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Fact Sheets & Briefs

UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea

March 2013

Press Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Nonproliferation Analyst, 202-463-8270 ex. 102.

March 2013

The United Nations Security Council has adopted three major resolutions that sanction North Korea for continuing to develop its nuclear weapons program and call on Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear program “in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner" and refrain from ballistic missile tests. The first two resolutions were passed shortly after North Korean nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. The third came a month after North Korea successfully launched a satellite on Dec. 12, 2012. North Korea is prohibited from such launches under previous UN Security Council Resolutions because the technology in a satellite launch vehicle is directly applicable to ballistic missile development.  

All three resolutions were passed unanimously by the Security Council under Chapter VII, Article 41 of the United Nations Charter.  While legally binding, states are prohibited from using force to carry out the obligations of the resolutions.  The resolutions call upon North Korea to rejoin the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which it acceded to in 1985 but withdrew from in 2003 after U.S. allegations that the country was pursuing an illegal uranium enrichment program.  The Security Council also has called for North Korea to return to negotiations in the Six-Party Talks, negotiations between South Korea, North Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States, that aim to peacefully dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.  Talks began in 2003 but little real progress was made until February 2007 when negotiators reached an agreement with North Korea to shut down its nuclear program in exchange for humanitarian aid. However, progress on this front broke down in 2009 when North Korea completely withdrew from the talks in response to international condemnation of its attempt to launch a satellite in April 2009.

To this date, UN Security Council resolutions have been largely unsuccessful in preventing North Korea from advancing its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, although the sanctions have slowed development in these areas. The United Nations continues to closely monitor these programs.  The 1718 Committee was established by Security Council Resolution 1718 in 2006 to oversee implementation and enforcement of sanctions against North Korea.  A Panel of Experts produces regular reports to the Security Council on the status of the sanctions and enforcement.  In the May 2012 report, the committee found that “the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continues actively to defy the measures in the resolutions” and that “the resolutions have not caused [North Korea] to halt its banned activities” (Report of the Panel of Experts, 2012).

Security Council Resolution 1718

Resolution 1718 was unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council on October 14, 2006.  The resolution was passed under Chapter VII, Article 41 of the UN Charter.  The resolution was adopted in the wake of North Korea’s October 9, 2006 nuclear test.  The blast had an estimated explosive force of less than one kiloton and some radioactive output was detected. Many experts suggested the devise may have partially misfired.

Resolution 1718’s Principal Provisions

Resolution 1718 prohibits North Korea from conducting future nuclear tests or launching a ballistic missile.  It calls for the country to suspend its ballistic missile program and to completely abandon efforts to pursue a nuclear weapon. The resolution included a range of sanctions designed to prevent North Korea from continuing to develop these programs.

The resolution urged North Korea’s immediate return to the negotiating table for multilateral talks regarding its nuclear weapons program.

Resolution 1718’s Sanctions

UNSCR 1718 banned a range of imports and exports to North Korea and imposed an asset freeze and travel ban on persons involved in the country’s nuclear program.  This trade ban included “battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems.”  The resolution also prohibited imports of luxury goods to the country.

Large-scale arms, nuclear technology, and related training on nuclear weapons development were prohibited from being provided to North Korea.  All states were to cooperate in inspecting cargo suspected of trafficking nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons into the country.  In practice, not all states supported this and China, an ally of North Korea, did not inspect cargo to and from the country and continued to support the North Korean regime.

Sanctions limiting trade and instituting travel bans also were included.  Stipulations required states to freeze the assets of individuals suspected of being involved with North Korea’s nuclear program.  Special provisions were included that allowed money transfers and travel ban exemptions for humanitarian purposes to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

Resolution 1718’s Monitoring Mechanisms

The resolution established a committee composed of the 15 current members of the UNSC to function as a monitoring body to review and adjust the imposed sanctions and violations of the sanctions.  The body was to provide a report every 90 days.

Relevant Excerpts of Resolution 1718

A full copy can be found at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1718(2006).

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking  measures under its Article 41,

1. Condemns the nuclear test proclaimed by the DPRK on 9 October 2006 in flagrant disregard of its relevant resolutions, in particular resolution 1695 (2006), as well as of the statement of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), including that such a test would bring universal condemnation of the international community and would represent a clear threat to international peace and security;

2. Demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile;

3. Demands that the DPRK immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

4. Demands further that the DPRK return to the Treaty on the  Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and  underlines the need for all States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations;

5. Decides that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching;

6. Decides that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the terms and conditions of its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403) and shall provide the IAEA transparency measures extending beyond these requirements, including such access to individuals, documentation, equipments and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary by the IAEA;

8. Decides that:  (a) All Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of:

(i) Any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms, or related materiel including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established by paragraph 12 below (the Committee);

(ii) All items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as set out in the lists in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815, unless within 14 days of adoption of this resolution the Committee has amended or completed their provisions also taking into account the list in document S/2006/816, as well as other items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined by the Security Council or the Committee, which could contribute to DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction related programmes;

(iii) Luxury goods;

(b) The DPRK shall cease the export of all items covered in subparagraphs (a) (i) and (a) (ii) above and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flagged vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK;

(c) All Member States shall prevent any transfers to the DPRK by their nationals or from their territories, or from the DPRK by its nationals or from its territory, of technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items in subparagraphs (a) (i) and (a) (ii) above;

(d) All Member States shall, in accordance with their respective legal processes, freeze immediately the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of the adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the persons or entities designated by the Committee or by the Security Council as being engaged in or providing support for, including through other illicit means, DPRK’s nuclear-related, other weapons of mass  destruction-related and ballistic missile related programmes ...;

(f) In order to ensure compliance with the requirements of this paragraph, and thereby preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials, all Member States are called upon to take, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, cooperative action including through inspection of cargo to and from the DPRK, as necessary;

9. Decides that the provisions of paragraph 8 (d) above do not apply to financial or other assets or resources that have been determined by relevant States:

(a) To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges, or exclusively for  payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges …;

10. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 8 (e) above shall not apply where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of the present resolution;

12. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks:

(a) To seek from all States, in particular those producing or possessing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in paragraph 8 (a) above, information regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 8 above of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;

(b) To examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations of measures imposed by paragraph 8 of this resolution;

(g) To report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work, with its observations and recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the measures imposed by paragraph 8 above;

13.  Welcomes and encourages further the efforts by all States concerned to intensify their diplomatic efforts, to refrain from any actions that might aggravate S/RES/1718 (2006)06-57207  5 tension and to facilitate the early resumption of the Six-Party Talks, with a view to the expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005 by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, to achieve the verifiable  denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia;

14. Calls upon the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition and to work towards the expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005 by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States;

17. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Security Council Resolution 1874

Resolution 1874 was unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council on June 12, 2009.  It was passed under Chapter VII, Article 41, like Resolution 1718, and imposed further sanctions on North Korea for continuing to develop its nuclear program.  The resolution was passed in  response to North Korea’s underground nuclear test on May 25, 2009, which was “in violation and flagrant disregard” of the previous Security Council Resolution from 2006.

Resolution 1874’s Principal Provisions

The resolution strengthened previous measures against the North Korean weapons development program by tightening sanctions on additional goods, persons, and entities.  Sanctions were expanded on arms exports and imports and member states were encouraged to inspect and destroy any cargo found within their territory en route to or from North Korea suspected of violating the arms embargo.

The Security Council again called upon North Korea to return to negotiating, especially through the Six Party talks with South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the US.  The resolution also called for North Korea to rejoin the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Resolution 1874’s Sanctions

Resolution 1874 strengthened sanctions stipulated in Resolution 1718.  It expanded the arms embargo by banning all imports and exports of weapons, excluding small arms, and stipulated that a state must notify the Security Council before selling arms to North Korea.

It also authorized states to inspect North Korean cargo within their territory on land, sea, and air suspected of being involved in the country’s weapons development program.  Seized cargo suspected of being connected with North Korea’s nuclear program was to be destroyed and the Security Council was to be notified.

Financial assistance to the regime was also limited.  Financial transfers that could be used to aid North Korea’s weapons development were prohibited.  Member states were also not allowed to enter into loans with the country unless for explicitly humanitarian purposes.

Resolution 1874’s Monitoring Mechanisms

The Secretary-General was asked to set up a seven-member expert panel to assist the sanctions committee in enforcing the resolution and monitor implementation.

Relevant Excerpts of Resolution 1874

A full copy can be found here: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1874(2009).

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. Condemns in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 25 May 2009 (local time) in violation and flagrant disregard of its relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 1695 (2006) and 1718 (2006), and the statement of its President of 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7);

2. Demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology;

3. Decides that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches;

4. Demands that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1718 (2006);

5. Demands that the DPRK immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT;

6. Demands further that the DPRK return at an early date to the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, bearing in mind the rights and obligations of States Parties to the NPT, and underlines the need for all States Parties to the NPT to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations;

7. Calls upon all Member States to implement their obligations pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), including with respect to designations made by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) (“the Committee”) pursuant to the statement of its President of 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7);

8. Decides that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities,  shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the NPT and the terms and conditions of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403) and shall provide the IAEA transparency measures extending beyond these requirements, including such access to individuals, documentation, equipment and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary by the IAEA;

9. Decides that the measures in paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to all arms and related materiel, as well as to financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms or materiel;

11. Calls upon all States to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent  with international law, all cargo to and from the DPRK, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

17. Decides that Member States shall prohibit the provision by their nationals or from their territory of bunkering services, such as provision of fuel or supplies, or other servicing of vessels, to DPRK vessels if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe they are carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution …;

19. Calls upon all Member States and international financial and credit institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, or concessional loans to the DPRK, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes directly addressing the needs of the civilian population, or the promotion of denuclearization, and also calls upon States to exercise enhanced vigilance with a view to reducing current commitments;

22. Calls upon all Member States to report to the Security Council within forty-five days of the adoption of this resolution and thereafter upon request by the Committee on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) as well as paragraphs 9 and 10 of this resolution, as well as financial measures set out in paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 of this resolution;

26. Requests the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to seven experts (“Panel of Experts”), acting under the direction of the Committee to carry out the following tasks: (a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in resolution 1718 (2006) and the functions specified in paragraph 25 of this resolution; (b) gather, examine and analyze information from States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance; (c) make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or Member States, may consider to improve implementation of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and in this resolution; and (d) provide an interim report on its work to the Council no later than 90 days after adoption of this resolution, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;

29. Calls upon the DPRK to join the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest date;

30. Supports peaceful dialogue, calls upon the DPRK to return immediately to the Six Party Talks without precondition …;

34. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Security Council Resolution 2087

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2087 on January 22, 2013 after a successful North Korea satellite launch.  The December 12, 2012 launch was a clear violation of previous resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) that prohibited any further development of technology applicable to North Korea’s nuclear or ballistic weapons programs.

Resolution 2087’s Principal Provisions

Resolution 2087 condemned North Korea’s satellite launch and recalled the previous sanctions imposed against the country’s weapons development programs.  It urged compliance with these resolutions and promised to take further action if the country refused to cooperate or conducted another nuclear test.

The resolution recalled North Korea’s obligations to completely abandon its nuclear programs in a verifiable and irreversible way and to cooperate with IAEA authorities in these efforts.  It also called for other states to “remain vigilant” in monitoring individuals and entities associated with the North Korean regime.

The resolution demanded that the country halt any future nuclear tests and promised “determination to take significant action” if it failed to comply.  It again called for North Korea to rejoin the Six-Party talks.

Resolution 2087’s Sanctions

Resolution 2087 strengthened the sanctions included in Resolutions 1718 and 1874.  Measures were included that clarified a state’s right to seize and destroy material suspected of heading to or from North Korea for purposes of weapons development or research.  It also reiterated travel bans on persons suspected of involvement with North Korea’s nuclear program.

