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Bloomberg News
August 27, 2018
Iraq

UN Talks With Iraq Fail to Yield Progress on Weapons Inspections

Alex Wagner

Marking his first high-level discussions with Baghdad since May 2001, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan met with Iraqi representatives March 7 in New York but was unable to persuade them to permit the return of international weapons inspectors.

Although the talks produced no progress on Iraq’s refusal to readmit inspectors, in violation of Security Council resolutions and the terms of the 1991 Persian Gulf War cease-fire, Annan remained positive, calling the talks “a good start.” Speaking after briefing the Security Council March 8, Annan said he had continued to demand no conditions on inspections and unimpeded access to suspected Iraqi weapons sites.

After the March 7 meeting, Annan’s spokesman, Fred Ekhart, described the dialogue as “frank and useful.” According to another UN official, the “cordial” atmosphere of the talks was decidedly different than previous discussions, due largely to the personal style of Foreign Minister Naji Sabri, who led the Iraqi delegation. The official said that, although Sabri did not accept the terms of UN Resolution 1284, he did not reject them either.

Resolution 1284, passed in December 1999, created the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and charged it with completing Iraq’s disarmament. UNMOVIC succeeded the now-defunct UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), which was withdrawn from Iraq in late 1998 prior to U.S.-led air strikes.

Although apparently willing to allow some sort of inspections to resume, Iraq has reportedly demanded prenotification of inspection times and sites, as well as a predetermined timetable for how long inspections can continue—conditions that the United States considers unacceptable.

Perhaps most noteworthy about the dialogue was the willingness of the Iraqi delegation, which included Baghdad’s international weapons inspection liaison, Major General Hussan Amin, to meet for the first time with UNMOVIC chairman Hans Blix. In his March 8 remarks, Annan termed the presence of Blix and Amin “significant,” calling it “an indication” that Iraq is “taking this issue seriously.”

James Cunningham, U.S. deputy ambassador to the UN, was more pessimistic about the meeting, telling reporters that the secretary-general “did not get a positive response from the Iraqis.” Cunningham, however, commended Annan for keeping the focus “where it should be, properly,” that is, on implementation of Security Council resolutions as opposed to Iraq’s grievances with the 11-year sanctions regime.

Annan will meet again with Sabri in New York on April 18 and 19.

U.S. Intentions

The UN meeting came as Vice President Richard Cheney traveled to Middle East capitals in a quest to gauge support for U.S. military intervention against Iraq, but in a March 11 interview on The News Hour with Jim Lehrer, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice stressed that Cheney was not seeking to warn U.S. friends and allies in the region about an impending attack.

Some analysts have suggested that the U.S. push for inspections, which it believes Iraq will reject, is being carried out simply to force a showdown that would facilitate military action. Washington, in making its case for regime change, has repeatedly emphasized the threat that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein poses to the world and to his own people. At a March 13 press conference, President George W. Bush said that “all options are on the table” regarding action in Iraq, calling Hussein “a problem” his administration was “going to deal with.”

Although he acknowledged that the Bush administration has “made very clear” that “the region would be better off with a different regime in Baghdad,” Cunningham disputed suggestions that the United States considered the UN dialogue with Iraq merely “a sideshow.”

Russia has taken issue with the “personalization” of the U.S. approach to Iraq. In a March 17 interview on Meet the Press, Russian Defense Minister Sergi Ivanov said that “the problem is not with Saddam Hussein…[but] with weapons of mass destruction.” When asked if Moscow would support a military operation to change the Iraqi regime, Ivanov said only that he hoped the United States would inform Russia if it made such a decision.

Name-Calling or Nonproliferation?

Daryl G. Kimball

In a potent political one-liner delivered in January, President George W. Bush prominently labeled Iran, Iraq, and North Korea an “axis of evil” that is supporting terrorism and seeking weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. While the threat of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction is real, the problems of terrorism and proliferation are not identical and cannot be addressed with a one-size-fits-all approach.

