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Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

  • Fact Sheets & Briefs
    March 11, 2014

    March 2014

  • Fact Sheets & Briefs
    February 4, 2014

    February 2014

  • Threat Assessment Brief
    July 24, 2013

    Preventing the production and accumulation of fissile material is an important objective of nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Unfortunately, the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) exempts the fuel used in naval propulsion reactors from the constraints the treaty otherwise applies to enriching uranium beyond the levels used in civilian power reactors. As the number of countries with nuclear-powered submarines expands, this exclusionposes a growing risk to achieving the nonproliferation goals of the treaty.

  • Arms Control Today
    July 2, 2013

    The U.S. government is “cautiously optimistic” that the parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) will be able to reach agreement at the treaty’s 2015 review conference on “a meaningful way” to respond to countries that withdraw from the pact, a senior U.S. official said June 18.

  • Arms Control Today
    May 2, 2013

    The five countries that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) recognizes as nuclear-weapon states last month “expressed their shared disappointment” that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has not agreed to negotiate an international ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and “reiterated their support for the immediate start of negotiations” in the CD.

  • Threat Assessment Brief
    July 25, 2012

    A long submerged flaw in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) surfaced conspicuously in June when Iran announced it intended to build a nuclear-powered submarine. The treaty does not ban a non-nuclear weapons state's production of weapons-grade uranium if it is to be used to power a naval reactor.

  • Arms Control Today
    May 31, 2012

    Sidney D. Drell is a physics professor emeritus at the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He has advised the U.S. government for many years on technical aspects of national security issues. James E. Goodby, a former U.S. negotiator on arms control, nonproliferation, and transparency issues, is a member of the American Academy of Diplomacy. The recommendations offered in this article represent the authors’ personal views.

  • ACA Events
    May 16, 2012

    Prepared Comments by Daryl G. Kimball for Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and the Foreign Policy Initiative Forum on “Tightening Nuclear Nonproliferation Rules: What Congress’ Role Should Be”
    May 16, 2012

  • Arms Control Today
    December 2, 2011

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) last month provided the most extensive details to date regarding suspicions that Iran has engaged in activities to develop a nuclear warhead. The details in the Nov. 8 report suggest that Iran pursued a range of activities relevant to nuclear weapons development as part of a structured program prior to the fall of 2003 and has resumed  some weapons-related activities since then.

  • Arms Control Today
    December 1, 2011

    The Obama administration entered office in 2009 seeking both to maintain pressure on Iran to comply with its nonproliferation obligations and to engage Tehran in a renewed dialogue on confidence-building measures to allay concerns about the purpose of its nuclear program.