Resolution 2087’s Monitoring Mechanisms

No new monitoring mechanisms were included in Resolution 2087.  States were called upon to continue their duties imposed by Resolutions 1917 and 1874 and to continue inspecting cargo suspected of being involved in North Korea’s weapons program.

Relevant Excerpts of Resolution 2087

A full copy can be found here: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2087(2013).

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), as well as the statements of its President of  6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),

Recognizing the freedom of all States to explore and use outer space in accordance with international law, including restrictions imposed by relevant Security Council resolutions,

1. Condemns the DPRK’s launch of 12 December 2012, which used ballistic missile technology and was in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

2. Demands that the DPRK not proceed with any further launches using ballistic missile technology, and comply with resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) by suspending all activities related to its ballistic missile program and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches;

3. Demands that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its obligations under resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), including that it: abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; immediately cease all related activities; and not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile  technology, nuclear test or any further provocation;

4. Reaffirms its current sanctions measures contained in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

6.  Recalls paragraph 18 of resolution 1874 (2009), and calls upon Member States to exercise enhanced vigilance  in this regard, including monitoring the activities of their nationals, persons in their territories, financial institutions, and other entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad) with or on behalf of financial institutions in the DPRK, or of those that act on behalf or at the direction of DPRK financial institutions,  including their branches, representatives, agents and subsidiaries abroad;

8. Recalls paragraph 14 of resolution 1874 (2009), recalls further that States may seize and dispose of items consistent with the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and this resolution, and further clarifies that methods for States to dispose include, but are not limited to, destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to another State other than the originating or destination States for disposal;

9. Clarifies that the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) prohibit the transfer of any items if a State relevant to a transaction has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that a designated individual or entity is the originator, intended recipient or facilitator of the item’s transfer;

12. Deplores the violations of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) …;

15. Reaffirms its support to the Six Party Talks,  calls for their resumption, urges all the participants to intensify their efforts on the full and expeditious implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, with a view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in northeast Asia;

16. Calls upon all Member States to implement fully their obligations pursuant to resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);

20. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Security Council Resolution 2094

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2094 on March 7, 2013 in response to North Korea’s third nuclear test on February 12.  The third test was strongly condemned in the international arena.  North Korea called the test a direct response to Resolution 2087 of January 2013.  North Korea’s latest test was a flagrant violation of previous Security Council resolutions and the international norm against nuclear testing.

Resolution 2094’s Principal Provisions

Resolution 2094 condemned North Korea’s third nuclear test and its continued development of nuclear and ballistic missile programs.  It is the fifth Security Council resolution against North Korea since 2006 that sanctions the regime for continuing to pursue these programs.

The resolution aims to make it more difficult for North Korea to make further progress in its nuclear and ballistic missile programs by hindering its access to hard cash and technological equipment needed to build weapons and pursue uranium enrichment.  It also called for states to inspect and detain any suspected cargo or shipments to or from North Korea that transit through their territory, if the cargo is suspected to contain bulk cash or material that could be used in a nuclear program. States also were directed to enhance vigilance over North Korea’s diplomatic personnel.

The resolution also called again on North Korea to honor its obligations to completely abandon its nuclear programs in a verifiable and irreversible way and to cooperate with IAEA authorities in these efforts.  It again prohibited the DPRK from conducting any further launches, tests, or other provocations.  It expressed concern that North Korea’s nuclear tests and further provocations were a threat to nonproliferation efforts in the region and threatened international peace and security.  The resolution called for a resumption of the Six-Party Talks and for the implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement.

Resolution 2094’s Sanctions

New financial sanctions targeted blocking the access of the Kim regime to bulk cash transfers, preventing illicit DPRK activities, and restricting ties to international banking systems.  The resolution urged states to use guidance from the Financial Action Task Force to limit North Korea’s access to finances that could be used for proliferation purposes.

Resolution 2094 also strengthened existing sanctions, expanded the scope of materials covered, and increased measures for states to enforce and monitor the implementation of sanctions and the transshipment of materials to or from North Korea through their territories.

The resolution named an additional three individuals to be subject to travel bans and asset freezes and identified two entities for asset freezes that were determined to be involved in North Korea’s nuclear program.  It also expanded the list of prohibited imports of luxury goods to North Korea, to include jewelry, yachts, luxury cars, and racing cars.

Resolution 2094’s Monitoring Mechanisms

No new monitoring mechanisms were included in Resolution 2094 but additional measures were provided to states to implement and monitor the sanctions imposed against North Korea.  Members of the committee on sanctions were called upon to update the list of sanctioned goods, entities, and individuals annually and report back to the Security Council. Additionally, the resolution extended the mandate of the panel of experts that assesses implementation of UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea through April 2014.

Relevant Excerpts of Resolution 2094

A full copy can be found at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2094(2013).

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009) and resolution 2087 (2013), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41, S/RES/2094 (2013)

1. Condemns in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 12 February 2013 (local time) in violation and flagrant disregard of the Council’s relevant resolutions;

2. Decides that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests or any other provocation;

3. Demands that the DPRK immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT;

4. Demands further that the DPRK return at an early date to the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, bearing in mind the rights and obligations of States parties to the NPT, and underlines the need for all States parties to the NPT to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations;

5. Condemns all the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear activities, including its uranium enrichment, notes that all such activities are in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013), reaffirms its decision that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities and shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the NPT and the terms and conditions of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403);

6. Reaffirms its decision that the DPRK shall abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;

7. Reaffirms that the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) apply to items prohibited by paragraphs 8 (a) (i), 8 (a) (ii) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1874 (2009), decides that the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) also apply to paragraphs 20 and 22 of this resolution, and notes that these measures apply also to brokering or other intermediary services, including when arranging for the provision, maintenance or use of prohibited items in other States or the supply, sale or transfer to or exports from other States;

8. Decides further that measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in annexes I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and decides further that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to any individuals or entities acting on the behalf or at the direction of the individuals and entities that have already been designated, to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means;

9. Decides that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the individuals listed in annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;

10. Decides that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) and the exemptions set forth in paragraph 10 of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to any individual whom a State determines is working on behalf or at the direction of a designated individual or entity or individuals assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 S/RES/2094 (2013) (2013), and this resolution, and further decides that, if such an individual is a DPRK national, then States shall expel the individual from their territories for the purpose of repatriation to the DPRK consistent with applicable national and international law…;

11. Decides that Member States shall, in addition to implementing their obligations pursuant to paragraphs 8 (d) and (e) of resolution 1718 (2006), prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources, including bulk cash, that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution…;

12. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures to prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of DPRK banks, and also calls upon States to prohibit DPRK banks from establishing new joint ventures and from taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction to prevent the provision of financial services if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that these activities could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

13. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures to prohibit financial institutions within their territories or under their jurisdiction from opening representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, and other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution;

14. Expresses concern that transfers to the DPRK of bulk cash may be used to evade the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution…;

15. Decides that all Member States shall not provide public financial support for trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade) where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes…;

16. Decides that all States shall inspect all cargo within or transiting through their territory that has originated in the DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK, or has been brokered or facilitated by the DPRK or its nationals, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf, if the State concerned has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

17. Decides that, if any vessel has refused to allow an inspection after such an inspection has been authorized by the vessel’s flag State, or if any DPRK-flagged vessel has refused to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 1874 (2009), all States shall deny such a vessel entry to their ports, unless entry is required for the purpose of an inspection, in the case of emergency or in the case of return to its port of origination, and decides further that any State that has been refused by a vessel to allow an inspection shall promptly report the incident to the Committee;

18. Calls upon States to deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, except in the case of an emergency landing;

19. Requests all States to communicate to the Committee any information available on transfers of DPRK aircraft or vessels to other companies that may have been undertaken in order to evade the sanctions or in violating the provisions of resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, including renaming or re-registering of aircraft, vessels or ships, and requests the Committee to make that information widely available;

20. Decides that the measures imposed in paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in annex III of this resolution;

21. Directs the Committee to review and update the items contained in the lists specified in paragraph 5 (b) of resolution 2087 (2013) no later than twelve months from the adoption of this resolution and on an annual basis thereafter, and decides that, if the Committee has not acted to update this information by then, the Security Council will complete action to update within an additional thirty days;

22. Calls upon and allows all States to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to or from the DPRK or its nationals, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories of any item if the State determines that such item could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, and directs the Committee to issue an Implementation Assistance Notice regarding the proper implementation of this provision;

23. Reaffirms the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution 1718 (2006) regarding luxury goods, and clarifies that the term “luxury goods” includes, but is not limited to, the items specified in annex IV of this resolution;

24. Calls upon States to exercise enhanced vigilance over DPRK diplomatic personnel so as to prevent such individuals from contributing to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

29. Recalls the creation, pursuant to paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009), of a Panel of Experts, under the direction of the Committee, to carry out the tasks provided for by that paragraph, decides to extend until 7 April 2014 the Panel’s mandate…;

31. Underlines that measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK;

34. Reaffirms its support to the Six-Party Talks, calls for their resumption, urges all the participants to intensify their efforts on the full and expeditious implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, with a view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia;

36. Affirms that it shall keep the DPRK’s actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK’s compliance, and, in this regard, expresses its determination to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test;

37. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

-Researched by Alexandra Schmitt.

Nuclear/Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

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Posted: December 31, 1969

MANPADS at a Glance

March 2013

Press Contact: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

Updated: March 2013

Man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) are surface-to-air missiles that can be fired by an individual or a small team of people against aircraft. These weapon systems often are described as shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles. The United States and the Soviet Union first deployed MANPADS—the Redeye and Strela systems respectively—in the 1960s to provide their infantries with portable anti-aircraft weapons. Since their introduction, more than 20 states have manufactured an estimated one million MANPADS for national stockpiles or export. At least 102 countries have or have had MANPADS in their arsenals.[1] The US government estimates that approximately 500,000-750,000 MANPADS remain in stockpiles around the world, though it is difficult to estimate the number of operable systems.[2]

Three general types of MANPADS exist: command line of sight, laser guided, and infra-red seekers. Command line-of-sight MANPADS are guided to their targets through the use of a remote control. Laser-guided or laser beam rider MANPADS follow a laser projected onto the target. The most common MANPADS, however, are infrared seekers, which hone in on the heat of an aircraft’s engine. They are considered the easiest to operate and include the Soviet-era Strela and Igla weapons, as well as the U.S. Stinger. Today average MANPADS can reach a target from a distance of 3 miles, which means commercial aircraft are most vulnerable during periods of takeoff and landing.[3]

Although MANPADS production was originally limited to a few states, including the U.S., U.K., Russia and China, today over 30 countries manufacture MANPADS. Major MANPADS producing states today include China, France, Russia, Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S. The most commonly produced MANPADS are the Soviet SA-7 and the U.S. Stinger.