The president is to be commended for focusing attention on the ongoing threat of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile proliferation in dangerous regions. But his gratuitous name-calling in the absence of practical, country-specific nonproliferation strategies has complicated the task of addressing proliferation problems, particularly in North Korea.

Bush’s statement puts North Korea and Iran in the same category as Iraq and has raised concerns about military action against all three. Our friends and allies may eventually agree to collective military action to enforce Security Council mandates for UN weapons inspections in Iraq, but leaders in South Korea, Japan, and Europe correctly understand that the most effective approach to Pyongyang is resuming the North-South-U.S. dialogue.

While in Seoul for a February state visit, Bush had to clarify that the United States “has no intention of invading North Korea,” and he reiterated his administration’s willingness to talk “anytime, anywhere” with Pyongyang on a range of security issues. Yet, in the same speech, he repeated harsh recriminations that substantially undermine the possibility that the North will re-engage. The president’s tough talk may play well in Washington’s conservative political circles, but it has plunged the United States and North Korea into another cycle of mistrust and missed opportunity.

Rather than launching verbal jabs and waiting for the North to resume the security dialogue, the United States should take concrete steps on the most significant issues: averting a looming crisis on the implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework to dismantle Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program and resuming negotiations on a verifiable freeze of the North’s ballistic missile enterprise. To start, Bush should appoint a new, high-level coordinator for North Korea policy. The coordinator’s first task would be to bring some practical ideas and proposals—not harsh recriminations—to the bargaining table.

The Agreed Framework is a good, but imperfect, deal that both parties must honor. Under the agreement, the United States is facilitating construction of two safeguarded light-water nuclear power reactors, and, in exchange, North Korea is to verifiably abandon its nuclear weapons program. So far, this deal has effectively frozen Pyongyang’s nuclear program, but difficulties lie ahead.

North Korea will soon be obligated to comply with all International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, which prohibit military nuclear activities. It must do so when a “significant portion” of the two light-water nuclear power reactors are completed but before delivery of their nuclear components. Due to construction delays, a significant portion of the reactors will not be built until approximately 2005. IAEA inspection of declared and undeclared nuclear facilities in North Korea could take two to three years. Further slippage could set off a new high-stakes confrontation.

Prompt initiation of inspections is important, even though the Agreed Framework does not yet require North Korea to admit the IAEA. If the Bush administration is interested in results, it should re-affirm its support for the Agreed Framework, not threaten to stop implementation as some in Congress have suggested. Working with South Korea and Japan, Bush should, if necessary, be prepared to offer incentives—including in-kind food and electricity aid—for North Korean cooperation on early inspections. Such an arrangement could simultaneously improve the likelihood of completing the inspections and address shortcomings in the Agreed Framework’s implementation.

Through dialogue, not diatribes, Bush also has an opportunity to halt North Korea’s ballistic missile program—a prime source of global missile proliferation. In the final days of the Clinton administration, negotiators reportedly came “tantalizingly close” to an agreement. Sadly, the Bush administration has failed to pursue this possibility, though it is clearly in U.S. security interests. Given the North’s pledge to halt missile testing through 2003, there is still a window of opportunity to secure a sufficiently verifiable agreement that bans further missile exports, production, and testing and that bars further missile deployments.

Though Kim Jong-Il’s regime is difficult, undemocratic, and uninterested in its people’s welfare, history shows that pragmatic, principled engagement with such states can produce results that enhance U.S. security. Unless he is willing to seriously pursue such a course, Bush may fumble one of the United States’ better opportunities to solve one of the world’s thorniest nuclear and missile proliferation challenges.


Security Council Moves Closer To Adopting Iraqi 'Smart Sanctions'

Alex Wagner

The UN Security Council took a step closer to implementing a “smart sanctions” regime in Iraq on November 29 by unanimously agreeing to adopt a once-contentious Goods Review List, which aims to streamline the process of selling civilian goods to Baghdad.

