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The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional
Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies
Press Contact: Wade Boese
(202) 463-8270 ext. 104
The Wassenaar Arrangement, formally established in July 1996,
is a voluntary export control regime whose 33 members1
exchange information on transfers of conventional weapons and dual-use
goods and technologies. Through such exchanges, Wassenaar aims to
promote "greater responsibility" among its members in exports of
weapons and dual-use goods and to prevent "destabilizing accumulations."
Unlike its predecessor, the Cold War-era Coordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), which was created to restrict
exports to the former Eastern bloc, Wassenaar is not targeted at
any region or group of states, but rather at "states of concern"
to members. Wassenaar members also lack veto authority over other
members' proposed exports, a power that COCOM members exercised.
To promote transparency, Wassenaar calls on states to make a series
of voluntary information exchanges and notifications on their export
activities related to weapons and items appearing on the arrangement's
two control lists.
For the Munitions List (Conventional Weapons):
Every six months, members exchange information on deliveries
of conventional arms to non-Wassenaar members that fall under seven
broad weapon categories: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs),
large-caliber artillery, military aircraft/unmanned aerial vehicles,
military and attack helicopters, warships, and missiles or missile
systems. The ACV, aircraft, and helicopter categories include models
designed to perform reconnaissance or conduct command of troops
missions.
For the Dual-Use Goods and Technologies List:
Tier 1: Basic Items
Twice per year, members exchange information on all export
licenses denied on proposed transfers to non-Wassenaar
members.
Tier 2: Sensitive Items and its subset of Very Sensitive
Items
Within 60 days, members are requested to notify the Wassenaar
Secretariat of any export licenses denied on proposed
transfers to non-Wassenaar members.
Twice per year, members exchange information on all export
licenses issued or transfers made to non-Wassenaar
members.
For the subset of Very Sensitive items, such as stealth technology
materials and advanced radar, members are called on to "exert
extreme vigilance" in exports.
Within 60 days, members are requested to notify the Wassenaar
Secretariat of any export license approvals of transactions
that are "essentially identical" to transactions that another
Wassenaar member denied within the past three years. Wassenaar
members are not obligated to deny transfers previously denied
by others.
To date, Wassenaar has been characterized by various U.S. government
officials and others as disappointing, under-achieving, and under-performing.
Foremost among the arrangement's difficulties is that members continue
to be divided over Wassenaar's scope, primarily whether the arrangement
should become more than just a body for exchanging and collecting
information. Because Wassenaar operates by consensus, a single country
can block any proposal. In past years, a few members have consistently
refused to fully participate in voluntary information exchanges
and notifications on dual-use goods, though participation has reportedly
improved.2 In addition, there is no
consensus among members on which countries are "states of concern"
or what constitutes a "destabilizing" transfer. Another limiting
factor is that some major arms exporters—such as Belarus, Brazil,
China, Israel, and South Africa—are not members.
During the arrangement's more than five years of operation, Wassenaar
members have agreed to "exercise maximum restraint" in exports to
the Great Lakes region of Africa. They have also agreed on the importance
of "responsible export policies" on small arms and light weapons
and have expressed support for proscribing illegal arms transfers
to the UNITA forces in Angola. At its December 1998 plenary meeting,
the 33 members approved a paper of non-binding criteria to help
members determine whether potential arms exports could lead to destabilizing
accumulations.3 Wassenaar members have
also agreed on non-binding criteria to guide exports of shoulder-fired,
surface-to-air missiles, formally referred to as Man-Portable Air
Defense Systems (MANPADS), and endorsed voluntary "best practices"
for disposing of surplus military equipment, enforcing national
export controls, and controlling Very Sensitive dual-use exports.
Latest Developments:
At their last plenary meeting in December 2001, Wassenaar members
agreed for the first time to amend the arrangement's July 1996 founding
document, the Initial Elements. The members added a paragraph to
the Initial Elements calling on members to continue to prevent terrorist
groups and individuals from acquiring conventional arms and dual-use
goods and technologies. Members also agreed at the plenary to voluntarily
report on exports of bridge-launching vehicles and gun-carriers
designed specifically for towing artillery.
But Wassenaar members failed to find consensus on proposals to
include roughly 10 other power projection systems, such as equipment
used to carry troops to combat or recover damaged weapons from the
battlefield, in their voluntary reporting. A U.S.-led effort to
add a reporting category on small arms also failed to win the necessary
consensus. Some Wassenaar members allege that proposals to add new
reporting categories or expand existing categories are aimed at
undercutting or prohibiting their legitimate weapons trade, and
they are therefore resistant to any changes that would increase
reporting on exports.
Notes:
1. The 33 participating states
in the Wassenaar Arrangement are Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia,
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
2. Wassenaar members agreed that all information
exchanges, notifications, and Wassenaar discussions be kept confidential.
3. The Arms Control Association can provide copies
upon request.
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