ACA Logo
Adjust Text Size: Small Text Size Default Text Size Large Text Size

Fact Sheets & Briefs

The U.S. Atomic Energy Act Section 123 At a Glance

Press ContactsDaryl Kimball, (202) 463-8270 x107

Updated: March 2013

Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 establishes the conditions and outlines the process for major nuclear cooperation between the United States and other countries. In order for a country to enter into such an agreement with the United States, that country must commit to a set of nine nonproliferation criteria. The United States has entered into nuclear cooperation agreements with 23 countries, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and Taiwan.[1]

The nine nonproliferation criteria for section 123 agreements are as follows:

  • Nuclear material and equipment transferred to the country must remain under safeguards in perpetuity.
  • Non-nuclear-weapon states partners must have full-scope IAEA safeguards, essentially covering all major nuclear facilities.
  • A guarantee that transferred nuclear material, equipment, and technology will not have any role in nuclear weapons development or any other military purpose, except in the case of cooperation with nuclear-weapon states.
  • In the event that a non-nuclear-weapon state partner detonates a nuclear device using nuclear material produced or violates an IAEA safeguards agreement, the United States has the right to demand the return of any transfers.
  • U.S. consent is required for any re-transfer of material or classified data.
  • Nuclear material transferred or produced as a result of the agreement is subject to adequate physical security.
  • U.S. prior consent rights to the enrichment or reprocessing of nuclear material obtained or produced as a result of the agreement.
  • Prior U.S. approval is required for highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium obtained or produced as a result of the agreement.  An agreement permitting enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) using U.S. provided material requires separate negotiation.
  • The above nonproliferation criteria apply to all nuclear material or nuclear facilities produced or constructed as a result of the agreement.

Section 123 requires that the Department of State submit a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) explaining how the nuclear cooperation agreement meets these nonproliferation conditions. Congress has a total of 90 days in continuous session to consider the agreement, after which it automatically becomes law unless Congress adopts a joint resolution opposing it.

The President may exempt a proposed agreement from any of the above criteria upon determination maintaining such a criteria would be “seriously prejudicial to the achievement of U.S. non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense of the United States.” Exempted 123 agreements would then go through a different process than non-exempt agreements, requiring a congressional joint resolution approving the agreement for it to become law. There are no 123 agreements in force that were adopted with such exemptions.

In 2006, Congress passed the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act which amended the AEA permit nuclear cooperation with India, a country which is not a member of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not maintain full-scope safeguards.  The Hyde amendment has been criticized for undermining U.S. international counterproliferation efforts.

A 123 agreement alone does not permit countries to enrich or reprocess nuclear material acquired from the United States and permission to do so requires a further negotiated agreement.  A debate is currently raging in the nonproliferation community over the “Gold Standard,” named after the U.S.-UAE 123 agreement signed in 2009 whereby the UAE voluntarily renounced pursuing enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies and capabilities.  The UAE agreement stands in stark contrast to the “blanket consent” granted to India, Japan, and EURATOM, who have ENR approval from the U.S.  This consent is being sought by other countries as many 123 agreements are up for renewal and renegotiation in 2014, most notably South Korea.

ENR capabilities are controversial because the process transforms raw uranium or spent nuclear fuel into highly-enriched uranium.  While these capabilities are generally used for energy purposes, because the same technology can be used for weaponization processes there are concerns of serious proliferation risks when a country obtains the technology.  A Gold Standard for 123 agreements would require any country party to a 123 agreement with the United States to renounce ENR activities. The Department of Energy and the U.S. nuclear industry advocate a continuance of the case-by-case approach followed thus far in renewal agreements. A case-by-case approach allows countries to apply for ENR permission, and has been successfully pursued by India and Japan.  South Korea is pushing for an agreement to permit reprocessing to develop its own nuclear industry, a major target in its economic development plans.

Thus far Congress has attempted several times to pass measures ensuring that future 123 agreements adhere to the Gold Standard.  The most prominent of these bills was H.R. 1280, which among other amendments to the Atomic Energy Act declared that future 123 agreements must include “a requirement as part of the agreement for cooperation or other legally binding document that is considered part of the agreement that no reprocessing activities, or acquisition or construction of facilities for such activities, will occur within” the country.  The bill also required states considering 123 agreements to be members of many international treaties and conventions promoting non-proliferation.  Though reported out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in April 2011, it was blocked from floor consideration and died with the 112th Congress.

The executive branch has been less clear in its position.  The George W. Bush administration coined the term Gold Standard when the U.S.-UAE deal was signed in 2009 and declared it the new standard for nuclear cooperation agreements.  The Obama administration has not come out in favor of a Gold Standard, though their have been several interagency reviews soliciting opinions, the most recent during the summer of 2012.  A 2011 letter from the Obama administration to Capitol Hill renounced the idea of a uniform approach to 123 agreements and advocated for a case-by-case approach in future negotiations.  (See ACT, March 2012).

 


 

ENDNOTE:

1. A full list of countries with 123 agreements with the United States can be found at National Nuclear Security Administration, “123 Agreements for Peaceful Cooperation,” http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/treatiesagreements/123agreements

 

The Ottawa Convention: Signatories and States-Parties

Press Contact: Daryl Kimball, Deputy Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

Updated: March 2013

The Ottawa Convention, also referred to as the "Mine Ban Treaty," prohibits the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines (APLs). It requires states-parties to destroy their stockpiled APLs within four years and eliminate all APL holdings, including mines currently planted in the soil, within 10 years. Countries may request a renewable extension, which can be up to 10 years long, to fulfill their destruction obligations. States-parties are also required annually to report to the UN secretary-general their total APL stockpiles, the technical characteristics of their APLs, the location of all mined areas, and the status of APL destruction programs.

The convention, which is of unlimited duration and open to all nations, entered into force March 1, 1999. As of March 2013, 160 countries had ratified or acceded to the treaty, and one country, the Marshall Islands, has signed the accord but not ratified it. States-parties overwhelmingly come from Europe, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean. Almost no countries in the Near East and only about half of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region have signed the treaty.

Some key current and past producers and users of landmines, including the United States, China, India, Pakistan, and Russia, have not signed the treaty. The George W. Bush administration announced Feb. 27, 2004 that the United States would not join the Ottawa Convention. The United States is party to the 1996 amended mines protocol of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which restricts but does not ban APL use.  The Obama administration has stated that its current landmine policy is under review and plans to clarify its position on the Ottawa treaty in the future.

A precise accounting of the number of landmines planted globally is not possible. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, a coalition of more than 1,400 non-government organizations working on landmine issues, has estimated that 59 countries have landmines on their territories. The coalition also has recently estimated that as many as 100 million APLs may be stockpiled around the globe, of which roughly 14 million are stockpiled by Ottawa Convention states-parties and signatories.

The following is a complete list of all Ottawa Convention signatories and states-parties:

Country
Signature
Deposit
Afghanistan 9/11/02
Albania 9/8/98 2/29/00
Algeria 12/3/97 10/9/01
Andorra 12/3/97 6/29/98
Angola 12/4/97 7/5/02
Antigua & Barbuda 12/3/97 5/3/99
Argentina 12/4/97 9/14/99
Australia 12/3/97 1/14/99
Austria 12/3/97 6/29/98
Bahamas 12/3/97 7/31/98
Bangladesh 5/7/98 9/6/00
Barbados 12/3/97 1/26/99
Belarus 9/03/03
Belgium 12/3/97 9/4/98
Belize 2/27/98 4/23/98
Benin 12/3/97 9/25/98
Bhutan 8/18/05
Bolivia 12/3/97 6/9/98
Bosnia and Herzegovina 12/3/97 9/8/98
Botswana 12/3/97 3/1/00
Brazil 12/3/97 4/30/99
Brunei Darussalam 12/4/97 4/24/06
Bulgaria 12/3/97 9/4/98
Burkina Faso 12/3/97 9/16/98
Burundi 12/3/97 10/22/03
Cambodia 12/3/97 7/28/99
Cameroon 12/3/97 9/19/02
Canada 12/3/97 12/3/97
Cape Verde 12/4/97 5/14/01
Central African Republic 11/8/02
Chad 7/6/98 5/6/99
Chile 12/3/97 9/10/01
Colombia 12/3/97 9/6/00
Comoros 9/19/02
Congo 5/4/01
Cook Islands 12/3/97 3/15/06
Costa Rica 12/3/97 3/17/99
Cote d'Ivoire 12/3/97 6/30/00
Croatia 12/4/97 5/20/98
Cyprus 12/4/97 1/17/03
Czech Republic 12/3/97 10/26/99
Democratic Republic of Congo 5/2/02
Denmark 12/4/97 6/8/98
Djibouti 12/3/97 5/18/98
Dominica 12/3/97 3/26/99
Dominican Republic 12/3/97 6/30/00
Ecuador 12/4/97 4/29/99
El Salvador 12/4/97 1/27/99
Equatorial Guinea 9/16/98
Eriitrea 8/27/01
Estonia 5/12/04
Ethiopia 12/3/97 12/17/04
Fiji 12/3/97 6/10/98
Finland 1/09/12
France 12/3/97 7/23/98
Gabon 12/3/97 9/8/00
Gambia 12/4/97 9/23/02
Germany 12/3/97 7/23/98
Ghana 12/4/97 6/30/00
Greece 12/3/97 9/25/03
Grenada 12/3/97 8/19/98
Guatemala 12/3/97 3/26/99
Guinea 12/4/97 10/8/98
Guinea-Bissau 12/3/97 5/22/01
Guyana 12/4/97 8/5/03
Haiti 12/3/97 2/15/06
Holy See 12/4/97 2/17/98
Honduras 12/3/97 9/24/98
Hungary 12/3/97 4/6/98
Iceland 12/4/97 5/5/99
Indonesia 12/4/97 2/20/07
Iraq 8/15/07
Ireland 12/3/97 12/3/97
Italy 12/3/97 4/23/99
Jamaica 12/3/97 7/17/98
Japan 12/3/97 9/30/98
Jordan 8/11/98 11/13/98
Kenya 12/5/97 1/23/01
Kiribati 9/7/00
Kuwait 7/31/07
Latvia 7/1/05
Lesotho 12/4/97 12/2/98
Liberia 12/23/99
Liechtenstein 12/3/97 10/5/99
Lithuania 2/26/99 5/12/03
Luxembourg 12/4/97 6/14/99
Macedonia, FYR 9/9/98
Madagascar 12/4/97 9/16/99
Malawi 12/4/97 8/13/98
Malaysia 12/3/97 4/22/99
Maldives 10/1/98 9/7/00
Mali 12/3/97 6/2/98
Malta 12/4/97 5/7/01
Marshall Islands 12/4/97
Mauritania 12/3/97 7/21/00
Mauritius 12/3/97 12/3/97
Mexico 12/3/97 6/9/98
Moldova 12/3/97 9/8/00
Monaco 12/4/97 11/17/98
Montenegro 10/23/06
Mozambique 12/3/97 8/25/98
Namibia 12/3/97 9/21/98
Nauru 8/7/00
Netherlands 12/3/97 4/12/99
New Zealand 12/3/97 1/27/99
Nicaragua 12/4/97 11/30/98
Niger 12/4/97 3/23/99
Nigeria 9/27/01
Niue 12/3/97 4/15/98
Norway 12/3/97 7/9/98
Palau 11/19/07
Panama 12/4/97 10/7/98
Papua New Guinea 6/28/04
Paraguay 12/3/97 11/13/98
Peru 12/3/97 6/17/98
Philippines 12/3/97 2/15/00
Poland 12/4/97 12/27/12
Portugal 12/3/97 2/19/99
Qatar 12/4/97 10/13/98
Romania 12/3/97 11/30/00
Rwanda 12/3/97 6/8/00
St. Kitts & Nevis 12/3/97 12/2/98
St. Lucia 12/3/97 4/13/99
St. Vincent & the Grenadines 12/3/97 8/1/01
Samoa 12/3/97 7/23/98
San Marino 12/3/97 3/18/98
Sao Tome & Principe 4/30/98 3/31/03
Senegal 12/3/97 9/24/98
Serbia & Montenegro 9/18/03
Seychelles 12/4/97 6/2/00
Sierra Leone 7/29/98 4/25/01
Slovakia 12/3/97 2/25/99
Slovenia 12/3/97 10/27/98
Solomon Islands 12/4/97 1/26/99
Somalia 4/16/12
South Africa 12/3/97 6/26/98
South Sudan 11/11/11
Spain 12/3/97 1/19/99
Sudan 12/4/97 10/13/03
Suriname 12/4/97 5/23/02
Swaziland 12/4/97 12/22/98
Sweden 12/4/97 11/30/98
Switzerland 12/3/97 3/24/98
Tajikistan 10/12/99
Tanzania 12/3/97 11/13/00
Thailand 12/3/97 11/27/98
Timor Leste 5/7/03
Togo 12/4/97 3/9/00
Trinidad & Tobago 12/4/97 4/27/98
Tunisia 12/4/97 7/9/99
Turkey 9/25/03
Turkmenistan 12/3/97 1/19/98
Tuvalu 9/13/11
Uganda 12/3/97 2/25/99
Ukraine 2/24/99 12/27/05
United Kingdom 12/3/97 7/31/98
Uruguay 12/3/97 6/7/01
Vanuatu 12/4/97 9/16/05
Venezuela 12/3/97 4/14/99
Yemen 12/4/97 9/1/98
Zambia 12/12/97 2/23/01
Zimbabwe 12/3/97 6/18/98