Approved as part of a resolution that renewed the UN oil-for-food program for the eleventh time since 1996, the list contains weapons-related and dual-use items that would require UN approval before being exported to Iraq. The new resolution states that the Security Council intends to adopt the Goods Review List—“subject to any refinements”—for implementation on May 30, when the current phase of the oil-for-food program expires. The list can only be modified with the Security Council’s approval.

Iraqi Ambassador to the UN Mohammed Aldouri signed a memorandum of understanding December 2, accepting the resolution.

Once the list is adopted, Baghdad will be allowed to import—without UN oversight—any civilian, nonweapons, or dual-use items not specifically enumerated on the list. Contracts containing items on the list would need the UN Iraq Sanctions Committee’s approval before export. Proceeds from Iraqi oil sales held in a UN-controlled escrow account would pay for the items.

Under the current regime, all of Baghdad’s nonhumanitarian purchases are subject to UN review. But the arrangement allows Iraq to sell unlimited amounts of oil on the international market, with the proceeds placed in a UN account. The only legal way for Iraq to sell oil is through the oil-for-food program.

By facilitating the flow of civilian goods to Iraq, the “smart sanctions” proposals envisioned by the Bush administration aim to undermine arguments that sanctions are hurting the Iraqi people. It also seeks to tighten the existing sanctions regime to prevent Iraq from using smuggled oil revenues to develop weapons systems.

The planned adoption of the Goods Review List addresses the first point. However, the resolution does not take up the issues of strengthening border controls or cracking down on Iraq’s illegal oil-smuggling relationships with Jordan, Turkey, and Syria. The UN currently tolerates Baghdad’s oil sales to these states, which are conducted outside of the oil-for-food program, because of their importance to these nations’ economies. Iraq can use the revenues from these unaccountable oil sales for weapons purchases because these transactions lack the UN oversight.

A number of proposals for bringing these relationships under UN auspices were included in a draft June resolution put forth by the United Kingdom and backed by the United States, but they were subsequently scuttled by Russian opposition. (See ACT, July/August 2001.) Implementation of such proposals, however, would be difficult because they require Iraq’s neighbors to abandon extremely profitable transactions voluntarily.

Despite the absence of a means to stem Iraqi oil smuggling, U.S. officials appeared satisfied with the resolution. Ambassador John Negroponte, the U.S. permanent representative to the UN, remarked on November 29 that the unanimity with which the Security Council made the decision “should send a signal to Iraq” that the United States is committed to revamping the current sanctions regime. At a December 3 press briefing, Secretary of State Colin Powell said he too was “pleased” with the outcome.

Washington’s key Security Council ally, the United Kingdom, expressed a similar sentiment. On November 30, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw called the Security Council vote “a significant step forward” that demonstrates that the “international community is united over how to apply controls to the Baghdad regime.” Straw went on to say that Iraq is now “free to meet all its civilian needs” while leaving Saddam Hussein “with no excuses for the suffering of the Iraqi people.”

The review list had been the primary sticking point during the Security Council’s consideration of the U.S.-U.K. “smart sanctions” proposal in May and June. At the time, France and China approved the list. But Russia, contesting certain items on the list, refused to endorse the measure and issued a veto threat, forcing Washington and London to postpone the debate to November.

A UN official suggested that, because the revised review list is largely similar to the one proposed in June, Russia’s veto threat had stemmed more from a desire to maintain and possibly expand commercial relations with Iraq than disagreement with the list itself. The official characterized Russia’s turnaround as a “major concession,” noting that the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States had brought Washington and Moscow closer together and focused new attention on the urgency of dealing with Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

While not discounting the value of improved U.S.-Russian relations since September 11, a U.S. official emphasized that stronger French and Chinese support for the list had isolated Russia on the issue. The official explained that France and China officially supported the list in June 2001 because they knew that they could hide behind a Russian veto. Since then, however, negotiations with Washington and London persuaded Paris and Beijing to come out in full support for the arrangement.