MANPADS Proliferation

Although the vast majority of MANPADS are in national stockpiles, terrorists and other non-state actors have acquired the anti-aircraft missiles through deliberate transfers, the black market, or theft. All told, the Department of State estimates that as many as several thousand MANPADS exist outside state control, including in the hands of al Qaeda.[4] Exacerbating the proliferation concern is the very long shelf-life of MANPADS, which can remain functional for up to twenty years.[5]

The U.S. supply of Stingers to anti-Soviet Afghan fighters during the 1980s illustrates how MANPADS spread. Between 1986 and 1989, Afghan forces used the missiles to down an estimated 269 aircraft and helicopters. Many Stingers, however, remained unaccounted for after the conflict despite U.S. efforts to have unused missiles returned to U.S. control. Some of the missiles made it into the international black market and the hands of terrorists. Estimates of black market prices for MANPADS range from just a few hundred dollars for basic technology models to thousands for more advanced units.[6]

The problem is not confined to U.S.-origin missiles. The Soviet Union supplied its allies with MANPADS and apparently some were re-transferred to non-state actors or stolen. Libya reportedly shipped Soviet-supplied MANPADS to at least the Irish Republican Army and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.[7] Numerous reports claim significant MANPADS looting from insecure military stores of the Soviet Union after its 1991 collapse. Similarly, after U.S.-led military forces in 2003 toppled Saddam Hussein and his regime from power, as many as 4,000 MANPADS went missing from Iraqi military holdings.[8]

MANPADs were discovered in use in recent conflicts in Libya, the Gaza Strip, and Syria. Iran has been accused of smuggling weapons, including MANPADS, into other countries in the region to armed insurgents. U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta commented to the Wall Street Journal, “There is no question when you start passing MANPADS around, that becomes a threat, not just to military aircraft but to civilian aircraft. That is an escalation.”[9]

After the Libyan civil war, many feared that weapons from the Gaddafi regime may have been smuggled out of the country during the conflict to other countries in the region and into the hands of armed groups or terrorist units, like al Qaeda in the Magrheb, Hamas in Gaza, Boko Haram in Niger, or Syrian insurgents.[10] At the end of the war 5,000 MANPADS left from the Gaddafi regime were located and destroyed by a multinational team, though some reports suggest that the regime was in possession of over 20,000, most of which remain unaccounted for.[11]

During the November 2012 skirmish between Israel and the Gaza Strip Hamas released a video displaying its possession of MANPADS.[12] A cable by Israeli Defense Intelligence also claimed Hamas possessed SA-7 MANPADS.[13] These were likely smuggled into Gaza from Libya after the end of the civil war.[14] It also suspected the smuggled Libyan MANPADS were transported into Mali and used by insurgents in that country.[15]

In the Syrian civil war video and photographic evidence proved rebel opposition forces in possessed SA-16 and SA-7 MANPADs for targeting the aircraft of al-Assad’s government forces.[16] Rebels acquired at least 40 MANPADS through captured government military stockpiles and international smuggling, including from Qatar, in their efforts to drive out the regime.[17]

The Threat to Civil Aviation

The first successful MANPADS attack against a civilian aircraft occurred Sept. 3, 1978, when rebels of the Zimbabwe Peoples Revolution Army shot down Air Rhodesia Flight 825. The MANPADS attack with arguably the most severe consequences was the 1994 downing of a plane carrying the leaders ofRwanda and Burundi. That attack helped precipitate a war that killed more than 800,000 Rwandans; conflict in the region continues. More recently, in 2002, al-Qaeda affiliated terrorists in Mombassa, Kenya, fired two MANPADS at an Arkia Israel Airlines plane. Both missiles missed, but the act marked the first attack on a civilian airliner outside a conflict zone.

More than 50 MANPADS attacks against civilian aircraft have occurred, mostly in Africa and Asia.[18] Aircraft are most vulnerable after take-off, during the initial climbing period, and while gaining altitude when the planes are at slow speeds and in regular flight patterns.  Some thirty attacks have been fatal and have resulted in almost 1,000 civilian deaths.  Most attacks against civilian plans occurred within active war zones.  Since 1998, an estimated 47 non-state groups are thought to be in control of MANPADS systems.[19] While there has never been a MANPADS attack on a U.S. civilian plane, the estimated consequences of terrorists shooting down a U.S. airliner are severe. A 2005 RAND Corporation study projected that the direct costs of such an attack would approach $1 billion. The indirect economic costs, according to the study, would soar much higher. For example, if all U.S. airports stopped operating for one week after the attack, losses could climb past $3 billion. Depressed demand to fly in the following months could result in losses totaling up to $12 billion. In sum, RAND concluded that one anti-aircraft missile purchased for as little as a few thousand dollars on the black market could kill hundreds of people and cause economic damage exceeding $16 billion. The costs could be even higher if consumers shunned flying or airports remained closed for a long period.

Efforts to Reduce the MANPADS Threat

The U.S. government is pursuing three main strategies to prevent MANPADS proliferation and protect civilian aircraft: stiffening global export controls and transparency, funding MANPADS stockpile security and destruction worldwide, and researching defensive countermeasures.

Although the United States had been promoting new MANPADS security and export controls since 1998, the 2002 Mombassa attack galvanized U.S. efforts. In 2003, governments added MANPADS exports and imports to the list of weapons transactions that should be volunteered annually by states to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. That same year, the voluntary Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), a group of arms suppliers that seeks to coordinate their export controls, agreed to strengthen export procedures governing MANPADS transfers and urged governments to equip newly-manufactured systems with safety devices to prevent unauthorized use. Today the WA includes 41 participating states. Other international institutions, such as the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, have also focused more attention on strengthening MANPADS controls and stockpile security. A number of OCSE country plans have included destruction of MANPADS stockpiles as a priority.

Some countries exercise poor accounting and security of their MANPADS, making them vulnerable to theft. Aiming to mitigate this problem, the State Department’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement and the Department of Defense’s Threat Reduction Agency operate programs to help foreign governments destroy excess weapons and improve protection of their missile stockpiles. The State Department claims these programs have destroyed approximately 32,500 MANPADS in over 30 countries since 2003, amounting to about 5-10% of the total world inventory.[20]

The prospect of terrorists using MANPADS to attack U.S. airliners has led to some calls for equipping civilian airliners with defensive countermeasures, such as onboard lasers to confuse infra-red seeking missiles. Multiple versions of these counter-MANPADS technologies exist, such as the MANTA (acronym for MANPADS Threat Avoidance), a “multi-spectral multi-band high-energy laser-based system” that can counter several MANPADS attacks simultaneously, though the system is bulky and only suitable for certain types of planes.[21] Other examples of active countermeasures include missile approach warning systems, flares, offset decoys, infrared countermeasure systems, and high-energy lasers.  The estimated cost of outfitting all U.S. airline planes with antimissile technologies would exceed $40 billion. This high cost is so prohibitive that the majority of civilian planes around the world do not have countermeasures and are thus vulnerable to attack.[22] More behavioral safety precautions against MANPADS include improved pilot training on surviving a MANPADS hit on an aircraft, better airport security and improved stockpile safeguards.  While a MANPADS hit on an aircraft does not necessarily result in bringing down the plane, nearly 70% of recorded attacks on civilian planes caused crashes and fatalities.[23]

New technologies are available to attempt to reduce the threat of MANPADS. These include infrared decoy flares that can confuse infrared seekers on the weapons. Directed Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCMs) cause the missile’s seeker to misread the location of the aircraft and miss its target. Missile warning systems (MWS) can alert an aircraft of an incoming missile. However, some studies have concluded that current available anti-MANPADS countermeasures would take years to install, cost upwards of $1-4 million per plane, and likely be ineffective against next-generation MANPADS given technological advancement.[24] A solution that might be available in future MANPADS technology would be including GPS chips in the weapons that could be used to only allow activation of the weapon with a certain code or automatic disablement in the presence of U.S. or allied aircraft to prevent misuse of MANPADS in the wrong hands.[25]

-Updated by Alexandra Schmitt


ENDNOTES

1. BonnInternationalCenter for Conversion, “Brief 47: MANPADS – A Terrorist Threat to Aviation?” February 2013.

2. Small Arms Survey, “MANPADS,” http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/products/manpads.html.

3. STRATFOR Global Intelligence, “The Continuing Threat of Libyan Missiles,” May 3, 2012, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/continuing-threat-libyan-missiles.

4. Ibid.

5. Small Arms Survey, “Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS),” Research Notes 1, January 2011, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-1.pdf.

6. Sarah Chankin-Gould and Matt Schroeder, “Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) Proliferation,” Federation of American Scientists, January 2004, http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/asmp/MANPADS.html.

7. Matt Schroeder, Dan Smith, and Rachel Stohl, The Small Arms Trade, Oneworld Oxford, 2007.

8. Douglas Jehl and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Expands List of Lost Missiles,” The New York Times, November 6, 2004.

9. “Iran escalating efforts to destabilize region – Panetta,” Reuters, February 1, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/02/us-usa-iran-panetta-idUSBRE91102D20130202.

10. Defense News, “5,000 Libyan MANPADS Secured: Some may have been smuggled out,” April 12, 2012, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120412/DEFREG04/304120002/5-000-Libyan-MANPADS-Secured?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE.

11. “Libyan missiles on the loose,” Washington Post, May 8, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/libyan-missiles-on-the-loose/2012/05/08/gIQA1FCUBU_story.html.

12. “Small Arms, Big Problems,” Foreign Policy, November 19, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/19/small_arms_big_problems?page=0,1.

13. “WikiLeaks cable: Israel worried about Hamas producing its own weapons,” Washington Post, November 15, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/11/15/wikileaks-cable-israel-worried-about-hamas-producing-its-own-weapons/.

14. “Hamas boosting anti-aircraft arsenal with looted Libyan missiles,” Haaretz, October 27, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/hamas-boosting-anti-aircraft-arsenal-with-looted-libyan-missiles-1.392186.

15. STRATFOR Global Intelligence, “The Continuing Threat of Libyan Missiles,” May 3, 2012, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/continuing-threat-libyan-missiles.

16. “Possible Score for Syrian Rebels: Pictures Show Advanced Missile Systems,” New York Times, November 13, 2012, http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/13/possible-score-for-syrian-rebels-pictures-show-advanced-missile-systems/.

17. “Officials: Syrian rebels’ arsenal includes up to 40 antiaircraft missile systems,” Washington Post, November 28, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-28/world/35508404_1_syrian-rebels-syrian-helicopter-aleppo.

18. BonnInternationalCenter for Conversion, “Brief 47: MANPADS – A Terrorist Threat to Aviation?” February 2013.

19. Small Arms Survey, “MANPADS,” http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/products/manpads.html.

20. State Department, “MANPADS: Combating the Threat to Global Aviation from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems,” July 27, 2011, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/169139.htm.

21. Avionics Today, “Countering MANPADS,” February 1, 2012, http://www.aviationtoday.com/av/military/Countering-MANPADS_75571.html#.UQwgZh3LSd9.

22. STRATFOR Global Intelligence, “The Continuing Threat of Libyan Missiles,” May 3, 2012, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/continuing-threat-libyan-missiles.

23. Ibid.

24. Sarah Chankin-Gould and Matt Schroeder, “Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) Proliferation,” Federation of American Scientists, January 2004, http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/asmp/MANPADS.html.

25. “Tracking chips and kill switches for MANPADS,” Foreign Policy, October 19, 2012, http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/19/tracking_chips_and_kill_switches_for_manpads.

 

Conventional Arms Issues

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Posted: December 31, 1969

The U.S. Atomic Energy Act Section 123 At a Glance

March 2013

Press ContactsDaryl Kimball, (202) 463-8270 x107

Updated: March 2013

Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 establishes the conditions and outlines the process for major nuclear cooperation between the United States and other countries. In order for a country to enter into such an agreement with the United States, that country must commit to a set of nine nonproliferation criteria. The United States has entered into nuclear cooperation agreements with 23 countries, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and Taiwan.[1]

The nine nonproliferation criteria for section 123 agreements are as follows:

  • Nuclear material and equipment transferred to the country must remain under safeguards in perpetuity.
  • Non-nuclear-weapon states partners must have full-scope IAEA safeguards, essentially covering all major nuclear facilities.
  • A guarantee that transferred nuclear material, equipment, and technology will not have any role in nuclear weapons development or any other military purpose, except in the case of cooperation with nuclear-weapon states.
  • In the event that a non-nuclear-weapon state partner detonates a nuclear device using nuclear material produced or violates an IAEA safeguards agreement, the United States has the right to demand the return of any transfers.
  • U.S. consent is required for any re-transfer of material or classified data.
  • Nuclear material transferred or produced as a result of the agreement is subject to adequate physical security.
  • U.S. prior consent rights to the enrichment or reprocessing of nuclear material obtained or produced as a result of the agreement.
  • Prior U.S. approval is required for highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium obtained or produced as a result of the agreement.  An agreement permitting enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) using U.S. provided material requires separate negotiation.
  • The above nonproliferation criteria apply to all nuclear material or nuclear facilities produced or constructed as a result of the agreement.