The Ottawa Convention at a Glance

Press Contact: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director; (202) 463-8270 x107

Updated: March 2013

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, typically referred to as the "Ottawa Convention" or "Mine Ban Treaty," seeks to end the use of anti-personnel landmines (APLs) worldwide. It was opened for signature on December 3, 1997, and it entered into force on March 1, 1999. As of February 2013, 161 states are party to the treaty.  One country, the Marshall Islands, has signed but not ratified it.  There are 36 non-signatories, including major powers such as the United States,[1] Russia, and China.  Few countries in key regions of tension, namely the Middle East and South Asia, have opted to participate.[2] There is some hope that because of the treaty new international norms have formed that discourage any country, signatory or not, from using mines.  Many non-signatories are in de facto compliance with the Ottawa Convention by refusing to use landmines and committing to voluntary destruction of stockpiles.[3] Still, millions of mines are estimated to be planted in the ground in 59 countries. Global APL stockpiles are thought to total more than 100 million mines.[4][5] Some of thecountries that suffer the most from the humanitarian impacts of landmines include Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Iraq and Laos.[6]

The Obama administration is currently undertaking a review of its policy towards the Ottawa Convention.  Thus far, the U.S. has maintained that it will not absolutely renounce its ability to right to use “smart” landmines – those that can be remotely deactivated – as a defensive mechanism to protect its own troops.[7] Another issue of concern is the remaining defensive U.S. landmines in the demilitarized zone of the Korean Peninsula.[8]

Prohibitions: States-parties commit to not using, developing, producing, acquiring, retaining, stockpiling, or transferring anti-personnel landmines, which are defined by the treaty as mines "designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons." APLs that are remotely triggered, such as claymores, are not proscribed, nor are anti-vehicle mines, including those equipped with anti-handling devices, which are designed to protect anti-vehicles mines from being tampered with or moved.  The treaty also forbids signatories from assisting or encouraging any other state or party from engaging in the activities outlawed by the treaty.

APL Destruction: Each state-party is expected to destroy all APLs stockpiled in arsenals, except those retained for demining training, within four years of becoming bound by the treaty. Within 10 years of its entry into force date, each country is required to destroy all APLs under its jurisdiction and control, including those planted in the soil. A country may request renewable extensions of up to 10 years to complete this destruction task. A majority of participants at a meeting of states-parties or review conference must approve an extension request. Twenty-seven state parties have been granted such extensions on destruction deadlines, but only one so far, Nicaragua, has formally completed its obligations before the mandated deadline.  States-parties are expected to mark and monitor all suspected or known mined areas until they are cleared. All told, states-parties have destroyed more than 46 million stockpiled APLs under the treaty.  However, as of November 2012, there are still 45 state parties with confirmed or suspected remaining landmines with obligations to destroy them under Article 5 of the treaty.[9] Currently three states remain in violation of the treaty – Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine – for failure to complete destruction of their stockpiles within the 4-year deadline.[10]

Cooperation and Assistance: The treaty calls on any state-party "in a position to do so" to assist other states-parties in aiding mine victims, providing demining assistance, and helping with mine destruction. States-parties are expected to be as helpful as possible in making sure all states-parties have access to equipment, material, and scientific and technological information for implementing the treaty without "undue restrictions."

Transparency: Each state-party is to provide the United Nations with a comprehensive report on the numbers, types, and locations of all APLs under its control as well as the status of all programs for destroying APLs. An initial report is required 180 days after the treaty becomes legally binding for each state-party, and thereafter reports are expected annually by April 30.

Compliance: The treaty did not create an implementation or verification body or outline punitive measures for noncompliance. A state-party may question the compliance of another state-party, and a special meeting of states-parties can be convened to address the allegation. States-parties can establish a fact-finding mission to investigate the alleged noncompliance and, if necessary, call on the state-party in question to address the compliance issue.

Amendment and Withdrawal: Treaty amendments can be proposed, and then approved by two-thirds of all states-parties attending a special amendment conference. A state-party may withdraw from the treaty six months after submitting an instrument of withdrawal, though it will not take effect if the country is engaged in armed conflict.

Updated by Alexandra Schmitt


 

ENDNOTES

1. The George W. Bush administration announced February 27, 2004 that the United States would not join the Ottawa Convention. U.S. landmine policy had been under review since the summer of 2001. The Clinton administration had stated that the United States would sign the Ottawa Convention by 2006 if the Pentagon could identify and field suitable alternatives to U.S. anti-personnel landmines and mixed systems, which are comprised of both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle components, by that time.

2. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “States Not Party,” http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Universal/MBT/States-Not-Party.

3. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Treaty Basics,” http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Treaty/MBT/Treaty-Basics.

4. “Landmine Monitor 2012,” International Campaign to Ban Landmines, http://www.the-monitor.org/lm/2012/resources/Landmine_Monitor_2012.pdf.

5. “Landmines: FAQ,” Care, http://www.care.org/newsroom/specialreports/land_mines/facts.asp.

6. Ibid.

7. “Why hasn’t the U.S. signed an international ban on land mines?” Los Angeles Times, April 5, 2012, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/04/mine-treaty-us-ottawa-convention.html

8. For further discussion of U.S. landmines located in the demilitarized zone of the Korean Peninsula, see Los Angeles Times articles “In South Korea, land mines remain a threat,” and “Why hasn’t the U.S. signed an international ban on land mines?

9. “Landmine Monitor 2012,” International Campaign to Ban Landmines, http://www.the-monitor.org/lm/2012/resources/Landmine_Monitor_2012.pdf.

10. Ibid.

The Nuclear Testing Tally

Press Contacts: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

Updated: February 2013

Since the first nuclear test explosion on July 16, 1945, at least eight nations have detonated 2,053 nuclear test explosions at dozens of test sites from Lop Nor in China, to the atolls of the Pacific, to Nevada, to Algeria where France conducted its first nuclear device, to western Australia where the U.K. exploded nuclear weapons, the South Atlantic, to Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan, across Russia, and elsewhere.

Most of the test sites are in the lands of indigenous peoples and far from the capitals of the testing governments. A large number of the early tests-- 528 -- were detonated in the atmosphere, which spread radioactive materials through the atmosphere. Many underground nuclear blasts have also vented radioactive material into the atmosphere and left radioactive contamination in the soil.

Through nuclear test explosions, the testing nations have been able to proof-test new warhead designs and create increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons. In 1996, negotiations on a global Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) were concluded and the treaty was opened for signature on September 24, 1996. The CTBT, which prohibits "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion" and established a international test monitoring and verification system, has not yet entered into force.

 

United States (1,030)
First tested: July 16, 1945.
Last tested: Sept. 23, 1992.
Signed CTBT: Sept. 24, 1996.

USSR/Russia (715 tests)
First tested: Aug. 29, 1949.
Last tested: Oct. 24, 1990.
Deposited CTBT Ratification: June 30, 2000..

United Kingdom (45 tests)
First tested: Oct. 3, 1952.
Last tested: Nov. 26, 1991.
Signed CTBT: Sept. 24, 1996.
Deposited CTBT Ratification:
Apr. 6, 1998.

France (210 tests)
First tested: Feb. 13, 1960.
Last tested: Jan. 27, 1996.
Signed CTBT: Sept. 24, 1996.
Deposited CTBT Ratification:
Apr. 6, 1998.

China (45 tests)
First tested: Oct. 16, 1964.
Last tested: July 29, 1996.
Signed CTBT: Sept. 24, 1996.

India (3 tests1)
First tested: May 18, 1974.
Last tested: May 13, 1998.
Not a CTBT signatory.

Pakistan (2 tests1)
First tested: May 28, 1998.
Last tested: May 30, 1998.
Not a CTBT signatory.

North Korea (3 tests)
First tested: Oct. 9, 2006.
Last tested: Feb 12, 2013.
Not a CTBT signatory.