The U.S. official was “optimistic” that the Security Council would finalize the list by June, although elements of the list are “likely to change.” The official also said that strong Security Council support could allow Russia to pressure Iraq to allow UN weapons inspectors to return to the country.


U.S. Names Countries Thought to Be Violating BWC

Seth Brugger

During a November 19 speech, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton accused Iraq and North Korea of breaching the terms of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and warned of possible violations by other countries.

Bolton spoke to delegations from BWC member states on the opening day of a conference that is convened in Geneva every five years to review and improve upon the treaty’s implementation. The accord outlaws biological weapons but contains no verification measures.

Bolton told the conference that Washington is “extremely concerned” that some states are engaging in treaty-prohibited activities and is “concerned” about potential use of biological weapons by terrorist groups. Specifically, the undersecretary said that Washington is worried about accused terrorist Osama bin Laden’s “stated intention to use biological weapons against the United States…. We are concerned that he could have been trying to acquire a rudimentary biological weapons capability, possibly with support from a state.”

Beyond this threat, Bolton said that “the most serious concern” is Iraq. “The United States strongly suspects that Iraq has taken advantage of three years of no UN inspections to improve all phases of its offensive BW program. The existence of Iraq’s program is beyond dispute, in complete contravention of the BWC,” Bolton contended.

Washington also believes that North Korea “has a dedicated, national-level effort to achieve a BW [biological weapons] capability and that it has developed and produced, and may have weaponized, BW agents in violation of the convention,” Bolton asserted. “North Korea likely has the capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents for military purposes within weeks of a decision to do so.”

Bolton added that the Bush administration is “quite concerned about Iran, which the United States believes probably has produced and weaponized BW agents in violation of the convention.” Other countries of concern included Libya, Syria, and Sudan, the latter of which is is neither a party to nor a signatory of the BWC. Bolton also said that he could name other states that are pursuing offensive biological weapons programs but that Washington plans to contact them privately.

Bolton’s speech marked a change from past U.S. practice. At previous review conferences, the United States did not name specific countries it believed were violating the convention, except Iraq. Explaining the shift in U.S. tactics, Bolton said, “Prior to September 11, some would have avoided this approach. The world has changed, however, and so must our business-as-usual approach.”

Iran, Iraq, and Libya denied the U.S. charges. According to a source in Geneva, other delegations did not officially comment on the U.S. accusations, believing that “there are already enough substantive problems that we have to deal with here without trying to sidetrack it and begin another debate, arguing whether the United States was correct to do what it did.”


UN Security Council Not Likely To Agree on Iraqi Sanctions

Alex Wagner

As a July 3 deadline approaches, Russian opposition appears likely to prevent the United Nations Security Council from passing a U.S.-endorsed, British draft resolution to revamp the 11-year-old sanctions regime against Iraq.

Since June 20, Security Council technical experts have been discussing a slightly revised version of a British draft resolution initially submitted in May, which would, among other things, allow most commercial transactions with Iraq to proceed and bring all illegal oil-export relationships under UN control.

Over the June 23 weekend, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov sent a letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell, informing him that Russia “cannot allow” passage of the British approach to reshaping the current sanctions regime, which was imposed on Iraq after its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. During a Security Council meeting June 26, Moscow’s ambassador to the UN, Sergey Lavrov, criticized the British draft for burying hopes for ongoing arms monitoring and for damaging the legitimate economic interests of many countries, including Russia.

In response to the British proposal, Lavrov announced submission of a new Russian draft resolution, which purported to present a “comprehensive approach” to resolving the humanitarian crisis in Iraq. Lavrov said that the Russian draft contained “clear criteria for suspending and then lifting sanctions, tied with the deployment” of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), which was created by Security Council Resolution 1284 in December 1999.