Section 123 requires that the Department of State submit a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) explaining how the nuclear cooperation agreement meets these nonproliferation conditions. Congress has a total of 90 days in continuous session to consider the agreement, after which it automatically becomes law unless Congress adopts a joint resolution opposing it.

The President may exempt a proposed agreement from any of the above criteria upon determination maintaining such a criteria would be “seriously prejudicial to the achievement of U.S. non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense of the United States.” Exempted 123 agreements would then go through a different process than non-exempt agreements, requiring a congressional joint resolution approving the agreement for it to become law. There are no 123 agreements in force that were adopted with such exemptions.

In 2006, Congress passed the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act which amended the AEA permit nuclear cooperation with India, a country which is not a member of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not maintain full-scope safeguards.  The Hyde amendment has been criticized for undermining U.S. international counterproliferation efforts.

A 123 agreement alone does not permit countries to enrich or reprocess nuclear material acquired from the United States and permission to do so requires a further negotiated agreement.  A debate is currently raging in the nonproliferation community over the “Gold Standard,” named after the U.S.-UAE 123 agreement signed in 2009 whereby the UAE voluntarily renounced pursuing enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies and capabilities.  The UAE agreement stands in stark contrast to the “blanket consent” granted to India, Japan, and EURATOM, who have ENR approval from the U.S.  This consent is being sought by other countries as many 123 agreements are up for renewal and renegotiation in 2014, most notably South Korea.

ENR capabilities are controversial because the process transforms raw uranium or spent nuclear fuel into highly-enriched uranium.  While these capabilities are generally used for energy purposes, because the same technology can be used for weaponization processes there are concerns of serious proliferation risks when a country obtains the technology.  A Gold Standard for 123 agreements would require any country party to a 123 agreement with the United States to renounce ENR activities. The Department of Energy and the U.S. nuclear industry advocate a continuance of the case-by-case approach followed thus far in renewal agreements. A case-by-case approach allows countries to apply for ENR permission, and has been successfully pursued by India and Japan.  South Korea is pushing for an agreement to permit reprocessing to develop its own nuclear industry, a major target in its economic development plans.

Thus far Congress has attempted several times to pass measures ensuring that future 123 agreements adhere to the Gold Standard.  The most prominent of these bills was H.R. 1280, which among other amendments to the Atomic Energy Act declared that future 123 agreements must include “a requirement as part of the agreement for cooperation or other legally binding document that is considered part of the agreement that no reprocessing activities, or acquisition or construction of facilities for such activities, will occur within” the country.  The bill also required states considering 123 agreements to be members of many international treaties and conventions promoting non-proliferation.  Though reported out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in April 2011, it was blocked from floor consideration and died with the 112th Congress.

The executive branch has been less clear in its position.  The George W. Bush administration coined the term Gold Standard when the U.S.-UAE deal was signed in 2009 and declared it the new standard for nuclear cooperation agreements.  The Obama administration has not come out in favor of a Gold Standard, though there have been several interagency reviews soliciting opinions, the most recent during the summer of 2012.  A 2011 letter from the Obama administration to Capitol Hill renounced the idea of a uniform approach to 123 agreements and advocated for a case-by-case approach in future negotiations.  (See ACT, March 2012).

 


 

ENDNOTE:

1. A full list of countries with 123 agreements with the United States can be found at National Nuclear Security Administration, “123 Agreements for Peaceful Cooperation,” http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/treatiesagreements/123agreements

 

Strategic Arms Control and Policy

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Posted: December 31, 1969

The Ottawa Convention: Signatories and States-Parties

March 2013

Press Contact: Daryl Kimball, Deputy Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

Updated: March 2013

The Ottawa Convention, also referred to as the "Mine Ban Treaty," prohibits the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines (APLs). It requires states-parties to destroy their stockpiled APLs within four years and eliminate all APL holdings, including mines currently planted in the soil, within 10 years. Countries may request a renewable extension, which can be up to 10 years long, to fulfill their destruction obligations. States-parties are also required annually to report to the UN secretary-general their total APL stockpiles, the technical characteristics of their APLs, the location of all mined areas, and the status of APL destruction programs.

The convention, which is of unlimited duration and open to all nations, entered into force March 1, 1999. As of March 2013, 160 countries had ratified or acceded to the treaty, and one country, the Marshall Islands, has signed the accord but not ratified it. States-parties overwhelmingly come from Europe, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean. Almost no countries in the Near East and only about half of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region have signed the treaty.

Some key current and past producers and users of landmines, including the United States, China, India, Pakistan, and Russia, have not signed the treaty. The George W. Bush administration announced Feb. 27, 2004 that the United States would not join the Ottawa Convention. The United States is party to the 1996 amended mines protocol of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which restricts but does not ban APL use.  The Obama administration has stated that its current landmine policy is under review and plans to clarify its position on the Ottawa treaty in the future.

A precise accounting of the number of landmines planted globally is not possible. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, a coalition of more than 1,400 non-government organizations working on landmine issues, has estimated that 59 countries have landmines on their territories. The coalition also has recently estimated that as many as 100 million APLs may be stockpiled around the globe, of which roughly 14 million are stockpiled by Ottawa Convention states-parties and signatories.

The following is a complete list of all Ottawa Convention signatories and states-parties:

Country
Signature
Deposit
Afghanistan 9/11/02
Albania 9/8/98 2/29/00
Algeria 12/3/97 10/9/01
Andorra 12/3/97 6/29/98
Angola 12/4/97 7/5/02
Antigua & Barbuda 12/3/97 5/3/99
Argentina 12/4/97 9/14/99
Australia 12/3/97 1/14/99
Austria 12/3/97 6/29/98
Bahamas 12/3/97 7/31/98
Bangladesh 5/7/98 9/6/00
Barbados 12/3/97 1/26/99
Belarus 9/03/03
Belgium 12/3/97 9/4/98
Belize 2/27/98 4/23/98
Benin 12/3/97 9/25/98
Bhutan 8/18/05
Bolivia 12/3/97 6/9/98
Bosnia and Herzegovina 12/3/97 9/8/98
Botswana 12/3/97 3/1/00
Brazil 12/3/97 4/30/99
Brunei Darussalam 12/4/97 4/24/06
Bulgaria 12/3/97 9/4/98
Burkina Faso 12/3/97 9/16/98
Burundi 12/3/97 10/22/03
Cambodia 12/3/97 7/28/99
Cameroon 12/3/97 9/19/02
Canada 12/3/97 12/3/97
Cape Verde 12/4/97 5/14/01
Central African Republic 11/8/02
Chad 7/6/98 5/6/99
Chile 12/3/97 9/10/01
Colombia 12/3/97 9/6/00
Comoros 9/19/02
Congo 5/4/01
Cook Islands 12/3/97 3/15/06
Costa Rica 12/3/97 3/17/99
Cote d'Ivoire 12/3/97 6/30/00
Croatia 12/4/97 5/20/98
Cyprus 12/4/97 1/17/03
Czech Republic 12/3/97 10/26/99
Democratic Republic of Congo 5/2/02
Denmark 12/4/97 6/8/98
Djibouti 12/3/97 5/18/98
Dominica 12/3/97 3/26/99
Dominican Republic 12/3/97 6/30/00
Ecuador 12/4/97 4/29/99
El Salvador 12/4/97 1/27/99
Equatorial Guinea 9/16/98
Eriitrea 8/27/01
Estonia 5/12/04
Ethiopia 12/3/97 12/17/04
Fiji 12/3/97 6/10/98
Finland 1/09/12
France 12/3/97 7/23/98
Gabon 12/3/97 9/8/00
Gambia 12/4/97 9/23/02
Germany 12/3/97 7/23/98
Ghana 12/4/97 6/30/00
Greece 12/3/97 9/25/03
Grenada 12/3/97 8/19/98
Guatemala 12/3/97 3/26/99
Guinea 12/4/97 10/8/98
Guinea-Bissau 12/3/97 5/22/01
Guyana 12/4/97 8/5/03
Haiti 12/3/97 2/15/06
Holy See 12/4/97 2/17/98
Honduras 12/3/97 9/24/98
Hungary 12/3/97 4/6/98
Iceland 12/4/97 5/5/99
Indonesia 12/4/97 2/20/07
Iraq 8/15/07
Ireland 12/3/97 12/3/97
Italy 12/3/97 4/23/99
Jamaica 12/3/97 7/17/98
Japan 12/3/97 9/30/98
Jordan 8/11/98 11/13/98
Kenya 12/5/97 1/23/01
Kiribati 9/7/00
Kuwait 7/31/07
Latvia 7/1/05
Lesotho 12/4/97 12/2/98
Liberia 12/23/99
Liechtenstein 12/3/97 10/5/99
Lithuania 2/26/99 5/12/03
Luxembourg 12/4/97 6/14/99
Macedonia, FYR 9/9/98
Madagascar 12/4/97 9/16/99
Malawi 12/4/97 8/13/98
Malaysia 12/3/97 4/22/99
Maldives 10/1/98 9/7/00
Mali 12/3/97 6/2/98
Malta 12/4/97 5/7/01
Marshall Islands 12/4/97
Mauritania 12/3/97 7/21/00
Mauritius 12/3/97 12/3/97
Mexico 12/3/97 6/9/98
Moldova 12/3/97 9/8/00
Monaco 12/4/97 11/17/98
Montenegro 10/23/06
Mozambique 12/3/97 8/25/98
Namibia 12/3/97 9/21/98
Nauru 8/7/00
Netherlands 12/3/97 4/12/99
New Zealand 12/3/97 1/27/99
Nicaragua 12/4/97 11/30/98
Niger 12/4/97 3/23/99
Nigeria 9/27/01
Niue 12/3/97 4/15/98
Norway 12/3/97 7/9/98
Palau 11/19/07
Panama 12/4/97 10/7/98
Papua New Guinea 6/28/04
Paraguay 12/3/97 11/13/98
Peru 12/3/97 6/17/98
Philippines 12/3/97 2/15/00
Poland 12/4/97 12/27/12
Portugal 12/3/97 2/19/99
Qatar 12/4/97 10/13/98
Romania 12/3/97 11/30/00
Rwanda 12/3/97 6/8/00
St. Kitts & Nevis 12/3/97 12/2/98
St. Lucia 12/3/97 4/13/99
St. Vincent & the Grenadines 12/3/97 8/1/01
Samoa 12/3/97 7/23/98
San Marino 12/3/97 3/18/98
Sao Tome & Principe 4/30/98 3/31/03
Senegal 12/3/97 9/24/98
Serbia & Montenegro 9/18/03
Seychelles 12/4/97 6/2/00
Sierra Leone 7/29/98 4/25/01
Slovakia 12/3/97 2/25/99
Slovenia 12/3/97 10/27/98
Solomon Islands 12/4/97 1/26/99
Somalia 4/16/12
South Africa 12/3/97 6/26/98
South Sudan 11/11/11
Spain 12/3/97 1/19/99
Sudan 12/4/97 10/13/03
Suriname 12/4/97 5/23/02
Swaziland 12/4/97 12/22/98
Sweden 12/4/97 11/30/98
Switzerland 12/3/97 3/24/98
Tajikistan 10/12/99
Tanzania 12/3/97 11/13/00
Thailand 12/3/97 11/27/98
Timor Leste 5/7/03
Togo 12/4/97 3/9/00
Trinidad & Tobago 12/4/97 4/27/98
Tunisia 12/4/97 7/9/99
Turkey 9/25/03
Turkmenistan 12/3/97 1/19/98
Tuvalu 9/13/11
Uganda 12/3/97 2/25/99
Ukraine 2/24/99 12/27/05
United Kingdom 12/3/97 7/31/98
Uruguay 12/3/97 6/7/01
Vanuatu 12/4/97 9/16/05
Venezuela 12/3/97 4/14/99
Yemen 12/4/97 9/1/98
Zambia 12/12/97 2/23/01
Zimbabwe 12/3/97 6/18/98