Year United States USSR/ Russia United Kingdom France China India Pakistan North Korea Total
1945 1 1
1946 2 2
1947 0 0
1948 3 3
1949 0 1 1
1950 0 0 0
1951 16 2 18
1952 10 0 1 11
1953 11 5 2 18
1954 6 10 0 16
1955 18 6 0 24
1956 18 9 6 33
1957 32 16 7 55
1958 77 34 5 116
1959 0 0 0 0
1960 0 0 0 3 3
1961 10 59 0 2 71
1962 96 79 2 1 178
1963 47 0 0 3 50
1964 45 9 2 3 1 60
1965 38 14 1 4 1 58
1966 48 18 0 7 3 76
1967 42 17 0 3 2 64
1968 56 17 0 5 1 79
1969 46 19 0 0 2 67
1970 39 16 0 8 1 64
1971 24 23 0 5 1 53
1972 27 24 0 4 2 57
1973 24 17 0 6 1 48
1974 22 21 1 9 1 1 55
1975 22 19 0 2 1 0 44
1976 20 21 1 5 4 0 51
1977 20 24 0 9 1 0 54
1978 19 31 2 11 3 0 66
1979 15 31 1 10 1 0 58
1980 14 24 3 12 1 0 54
1981 16 21 1 12 0 0 50
1982 18 19 1 10 1 0 49
1983 18 25 1 9 2 0 55
1984 18 27 2 8 2 0 57
1985 17 10 1 8 0 0 36
1986 14 0 1 8 0 0 23
1987 14 23 1 8 1 0 47
1988 15 16 0 8 1 0 40
1989 11 7 1 9 0 0 28
1990 8 1 1 6 2 0 18
1991 7 0 1 6 0 0 14
1992 6 0 0 0 2 0 8
1993 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
1994 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
1995 0 0 0 5 2 0 7
1996 0 0 0 1 2 0 3
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1998 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 4
1999-2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2007-2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 02 0
2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2012 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Total 1,030 715 45 210 45 3 2 3 2,053
NOTE

1. In accordance with the definition of a nuclear test contained in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and to allow accurate comparison with other countries' figures, India's three simultaneous nuclear explosions on May 11 are counted as only one nuclear test, as are the two explosions on May 13. Likewise, Pakistan's five simultaneous explosions on May 28 are counted as a single test.

2. In the article "Radionuclide Evidence for Low-Yield Nuclear Testing in North Korea in April/May 2010," Lars-Erik De Geer argued that the xexon and barium isotope concentrations in air currents from North Korea in April and May of 2010 were consistent with two low-yield nuclear tests. However, this theory was largely debunked when the Earth Institute at Columbia University measured seismology records and determined that no well-coupled explosion larger than one ton could have occured during that timeframe. According to the report, such a low yield explosion would have been incapable of advancing the North Korean's technical understanding of a nuclear weapon explosion.

Proposed U.S. Arms Export Agreements From January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2012

Press Contacts: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107; Tom Collina, Research Director, (202) 463-8270 x104

Updated: January 2013

The value of proposed conventional arms sales agreements doubled from 2011 to 2012.  The increase in proposed arms sales was largely due to Qatar's request for $23.6 billion in arms, which was nearly equal to the total amount of arms sales requested in 2011.  The $53 billion in agreements requested in 2012 was $20 billion above the ten-year average from 2002 to 2011 ($33.5 billion).

The United States conducts government-to-government transfers through the Defense Department’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Not all notified sales result in final transactions. Under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, Congress must be notified of proposed sales of “major defense equipment,” as defined on the U.S. Munitions List, that equals or exceeds $14 million; defense articles and services that are not defined as “major defense equipment” which total $50 million or more; and construction or design services amounting to or surpassing $200 million.[1] However, if the proposed sale involves NATO members, Australia, Israel, Japan, South Korea, or New Zealand, the notification thresholds are $25 million for major defense equipment, $100 million for other defense articles and services, and $300 million for construction or design services.[2] Once notified, Congress has 30 calendar days (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) to block a sale by passing a joint resolution of disapproval, though it has never stopped a sale once formally notified.

Qatar requested the most expensive package of arms sales agreements in 2012, with $23.6 billion requested--a nearly $23 billion increase from 2011.  Doha requested two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Fire Units for $6.5 billion and 11 Patriot Configuration-3 Modernized Fire Units for $9.9 billion, totaling over $16 billion for anti-ballistic missile defense systems alone. In addition, Qatar requested over $6 billion in attack helicopters from Washington in 2013, including Black Hawks, MH-60Rs and MH-60Ss, and Apaches.

The Republic of Korea also requested $8.8 billion in arms from the United States in 2012. $7.2 billion of the total consisted of requests for various attack helicopters, such as $1.0 billion for the MH-60R Seahawk, $2.6 billion for the AH-1Z Cobra, and $3.6 billion for the AH-64D Apache. In addition, Seoul also requested four RQ-4 Block 30 (I) unmanned aerial vehicles and several UGM-84L Harpoon missiles.

For the first time cince 2007, the Middle East has been supplanted by another region, this time Asia-Pacific, as the region that requested the highest value of conventional arms from the U.S. in 2012. Three of the top five countries that sought the highest values of U.S. arms exports were located in the Asia-Pacific region (Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea). The Obama administration's "pivot to Asia" is clearly illustrated by U.S. conventional arms sales in 2012 and is a pattern that is likely to continue in the near future as countries in the region attempt to bolster their conventional forces in the face of China's growing influence in the Asia-Pacific region.


Below are the five countries that sought the highest values in U.S. arms exports in 2012 and some of their specific requests.

Country

Total Value

Weapons/Services

Qatar

$23.6 billion

  • 12 UH-60M Blackhawk Utility Helicopters
  • 10 MH-60R Seahawk Multi-Mission Helicopters
  • 24 AH-64D Apache Block III Longbow
    Attack Helicopters
  • 700 AGM-114K3A or AGM-114R3 Hellfire
    tactical missiles
  • 2 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Fire Units
  • 11 Patriot Configuration-3 Modernized Fire Units
  • 7 M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
    (HIMARS) Launchers with various rockets

Republic of Korea

$8.8 billion

  • 8 MH-60R Seahawk Multi-Mission Helicopters
  • 18 UGM-84L Harpoon Block II All-Up-Round Missiles
  • 367 CBU-105D/B Wind Corrected Munition Dispenser (WCMD) Sensor Fuzed Weapons
  • 36 AH-64D Apache Longbow Block III Attack Helicopters
  • 36 AH-1Z Cobra Attack Helicopters
  • 4 RQ-4 Block 30 (I) Global Hawk Remotely
    Piloted Aircraft

Saudi Arabia

$8.2 billion

  • 10 Link-16 capable data link systems and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) suites
  • 20 C-130J-30 Aircraft and 5 KC-130J Air Refueling Aircraft
  • Spare parts in support of M1A2 Abrams Tanks, M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, equipment, support vehicles and other related logistics support
  • Technical services to recertify the functional shelf life of up to 300 Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) (MIM-104D) Guidance Enhanced Missiles
  • Follow-on support and services for the Royal Saudi Air Force

Australia

$1.7 billion

  • 12 EA-18G Modification Kits to convert F/A-18F aircrafts to the G configuration

Japan

$1.6 billion

  • Provide regeneration, overhaul, modifications and support for 6 KC-130R aircraft and associated engines
  • 4 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) aircraft with an option to purchase an additional 38 F-35 CTOL aircraft
  • Upgrade of previously provided Aegis Combat Systems

Below are all 26 countries that sought U.S. arms exports in 2012 according to FMS notifications and the total value of their identified requests (in billions of U.S. dollars):

Country

Total Value
($ Billions)

Qatar

23.56

Korea

8.81

Saudi Arabia

8.24

Australia

1.70

Japan

1.59

Indonesia

1.51

UAE

1.17

Morocco

1.12

Poland

.647

Israel

.647

Iraq

.613

Singapore

.435

Mexico

.412

Kuwait

.409

United Kingdom

.300

Norway

.300

Oman

.299

Finland

.264

Thailand

.253

Brazil

.233

Bangladesh

.180

Turkey

.140

Belgium

.88

Columbia

.87

Lebanon

.63

Netherlands

.60

Below are the total values of all notified requests each year from 1997 to 2012 in billions of U.S. dollars as compiled each year, in current dollars (unadjusted for inflation):

Year

Total Value
($ Billions, current dollars)

2012 53

2011

25

2010

103

2009

39

2008

75

2007

39

2006

37

2005

12

2004

12

2003

7

2002

16

2001

19

2000

12

1999

21

1998

12

1997

11

 

-Written by Marcus Taylor



 

ENDNOTES
1. The Department of State is also required to report to Congress any commercial sales it approves of “major defense equipment” that amount to $14 million or more, defense articles and services that equal or exceed $50 million, and any items defined as “significant military equipment.” As in the case of FMS sales, Congress can block the sale with a joint resolution of disapproval within 30 calendar days of notification (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea). There are no official compilations of commercial agreement data comparable to the FMS notifications and what exists is often incomplete and less precise than data on government-to-government transactions (Grimmett, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001-2009, Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, September 10, 2010, p. 23). The annual Section 655 report, prepared by the State and Defense Departments for Congress, details commercial licenses approved, but states have four years to act under the licenses. The State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls has final responsibility for license applications for commercial defense trade exports and all issues related to defense trade compliance, enforcement, and reporting.

2. Congress approved the higher notification thresholds for NATO members, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand in legislation passed in September 2002. South Korea was added to this list in 2008, and Israel was added in 2010.

Sources: Congressional Research Service, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and Department of State.

The Missile Technology Control Regime at a Glance

Press Contacts: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107; Kelsey Davenport, Nonproliferation Analyst, (202) 463-8270 x102

Updated: December 2012

The Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines and Annex

Established in April 1987, the voluntary Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) aims to limit the spread of ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems that could be used for chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks. The regime urges its 34 members,1 which include most of the world's key missile manufacturers, to restrict their exports of missiles and related technologies capable of carrying a 500-kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers or delivering any type of weapon of mass destruction.2

Since its inception, the MTCR has been credited with slowing or stopping several missile programs by making it difficult for prospective buyers to get what they want or stigmatizing certain activities and programs. Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq abandoned their joint Condor II ballistic missile program. Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan also shelved or eliminated missile or space launch vehicle programs. Some Eastern European countries, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, destroyed their ballistic missiles, in part, to better their chances of joining MTCR.3 The regime has further hampered Libyan and Syrian missile efforts.

Yet, the regime has its limitations. Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan continue to advance their missile programs. All four countries, with varying degrees of foreign assistance, have deployed medium-range ballistic missiles that can travel more than 1,000 kilometers and are exploring missiles with much greater ranges. These countries, which are not MTCR members, are also becoming sellers rather than simply buyers on the global arms market. North Korea, for example, is viewed as the primary source of ballistic missile proliferation in the world today. Iran has supplied missile production items to Syria.

How the MTCR Works

Each MTCR member is supposed to establish national export control policies for ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, space launch vehicles, drones, remotely piloted vehicles, sounding rockets, and underlying components and technologies that appear on the regime's Material and Technology Annex. Members can add items to or subtract them from the annex through consensus decisions.

The annex is divided into two separate groupings of items, Category I and Category II. Category I includes complete missiles and rockets, major sub-systems, and production facilities. Specialized materials, technologies, propellants, and sub-components for missiles and rockets comprise Category II.

Potential exports of Category I and II items are to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Approval for Category I exports is supposed to be rare. The regime's guidelines, which set out criteria for weighing possible exports, instruct members that "there will be a strong presumption to deny" Category I transfers. No exports of production facilities are to be authorized. MTCR restrictions for Category II exports are less severe, largely because many items in the category also have civilian uses. Members, however, are still asked to exercise caution in making such deals. No member can veto another's exports.

The MTCR identifies five factors that members should take into account when evaluating a possible export of controlled items:

  • Whether the intended recipient is pursuing or has ambitions for acquiring weapons of mass destruction;
  • The purposes and capabilities of the intended recipient's missile and space programs;
  • The potential contribution the proposed transfer could make to the intended recipient's development of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction;
  • The credibility of the intended recipient's stated purpose for the purchase; and
  • Whether the potential transfer conflicts with any multilateral treaty.