State Department spokesman Richard Boucher responded harshly to Russia’s criticisms of the British draft and questioned the motives of “other members of the Security Council, including some with extensive commercial relationships with Iraq.” Boucher called it “ironic that now that the United States has proposed a radical shift in how we deal with Iraq.…some on the Security Council oppose this change despite the fact that they had long advocated it.” Addressing Russia’s rejection of the revised British draft, Boucher shot back, “Our goal is not to allow Iraq what it wants. We have seen where that leads.”

Outside the Security Council on June 26, James Cunningham, acting U.S. representative to the UN, dismissed the Russian draft resolution as having “very little substance” and said that it would “not be a useful basis for discussion.”

Among the other permanent members of the Security Council, the primary point of contention had been the contents of a comprehensive “goods review list,” a catalog of weapons-related and “dual-use” items that would require UN authorization before being imported by Iraq. The list would be composed of three elements: proscribed items identified by UNMOVIC and the International Atomic Energy Agency as related to weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles; conventional and dual-use technology items governed by the Wassenaar Arrangement, a multilateral export control regime; and items detailed in a document proposed by the United States.

However, on June 29, Cunningham announced that Britain, China, France, and the United States had come to an agreement on what items would be included on the goods review list.

Discussions have intensified in the last month, as a general consensus emerged among council members that the current sanctions regime needs to be refocused. The United States had hoped to obtain agreement on altering the sanctions regime by the beginning of June, when the latest six-month phase of the oil-for-food program expired. (See ACT, June 2001.) Unable to come to a decision, the Security Council unanimously approved a resolution June 1 that extended the oil-for-food program for one month in order to provide members more time to consider the available proposals. The resolution declared the council’s desire to work on proposals that would re-energize the sanctions regime and to “consider new arrangements” that would improve both the flow of civilian goods to Iraq and controls on prohibited items.

In response to the short-term rollover of the oil-for-food program, Iraq stopped all of its UN-authorized oil exports, though it continued to export oil to neighboring states illicitly. Unsurprisingly, as the council’s experts met throughout June, Iraq remained highly critical of any approach to alter the existing regime.

France submitted a draft proposal of its own to the Security Council on June 19. Operating from the same basic principles as the British draft, the French resolution differs most notably in that it would allow Jordan and Iraq to maintain an oil-export relationship whose revenues would not be controlled by the UN, permit foreign investment in upgrading Iraq’s oil industry, and allow inspection of cargo flights within Iraq’s borders by UN personnel.

The British draft consents to foreign investment in civilian sectors but not in the oil industry. According to a UN official, France is not likely to oppose adoption of the British draft resolution if the United States and the United Kingdom accept some of the modifications outlined in the French proposal.

China has also expressed concerns regarding Washington’s and London’s attempt to reach a quick decision on such a complex issue, and at the June 26 Security Council session it supported elements of the French draft resolution that allow investment in the Iraqi oil industry and limit interference in oil relationships with Iraq’s neighbors.

A UN official indicated that Beijing has taken a much more constructive approach to the British draft than the Russians, tabling amendments and participating actively in technical experts meetings. It is believed that China does not oppose a resolution to overhaul the regime in principle, and Beijing has yet to indicate that it would veto the British draft should it be brought to a vote.

Were the United States and the United Kingdom able to secure French and Chinese support for the British draft, a UN official suggested it is possible they might push for a vote in order to challenge Russia’s willingness to veto the resolution. No Security Council resolution on the Iraqi situation has been vetoed by a permanent Security Council member. However, abstention by China, France, and Russia on Resolution 1284 has been cited as one of the reasons why Iraq has felt little pressure to comply with its terms.

Cunningham said June 29 that, facing a stalemate, the council will pass another temporary extension of the oil-for-food program, giving the diplomats additional time to work out the details of a comprehensive new arrangement. When asked June 25 about the prospects of another short-term extension, Powell expressed his desire to instead “see a new resolution” and hear what others have to say about the revised British draft before “prejudging what the council might do.”