Conventional Arms Issues

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Posted: December 31, 1969

The Ottawa Convention at a Glance

March 2013

Press Contact: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director; (202) 463-8270 x107

Updated: March 2013

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, typically referred to as the "Ottawa Convention" or "Mine Ban Treaty," seeks to end the use of anti-personnel landmines (APLs) worldwide. It was opened for signature on December 3, 1997, and it entered into force on March 1, 1999. As of February 2013, 161 states are party to the treaty.  One country, the Marshall Islands, has signed but not ratified it.  There are 36 non-signatories, including major powers such as the United States,[1] Russia, and China.  Few countries in key regions of tension, namely the Middle East and South Asia, have opted to participate.[2] There is some hope that because of the treaty new international norms have formed that discourage any country, signatory or not, from using mines.  Many non-signatories are in de facto compliance with the Ottawa Convention by refusing to use landmines and committing to voluntary destruction of stockpiles.[3] Still, millions of mines are estimated to be planted in the ground in 59 countries. Global APL stockpiles are thought to total more than 100 million mines.[4][5] Some of thecountries that suffer the most from the humanitarian impacts of landmines include Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Iraq and Laos.[6]

The Obama administration is currently undertaking a review of its policy towards the Ottawa Convention.  Thus far, the U.S. has maintained that it will not absolutely renounce its ability to right to use “smart” landmines – those that can be remotely deactivated – as a defensive mechanism to protect its own troops.[7] Another issue of concern is the remaining defensive U.S. landmines in the demilitarized zone of the KoreanPeninsula.[8]

Prohibitions: States-parties commit to not using, developing, producing, acquiring, retaining, stockpiling, or transferring anti-personnel landmines, which are defined by the treaty as mines "designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons." APLs that are remotely triggered, such as claymores, are not proscribed, nor are anti-vehicle mines, including those equipped with anti-handling devices, which are designed to protect anti-vehicles mines from being tampered with or moved.  The treaty also forbids signatories from assisting or encouraging any other state or party from engaging in the activities outlawed by the treaty.

APL Destruction: Each state-party is expected to destroy all APLs stockpiled in arsenals, except those retained for demining training, within four years of becoming bound by the treaty. Within 10 years of its entry into force date, each country is required to destroy all APLs under its jurisdiction and control, including those planted in the soil. A country may request renewable extensions of up to 10 years to complete this destruction task. A majority of participants at a meeting of states-parties or review conference must approve an extension request. Twenty-seven state parties have been granted such extensions on destruction deadlines, but only one so far, Nicaragua, has formally completed its obligations before the mandated deadline.  States-parties are expected to mark and monitor all suspected or known mined areas until they are cleared. All told, states-parties have destroyed more than 46 million stockpiled APLs under the treaty.  However, as of November 2012, there are still 45 state parties with confirmed or suspected remaining landmines with obligations to destroy them under Article 5 of the treaty.[9] Currently three states remain in violation of the treaty – Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine – for failure to complete destruction of their stockpiles within the 4-year deadline.[10]

Cooperation and Assistance: The treaty calls on any state-party "in a position to do so" to assist other states-parties in aiding mine victims, providing demining assistance, and helping with mine destruction. States-parties are expected to be as helpful as possible in making sure all states-parties have access to equipment, material, and scientific and technological information for implementing the treaty without "undue restrictions."

Transparency: Each state-party is to provide the United Nations with a comprehensive report on the numbers, types, and locations of all APLs under its control as well as the status of all programs for destroying APLs. An initial report is required 180 days after the treaty becomes legally binding for each state-party, and thereafter reports are expected annually by April 30.

Compliance: The treaty did not create an implementation or verification body or outline punitive measures for noncompliance. A state-party may question the compliance of another state-party, and a special meeting of states-parties can be convened to address the allegation. States-parties can establish a fact-finding mission to investigate the alleged noncompliance and, if necessary, call on the state-party in question to address the compliance issue.

Amendment and Withdrawal: Treaty amendments can be proposed, and then approved by two-thirds of all states-parties attending a special amendment conference. A state-party may withdraw from the treaty six months after submitting an instrument of withdrawal, though it will not take effect if the country is engaged in armed conflict.

Updated by Alexandra Schmitt


 

ENDNOTES

1. The George W. Bush administration announced February 27, 2004 that the United States would not join the Ottawa Convention. U.S. landmine policy had been under review since the summer of 2001. The Clinton administration had stated that the United States would sign the Ottawa Convention by 2006 if the Pentagon could identify and field suitable alternatives to U.S. anti-personnel landmines and mixed systems, which are comprised of both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle components, by that time.

2. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “States Not Party,” http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Universal/MBT/States-Not-Party.

3. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Treaty Basics,” http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Treaty/MBT/Treaty-Basics.

4. “Landmine Monitor 2012,” International Campaign to Ban Landmines, http://www.the-monitor.org/lm/2012/resources/Landmine_Monitor_2012.pdf.

5. “Landmines: FAQ,” Care, http://www.care.org/newsroom/specialreports/land_mines/facts.asp.

6. Ibid.

7. “Why hasn’t the U.S. signed an international ban on land mines?” Los Angeles Times, April 5, 2012, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/04/mine-treaty-us-ottawa-convention.html

8. For further discussion of U.S. landmines located in the demilitarized zone of the KoreanPeninsula, see Los Angeles Times articles “In South Korea, land mines remain a threat,” and “Why hasn’t the U.S. signed an international ban on land mines?

9. “Landmine Monitor 2012,” International Campaign to Ban Landmines, http://www.the-monitor.org/lm/2012/resources/Landmine_Monitor_2012.pdf.

10. Ibid.

Conventional Arms Issues

Posted: December 31, 1969

The Nuclear Testing Tally

February 2013

Press Contacts: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

Updated: April 2015

Since the first nuclear test explosion on July 16, 1945, at least eight nations have detonated 2,053 nuclear test explosions at dozens of test sites from Lop Nor in China, to the atolls of the Pacific, to Nevada, to Algeria where France conducted its first nuclear device, to western Australia where the U.K. exploded nuclear weapons, the South Atlantic, to Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan, across Russia, and elsewhere.

Most of the test sites are in the lands of indigenous peoples and far from the capitals of the testing governments. A large number of the early tests-- 528 -- were detonated in the atmosphere, which spread radioactive materials through the atmosphere. Many underground nuclear blasts have also vented radioactive material into the atmosphere and left radioactive contamination in the soil.

Through nuclear test explosions, the testing nations have been able to proof-test new warhead designs and create increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons. In 1996, negotiations on a global Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) were concluded and the treaty was opened for signature on September 24, 1996. The CTBT, which prohibits "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion" and established a international test monitoring and verification system, has not yet entered into force.

 

United States (1,030)
First tested: July 16, 1945.
Last tested: Sept. 23, 1992.
Signed CTBT: Sept. 24, 1996.

USSR/Russia (715 tests)
First tested: Aug. 29, 1949.
Last tested: Oct. 24, 1990.
Deposited CTBT Ratification: June 30, 2000..

United Kingdom (45 tests)
First tested: Oct. 3, 1952.
Last tested: Nov. 26, 1991.
Signed CTBT: Sept. 24, 1996.
Deposited CTBT Ratification:
Apr. 6, 1998.

France (210 tests)
First tested: Feb. 13, 1960.
Last tested: Jan. 27, 1996.
Signed CTBT: Sept. 24, 1996.
Deposited CTBT Ratification:
Apr. 6, 1998.

China (45 tests)
First tested: Oct. 16, 1964.
Last tested: July 29, 1996.
Signed CTBT: Sept. 24, 1996.

India (3 tests1)
First tested: May 18, 1974.
Last tested: May 13, 1998.
Not a CTBT signatory.

Pakistan (2 tests1)
First tested: May 28, 1998.
Last tested: May 30, 1998.
Not a CTBT signatory.

North Korea (3 tests)
First tested: Oct. 9, 2006.
Last tested: Feb 12, 2013.
Not a CTBT signatory.

Year United States USSR/ Russia United Kingdom France China India Pakistan North Korea Total
1945 1 1
1946 2 2
1947 0 0
1948 3 3
1949 0 1 1
1950 0 0 0
1951 16 2 18
1952 10 0 1 11
1953 11 5 2 18
1954 6 10 0 16
1955 18 6 0 24
1956 18 9 6 33
1957 32 16 7 55
1958 77 34 5 116
1959 0 0 0 0
1960 0 0 0 3 3
1961 10 59 0 2 71
1962 96 79 2 1 178
1963 47 0 0 3 50
1964 45 9 2 3 1 60
1965 38 14 1 4 1 58
1966 48 18 0 7 3 76
1967 42 17 0 3 2 64
1968 56 17 0 5 1 79
1969 46 19 0 0 2 67
1970 39 16 0 8 1 64
1971 24 23 0 5 1 53
1972 27 24 0 4 2 57
1973 24 17 0 6 1 48
1974 22 21 1 9 1 1 55
1975 22 19 0 2 1 0 44
1976 20 21 1 5 4 0 51
1977 20 24 0 9 1 0 54
1978 19 31 2 11 3 0 66
1979 15 31 1 10 1 0 58
1980 14 24 3 12 1 0 54
1981 16 21 1 12 0 0 50
1982 18 19 1 10 1 0 49
1983 18 25 1 9 2 0 55
1984 18 27 2 8 2 0 57
1985 17 10 1 8 0 0 36
1986 14 0 1 8 0 0 23
1987 14 23 1 8 1 0 47
1988 15 16 0 8 1 0 40
1989 11 7 1 9 0 0 28
1990 8 1 1 6 2 0 18
1991 7 0 1 6 0 0 14
1992 6 0 0 0 2 0 8
1993 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
1994 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
1995 0 0 0 5 2 0 7
1996 0 0 0 1 2 0 3
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1998 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 4
1999-2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2007-2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 02 0
2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2012 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Total 1,030 715 45 210 45 3 2 3 2,053
NOTE

1. In accordance with the definition of a nuclear test contained in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and to allow accurate comparison with other countries' figures, India's three simultaneous nuclear explosions on May 11 are counted as only one nuclear test, as are the two explosions on May 13. Likewise, Pakistan's five simultaneous explosions on May 28 are counted as a single test.

2. In the article "Radionuclide Evidence for Low-Yield Nuclear Testing in North Korea in April/May 2010," Lars-Erik De Geer argued that the xexon and barium isotope concentrations in air currents from North Korea in April and May of 2010 were consistent with two low-yield nuclear tests. However, this theory was largely debunked when the Earth Institute at Columbia University measured seismology records and determined that no well-coupled explosion larger than one ton could have occured during that timeframe. According to the report, such a low yield explosion would have been incapable of advancing the North Korean's technical understanding of a nuclear weapon explosion.

Nuclear Testing

Fact Sheet Categories:

Posted: December 31, 1969

Proposed U.S. Arms Export Agreements From January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2012

January 2013

Press Contacts: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107; Tom Collina, Research Director, (202) 463-8270 x104

Updated: January 2013

The value of proposed conventional arms sales agreements doubled from 2011 to 2012.  The increase in proposed arms sales was largely due to Qatar's request for $23.6 billion in arms, which was nearly equal to the total amount of arms sales requested in 2011.  The $53 billion in agreements requested in 2012 was $20 billion above the ten-year average from 2002 to 2011 ($33.5 billion).