MTCR members are asked to obtain an assurance from the intended recipient that it will only use the export for the purpose claimed when requesting the deal. Members are also to secure a pledge from the intended recipient that it will not transfer the requested item or any replicas or derivatives to a third party without permission.

Because the regime is voluntary and the decision to export is the sole responsibility of each member, the MTCR has no penalties for transfers of controlled items. However, U.S. law mandates that Washington sanction entities-individuals, companies, or governments (whether they are MTCR members or not)-exporting MTCR-controlled items to certain countries identified as proliferators or potential threats to U.S. security. Sanctions may also be levied if the United States judges the transfer contrary to the MTCR. Typically, Washington prohibits the charged entity from signing contracts, receiving aid, or buying arms from the U.S. government for a period of two years. Sometimes the penalties can be imposed for longer lengths of time or extended to commercial imports and exports as well.

Outside the MTCR

Several countries have pledged to abide by the MTCR without joining it. Israel, Romania, and the Slovak Republic have all committed to maintaining export controls consistent with the regime.

After several years of U.S. curtail its sale of missiles and missile technologies, China announced in November 2000 that it would not help other countries build ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Beijing, which was a key contributor to Pakistan's missile development, and has in the past provided sensetive technology to countries like North Korea and Iran, also pledged that it would issue a comprehensive list of controlled items requiring government approval before export. That list, however, was not published until August 2002. In 2004, China applied for MTCR membership, and, at the time, voluntarily pledged to follow the regime's export control guidelines. Although China no longer sells complete missile systems and has tightened its export controls, its membership was rejected due to concerns that Chinese entities continued to provide sensitive technologies to countries developing ballistic missiles, such as North Korea.

In 2008 India voluntarily committed to following the MTCR export control guidelines, since that time the United States has been working to secure India's membership in the regime. India's announcment was made shortly before the Nuclear Suppliers Group granted an exemption to India. New Dehli continues to develop its own ballistic missile program.

MTCR members spearheaded a voluntary November 2002 initiative, the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (formerly known as the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation), calling on all countries to show greater restraint in their own development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and to reduce their existing missile arsenals if possible. The aim of the initiative is to establish a norm against missiles that could be armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads. As part of the initiative, participating countries are to annually exchange information on their ballistic missile and space launch vehicle programs, as well as provide advance notice of any launches of ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles. The Hague Code of Conduct has 134 member states, including all MTCR members except Brazil. Brazil has expressed concerns about how the initiative might affect its space program.

Notes:

1. MTCR members, followed by the year they joined the regime, are: Argentina (1993), Australia (1990), Austria (1991), Belgium (1990), Brazil (1995), Bulgaria (2004), Canada (1987), the Czech Republic (1998), Denmark (1990), Finland (1991), France (1987), Germany (1987), Greece (1992), Hungary (1993), Iceland (1993), Ireland (1992), Italy (1987), Japan (1987), Luxembourg (1990), the Netherlands (1990), New Zealand (1991), Norway (1990), Poland (1998), Portugal (1992), Russia (1995), South Africa (1995), South Korea (2001) Spain (1990), Sweden (1991), Switzerland (1992), Turkey (1997), Ukraine (1998), the United Kingdom (1987), and the United States (1987).

2. Originally, the MTCR was limited to stopping the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles, which was defined as a missile able to travel at least 300 kilometers with a 500-kilogram payload. Five hundred kilograms was considered the minimum weight of a first generation nuclear warhead, while 300 kilometers was believed to be the minimum distance needed to carry out a strategic strike. Members agreed in the summer of 1992 to expand the regime's objective to also apply to missiles and related technologies designed for chemical and biological weapons. That change took effect in January 1993. The move effectively tasked members with a making a more difficult and subjective assessment about an importer's intentions, as opposed to denying a specific capability (a missile able to deliver a 500-kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers), because many more missiles and unmanned delivery vehicles could be adapted to deliver lighter chemical and biological weapons payloads.

3. Prospective MTCR members must win consensus approval from existing members. U.S. policy is that new members that are not recognized nuclear-weapon states must eliminate or forgo ballistic missiles able to deliver a 500-kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers. The United States, however, made an exception in 1998 for Ukraine, permitting it to retain Scud missiles. Three years later, Washington also agreed to let South Korea develop missiles with ranges up to 300 kilometers to secure its membership in the MTCR. Seoul previously agreed in 1979 to limit its missile development to those with ranges less than 180 kilometers. South Korea was granted another extension in October 2012. Seoul and Washington reached an agreement allowing South Korea to extend the range of its ballistic missiles to 800 kilometers with a 500 kilogram payload. This extension will allow Seoul to target all of North Korea from any part of South Korea.

Hotline Agreements

Press Contact: Kelsey Davenport,
Nonproliferation Analyst, (202) 463-8270 x102


Updated: November 2012

Hotline Agreements

A hotline is a quick communication link between heads of states, which is designed to reduce the danger of an accident, miscalculation or a surprise attack, and especially an incident that might trigger a nuclear war.

1963 Memorandum of Understanding
On June 20, 1963, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the "Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link," also known as the hotline agreement, which was designed to help speed up communications between the two governments and prevent the possibility of accidental nuclear war. It is no coincidence that the agreement came just a few months after the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis, when the United States and the Soviet Union came to the brink of nuclear conflict. The new agreement was designed to forestall such a crisis in the future.

The hotline agreement held each government responsible for the arrangements for the communications link on their territories respectively. The hotline would comprise of a full-time duplex wire telegraph circuit with two terminal points with teletype equipment routed between Washington and Moscow via London, Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Helsinki and a full-time duplex radiotelegraph routed through Stockholm-Helsinki-Moscow. In case the wire circuit was interrupted, messages would be transmitted via radio circuit.[1]

It is a misleading belief that the hotline was a red telephone that sat in the Oval Office of the White house. The first generation of the hotline had no voice element and actually resided in the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon. “It was decided that if the leaders spoke over the telephone they would have to rely too heavily on rapid translation. Printed messages would provide greater clarity and give either party time to reflect before replying.”[2] The Washington–London link was originally carried over the TAT-1, the first submarine transatlantic telephone cable. Such a design prevented spontaneous verbal communications, which could lead to misunderstanding and misperceptions.

A secondary radio line was routed between Washington, D.C. and Moscow via Tangier. American teletype machines had been installed in the Kremlin to receive messages from Washington; Soviet teletypes were installed in the Pentagon. Both nations also exchanged encoding devices in order to decipher the messages. The transmission of a message from one nation to another would take just a few minutes. The messages then were translated.

First Use of the Hotline

The hotline significantly reduced the time required for direct communication between the heads of the two governments from hours to minutes. In August 1963, the system was ready to be tested. On August 30, 1963 the United States sent its first message to the Soviet Union over the hotline: "The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog's back 1234567890."

The message used every letter and number key on the teletype machine in order to see that each was in working order. The return message from Moscow was in Russian, but it indicated that all of the keys on the Soviet teletype were also functioning.[3]

The hotline was first used by the United States and Russia in 1967 during the Six Day War between Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria to clarify the intentions of fleet movements in the Mediterranean that could have been interpreted as hostile. Thereby, the Soviet Union and the United States intended to reassure each other that they did not wish to be militarily involved in the crisis and did not make efforts to bring about a ceasefire. Throughout the duration of the Six Days War, the two sides used the hotline almost two dozen times for a variety of purposes. Richard Nixon also used it during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and again during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. During the Reagan Administration, the hotline was used several more times.[4] However, an official listing of the instances when the states used the hotline never has been released to the public.

Modern Version of U.S.–Russian Nuclear Hotline
In the 1970s, the hotline was improved with better technologies. In 1971, the two sides signed the hotline modernization agreement. Under this agreement, the United States was to provide one circuit via the Intelsat system, and the Soviet Union a circuit via its Molniya system. The 1963 radio circuit was terminated, and the wire telegraph was retained as a back-up.[5]

The hotline had undergone several more upgrades to include facsimile transmission and was renamed as the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) in 1987. The Center used both U.S. and Soviet satellites to transmit facsimile data. Later that year, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) was signed making the NRRC system the official channel for all data exchanges and notifications required under the treaty. Use of the NRRC network was expanded even further with the signing of START I in 1991, and its entry into force in 1994. [6]

"Although used primarily for the exchange of notifications under existing bilateral and multilateral treaties, the NRRC has periodically proved its use in other areas as well. In January 1991, goodwill notifications were used to exchange information on the re-entry of the Salyut 7 space station. Later that same year the NRRCs served as a means of emergency communications during a major fire in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow."[7] The hotline between Moscow and Washington still exists, despite improved relations and the end of the Cold War. Over the years, it has been upgraded keeping apace with the technological development. The former C.I.A. director and defense secretary, Robert Gates, has said that the hotline will remain an important tool for "as long as these two sides have submarines roaming the oceans and missiles pointed at each other." [8]

Other Bilateral Hotline Agreements

Once the hotline between Washington and Moscow proved to be useful, other states established hotlines. In 1966, France signed an accord establishing a direct communications link between Paris and Moscow. Under the 1967 British-Soviet agreement, a direct communications line was set up between Moscow and London.

Russia–China Nuclear Notline
In 1998, Beijing established head-of-state hotlines with Russia and the United States. In April 1996, during Russian President Yeltsin’s third summit meeting in Beijing, the two sides agreed to maintain regular dialogues at various levels and through multiple channels, including a governmental telephone hotline. On May 3, 1998, a hotline between China and Russia finally began operating. This is the first time Beijing has established a hotline with the head of a foreign state.[9] Ten years later, in March 2008, a hotline between the Chinese and Russian Defense Ministries was established to enhance bilateral cooperation between the two states. The Russian and Chinese were exchanging their views on the international and regional situation as well as other issues of common concern.[10]

U.S.–China Nuclear Hotline
In April 1998, China’s minister of Foreign Affairs Tang Jiaxuan and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright signed an agreement to establish a hotline between the governments of the two countries. The hotline was activated during President Clinton’s visit to China in June 1998.[11]

India–Pakistan Nuclear Hotline
In 2004 India and Pakistan agreed to set up a telephone hotline between the most senior officials in their foreign ministries respectively to prevent a nuclear incident. The two states have fought three wars since they both gained independence in 1947, and were dangerously teetering on the brink of nuclear conflict in 2002. In 2004, along with the establishment of the hotline, both states limited command and control structures, and reaffirmed that each side would continue to uphold the moratorium on nuclear tests.[12]
After the 2008 Mumbai attacks from Pakistan had upset the relations between the two states. Three years later in 2011, India and Pakistan set up a “terror hotline”. The hotline warns each party state of possible militant attacks and moves them to restore the trust between each other.