Iraqi Radiological Weapons Program Detailed

An Iraqi government report detailing Baghdad’s efforts to build a radiological weapon was made public at the end of April by the private Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. A radiological weapon does not involve a nuclear explosion but simply dispenses radioactive isotopes with conventional explosives.

Although the existence of Iraq’s radiological weapons program has been recognized for some time, the 1987 Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency report, which was turned over to the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) after the Persian Gulf War, provides details of Baghdad’s attempt to build and test a radiological weapon that were not previously available to the public. The Wisconsin Project obtained the report from an unnamed UN source and gave it to The New York Times, which reported on its contents April 29.

Iraq developed and reportedly tested a radiological bomb in late 1987 to achieve a means of “area denial” during the final stages of the Iran-Iraq War. According to a December 1995 UNSCOM report—and confirmed by the leaked document—Iraqi scientists tested three prototype weapons. UNSCOM reported that the Iraqis characterized the test results as “disappointing” because most of the radioactive material did not disperse in a militarily useful way. Iraq told UNSCOM that the program had been “shelved” in mid-1988.

The Iraqi ambassador to the UN, Mohammed Al-Douri, responded to the leaked document in a May 5 letter addressed to the UN secretary-general. Although admitting that “Iraqi specialists explored the technical and practical aspects” of a radiological device, “they ascertained that it was not feasible.” However, the letter directly refuted the charges in both the UNSCOM report and the Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency document that the device was ever constructed or tested, noting that “the idea died, and no radiological bombs were manufactured and none were tested.”

Shortly before the Gulf War began in January 1991, the National Intelligence Council, in response to newspaper reports, concluded that while it would be feasible for the Iraqis “to build a functioning radiological weapon,” it would not be militarily significant: “It would create no special blast effect, and it could not cause widespread radiation sickness.”

U.S. Considers Retargeting Iraqi Sanctions Regime

Alex Wagner

Looking to strengthen the deteriorating sanctions regime imposed on Baghdad after the Persian Gulf War, the Bush administration is considering focusing the restrictions solely on Iraq's proscribed weapons programs. According to Secretary of State Colin Powell, the most "attractive" approach to boosting international support for the regime would involve "eliminating those items in the sanctions regime that really were of civilian use and benefited people and focus exclusively on weapons of mass destruction."

During the past year, the sanctions regime, which the United Nations put in place after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait and which severely restricts Iraq's economic interaction with the rest of the world, has appeared to weaken considerably. Reported violations include rampant smuggling of goods into and out of Iraq, Iraqi receipt of oil surcharges not authorized by the United Nations, and illegal exports of oil from Iraq via its pipeline with Syria.

International support for the regime has also waned, with Russia, France, China, and Arab states voicing strong criticism about the humanitarian impact the sanctions are having on ordinary Iraqi citizens. After returning from a late February tour of Mideast capitals, Powell expressed concern that "more and more nations were saying let's just get rid of the sanctions, let's not worry about inspectors, let's just forget it."

Although the Bush administration has yet to provide any details about its proposal, press reports have indicated that it is considering removing controls on almost all consumer goods exports to Iraq and allowing Iraq's neighbors to purchase Iraqi oil at discounted prices in return for cooperating with the sanctions overhaul. According to the administration, the net impact of such a policy would be to encourage regional support for sanctions, discourage smuggling, and focus international efforts on inhibiting Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Depending on the nature of the changes, alterations to the sanctions regime would need approval from the UN committee that oversees the Iraqi sanctions or the UN Security Council.

The administration appears to have received support for modifying the sanctions regime from Iraq's neighbors. Referring to Powell's recent trip to the region, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said, "We found substantial support for the idea of keeping tight controls on weapons, on money, on smuggling, and taking steps to tighten up on those things at the same time as we were able to smooth out the flow of civilian goods to the civilian population." Russia and France have also expressed interest in the proposal.