The United States conducts government-to-government transfers through the Defense Department’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Not all notified sales result in final transactions. Under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, Congress must be notified of proposed sales of “major defense equipment,” as defined on the U.S. Munitions List, that equals or exceeds $14 million; defense articles and services that are not defined as “major defense equipment” which total $50 million or more; and construction or design services amounting to or surpassing $200 million.[1] However, if the proposed sale involves NATO members, Australia, Israel, Japan, South Korea, or New Zealand, the notification thresholds are $25 million for major defense equipment, $100 million for other defense articles and services, and $300 million for construction or design services.[2] Once notified, Congress has 30 calendar days (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) to block a sale by passing a joint resolution of disapproval, though it has never stopped a sale once formally notified.

Qatar requested the most expensive package of arms sales agreements in 2012, with $23.6 billion requested--a nearly $23 billion increase from 2011.  Doha requested two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Fire Units for $6.5 billion and 11 Patriot Configuration-3 Modernized Fire Units for $9.9 billion, totaling over $16 billion for anti-ballistic missile defense systems alone. In addition, Qatar requested over $6 billion in attack helicopters from Washington in 2013, including Black Hawks, MH-60Rs and MH-60Ss, and Apaches.

The Republic of Korea also requested $8.8 billion in arms from the United States in 2012. $7.2 billion of the total consisted of requests for various attack helicopters, such as $1.0 billion for the MH-60R Seahawk, $2.6 billion for the AH-1Z Cobra, and $3.6 billion for the AH-64D Apache. In addition, Seoul also requested four RQ-4 Block 30 (I) unmanned aerial vehicles and several UGM-84L Harpoon missiles.

For the first time cince 2007, the Middle East has been supplanted by another region, this time Asia-Pacific, as the region that requested the highest value of conventional arms from the U.S. in 2012. Three of the top five countries that sought the highest values of U.S. arms exports were located in the Asia-Pacific region (Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea). The Obama administration's "pivot to Asia" is clearly illustrated by U.S. conventional arms sales in 2012 and is a pattern that is likely to continue in the near future as countries in the region attempt to bolster their conventional forces in the face of China's growing influence in the Asia-Pacific region.


Below are the five countries that sought the highest values in U.S. arms exports in 2012 and some of their specific requests.

Country

Total Value

Weapons/Services

Qatar

$23.6 billion

  • 12 UH-60M Blackhawk Utility Helicopters
  • 10 MH-60R Seahawk Multi-Mission Helicopters
  • 24 AH-64D Apache Block III Longbow
    Attack Helicopters
  • 700 AGM-114K3A or AGM-114R3 Hellfire
    tactical missiles
  • 2 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Fire Units
  • 11 Patriot Configuration-3 Modernized Fire Units
  • 7 M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
    (HIMARS) Launchers with various rockets

Republic of Korea

$8.8 billion

  • 8 MH-60R Seahawk Multi-Mission Helicopters
  • 18 UGM-84L Harpoon Block II All-Up-Round Missiles
  • 367 CBU-105D/B Wind Corrected Munition Dispenser (WCMD) Sensor Fuzed Weapons
  • 36 AH-64D Apache Longbow Block III Attack Helicopters
  • 36 AH-1Z Cobra Attack Helicopters
  • 4 RQ-4 Block 30 (I) Global Hawk Remotely
    Piloted Aircraft

Saudi Arabia

$8.2 billion

  • 10 Link-16 capable data link systems and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) suites
  • 20 C-130J-30 Aircraft and 5 KC-130J Air Refueling Aircraft
  • Spare parts in support of M1A2 Abrams Tanks, M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, equipment, support vehicles and other related logistics support
  • Technical services to recertify the functional shelf life of up to 300 Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) (MIM-104D) Guidance Enhanced Missiles
  • Follow-on support and services for the Royal Saudi Air Force

Australia

$1.7 billion

  • 12 EA-18G Modification Kits to convert F/A-18F aircrafts to the G configuration

Japan

$1.6 billion

  • Provide regeneration, overhaul, modifications and support for 6 KC-130R aircraft and associated engines
  • 4 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) aircraft with an option to purchase an additional 38 F-35 CTOL aircraft
  • Upgrade of previously provided Aegis Combat Systems

Below are all 26 countries that sought U.S. arms exports in 2012 according to FMS notifications and the total value of their identified requests (in billions of U.S. dollars):

Country

Total Value
($ Billions)

Qatar

23.56

Korea

8.81

Saudi Arabia

8.24

Australia

1.70

Japan

1.59

Indonesia

1.51

UAE

1.17

Morocco

1.12

Poland

.647

Israel

.647

Iraq

.613

Singapore

.435

Mexico

.412

Kuwait

.409

United Kingdom

.300

Norway

.300

Oman

.299

Finland

.264

Thailand

.253

Brazil

.233

Bangladesh

.180

Turkey

.140

Belgium

.88

Columbia

.87

Lebanon

.63

Netherlands

.60

Below are the total values of all notified requests each year from 1997 to 2012 in billions of U.S. dollars as compiled each year, in current dollars (unadjusted for inflation):

Year

Total Value
($ Billions, current dollars)

2012 53

2011

25

2010

103

2009

39

2008

75

2007

39

2006

37

2005

12

2004

12

2003

7

2002

16

2001

19

2000

12

1999

21

1998

12

1997

11

 

-Written by Marcus Taylor



 

ENDNOTES
1. The Department of State is also required to report to Congress any commercial sales it approves of “major defense equipment” that amount to $14 million or more, defense articles and services that equal or exceed $50 million, and any items defined as “significant military equipment.” As in the case of FMS sales, Congress can block the sale with a joint resolution of disapproval within 30 calendar days of notification (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea). There are no official compilations of commercial agreement data comparable to the FMS notifications and what exists is often incomplete and less precise than data on government-to-government transactions (Grimmett, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001-2009, Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, September 10, 2010, p. 23). The annual Section 655 report, prepared by the State and Defense Departments for Congress, details commercial licenses approved, but states have four years to act under the licenses. The State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls has final responsibility for license applications for commercial defense trade exports and all issues related to defense trade compliance, enforcement, and reporting.

2. Congress approved the higher notification thresholds for NATO members, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand in legislation passed in September 2002. South Korea was added to this list in 2008, and Israel was added in 2010.

Sources: Congressional Research Service, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and Department of State.

Conventional Arms Issues

Subject Resources:

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Posted: December 31, 1969

The Missile Technology Control Regime at a Glance

December 2012

Press Contacts: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107; Kelsey Davenport, Nonproliferation Analyst, (202) 463-8270 x102

Updated: December 2012

The Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines and Annex

Established in April 1987, the voluntary Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) aims to limit the spread of ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems that could be used for chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks. The regime urges its 34 members,1 which include most of the world's key missile manufacturers, to restrict their exports of missiles and related technologies capable of carrying a 500-kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers or delivering any type of weapon of mass destruction.2

Since its inception, the MTCR has been credited with slowing or stopping several missile programs by making it difficult for prospective buyers to get what they want or stigmatizing certain activities and programs. Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq abandoned their joint Condor II ballistic missile program. Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan also shelved or eliminated missile or space launch vehicle programs. Some Eastern European countries, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, destroyed their ballistic missiles, in part, to better their chances of joining MTCR.3 The regime has further hampered Libyan and Syrian missile efforts.

Yet, the regime has its limitations. Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan continue to advance their missile programs. All four countries, with varying degrees of foreign assistance, have deployed medium-range ballistic missiles that can travel more than 1,000 kilometers and are exploring missiles with much greater ranges. These countries, which are not MTCR members, are also becoming sellers rather than simply buyers on the global arms market. North Korea, for example, is viewed as the primary source of ballistic missile proliferation in the world today. Iran has supplied missile production items to Syria.

How the MTCR Works

Each MTCR member is supposed to establish national export control policies for ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, space launch vehicles, drones, remotely piloted vehicles, sounding rockets, and underlying components and technologies that appear on the regime's Material and Technology Annex. Members can add items to or subtract them from the annex through consensus decisions.

The annex is divided into two separate groupings of items, Category I and Category II. Category I includes complete missiles and rockets, major sub-systems, and production facilities. Specialized materials, technologies, propellants, and sub-components for missiles and rockets comprise Category II.

Potential exports of Category I and II items are to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Approval for Category I exports is supposed to be rare. The regime's guidelines, which set out criteria for weighing possible exports, instruct members that "there will be a strong presumption to deny" Category I transfers. No exports of production facilities are to be authorized. MTCR restrictions for Category II exports are less severe, largely because many items in the category also have civilian uses. Members, however, are still asked to exercise caution in making such deals. No member can veto another's exports.

The MTCR identifies five factors that members should take into account when evaluating a possible export of controlled items:

  • Whether the intended recipient is pursuing or has ambitions for acquiring weapons of mass destruction;
  • The purposes and capabilities of the intended recipient's missile and space programs;
  • The potential contribution the proposed transfer could make to the intended recipient's development of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction;
  • The credibility of the intended recipient's stated purpose for the purchase; and
  • Whether the potential transfer conflicts with any multilateral treaty.

MTCR members are asked to obtain an assurance from the intended recipient that it will only use the export for the purpose claimed when requesting the deal. Members are also to secure a pledge from the intended recipient that it will not transfer the requested item or any replicas or derivatives to a third party without permission.

Because the regime is voluntary and the decision to export is the sole responsibility of each member, the MTCR has no penalties for transfers of controlled items. However, U.S. law mandates that Washington sanction entities-individuals, companies, or governments (whether they are MTCR members or not)-exporting MTCR-controlled items to certain countries identified as proliferators or potential threats to U.S. security. Sanctions may also be levied if the United States judges the transfer contrary to the MTCR. Typically, Washington prohibits the charged entity from signing contracts, receiving aid, or buying arms from the U.S. government for a period of two years. Sometimes the penalties can be imposed for longer lengths of time or extended to commercial imports and exports as well.

Outside the MTCR

Several countries have pledged to abide by the MTCR without joining it. Israel, Romania, and the Slovak Republic have all committed to maintaining export controls consistent with the regime.

After several years of U.S. curtail its sale of missiles and missile technologies, China announced in November 2000 that it would not help other countries build ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Beijing, which was a key contributor to Pakistan's missile development, and has in the past provided sensetive technology to countries like North Korea and Iran, also pledged that it would issue a comprehensive list of controlled items requiring government approval before export. That list, however, was not published until August 2002. In 2004, China applied for MTCR membership, and, at the time, voluntarily pledged to follow the regime's export control guidelines. Although China no longer sells complete missile systems and has tightened its export controls, its membership was rejected due to concerns that Chinese entities continued to provide sensitive technologies to countries developing ballistic missiles, such as North Korea.

In 2008 India voluntarily committed to following the MTCR export control guidelines, since that time the United States has been working to secure India's membership in the regime. India's announcment was made shortly before the Nuclear Suppliers Group granted an exemption to India. New Dehli continues to develop its own ballistic missile program.

MTCR members spearheaded a voluntary November 2002 initiative, the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (formerly known as the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation), calling on all countries to show greater restraint in their own development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and to reduce their existing missile arsenals if possible. The aim of the initiative is to establish a norm against missiles that could be armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads. As part of the initiative, participating countries are to annually exchange information on their ballistic missile and space launch vehicle programs, as well as provide advance notice of any launches of ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles. The Hague Code of Conduct has 134 member states, including all MTCR members except Brazil. Brazil has expressed concerns about how the initiative might affect its space program.