South Korea–China Defense Hotline
In 2008, South Korea and China set up telephone hotlines between their navies and air forces to help prevent accidental clashes. However, the hotline has reportedly been used only a handful of times, and never to test procedures in a simulated crisis. South Korea and China agreed on July 31, 2012 to establish an additional high-level hotline between their defense chiefs in an effort to strengthen military cooperation, officials in Seoul said.[13]

India-China Hotline

In April 2010, the prime ministers of China and India agreed to det up a hotline to better avoid flare-ups over a longstanding border dispute across the Himalayas, and to strengthen their diplomatic ties. "The agreement to establish a hotline is an important confidence-building measure and it opens up a direct channel of communication between the two leaders," India's foreign secretary, Nirupama Rao, told reporters ar a press conference in Beijing.[14]

Vietnam-China Hotline
A hotline between the Vietnamese and the Chinese Mnistries of Foreign Affairs was established in March 2012. In their talk on the line, the ministers affirmed their will to strengthen the Vietnam-China comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership. [15]

Research Assistance by Daria Medvedeva

Endnotes:

1. The text of the memorandum: http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4785.htm

2. Blacker C.D., Duffy G. (Stanford Arms Control Group). “International arms control”, Standford University Press. 1984.

3. “August 30, 1963: The U.S.-Soviet "hotline" goes into operation”, This day in History, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/the-us-soviet-hot-line-goes-into-operation

4. The Learning Network, “Aug. 30, 1963 | Communications ‘Hotline’ Connects Soviet and U.S. Heads of State”, The New York Times, Aug.30, 2011 http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/aug-30-1963-communications-hot-line-connects-soviet-and-u-s-heads-of-state/

5. Goldblat J. “Agreements for Arms Control: A Critical Survey”. SIPRI. Taylor and Francis Ltd, 1982.  p.73

6.Krass Allan S. The United States and Arms Control. The Challenge of Leadership. Westport, Connecticut. Praeger 1997  p.77

7. Pakistan and India: Can NRRCs Help Strengthen Peace? Colonel Rafi uz Zaman Khan. Occasional paper N.49. December 2002. Stimson Center

8. The Learning Network, “Aug. 30, 1963 | Communications ‘Hotline’ Connects Soviet and U.S. Heads of State”, The New York Times, Aug.30, 2011 http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/aug-30-1963-communications-hot-line-connects-soviet-and-u-s-heads-of-state/

9. Liao Xin, “New Relations Between China and Russia,” Beijing Review in English (FBIS-CHI-97-363, December 1997), 7-8. Grigoriy Arslanov, “Russia: Hotline for Russia’s Yeltsin’s Jiang Now Operational,” Moscow ITAR-TASS in English (FBIS-SOV-98-125, 5 May 98). From “Military Confidence-Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait" by Kenneth W.Allen. http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/cbmapstraits.pdf

10. Hogg Ch. Army phone links China and Russia. BBC News, Beijing. December 29,  2008 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7803028.stm

11. Liao Xin, “New Relations Between China and Russia,” Beijing Review in English (FBIS-CHI-97-363, December 1997), 7-8. Grigoriy Arslanov, “Russia: Hotline for Russia’s Yeltsin’s Jiang Now Operational,” Moscow ITAR-TASS in English (FBIS-SOV-98-125, 5 May 98). From “Military Confidence-Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait" by Kenneth W.Allen. http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/cbmapstraits.pdf

12. India and Pakistan set up hotline. BBC News. 20 June, 2004 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3822751.stm

13. Choi He-suk. Seoul, Beijing to set up defense hotline. The Korea Herald. http://www.asianewsnet.net/home/news.php?sec=1&id=34296

14. India, China set up hotline to ease border dispute. By Mian Ridge. The Christian Science Monitor. April 8, 2010 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2010/0408/India-China-set-up-hotline-to-ease-border-dispute

15. The voice of Vietnam. Hotline set up between Chinese, Vietnamese foreign ministries. Feb. 3, 2012 http://english.vov.vn/Home/Hotline-set-up-between-Chinese-Vietnamese-foreign-ministries/20123/135342.vov

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cluster Munitions at a Glance

Press Contact: Daryl Kimball,
Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107


Updated: November 2012

Cluster munitions, also called cluster bombs or CBUs, are gravity bombs, artillery shells, and rockets that fragment into small bomblets or grenades. Some cluster munitions disperse only two bomblets while others can spread up to hundreds of submunitions over a large area. These weapons are designed for use against massed formations of troops and armor or broad targets, such as airfields. Cluster submunitions, however, sometimes fail to explode on impact and can kill or maim civilians who later come into contact with them. These unexploded submunitions may remain dangerous for decades. According to Cluster Munition Monitor 2010, at least 16,816 cluster munition casualties have been confirmed through the end of 2009. About 14,700 came from unexploded submunitions, and about 2,000 from strikes. Estimated totals, however, are considered much higher, and according to the Monitor, “are likely a better indicator of the true numbers.” Estimates for a global total range from 58,000 to 85,000. Almost all reported cluster munition casualties have been civilians, in large part because of the unwillingness of militaries to provide information.[1]

Cluster munitions have been used during armed conflict in 36 countries and four disputed territories since the end of World War II. Almost every part of the world has experienced cluster munition use at some point over the past 70 years, including Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. Although cluster munitions first saw use in World War II and more than 50 countries have since acquired stockpiles of such arms, efforts to regulate or ban the use of cluster munitions gained greater attention and momentum after the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, a Shiite organization that the United States identifies as a terrorist group. Israel’s extensive cluster munitions use in the last 72 hours of that conflict resulted in an estimated one million unexploded bomblets scattered across southern Lebanon, arousing some strong condemnation. Jan Egeland, then-UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, blasted Israel’s use of cluster munitions as “shocking and completely immoral.”

The CCW Process

The CCW regulates certain indiscriminate or inhumane conventional weapons, such as landmines, incendiary weapons, and blinding lasers. In 2003, CCW states-parties approved a new protocol on so-called explosive remnants of war—abandoned or unexploded artillery shells, rockets, grenades, landmines, and other ordnance. Each CCW state-party that agrees to be bound by that new protocol is obligated to clean up such battlefield remnants after hostilities end. While the protocol addresses unexploded cluster submunitions, it does not restrict their initial use.
At a November 2006 CCW Review Conference, a group of states, including Austria, the Holy See, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden, sought CCW negotiation of a new protocol on cluster munitions. The CCW operates by consensus and some other countries, most notably Russia and the United States, opposed such talks. The states-parties, however, agreed to convene a June 2007 group of governmental experts meeting to study the matter.

On November 25, 2011, after four years of intensive negotiations, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) failed to reach an agreement on a new protocol to regulate cluster munitions. The most significant opposition to the protocol came from a number of nonproducing countries that are signatories to the most comprehensive international treaty on cluster bombs―the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). The International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN High Commission for Human Rights, and many international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also criticized the text at the review conference. The CCM prohibits a much wider array of cluster munitions than the CCW. Major producers of cluster munitions have not signed the CCM, but are party to the CCW.[2]

Convention on Cluster Munitions

Frustrated with the slow-moving CCW approach, Norway at the November 2006 conference announced an alternative effort to negotiate a treaty on cluster munitions. The inaugural meeting of that effort convened February 2007 in Oslo. Of the 49 governments attending the conference, 46 ultimately signed the “Oslo Declaration” to “conclude, by 2008, a legally binding instrument that will…prohibit the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.”

Much of the debate among participating governments over the future treaty has centered on two issues. The first is whether future use restrictions should take effect immediately or, as Germany has argued, be phased in to allow time for the development of alternative weapons. The second is whether the treaty should outlaw all cluster munitions or permit some exemptions for certain types or for their use in certain circumstances. Sweden has called for a treaty balancing “legitimate humanitarian and military interests,” while the United Kingdom has sought exemptions for systems equipped with self-destruct or self-deactivation devices that are supposed to render unexploded munitions harmless after a short period of time. Other countries, such as Norway, Ireland, and Mexico, favor a total ban.

The Cluster Munition Coalition is an international civil society campaign working to eradicate cluster munitions, prevent further casualties from these weapons and put an end for all time to the suffering they cause. Its 350 member organizations in some 100 countries include large international NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch as well as smaller nationally based organizations such as the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society and the Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines.[3]
On May 30, 2008 the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions adopted a comprehensive new treaty banning cluster munitions. The 107 states adopted the treaty. The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) is a legally binding international treaty that prohibits the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of cluster munitions and requires clearance of remnants and destruction of stocks. It requires states to provide assistance to survivors and their communities and builds on existing international human rights and humanitarian law. The treaty requires states to destroy existing stockpiles within eight years and to clear contaminated land within 10 years. The obligations relating to victim assistance are groundbreaking; they demand the full realization of the rights of people affected by cluster munitions and require states to implement effective victim assistance measures.[4]

The Convention on Cluster Munitions was signed by 94 countries at the Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008, and entered into force on August 1, 2010, after 30 states ratified it by February 16, 2010. In November 2010, the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (1MSP) took place in Vientiane, Lao PDR. For the first time States Parties to the treaty, UN agencies, international organizations, civil society, and cluster bomb survivors got together to share progress and plans for implementation of the Convention, and drew up a blueprint to translate the treaty into action.[5] After holding their First Meeting of States Parties in Lao PDR in November 2010, States Parties convened in Lebanon, another highly contaminated country, for the convention’s Second Meeting of States Parties on September 12–16, 2011. At the meeting, States Parties adopted the Beirut Progress Report, charting implementation of the Vientiane Action Plan, which guides the work of the convention through to its First Review Conference in 2015.

Status of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions

A total of 74 signatories had ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions as of 11 October 2012. States Parties include former producers and users of cluster munitions such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (UK). 42 countries that have used, produced, exported, or stockpiled cluster munitions have joined the convention, thereby committing to never engage in those activities again. Since the convention entered into force on August 1, 2010, becoming binding international law, states can no longer sign, but must instead accede. Three countries have acceded, all during 2011: Grenada, Swaziland, and Trinidad and Tobago.

A total of 12 signatories have ratified the convention since August 2011, including countries where cluster munitions have been used (Afghanistan and Mauritania), former cluster munition producers (Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland), and countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions (Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Czech Republic, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Mauritania, Sweden, and Switzerland), as well as Cameroon, Dominican Republic, and Togo.

Unilateral restrictions on use

The US confirmed in November 2011 that its policy on cluster munitions is still guided by a June 2008 US Department of Defense directive requiring that any US use of cluster munitions before 2018 that results in a 1 percent or higher unexploded ordnance (UXO) rate—which includes all but a tiny fraction of the US arsenal—must be approved by a “Combatant Commander,” a very high-ranking military official. After 2018, the US will no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than 1 percent UXO.

