by Dec. 31, 2012. However, the treaty expires that same day, freeing up both countries to expand their arsenals afterwards if they so choose. In February 2009, the U.S. government completed its reductions to 2,200 strategic deployed weapons, meeting the upper limit under SORT over three years early.

In addition, SORT did not include verification measures. Instead, it relied on the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty’s (START) verification regime, which provided for the United States and Russia to exchange information, visit, and monitor each other’s nuclear weapons complexes. START expired in December 2009.

In April 2010, the United States and Russia signed a successor to the original START accord. The new treaty, known as New START, would require that both sides reduce their arsenals to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear weapons within seven years of the treaty’s entry into force. In addition, it would restore many of the verification measures from the original START accord. As of yet, the treaty has not been ratified in either the U.S. or Russian legislatures.

The United States is party to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, but not to the 1999 Adapted CFE Treaty. The United States has led NATO in demanding that Russia withdraw its remaining military forces from Georgia and Moldova as a condition for ratification of the Adapted Treaty, which would replace the original treaty’s bloc and regional arms limits with national weapon ceilings.

The United States is also party to another European security instrument, the Open Skies Treaty, which facilitates unarmed reconnaissance flights over the territories of all states-parties.

The United States has signed and ratified protocols stating its intent to respect and not threaten the use of nuclear weapons against states-parties to the Latin American nuclear-weapon free zone treaty. It has signed but not ratified similar protocols to the African and South Pacific zones. It has not signed the protocols for the Central Asian or Southeast Asian zones.

The United States has been a leading proponent of negotiating a fissile material cutoff treaty at the 65-member Conference on Disarmament (CD). During the Bush administration, however, the United States dropped its support for seeking an “effectively verifiable” cutoff, claiming that a verification regime would be time-consuming to negotiate, costly to implement, and ultimately imperfect, potentially impinging on the national security interests of law-abiding states while not deterring determined cheaters. This contributed to the deadlock at the CD, which was unable to agree on an agenda throughout the entirety of the Bush administration’s tenure. In 2009, the Obama administration affirmed its support for a verifiable fissile material cutoff treaty. However, Pakistan has since prevented negotiations from beginning on such a treaty, and as of this writing the stalemate at the CD continues.

Within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the United States has joined with many other countries to promote new restrictions on the use of anti-vehicle mines, but that effort has been blocked by China, Pakistan, and Russia. The United States announced in June 2007 that it was dropping its opposition to negotiations by CCW states on restricting cluster munitions. But the United States said it has no position on the potential outcome of the negotiations except that an agreement should “protect civilians while taking into account security requirements.” The United States has declined to join a Norwegian-led effort outside the CCW to negotiate a treaty to ban cluster munitions that “cause unacceptable harm to civilians.”

In 2009, the United States declared its support for an arms trade treaty “that contains the highest possible, legally binding standards for the international transfer of conventional weapons.” [7]

Although the United States has elected not to join the Ottawa Mine Ban Convention, the United States is not known to have used antipersonnel landmines since the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In 2004, the United States announced that it would phase out the use of any type of mine lacking self-destruct or self-deactivation features. Washington has also led the world in financial contributions to global demining efforts.

In July 2005, the United States launched an initiative with India to repeal most U.S. and multilateral civilian nuclear trade restrictions on India. In 2006, the U.S. Congress amended its own domestic legislation to allow nuclear trade with India to proceed. The two governments later concluded a “123 Agreement,” which was approved by Congress and signed into law in October 2008. The previous month, India received a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group. However, nuclear trade between the two nations has yet to formally proceed.

The United States led a 2003 invasion of Iraq citing its alleged pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. No evidence has been discovered to support these allegations.

-Updated by Scoville Fellow Rob Golan-Vilella.

ENDNOTES

1. The Senate could vote on the treaty again. The George W. Bush administration did not support the treaty. Since taking office, President Obama has repeatedly pledged to secure the Senate’s advice and consent on the treaty, but no action has been taken thus far.

2. The United States has not ratified Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons, Protocol IV on Blinding Lasers, and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. It also has not approved an amendment that extends the convention’s application beyond just interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts.

3. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor Report 2006, July 2006, 1,236 pp.

4. Roffey, Roger, Hart, John, and Kuhlau, Frida, “Crucial Guidance: A Code of Conduct for Biodefense Scientists,” Arms Control Today, September 2006, p. 17.

5. International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report, 2009, September 2009, 178 pp.

6. Grimmett, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2002-2009, Congressional Research Service, September 10, 2010, 84 pp.

7. Clinton, Hillary Rodham, “U.S. Support for an Arms Trade Treaty,” October 14, 2009, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/130573.htm.