Notes:

1. MTCR members, followed by the year they joined the regime, are: Argentina (1993), Australia (1990), Austria (1991), Belgium (1990), Brazil (1995), Bulgaria (2004), Canada (1987), the Czech Republic (1998), Denmark (1990), Finland (1991), France (1987), Germany (1987), Greece (1992), Hungary (1993), Iceland (1993), Ireland (1992), Italy (1987), Japan (1987), Luxembourg (1990), the Netherlands (1990), New Zealand (1991), Norway (1990), Poland (1998), Portugal (1992), Russia (1995), South Africa (1995), South Korea (2001) Spain (1990), Sweden (1991), Switzerland (1992), Turkey (1997), Ukraine (1998), the United Kingdom (1987), and the United States (1987).

2. Originally, the MTCR was limited to stopping the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles, which was defined as a missile able to travel at least 300 kilometers with a 500-kilogram payload. Five hundred kilograms was considered the minimum weight of a first generation nuclear warhead, while 300 kilometers was believed to be the minimum distance needed to carry out a strategic strike. Members agreed in the summer of 1992 to expand the regime's objective to also apply to missiles and related technologies designed for chemical and biological weapons. That change took effect in January 1993. The move effectively tasked members with a making a more difficult and subjective assessment about an importer's intentions, as opposed to denying a specific capability (a missile able to deliver a 500-kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers), because many more missiles and unmanned delivery vehicles could be adapted to deliver lighter chemical and biological weapons payloads.

3. Prospective MTCR members must win consensus approval from existing members. U.S. policy is that new members that are not recognized nuclear-weapon states must eliminate or forgo ballistic missiles able to deliver a 500-kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers. The United States, however, made an exception in 1998 for Ukraine, permitting it to retain Scud missiles. Three years later, Washington also agreed to let South Korea develop missiles with ranges up to 300 kilometers to secure its membership in the MTCR. Seoul previously agreed in 1979 to limit its missile development to those with ranges less than 180 kilometers. South Korea was granted another extension in October 2012. Seoul and Washington reached an agreement allowing South Korea to extend the range of its ballistic missiles to 800 kilometers with a 500 kilogram payload. This extension will allow Seoul to target all of North Korea from any part of South Korea.

Nuclear/Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

Posted: December 31, 1969

Hotline Agreements

December 2012

Press Contact: Kelsey Davenport,
Nonproliferation Analyst, (202) 463-8270 x102


Updated: November 2012

Hotline Agreements

A hotline is a quick communication link between heads of states, which is designed to reduce the danger of an accident, miscalculation or a surprise attack, and especially an incident that might trigger a nuclear war.

1963 Memorandum of Understanding
On June 20, 1963, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the "Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link," also known as the hotline agreement, which was designed to help speed up communications between the two governments and prevent the possibility of accidental nuclear war. It is no coincidence that the agreement came just a few months after the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis, when the United States and the Soviet Union came to the brink of nuclear conflict. The new agreement was designed to forestall such a crisis in the future.

The hotline agreement held each government responsible for the arrangements for the communications link on their territories respectively. The hotline would comprise of a full-time duplex wire telegraph circuit with two terminal points with teletype equipment routed between Washington and Moscow via London, Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Helsinki and a full-time duplex radiotelegraph routed through Stockholm-Helsinki-Moscow. In case the wire circuit was interrupted, messages would be transmitted via radio circuit.[1]

It is a misleading belief that the hotline was a red telephone that sat in the Oval Office of the White house. The first generation of the hotline had no voice element and actually resided in the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon. “It was decided that if the leaders spoke over the telephone they would have to rely too heavily on rapid translation. Printed messages would provide greater clarity and give either party time to reflect before replying.”[2] The Washington–London link was originally carried over the TAT-1, the first submarine transatlantic telephone cable. Such a design prevented spontaneous verbal communications, which could lead to misunderstanding and misperceptions.

A secondary radio line was routed between Washington, D.C. and Moscow via Tangier. American teletype machines had been installed in the Kremlin to receive messages from Washington; Soviet teletypes were installed in the Pentagon. Both nations also exchanged encoding devices in order to decipher the messages. The transmission of a message from one nation to another would take just a few minutes. The messages then were translated.

First Use of the Hotline

The hotline significantly reduced the time required for direct communication between the heads of the two governments from hours to minutes. In August 1963, the system was ready to be tested. On August 30, 1963 the United States sent its first message to the Soviet Union over the hotline: "The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog's back 1234567890."

The message used every letter and number key on the teletype machine in order to see that each was in working order. The return message from Moscow was in Russian, but it indicated that all of the keys on the Soviet teletype were also functioning.[3]

The hotline was first used by the United States and Russia in 1967 during the Six Day War between Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria to clarify the intentions of fleet movements in the Mediterranean that could have been interpreted as hostile. Thereby, the Soviet Union and the United States intended to reassure each other that they did not wish to be militarily involved in the crisis and did not make efforts to bring about a ceasefire. Throughout the duration of the Six Days War, the two sides used the hotline almost two dozen times for a variety of purposes. Richard Nixon also used it during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and again during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. During the Reagan Administration, the hotline was used several more times.[4] However, an official listing of the instances when the states used the hotline never has been released to the public.

Modern Version of U.S.–Russian Nuclear Hotline
In the 1970s, the hotline was improved with better technologies. In 1971, the two sides signed the hotline modernization agreement. Under this agreement, the United States was to provide one circuit via the Intelsat system, and the Soviet Union a circuit via its Molniya system. The 1963 radio circuit was terminated, and the wire telegraph was retained as a back-up.[5]

The hotline had undergone several more upgrades to include facsimile transmission and was renamed as the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) in 1987. The Center used both U.S. and Soviet satellites to transmit facsimile data. Later that year, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) was signed making the NRRC system the official channel for all data exchanges and notifications required under the treaty. Use of the NRRC network was expanded even further with the signing of START I in 1991, and its entry into force in 1994. [6]

"Although used primarily for the exchange of notifications under existing bilateral and multilateral treaties, the NRRC has periodically proved its use in other areas as well. In January 1991, goodwill notifications were used to exchange information on the re-entry of the Salyut 7 space station. Later that same year the NRRCs served as a means of emergency communications during a major fire in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow."[7] The hotline between Moscow and Washington still exists, despite improved relations and the end of the Cold War. Over the years, it has been upgraded keeping apace with the technological development. The former C.I.A. director and defense secretary, Robert Gates, has said that the hotline will remain an important tool for "as long as these two sides have submarines roaming the oceans and missiles pointed at each other." [8]

Other Bilateral Hotline Agreements

Once the hotline between Washington and Moscow proved to be useful, other states established hotlines. In 1966, France signed an accord establishing a direct communications link between Paris and Moscow. Under the 1967 British-Soviet agreement, a direct communications line was set up between Moscow and London.

Russia–China Nuclear Notline
In 1998, Beijing established head-of-state hotlines with Russia and the United States. In April 1996, during Russian President Yeltsin’s third summit meeting in Beijing, the two sides agreed to maintain regular dialogues at various levels and through multiple channels, including a governmental telephone hotline. On May 3, 1998, a hotline between China and Russia finally began operating. This is the first time Beijing has established a hotline with the head of a foreign state.[9] Ten years later, in March 2008, a hotline between the Chinese and Russian Defense Ministries was established to enhance bilateral cooperation between the two states. The Russian and Chinese were exchanging their views on the international and regional situation as well as other issues of common concern.[10]

U.S.–China Nuclear Hotline
In April 1998, China’s minister of Foreign Affairs Tang Jiaxuan and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright signed an agreement to establish a hotline between the governments of the two countries. The hotline was activated during President Clinton’s visit to China in June 1998.[11]

India–Pakistan Nuclear Hotline
In 2004 India and Pakistan agreed to set up a telephone hotline between the most senior officials in their foreign ministries respectively to prevent a nuclear incident. The two states have fought three wars since they both gained independence in 1947, and were dangerously teetering on the brink of nuclear conflict in 2002. In 2004, along with the establishment of the hotline, both states limited command and control structures, and reaffirmed that each side would continue to uphold the moratorium on nuclear tests.[12]
After the 2008 Mumbai attacks from Pakistan had upset the relations between the two states. Three years later in 2011, India and Pakistan set up a “terror hotline”. The hotline warns each party state of possible militant attacks and moves them to restore the trust between each other.

South Korea–China Defense Hotline
In 2008, South Korea and China set up telephone hotlines between their navies and air forces to help prevent accidental clashes. However, the hotline has reportedly been used only a handful of times, and never to test procedures in a simulated crisis. South Korea and China agreed on July 31, 2012 to establish an additional high-level hotline between their defense chiefs in an effort to strengthen military cooperation, officials in Seoul said.[13]

India-China Hotline

In April 2010, the prime ministers of China and India agreed to det up a hotline to better avoid flare-ups over a longstanding border dispute across the Himalayas, and to strengthen their diplomatic ties. "The agreement to establish a hotline is an important confidence-building measure and it opens up a direct channel of communication between the two leaders," India's foreign secretary, Nirupama Rao, told reporters ar a press conference in Beijing.[14]

Vietnam-China Hotline
A hotline between the Vietnamese and the Chinese Mnistries of Foreign Affairs was established in March 2012. In their talk on the line, the ministers affirmed their will to strengthen the Vietnam-China comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership. [15]

Research Assistance by Daria Medvedeva

Endnotes:

1. The text of the memorandum: http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4785.htm

2. Blacker C.D., Duffy G. (Stanford Arms Control Group). “International arms control”, Standford University Press. 1984.

3. “August 30, 1963: The U.S.-Soviet "hotline" goes into operation”, This day in History, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/the-us-soviet-hot-line-goes-into-operation

4. The Learning Network, “Aug. 30, 1963 | Communications ‘Hotline’ Connects Soviet and U.S. Heads of State”, The New York Times, Aug.30, 2011 http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/aug-30-1963-communications-hot-line-connects-soviet-and-u-s-heads-of-state/

5. Goldblat J. “Agreements for Arms Control: A Critical Survey”. SIPRI. Taylor and Francis Ltd, 1982.  p.73

6.Krass Allan S. The United States and Arms Control. The Challenge of Leadership. Westport, Connecticut. Praeger 1997  p.77

7. Pakistan and India: Can NRRCs Help Strengthen Peace? Colonel Rafi uz Zaman Khan. Occasional paper N.49. December 2002. Stimson Center

8. The Learning Network, “Aug. 30, 1963 | Communications ‘Hotline’ Connects Soviet and U.S. Heads of State”, The New York Times, Aug.30, 2011 http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/aug-30-1963-communications-hot-line-connects-soviet-and-u-s-heads-of-state/

9. Liao Xin, “New Relations Between China and Russia,” Beijing Review in English (FBIS-CHI-97-363, December 1997), 7-8. Grigoriy Arslanov, “Russia: Hotline for Russia’s Yeltsin’s Jiang Now Operational,” Moscow ITAR-TASS in English (FBIS-SOV-98-125, 5 May 98). From “Military Confidence-Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait" by Kenneth W.Allen. http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/cbmapstraits.pdf

10. Hogg Ch. Army phone links China and Russia. BBC News, Beijing. December 29,  2008 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7803028.stm

11. Liao Xin, “New Relations Between China and Russia,” Beijing Review in English (FBIS-CHI-97-363, December 1997), 7-8. Grigoriy Arslanov, “Russia: Hotline for Russia’s Yeltsin’s Jiang Now Operational,” Moscow ITAR-TASS in English (FBIS-SOV-98-125, 5 May 98). From “Military Confidence-Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait" by Kenneth W.Allen. http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/cbmapstraits.pdf

12. India and Pakistan set up hotline. BBC News. 20 June, 2004 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3822751.stm

13. Choi He-suk. Seoul, Beijing to set up defense hotline. The Korea Herald. http://www.asianewsnet.net/home/news.php?sec=1&id=34296

14. India, China set up hotline to ease border dispute. By Mian Ridge. The Christian Science Monitor. April 8, 2010 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2010/0408/India-China-set-up-hotline-to-ease-border-dispute