Several states that have not joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions have imposed restrictions on the possible future use of cluster munitions. Romania has said it restricts the use of cluster munitions to use exclusively on its own territory. Poland has said it would use cluster munitions for defensive purposes only, and does not intend to use them outside its own territory. Estonia, Finland, and Slovakia have made similar declarations. During the CCW negotiations on cluster munitions, several states that have not signed or ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions publicly stated that they were prepared to accept a ban on the use of cluster munitions produced before 1980 as part of the proposed CCW protocol, including Russia, China, India, and South Korea. The CMC urges that as an interim measure toward joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions, these states should to institute the commitment made at CCW as national policy.[6]

U.S. Cluster Munitions Policy

The United States is a producer and exporter of cluster bombs. It stockpiles cluster munitions containing between 700 million and one billion submunitions.[7] In 2001, the United States adopted a policy that all cluster munitions produced domestically after late 2004 must have submunitions with failure rates of less than one percent. As with all U.S. arms exports, transfers of cluster munitions are governed by conditions restricting their re-transfer and use by importers. One such agreement applies to U.S. cluster munitions shipped to Israel. Although secret, the agreement is generally understood to prohibit the use of cluster munitions in populated areas and against targets that are not clearly military. Following the 2006 conflict in Lebanon, the Department of State’s Office of Defense Trade Controls opened an investigation into whether Israel had violated the agreement. State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack said that the preliminary report, delivered to the president and Congress in January 2007, found that “there may likely could have been some violations.” Should the United States sanction Israel for misusing cluster munitions it would not be the first time. The Ronald Reagan administration suspended cluster munitions sales to Israel between 1982 and 1988 following Israel’s widespread use of such arms during an earlier invasion of Lebanon.

The United States for some time had opposed negotiations on cluster munitions. At the November 2006 CCW Review Conference, Washington insisted that governments focus on implementing existing protocols and “not on negotiating new rules on cluster munitions.” But at the June 2007 CCW experts meeting the United States did an about face and said it would be willing to negotiate on cluster munitions. Ronald Bettauer, head of the U.S. delegation, attributed the reversal “to the importance of this issue, concerns raised by other countries, and our own concerns about the humanitarian implications of these weapons.” Department of State Legal Adviser Harold Koh stated November 9, 2009, that the United States has determined that it’s “national security interests cannot be fully ensured consistent with the terms” of the CCM. However, the United States has agreed to address the humanitarian aspects of cluster munitions use in the CCW. Koh stated that “the United States remains committed to negotiate a legally binding Protocol on Cluster Munitions in the CCW.”

In a November 25, 2012 statement, the United States said that it would continue to implement the DOD policy on cluster munitions issued June 19, 2008. This policy recognizes the need to minimize harm to civilians and infrastructure but also reaffirms the contention that “cluster munitions are legitimate weapons with clear military utility.” The central directive in the Pentagon’s new policy is the unwaivable requirement that cluster munitions used after 2018 must leave less than one percent of unexploded submunitions on the battlefield. Prior to 2018, U.S. use of cluster munitions with a greater than one percent-unexploded ordnance rate must be approved by Combatant Commanders. This policy is believed to permit the development of a new generation of cluster munitions less dangerous to civilians.[8]

Regional meetings against cluster bombs

On May 30, 2012, a meeting to further the global fight against cluster bombs held in Accra. 34 African countries adopted an action plan with the ultimate aim of a cluster munition-free Africa. The Accra Universalization Action Plan lays out practical steps states should take to promote and achieve continent-wide membership of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, which comprehensively prohibits the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of these weapons. The document reaffirms the partnership between states, the UN, and civil society to achieve the goals of the treaty and ensure it is fully implemented at the national level.[9]

Research Assistance by Daria Medvedeva


Endnotes:

1. Meeting the Challenge Protecting Civilians through the Convention on Cluster Munitions. November 2010. A report by Human Rights Watch. P.69

2. Farrah Zughni. Cluster Munitions Protocol Fails. ACT Dec. 2011

3. Cluster Munition Coalition. http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/the-coalition/members/

4. CMC Briefing Paper on the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Cluster Munition Coalition http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/cmc-briefing-paper-on-ccm.pdf

5. First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Cluster Munition Coalition http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/1msp/

6. Cluster Munition Monitor 2012  September 2012 by Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor  http://www.the-monitor.org/cmm/2012/pdf/Cluster_Munition_Monitor_2012.pdf

7. Landmine and cluster munition monitor. http://the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=2009&pqs_type=cm&pqs_report=usa&pqs_section=

8. Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress. Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22907.pdf p.4-5

9. Africa unites against cluster bombs. Cluster Munition Coalition http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news/?id=3679

 

 

 

Proposed U.S. Arms Export Agreements From January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011

Press Contacts: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107; Tom Collina, Research Director, (202) 463-8270 x104

Updated: October 2012

After a record high of an estimated $102.5 billion in proposed conventional arms sales agreements in 2010, government-to-government arms sales agreements fell to $25 billion in 2011.  The spike in the value of U.S. arms control agreements in 2010 was largely due to a proposed $61 billion in arms sales by Saudi Arabia.  The $25 billion in agreements requested in 2011 was $10 billion below the ten-year average from 2001 to 2010 ($35.9 billion), but was nearly identical to the average once the 2010 outlier is taken out ($25.6 billion).

The United States conducts government-to-government transfers through the Defense Department’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Not all notified sales result in final transactions. Under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, Congress must be notified of proposed sales of “major defense equipment,” as defined on the U.S. Munitions List, that equals or exceeds $14 million; defense articles and services that are not defined as “major defense equipment” which total $50 million or more; and construction or design services amounting to or surpassing $200 million.[1] However, if the proposed sale involves NATO members, Australia, Israel, Japan, South Korea, or New Zealand, the notification thresholds are $25 million for major defense equipment, $100 million for other defense articles and services, and $300 million for construction or design services.[2] Once notified, Congress has 30 calendar days (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) to block a sale by passing a joint resolution of disapproval, though it has never stopped a sale once formally notified.

Taiwan requested the most expensive package of arms sales agreements in 2011, with $5.8 billion requested.  Approximately $5.3 billion of Taiwan's request was for the retrofitting of Taiwan's 145 aging F-16A/B aircraft, along with associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support.  The agreement also includes an extension of the Taiwanese pilot training program at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, as well as provides advanced radar systems and guided bombs.  However, Washington continued to deny Taipei the 66 F-16 C/D aircraft that it has been seeking since 2006.  The proposed sale of F-16C/D to Taiwan has been a contentious issue in U.S.-China relations since its proposal in 2006 and has recently caused domestic political problems for the Obama administration.  For instance, in 2011 Senators John Cornyn (R-TX) and Robert Menendez (R-NJ) attempted to pass an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 that would have forced President Obama to approve the F-16C/D deal with Taiwan.

Australia also requested $3.4 billion in arms from the United States in 2011, a 36% increase from 2010.  The Australian government sought 2 C-17 Globemaster III aircraft, 10 C-27J aircraft, and 110 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles.  Additionally, the proposed agreement included 10-years of Through-Life-Support (TLS) for 24 MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopters.  This is the second year in a row that Australia has been among the five countries that sought the highest value of U.S. arms exports.

The Middle East once again had three out of five of the nations seeking the highest values of U.S. arms exports in 2011 with Iraq ($3.4 billion), Saudi Arabia ($2.3 billion), and the United Arab Emirates ($1.4 billion) each requesting significant amounts of military equipment.  In 2011, Iraq requested the second-highest amount of U.S. arms exports at $3.4 billion.  Iraq's request included a variety of advanced radar and radio systems, 18 F-16IQ aircraft, 44,608 M107 155mm High Explosive Projectiles and 9,328 M485A2 155mm Illumination Projectiles.  Saudi Arabia sought a variety of thermal and night vision equipment, over 100 Light Armored Vehicles, and 450 High Mobility Multipurpose Vehicles of varying models.  The United Arab Emirates requested 218 AIM-9X-2 Sidewinder Block II tactical missiles, support for their existing F-16 fleet, 5 UH-60M Blackhawk VIP Helicopters, and over 750 Hellfire and Javelin missiles.


Below are the five countries that sought the highest values in U.S. arms exports in 2011 and some of their specific requests.

Country

Total Value

Weapons/Services

Taiwan

$5.8 billion

  • Spare Parts for F-16A/B, F-5E/F, C-130H, and Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) Aircraft
  • Retrofitting of F-16A/B Aircraft
  • Pilot Training Program

Iraq

$3.4 billion

  • 6 AN/TPQ-36(V)10 Firefinder Radar Systems
  • 18 AN/TPQ-48 Light Weight Counter-Mortar Radars
  • 750 50-Watt Vehicular Multiband Handheld Radio Systems
  • 900 5-Watt Multiband Handlheld Radio Systems
  • 50 50-Watt Multiband Handheld Base Station Radio Systems
  • 50 20-Watt High Frequency Base Station Radio Systems
  • 100 5-Watt Secure Personal Role Handheld Radio Systems
  • Support for TC-208s, Cessna 172s, AC-208s, T-6As, and King Air 350s
  • 44,608 M107 155mm High Explosive Projectiles
  • 9,328 M485A2 155mm Illumination Projectiles
  • 18 F-16IQ aircraft

Australia

$3.4 billion

  • 10-year Through-Life-Support (TLS) for 24 MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopters
  • 2 C-17 Globemaster III aircraft
  • 110 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles
  • 10 C-27J aircraft

Saudi Arabia

$2.3 billion

  • 200 High-performance In-Line Sniper Sight Thermal Weapon Sights
  • 200 MilCAM Recon III LocatIR Thermal Binoculars
  • 7,000 Dual Beam Aiming Lasers (DBAL A2)
  • 6000 AN/PVS-21 Low Profile Night Vision Goggles (LPNVG)
  • 48 LAV-25mm Light Armored Vehicles (LAV), 17 LAV Personnel Carriers, 5 LAV Recovery Vehicles, 27 LAV Command and Control Vehicles, 28 LAV Anti-Tank (TOW) Vehicles
  • 404 CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapons
  • AN/VRC-92E Export Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS)
  • 36 M777A2 Howitzers, 54 M119A2 Howitzers
  • 24 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (AFATDS)
  • 17,136 Rounds M107 155mm High Explosive (HE) Ammunition
  • 2,304 Rounds M549 155mm Rocket Assisted Projectiles
  • 60 M1165A1 High Mobility Multipurpose Vehicles (HMMWVs)
  • 120 M1151A1 HMMWVs
  • 252 M1152A1 HMMWVs
  • 124 M1152A1-B2 Up-Armored HMMWVs
  • Continuation of Services for Patriot Systems Engineering Services Program (ESP)

United Arab Emirates

$1.4 billion

  • 218 AIM-9X-2 Sidewinder Block II Tactical Missiles
  • Support and Maintenance of F-16 Aircraft
  • 5 UH-60M Blackhawk VIP Helicopters
  • 107 MIDS/LVT Link 16 Terminals
  • 500 AGM-114R3 Hellfire Missiles
  • 4,900 JDAM Kits
  • 260 Javelin Anti-Tank Guided Missiles

Below are all 28 countries that sought U.S. arms exports in 2011 according to FMS notifications and the total value of their identified requests (in billions of U.S. dollars):

Country

Total Value
($ Billions)

Taiwan

5.84

Iraq

3.42

Australia

3.35

Saudi Arabia

2.34

U.A.E.

1.40

Egypt

1.33

India

1.29

Oman

1.25

Indonesia

.750

Qatar

.750

Finland

.585

U.K.