The administration's suggested approach does not appear to address Baghdad's continued noncompliance with UN Security Council resolutions demanding inspections to verify that Iraq has eliminated its weapons of mass destruction programs. No weapons inspectors have been allowed in Iraq since December 1998, when the United States and Britain launched three days of punitive airstrikes against Iraq for its failure to cooperate fully with inspectors from the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).

While expressing support for inspections in an interview published March 5 in The Washington Times, Vice President Richard Cheney said the U.S. priority was to revitalize the sanctions regime and then to work on reintroducing inspectors to Iraq. "I think we'd like to see the inspectors back in there," Cheney said, but "I don't think we want to hinge our policy just to the question of whether or not the inspectors go back in there."

Baghdad has not reacted favorably to U.S. interest in modifying the terms of the sanctions and has said that, even if sanctions were lifted, it would not allow weapons inspectors into Iraq unless every other country in the region, including Israel, was subjected to the same scrutiny.

IAEA Inspects Iraqi Nuclear Materials

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducted an inspection of Iraqi nuclear materials January 20-23, successfully verifying "the presence" of non-weapons-grade fissile materials under IAEA safeguards, according to Mohamed ElBaradei, the agency's director-general. ElBaradei's comments, made in a February 12 letter to the UN Security Council, added that Iraq had provided the inspectors with the "necessary cooperation" and access required to perform their mission "effectively and efficiently."

The inspection, known as a physical inventory verification (PIV), sought to ensure that Iraq's known remaining nuclear material—which is non-weapons-grade and all located near Baghdad at the Tuwaitha C storage facility—was accounted for and properly safeguarded. As a member of the IAEA and nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iraq is required not to divert to weapons purposes any of the 1.8 tons of low-enriched uranium or several tons of natural and depleted uranium held at the storage facility.

PIV inspections are not conducted under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 687, which was passed after the Persian Gulf War and required Iraq to give up its weapons of mass destruction. Under the resolution, the IAEA carried out full-scale monitoring and inspection activities and removed "weapons-relevant" nuclear materials from Iraq. PIVs are conducted under the agency's 1972 safeguards agreement with Baghdad, which requires inspections at declared nuclear facilities at least every 14 months. The last PIV was conducted in January 2000.

Due to its limited scope, a PIV cannot verify that Iraq has not been attempting to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. According to the IAEA, it will only be able to give such an assurance when it resumes the activities established under Resolution 687, which were suspended in December 1998 just before U.S.-British airstrikes against Iraq.

Even the Last Superpower Needs Friends

Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.

Secretary of State Colin Powell's decision to re-examine sanctions policy against Iraq suggests that the Bush administration may be moving beyond campaign posturing to real-world problem solving. In reviewing its foreign policy options, the administration must remember that even though the United States is now the only superpower, it cannot act alone in Iraq or elsewhere but must seek broad support to implement successfully controversial foreign policy objectives.

By driving a wedge between the United States and much of the world community, the sanctions against Iraq have undercut the U.S. policy objective of maintaining the international consensus that Saddam Hussein must not be allowed to re-emerge as a regional threat armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Ten years of sanctions have not rectified Saddam's truly outrageous behavior or brought down his regime. The sanctions have, however, come under increasing criticism by countries such as France and Russia that want to resume economic relations with Iraq and by many countries that believe the sanctions have unfairly impacted ordinary Iraqis. Although it is probably true that adequate food and medicine could have been available had Saddam not manipulated their distribution for political purposes, it is widely perceived that sanctions have resulted in serious privation among innocent civilians.