15. The voice of Vietnam. Hotline set up between Chinese, Vietnamese foreign ministries. Feb. 3, 2012 http://english.vov.vn/Home/Hotline-set-up-between-Chinese-Vietnamese-foreign-ministries/20123/135342.vov

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Strategic Arms Control and Policy

Posted: December 31, 1969

Cluster Munitions at a Glance

November 2012

Press Contact: Daryl Kimball,
Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107


Updated: November 2012

Cluster munitions, also called cluster bombs or CBUs, are gravity bombs, artillery shells, and rockets that fragment into small bomblets or grenades. Some cluster munitions disperse only two bomblets while others can spread up to hundreds of submunitions over a large area. These weapons are designed for use against massed formations of troops and armor or broad targets, such as airfields. Cluster submunitions, however, sometimes fail to explode on impact and can kill or maim civilians who later come into contact with them. These unexploded submunitions may remain dangerous for decades. According to Cluster Munition Monitor 2010, at least 16,816 cluster munition casualties have been confirmed through the end of 2009. About 14,700 came from unexploded submunitions, and about 2,000 from strikes. Estimated totals, however, are considered much higher, and according to the Monitor, “are likely a better indicator of the true numbers.” Estimates for a global total range from 58,000 to 85,000. Almost all reported cluster munition casualties have been civilians, in large part because of the unwillingness of militaries to provide information.[1]

Cluster munitions have been used during armed conflict in 36 countries and four disputed territories since the end of World War II. Almost every part of the world has experienced cluster munition use at some point over the past 70 years, including Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. Although cluster munitions first saw use in World War II and more than 50 countries have since acquired stockpiles of such arms, efforts to regulate or ban the use of cluster munitions gained greater attention and momentum after the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, a Shiite organization that the United States identifies as a terrorist group. Israel’s extensive cluster munitions use in the last 72 hours of that conflict resulted in an estimated one million unexploded bomblets scattered across southern Lebanon, arousing some strong condemnation. Jan Egeland, then-UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, blasted Israel’s use of cluster munitions as “shocking and completely immoral.”

The CCW Process

The CCW regulates certain indiscriminate or inhumane conventional weapons, such as landmines, incendiary weapons, and blinding lasers. In 2003, CCW states-parties approved a new protocol on so-called explosive remnants of war—abandoned or unexploded artillery shells, rockets, grenades, landmines, and other ordnance. Each CCW state-party that agrees to be bound by that new protocol is obligated to clean up such battlefield remnants after hostilities end. While the protocol addresses unexploded cluster submunitions, it does not restrict their initial use.
At a November 2006 CCW Review Conference, a group of states, including Austria, the Holy See, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden, sought CCW negotiation of a new protocol on cluster munitions. The CCW operates by consensus and some other countries, most notably Russia and the United States, opposed such talks. The states-parties, however, agreed to convene a June 2007 group of governmental experts meeting to study the matter.

On November 25, 2011, after four years of intensive negotiations, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) failed to reach an agreement on a new protocol to regulate cluster munitions. The most significant opposition to the protocol came from a number of nonproducing countries that are signatories to the most comprehensive international treaty on cluster bombs―the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). The International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN High Commission for Human Rights, and many international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also criticized the text at the review conference. The CCM prohibits a much wider array of cluster munitions than the CCW. Major producers of cluster munitions have not signed the CCM, but are party to the CCW.[2]

Convention on Cluster Munitions

Frustrated with the slow-moving CCW approach, Norway at the November 2006 conference announced an alternative effort to negotiate a treaty on cluster munitions. The inaugural meeting of that effort convened February 2007 in Oslo. Of the 49 governments attending the conference, 46 ultimately signed the “Oslo Declaration” to “conclude, by 2008, a legally binding instrument that will…prohibit the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.”

Much of the debate among participating governments over the future treaty has centered on two issues. The first is whether future use restrictions should take effect immediately or, as Germany has argued, be phased in to allow time for the development of alternative weapons. The second is whether the treaty should outlaw all cluster munitions or permit some exemptions for certain types or for their use in certain circumstances. Sweden has called for a treaty balancing “legitimate humanitarian and military interests,” while the United Kingdom has sought exemptions for systems equipped with self-destruct or self-deactivation devices that are supposed to render unexploded munitions harmless after a short period of time. Other countries, such as Norway, Ireland, and Mexico, favor a total ban.

The Cluster Munition Coalition is an international civil society campaign working to eradicate cluster munitions, prevent further casualties from these weapons and put an end for all time to the suffering they cause. Its 350 member organizations in some 100 countries include large international NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch as well as smaller nationally based organizations such as the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society and the Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines.[3]
On May 30, 2008 the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions adopted a comprehensive new treaty banning cluster munitions. The 107 states adopted the treaty. The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) is a legally binding international treaty that prohibits the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of cluster munitions and requires clearance of remnants and destruction of stocks. It requires states to provide assistance to survivors and their communities and builds on existing international human rights and humanitarian law. The treaty requires states to destroy existing stockpiles within eight years and to clear contaminated land within 10 years. The obligations relating to victim assistance are groundbreaking; they demand the full realization of the rights of people affected by cluster munitions and require states to implement effective victim assistance measures.[4]

The Convention on Cluster Munitions was signed by 94 countries at the Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008, and entered into force on August 1, 2010, after 30 states ratified it by February 16, 2010. In November 2010, the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (1MSP) took place in Vientiane, Lao PDR. For the first time States Parties to the treaty, UN agencies, international organizations, civil society, and cluster bomb survivors got together to share progress and plans for implementation of the Convention, and drew up a blueprint to translate the treaty into action.[5] After holding their First Meeting of States Parties in Lao PDR in November 2010, States Parties convened in Lebanon, another highly contaminated country, for the convention’s Second Meeting of States Parties on September 12–16, 2011. At the meeting, States Parties adopted the Beirut Progress Report, charting implementation of the Vientiane Action Plan, which guides the work of the convention through to its First Review Conference in 2015.

Status of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions

A total of 74 signatories had ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions as of 11 October 2012. States Parties include former producers and users of cluster munitions such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (UK). 42 countries that have used, produced, exported, or stockpiled cluster munitions have joined the convention, thereby committing to never engage in those activities again. Since the convention entered into force on August 1, 2010, becoming binding international law, states can no longer sign, but must instead accede. Three countries have acceded, all during 2011: Grenada, Swaziland, and Trinidad and Tobago.

A total of 12 signatories have ratified the convention since August 2011, including countries where cluster munitions have been used (Afghanistan and Mauritania), former cluster munition producers (Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland), and countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions (Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Czech Republic, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Mauritania, Sweden, and Switzerland), as well as Cameroon, Dominican Republic, and Togo.

Unilateral restrictions on use

The US confirmed in November 2011 that its policy on cluster munitions is still guided by a June 2008 US Department of Defense directive requiring that any US use of cluster munitions before 2018 that results in a 1 percent or higher unexploded ordnance (UXO) rate—which includes all but a tiny fraction of the US arsenal—must be approved by a “Combatant Commander,” a very high-ranking military official. After 2018, the US will no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than 1 percent UXO.

Several states that have not joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions have imposed restrictions on the possible future use of cluster munitions. Romania has said it restricts the use of cluster munitions to use exclusively on its own territory. Poland has said it would use cluster munitions for defensive purposes only, and does not intend to use them outside its own territory. Estonia, Finland, and Slovakia have made similar declarations. During the CCW negotiations on cluster munitions, several states that have not signed or ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions publicly stated that they were prepared to accept a ban on the use of cluster munitions produced before 1980 as part of the proposed CCW protocol, including Russia, China, India, and South Korea. The CMC urges that as an interim measure toward joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions, these states should to institute the commitment made at CCW as national policy.[6]

U.S. Cluster Munitions Policy

The United States is a producer and exporter of cluster bombs. It stockpiles cluster munitions containing between 700 million and one billion submunitions.[7] In 2001, the United States adopted a policy that all cluster munitions produced domestically after late 2004 must have submunitions with failure rates of less than one percent. As with all U.S. arms exports, transfers of cluster munitions are governed by conditions restricting their re-transfer and use by importers. One such agreement applies to U.S. cluster munitions shipped to Israel. Although secret, the agreement is generally understood to prohibit the use of cluster munitions in populated areas and against targets that are not clearly military. Following the 2006 conflict in Lebanon, the Department of State’s Office of Defense Trade Controls opened an investigation into whether Israel had violated the agreement. State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack said that the preliminary report, delivered to the president and Congress in January 2007, found that “there may likely could have been some violations.” Should the United States sanction Israel for misusing cluster munitions it would not be the first time. The Ronald Reagan administration suspended cluster munitions sales to Israel between 1982 and 1988 following Israel’s widespread use of such arms during an earlier invasion of Lebanon.

The United States for some time had opposed negotiations on cluster munitions. At the November 2006 CCW Review Conference, Washington insisted that governments focus on implementing existing protocols and “not on negotiating new rules on cluster munitions.” But at the June 2007 CCW experts meeting the United States did an about face and said it would be willing to negotiate on cluster munitions. Ronald Bettauer, head of the U.S. delegation, attributed the reversal “to the importance of this issue, concerns raised by other countries, and our own concerns about the humanitarian implications of these weapons.” Department of State Legal Adviser Harold Koh stated November 9, 2009, that the United States has determined that it’s “national security interests cannot be fully ensured consistent with the terms” of the CCM. However, the United States has agreed to address the humanitarian aspects of cluster munitions use in the CCW. Koh stated that “the United States remains committed to negotiate a legally binding Protocol on Cluster Munitions in the CCW.”

In a November 25, 2012 statement, the United States said that it would continue to implement the DOD policy on cluster munitions issued June 19, 2008. This policy recognizes the need to minimize harm to civilians and infrastructure but also reaffirms the contention that “cluster munitions are legitimate weapons with clear military utility.” The central directive in the Pentagon’s new policy is the unwaivable requirement that cluster munitions used after 2018 must leave less than one percent of unexploded submunitions on the battlefield. Prior to 2018, U.S. use of cluster munitions with a greater than one percent-unexploded ordnance rate must be approved by Combatant Commanders. This policy is believed to permit the development of a new generation of cluster munitions less dangerous to civilians.[8]

Regional meetings against cluster bombs

On May 30, 2012, a meeting to further the global fight against cluster bombs held in Accra. 34 African countries adopted an action plan with the ultimate aim of a cluster munition-free Africa. The Accra Universalization Action Plan lays out practical steps states should take to promote and achieve continent-wide membership of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, which comprehensively prohibits the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of these weapons. The document reaffirms the partnership between states, the UN, and civil society to achieve the goals of the treaty and ensure it is fully implemented at the national level.[9]

Research Assistance by Daria Medvedeva


Endnotes:

1. Meeting the Challenge Protecting Civilians through the Convention on Cluster Munitions. November 2010. A report by Human Rights Watch. P.69

2. Farrah Zughni. Cluster Munitions Protocol Fails. ACT Dec. 2011

3. Cluster Munition Coalition. http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/the-coalition/members/

4. CMC Briefing Paper on the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Cluster Munition Coalition http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/cmc-briefing-paper-on-ccm.pdf

5. First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Cluster Munition Coalition http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/1msp/

6. Cluster Munition Monitor 2012  September 2012 by Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor  http://www.the-monitor.org/cmm/2012/pdf/Cluster_Munition_Monitor_2012.pdf

7. Landmine and cluster munition monitor. http://the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=2009&pqs_type=cm&pqs_report=usa&pqs_section=

8. Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress. Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22907.pdf p.4-5

9. Africa unites against cluster bombs. Cluster Munition Coalition http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news/?id=3679

 

 

 

Conventional Arms Issues

Fact Sheet Categories:

Posted: December 31, 1969

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