.427

Hungary

.426

Germany

.300

Greece

.260

Poland

.200

France

.180

Argentina

.166

Canada

.125

Malaysia

.124

Peru

.124

Morocco

.117

Turkey

.111

Kuwait

.100

Norway

.095

Pakistan

.062

Ecuador

.060

Bahrain

.053

Below are the total values of all notified requests each yearfrom 1997 to 2011 in billions of U.S. dollars as compiled each year, in current dollars (unadjusted for inflation):

Year

Total Value
($ Billions, current dollars)

2011

25

2010

103

2009

39

2008

75

2007

39

2006

37

2005

12

2004

12

2003

7

2002

16

2001

19

2000

12

1999

21

1998

12

1997

11

 

-Written by Marcus Taylor

 


 

 

ENDNOTES
1. The Department of State is also required to report to Congress any commercial sales it approves of “major defense equipment” that amount to $14 million or more, defense articles and services that equal or exceed $50 million, and any items defined as “significant military equipment.” As in the case of FMS sales, Congress can block the sale with a joint resolution of disapproval within 30 calendar days of notification (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea). There are no official compilations of commercial agreement data comparable to the FMS notifications and what exists is often incomplete and less precise than data on government-to-government transactions (Grimmett, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001-2009, Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, September 10, 2010, p. 23). The annual Section 655 report, prepared by the State and Defense Departments for Congress, details commercial licenses approved, but states have four years to act under the licenses. The State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls has final responsibility for license applications for commercial defense trade exports and all issues related to defense trade compliance, enforcement, and reporting.

2. Congress approved the higher notification thresholds for NATO members, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand in legislation passed in September 2002. South Korea was added to this list in 2008, and Israel was added in 2010.

Sources: Congressional Research Service, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and Department of State.

 

UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran

Press Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Nonproliferation Analyst, 202-463-8270 ex. 102.

August 2012

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has adopted six resolutions as part of international efforts to address Iran’s nuclear program. The central demand by the council is that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment program, as well as undertake several confidence-building measures outlined in a February 2006 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors resolution - including reconsidering the construction of its heavy-water reactor and ratifying the IAEA Additional Protocol. The council initially laid out these calls in a nonbinding Security Council presidential statement adopted in March 2006. (See ACT, April 2006.)

Almost all the resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, making most of the provisions of the resolutions legally binding on Iran, or all UN member states. Four of them include a series of progressively expansive sanctions on Iran and or Iranian persons and entities. The sanctions represent one track in a “dual-track approach” pursued by the permanent five members of the council and Germany (the so-called P5+1), to address Iran’s nuclear program. The other track involves a June 2006 proposal for comprehensive negotiations with Iran which was updated in June 2008. (See History of Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue.)

 

Security Council Resolution 1696

On July 31, 2006, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 under Article 40 of the UN Charter. Fourteen countries voted in favor of the resolution; only Qatar voted against it.

Resolution 1696’s Principal Provisions

In Resolution 1696, the council calls on Tehran to suspend its enrichment program and verify its compliance with the IAEA Board of Governor’s requirements. It encourages Iran to take these steps as confidence building measures.

The resolution expresses the council’s “intention…to adopt appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations” if Iran does not cooperate. However, such measures will not be adopted automatically. The resolution “underlines” that the council must undertake “further decisions…should such additional measures be necessary.”

Resolution 1696’s Sanctions

Resolution 1696 calls on states to follow their existing domestic law and international law to “exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer of any items, materials, good and technology that could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and ballistic missile programmes.”

The resolution warns Iran that its failure to comply by August 31, 2006 could result in punitive Security Council measures, such as economic sanctions.

Resolution 1696’s Monitoring Mechanisms

The resolution calls for a report from the Director General of the IAEA by August 31 on Iran’s compliance with this resolution.

Relevant Excerpts of Resolution 1696

A full copy can be found at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm

Acting under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in order to make mandatory the suspension required by the IAEA,

1. Calls upon Iran without further delay to take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions,

2. Demands, in this context, that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA,

3. Expresses the conviction that such suspension as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors, would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, underlines the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution, encourages Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and stresses that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran,

4. Endorses, in this regard, the proposals of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative, for a long-term comprehensive arrangement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme (S/2006/521),

5. Calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and ballistic missile programmes,

6. Expresses its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA process, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends and encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its Secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all remaining outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the Agency, underlines the necessity of the IAEA continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme, and calls upon Iran to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol and to implement without delay all transparency measures as the IAEA may request in support of its ongoing investigations,

7. Requests by 31 August a report from the Director General of the IAEA primarily on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the above provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration,

8. Expresses its intention, in the event that Iran has not by that date complied with this resolution, then to adopt appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary,

9. Confirms that such additional measures will not be necessary in the event that Iran complies with this resolution,

10. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

 

Security Council Resolution 1737

On December 23, 2006, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1737 unanimously under Article 41 of the UN Charter.

Resolution 1737’s Principal Provisions

Resolution 1737 was adopted in response to Iran’s failure to comply with Resolution 1696. Consequently, it echoes the principal provisions of the earlier resolution, requiring Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and take other confidence-building measures. The resolution goes further than the IAEA requests, however, as it obligates Iran to suspend work on its heavy-water reactor projects rather than just reconsider them. It also calls on Iran to ratify the IAEA’s Additional Protocol.

Resolution 1737’s Sanctions

The resolution imposes sanctions against both the state of Iran and Iranian individuals and entities deemed to be providing support for Iran’s proliferation-related activities.

It requires all states to prevent the supply, sale, or transfer of designated nuclear and ballistic missile-related goods to Iran. The resolution states that this measure is to ensure that Iran cannot employ the designated goods in its enrichment-related, reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities, or its development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. The resolution does permit states to export nuclear and ballistic missile-related goods that are not itemized in the resolution’s control lists if: certain guidelines are followed, end-user controls are put in place, and the 1737 Committee is notified. It is also necessary for states to notify the IAEA to export certain nuclear and ballistic missile-related materials to Iran.

Resolution 1737 also states that countries must not provide technical or financial assistance, training, or resources related to certain nuclear and ballistic missile-related goods, and that all member states must refrain from importing designated nuclear and ballistic missile-related items from Iran.

There are three provisions in Resolution 1737 that target Iranian individuals and entities. First, the resolution calls on states to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into their territory of individuals engaged in Iran’s nuclear or ballistic missile activities. Second, states must freeze the funds, financial assets, and economic resources of designated individuals who are involved with Iran’s nuclear programs. Third, the resolution calls on states to prevent the “specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals” of subjects that would enhance Iran’s nuclear goals.

Resolution 1737’s Monitoring Mechanisms

Resolution 1737 sets out numerous measures to monitor compliance with the resolution. In paragraph 18 it establishes a Committee (known as the 1737 Committee) to oversee the implementation of the resolution’s key provisions. A subsequent paragraph requires states to furnish reports to the Committee detailing their compliance with the resolution.

In addition, the Director General of the IAEA has to report to the IAEA Board of Governors and to the Security Council within 60 days of the resolution being issued on whether Iran has suspended its enrichment and heavy water-related activities. The UNSC will review Iran’s actions based on the findings of that report. The council can decide to either suspend or terminate the resolution’s sanctions if Iran has complied with them. In the event that Iran has not complied with the sanctions, the Security Council is empowered to adopt further measures as it sees fit.

 

Relevant Excerpts of Resolution 1737

A full copy can be found at: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1737-2006.pdf

The Security Council…[a]cting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Affirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions;

2. Decides, in this context, that Iran shall without further delay suspend the following proliferation sensitive nuclear activities:

a) all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA; and

b) work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA

3. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems…

5. Decides that, for the supply, sale or transfer of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology covered by documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 the export of which to Iran is not prohibited by subparagraphs 3 (b), 3(c) or 4(a) above, States shall ensure that:

a)     the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 have been met; and

b)     they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and

c)     they notify the Committee within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer, and

d)     in the case of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology contained in document S/2006/814, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer.

6. Decides that all States shall also take the necessary measures to prevent the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale transfer, manufacture or use of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods and technology specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 above;

7. Decides that Iran shall not export any of the items in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;

10. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee of the entry into or transit through their territories of [designated] persons…;

12. Decides that all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by [designated] persons…;

16. Decides that technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or where it is necessary for projects directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3(b)(i) and (ii) above, but that no such technical cooperation shall be provided that relates to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities set out in paragraph 2 above;

17. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals, within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which would contribute to Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

23. Requests within 60 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council, for its consideration;

24. Affirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in the light of the report referred to in paragraph 23 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:

a)     that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations;

b)     that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 12 of this resolution as soon as it determines that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

c)     that it shall not, in the event that the report in paragraph 23 above shows that Iran has not complied with this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary.

 

Security Council Resolution 1747

On March 24, 2007, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1747 unanimously under Article 41 of the UN Charter.

Resolution 1747 Principle Provisions

This resolution was adopted as a result of Iran’s failure to comply with the previous two resolutions. It calls on Iran to take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors and outlined in Resolution 1737 to verify that its nuclear program has only peaceful purposes. Resolution 1747 also encourages Iran to consider the June 2006 proposals to reach a long-term comprehensive agreement with the P5+1.

Resolution 1747’s Sanctions

The resolution repeats and enhances some of the key sanctions from Resolution 1737 as well as introduces some new measures.

Resolution 1737 calls on states to “exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.” Its successor reiterates this provision, and strengthens it by calling on states to exercise “restraint” in addition to “vigilance,” regarding the entry of persons into their territory. Resolution 1737 also declares that states must advise the 1737 Committee when certain individuals, listed in the annex of Resolution 1737, entered their territory. Resolution 1747 adds further names to the list of individuals who must be reported to the Committee.

Resolution 1737 listed certain Iranian individuals and entities whose “funds, other financial assets and economic resources,” states were required to freeze. This resolution adds the names of 28 more individuals and entities to that list.

This resolution also expands the list of items prohibited for export to or import from Iran. Resolution 1737 prevented Iran from exporting designated nuclear and ballistic missile-related items. Its successor states that Iran “shall not supply, sell or transfer…any arms or related material,” and that states must prohibit the procurement of such material from Iran.

In addition to building on the above provisions in Resolution 1737, Resolution 1747 introduces a number of new sanctions. First, it calls on states to “exercise vigilance and restraint” in the supply, sale, or transfer of major military weapons systems and related material to Iran, as well as the provision of any technical assistance, financial assistance, or other service related to the provision of these items. Second, Resolution 1747 calls on states and international financial institutions “not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans” with the Iranian government unless they are for humanitarian or developmental purposes.

Resolution 1747’s Monitoring Mechanisms

Like its predecessor, all states are required to report to the 1737 Committee within 60 days of Resolution 1747’s adoption on the steps they have taken to implement it. Also within 60 days, the Director General of the IAEA must furnish a report on Iran’s compliance with the resolution to both the IAEA Board of Governors and to the Security Council.

 

Relevant Excerpts of Resolution 1747

A full copy can be found at: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1747-2007.pdf

The Security Council…[a]cting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Reaffirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context, affirms its decision that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006);

2. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regards that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein “the Committee”) of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to resolution 1737 (2006) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such travel is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3(b)(i) and (ii) of that resolution;

4. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annex I to this resolution;

5. Decides that Iran shall not supply, sell, or transfer directly or indirectly from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or related material, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;

6. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms to Iran, and in the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of such items in order to prevent a destablising accumulation of arms;

7. Calls upon all States and international financial institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes;

8. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above;

12. Requests within 60 days a further report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of resolution 1737 (2006) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

13. Affirms that is shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to in paragraph 12 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:

a)      that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;

b)     that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 above as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in paragraph 12 above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

c)     that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 12 above shows that Iran has not complied with resolution 1737 (2006) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary.