This situation can be remedied by limiting the sanctions to equipment that could potentially contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq's indigenous capabilities to produce weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. This narrowing of sanctions would be a small price to pay to keep the countries presently seeking to end sanctions united in the effort to prevent Saddam's rearmament. In return for the relaxation of sanctions, Iraq would have to readmit United Nations inspectors, which Saddam has vowed never to accept. However, if inspections were reoriented from the almost impossible task of seeking out the last remnant of Iraq's pre-Gulf War WMD programs to the simpler but more important task of monitoring whether a WMD rearmament effort is underway, this inspections process could be a more focused and less intrusive effort. This would put UN inspectors on the ground while allowing Saddam to claim he had protected Iraqi sovereignty. If Saddam can be persuaded by countries favoring resumption of trade to accept such an arrangement, the main U.S. objective will have been achieved. If Saddam rejects the initiative out of hand, as he may well do, he will have lost much of his political leverage to end the existing sanctions.

As he reviews the world scene, Powell will also find that ample opportunities already exist to deal constructively with other non-proliferation problems. If addressed in concert with other interested parties (South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia) and not allowed to become fodder for U.S. domestic political posturing, North Korea's WMD and ballistic missile programs should be containable. And even Iran, where further political change seems likely, may present a fertile field for constructive diplomacy together with other concerned parties.

The opportunity for serious progress in bolstering the non-proliferation regime is within our grasp. But, if any of these efforts are to succeed, Powell must also listen carefully to what the world is saying about the apparent Bush commitment to deployment of a national missile defense (NMD) in clear violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Not only have Russia and China vehemently opposed the proposed U.S. NMD deployment, but Russia has also shown no interest in amending the ABM Treaty. Russia has even threatened to withdraw from START II—and possibly START I and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty—if the ABM Treaty is abrogated. Moreover, U.S. NATO allies, Japan, and even South Korea, as well as almost all members of the United Nations, have also expressed serious concerns about the consequences of unilateral U.S. action to deploy a treaty-non-compliant NMD. Unless the United States backs off from its explicit threat to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and its implicit threat to eschew arms control treaties that would in any way restrict U.S. freedom of action, the international community is unlikely to follow the U.S. lead when it jeopardizes other countries' economic and political interests.

In the process of transitioning the Bush administration from campaign rhetoric to responsible policies, Secretary Powell should draw on his considerable talents and prestige to determine and communicate objectively to his new colleagues the attitudes of other countries to U.S. military and arms control policies. As in the case of Iraq, he must bring home to the administration that the United States needs the genuine support of the world community, which must not be alienated by objectives driven by U.S. domestic political considerations.

Iraq Meets With UN Secretary-General

At the request of the Iraqi government, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan met with Iraqi Vice President Ezzat Ibrahim on the sidelines of a November 13 conference in Qatar. Although Annan would not reveal the details of his discussions, he described the meeting as "frank and useful" and confirmed that discussions included "ways and means to break the current deadlock." Baghdad has refused to allow UN-mandated weapons inspectors into the country since the December 1998 U.S.-British airstrikes against Iraq and remains subject to stringent sanctions put in place after the Persian Gulf War.

Ibrahim's meeting with Annan, however, comes as the sanctions regime appears to be weakening. Over the past few months, Iraq has tested the limits of the postwar settlement by resuming foreign airline passenger service to Baghdad and domestic commercial flights through the so-called no-fly-zones. It has also re-established diplomatic relations with several countries, most notably with Egypt on November 7.

Annan has little latitude to negotiate with Iraq, as he is limited to serving as an intermediary between the UN Security Council and Baghdad. Only the Security Council can reach an agreement with Iraq altering Resolution 1284, which lays out the terms for easing sanctions on Iraq. Annan called the current situation "unhealthy" but said he confidently believed that Iraq and the UN would "find ways of discussing things."

Though some observers have warned that Iraq is "breaking out of the box," State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said November 6 that the "basic sanctions regime" remains in place and continues to work. "The only way to get any kind of serious suspension of sanctions is to go through Resolution 1284…. That continues to work and continues to have the support of the international community," Boucher remarked. At a November 22 briefing, he added, "We are not interested in negotiating 1284."

Iraq Meets With UN Secretary-General

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