 

Security Council Resolution 1803

On March 3, 2008, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1803 with 14 of the council’s 15 members voting in favor. Indonesia abstained from the vote stating that it “remain[ed] to be convinced of the efficacy of adopting additional sanctions” against Iran.

Resolution 1803’s Principle Provisions

This resolution was adopted as a response to Iran’s decision not to comply with any of the previous resolutions. It reiterates the council’s desire that Iran halt its enrichment program and urges Iran to comply with the IAEA.

Resolution 1803’s Sanctions

The resolution reiterates its call from Resolution 1747 of states to “exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.” It adds more individuals to the list of people that states must report to the 1737 Committee if they enter their territory.

Moreover, for the first time, the resolution requires states to “prevent the entry into or transit through their territories” of designated individuals involved in pursuing Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Resolutions 1737 and 1747 both required states to freeze the funds, financial assets, and economic resources of certain individuals. Resolution 1803 augments the number of individuals subjected to this treatment.

In addition to targeting individuals, Resolution 1803 also outlines sanctions that apply directly to the Iranian state. It broadens the scope of restrictions on the supply, sale, or transfer of nuclear and ballistic missile-related items to Iran that were established in Resolution 1737 and sets down new provisions to prevent Iran from developing its nuclear program. Specifically, it calls on states to be vigilant “in entering new commitments for public provided financial support for trade with Iran,” lest such support be used by Iran to pursue its nuclear weapons ambitions. It also calls on states to “exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran,” to prevent such activities from enhancing Iran’s nuclear program.

Finally, the resolution calls on states to inspect cargo going to or from Iran on aircraft and vessels owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, where they have reasonable grounds for suspecting the cargo consists of  goods prohibited under resolutions 1737, 1747, or 1803.

Resolution 1803’s Monitoring Mechanisms

Similarly to its predecessors, Resolution 1803 sets out a number of reporting mechanisms that states and the Director General of the IAEA must fulfill to monitor compliance with this resolution. Echoing previous resolutions, Resolution 1803 requires states to file reports with the 1737 Committee within 60 days of being issued, detailing the steps they have taken to implement the resolution. It also requests the Director General of the IAEA to submit a report to the IAEA Board of Governors and to the Security Council within 90 days of the resolution’s adoption, stating the extent to which Iran has complied with Resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803. Once the council has received the Director General’s report, it is empowered to suspend, terminate or extend the sanctions in place against Iran as it deems appropriate.

Resolution 1803 extends the 1737 Committee’s scope from overseeing the implementation of only Resolution 1737 to also overseeing the implementation of Resolutions 1747 and 1803.

This resolution introduces a requirement that states must report to the Security Council when they inspect the cargo of an Iranian aircraft or vessel. The report must be filed within five working days of the inspection and it must detail “the grounds for the inspection, as well as information on its time, place circumstances, results and other relevant details.”

 

Relevant Excerpts of Resolution 1803

A full copy can be found at: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1803-2008.pdf

The Security Council…[a]cting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Reaffirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context, affirms, its decision that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of the resolution 1737 (2006), and underlines that the IAEA has sought confirmation that Iran will apply Code 3.1 modified;

2. Welcomes the agreement between Iran and the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programme and progress made in this regard as set out in the Director General’s report of 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), encourages the IAEA to continue its work to clarify all outstanding issues, stresses that this would help to re-establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, and supports the IAEA in strengthening its safeguards on Iran’s nuclear activities in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the IAEA;

3. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein “the Committee”) of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I to resolution 1747 (2007) or Annex I to this Committee, as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 or resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to them items in subparagraphs 3(b)(i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006);

5. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated in Annex II to this resolution as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3(b)(i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) and provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

7. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annexes I and III to this resolution, and any persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them and to persons and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted designated persons or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

8. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of:

a)     All items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2 of document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 5 of resolution 1737 (2006), of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in sections 1 and 2 of the Annex to that document, and sections 3 and 6 as notified in advance to the Committee, only when for exclusive use in light water reactors, and where such supply, sale or transfer is necessary for technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices as provided for in paragraph 16 of resolution 1737 (2006);

b)     All items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in 19.A.3 of Category II of document S/2006/815;

9. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance in entering into new commitments for public provided financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance, to their nationals or entities involved in such trade, in order to avoid such financial support contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);

10. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad, in order to avoid such activities contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);

11. Calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, to inspect the cargoes to and from Iran, of aircraft and vessels, at their airports and seaports, owned or operated by Iran Air cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft or vessel is transporting goods prohibited under this resolution or resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

12. Requires all States, in cases when inspection mentioned in the paragraph above is undertaken, to submit to the Security Council within five working days a written report on the inspection containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspection, as well as information on its time, place, circumstances, results and other relevant details;

13. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above;

14. Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the measures imposed in resolution 1747 (2007) and this resolution;

18. Requires within 90 days a further report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

19. Reaffirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to in the paragraph above, and:

a)     that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;

b)     that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006) , as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1747 (2007), and in paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above, as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in the paragraph above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

c)     that it shall, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should additional measures be necessary.

 

Security Council Resolution 1835

Resolution 1835 was unanimously adopted on September 27, 2008.

Resolution 1835’s Principle Provisions

In contrast to its predecessors, Resolution 1835 was not adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, nor does it set out new provisions that Tehran must comply with. Instead, it simply reaffirms the four previous resolutions, as well as a statement made by the Security Council’s President on March 29, 2006. It then reaffirms the council’s commitment “to an early negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.”

Resolution 1835’s Sanctions

This resolution does not outline new sanctions against Iran.

Resolution 1835’s Monitoring Mechanisms

This resolution does not outline new monitoring mechanisms.

 

Relevant Excerpts of Resolution 1835

A full copy can be found at: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1835-2008.pdf

The Security Council,

Taking note of the 15 September 2008 Report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions (GOV/2008/38),

Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NTP),

1. Reaffirms the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15 of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, its resolution 1737 (2006) of 23 December 2006, its resolution 1747 (2007) of 24 March 2007, and its resolution 1803 (2008) of 3 March 2008.

2. Takes note of the 3 March 2008 Statement of the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, with the support of the High Representative of the European Union, describing the dual-track approach to the Iranian nuclear issue;

3. Reaffirms its commitment within this framework to an early negotiated solution to the Iran nuclear issue and welcomes the continuing efforts in this regard;

4. Calls upon Iran to comply fully without delay with its obligations under the above-mentioned resolutions of the Security Council, and to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors;

5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

 

Security Council Resolution 1929

On June 9, 2010, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1929, with 12 countries voting in favor, Brazil and Turkey voting against, and Lebanon abstaining.

Resolution 1929’s Principle Provisions

The resolution reiterates the UNSC’s demands from previous resolutions that Iran halt all enrichment activity and other activities related to nuclear weapons development.

Resolution 1929’s Sanctions

This resolution imposed the sixth round of sanction against Iran. It bans Iran from investing in nuclear and missile technology abroad, including investment in uranium mining.  It establishes a complete arms embargo on Iran, banning the sale of “battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems” to Iran.  Iran is also prohibited from undertaking any activity related to ballistic missiles, and the resolution requires states to take necessary measures to prevent technology relevant to ballistic missiles from reaching Iran.  It also updates the list of items banned for transfer to and from Iran.

Resolution 1929 also subjects Iran to a new inspection regime designed to detect and stop Iranian smuggling.  States are called upon to inspect vessels on their territory that are suspected of carrying Iranian prohibited cargo, and are expected to comply with these rules on the high seas, including disposing of confiscated Iranian prohibited cargo.  States are also required to refuse services to ships that are not in compliance with these sanctions.

Lastly, this resolution includes financial sanctions targeting Iran’s ability to finance proliferation activities. Three companies related to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines are subject to an asset freeze and states are requested to report any circumventing of sanctions by Iran.  States must require their citizens and corporations to “exercise vigilance” when doing business with Iran or Iranian entities that contribute to proliferation efforts.  15 IRGC-related companies and 40 other Iranian companies are subject to an asset freeze.  States are also called upon to limit their interactions with Iranian financial institutions.

Resolution 1929’s Monitoring Mechanisms

Resolution 1929 requests that the Secretary-General create a panel of eight experts that will “assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate” and “make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures.”

It “urges” states and relevant UN bodies to comply with the recommendations of the Panel of Experts and “calls upon” states to submit a report 60 days after the adoption of the resolution on how they plan to comply with the sanctions regime.  It also requests a report within 90 days of the resolution’s adoption from the IAEA on whether Iran has complied with the demands of this and previous resolutions.

 

Relevant Excerpts of Resolution 1929

A full copy can be found at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9948.doc.htm

6. Reaffirms that, in accordance with Iran’s obligations under previous resolutions to suspend all reprocessing, heavy water-related and enrichment-related activities, Iran shall not begin construction on any new uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility and shall discontinue any ongoing construction of any uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility;

7. Decides that Iran shall not acquire an interest in any commercial activity in another State involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and technology as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1, in particular uranium-enrichment and reprocessing activities, all heavy-water activities or technology-related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and further decides that all States shall prohibit such investment in territories under their jurisdiction by Iran, its nationals, and entities incorporated in Iran or subject to its jurisdiction, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them;

8. Decides that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran, from or through their territories or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) (“the Committee”), decides further that all States shall prevent the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms and related materiel, and, in this context, calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel;

9.  Decides that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities;

14. Calls upon all States to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from Iran, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

15. Notes that States, consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea, may request inspections of vessels on the high seas with the consent of the flag State, and calls upon all States to cooperate in such inspections if there is information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

16. Decides to authorize all States to, and that all States shall, seize and dispose of (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution that are identified in inspections pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15 of this resolution, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, and decides further that all States shall cooperate in such efforts;

17. Requires any State, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15 above to submit to the Committee within five working days an initial written report containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspections, the results of such inspections and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if items prohibited for transfer are found, further requires such States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

21. Calls upon all States, in addition to implementing their obligations pursuant to resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, to prevent the provision of financial services, including insurance or re-insurance, or the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such services, assets or resources could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction or that hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are related to such programmes or activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in accordance with their national authorities and legislation;

22. Decides that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in Iran or subject to Iran’s jurisdiction, including those of the IRGC and IRISL, and any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems or to violations of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;

23. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of Iranian banks, and also that prohibit Iranian banks from establishing new joint ventures, taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction to prevent the provision of financial services if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that these activities could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

29. Requests the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts (“Panel of Experts”), under the direction of the Committee, to carry out the following tasks: (a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) and paragraph 28 of this resolution; (b) gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non‑compliance; (c) make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures; and (d) provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 90 days after the Panel’s appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to the termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;

30. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

31. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23 and 24;

 

Updated by Lauren Weiss