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– President Joe Biden
June 2, 2022
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Solving the Iranian Nuclear Puzzle: Toward a Realistic and Effective Comprehensive Nuclear Agreement

June 2014

For well over a decade, the sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been at the center of international concern about the further spread of nuclear weapons.

In November 2013, after years of on-and-off negotiations, Iran and six world powers concluded an interim agreement that pauses the some of Iran’s most proliferation sensitive activities and opened the way for further talks on a long-term, comprehensive solution to would ensure Iran’s nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful.

This briefing book is designed to provide casual observers and experts alike with an overview of Iran’s nuclear history and diplomatic efforts to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, and an up-to-date summary of the status and capabilities of Iran’s nuclear program.

It is the third and substantially revised edition of “Solving the Iranian Nuclear Puzzle” from the Arms Control Association’s research staff.

The volume also reviews the major issues and explains the policy options for the comprehensive agreement. These include: how to limit Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity and plutonium production potential, the significance of more extensive IAEA safeguards, options for resolving concerns about possible weapons-related experiments by Iran, and the options for the removal of nuclear-related sanctions against Iran.

Preface
Executive Summary
Section 1: Background and Status of Iran's Nuclear Program
Section 2: Understanding the Joint Plan of Action
Section 3: A Comprehensive Agreement
Appendix A: Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran*
Appendix B: History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue*
Appendix C: Text of the Joint Plan of Action
Appendix D: Key Sanctions on Iran
Appendix E: The Military Option
Endnotes

PDF Version

*These Fact Sheet versions are updated on an ongoing basis.

This report was made possible by the generous support of our members and donors, without which this report would not have been possible. In particular, we wish to thank the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Prospect Hill Foundation, which provide support for ACA research and public education programs on nuclear nonproliferation issues.

Preparing for Deep Nuclear Cuts: Options for Enhancing Euro-Atlantic and International Security

Incooperation with the Deep Cuts Commission

April 2014

A new report by a 21-member experts commission recommends practical, modest steps that the United States, NATO and Russia could take to further reduce nuclear arms, both strategic and non-strategic, and to resolve long-standing differences over missile defense and the regulation of conventional military forces in Europe.

 

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The Nuclear Security Summit: Assessment of Joint Statements

By Michelle Cann, Kelsey Davenport and Sarah Williams

March 2014

As 53 states prepare to meet in The Hague March 24-25 for the third Nuclear Security Summit, a new report released today by the Arms Control Association (ACA) and the Partnership for Global Security (PGS), finds that multilateral initiatives from the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit are improving targeted areas of nuclear security, but more ambitious initiatives are needed to address the lack of transparency and regime cohesion in the global nuclear security system.

While the three previous ACA-PGS reports on the Nuclear Security Summit process have focused on state actions, the 2014 edition, The Nuclear Security Summit: Assessment of Joint Statements, examines the progress made on the 13 joint statements presented at the 2012 summit. These multilateral initiatives allowed for like-minded states to collaborate on advancing common nuclear security goals.

“Solving the Iranian Nuclear Puzzle:” Updated ACA Briefing Book

September 2013

The election of Hassan Rouhani as President of Iran presents an important opening to reinvigorate negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear program. As the United States and its partners continue to pursue a range of strategies to guard against the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran, the non-partisan Arms Control Association has updated its comprehensive, entry-level guide to Iran’s nuclear program and its capabilities, and the risks, benefits, and limitations of the available policy options.

This briefing book is designed to provide an overview of Iran’s nuclear history, the status of its nuclear program, the role of international nonproliferation sanctions, the realities of potential military options, and the history and challenges of diplomatic efforts to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.

The Nuclear Security Summit: Progress Report

By Michelle Cann, Kelsey Davenport and Sarah Williams

July 2013

A new report released by the Arms Control Association (ACA) and Partnership for Global Security (PGS), finds that the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process has catalyzed action to secure nuclear weapons-usable materials, but the largely nationally-focused efforts to date are inadequate, and leading governments must begin building the framework for a cohesive international nuclear security governance system.

While the two previous reports from ACA and PGS assess the national commitments made at the 2010 summit, the 2013 edition of The Nuclear Security Summit: Progress Report provides a comprehensive overview of the progress states have made to improve nuclear security since the NSS process began in April 2010.

Updated ACA Report: "Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament: 2010-2013 Report Card"

By Kelsey Davenport and Marcus Taylor

April 2013

This updated report measures the performance of 11 key states in 10 universally-recognized nonproliferation, disarmament and nuclear security categories over the past two and a half years. It gives grades to China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, India, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran and Syria.

"Solving the Iranian Nuclear Puzzle:" An ACA Briefing Book

By the Arms Control Association Research Staff

February 2013

As the United States and other international leaders continue to pursue a range of strategies to head-off the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran, the non-partisan Arms Control Association has produced a comprehensive, entry-level guide to Iran's nuclear program and its capabilities, and the risks, benefits, and limitations of the available policy options.

This 42-page briefing book is designed to provide an overview of Iran’s nuclear history, the status of its nuclear program, the role of international nonproliferation sanctions, the realities of potential military options, and the history and challenges of diplomatic efforts to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.

CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects

Organized by the Arms Control Association in partnership with the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation with financial support from the Government of the United Kingdom.

October 2012

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has already helped to bring an end to nuclear testing, reduced nuclear arms competition, and improved global capabilities to detect and deter nuclear testing in the future. But until the CTBT enters into force, the door to renewed testing is still open. Entry into force requires ratification by a handful of key states.

On the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO), ACA organized a high-level conference on the CTBT in Vienna, Austria involving senior government representatives and leading technical experts. The participants reviewed the progress of the CTBTO and the International Monitoring System, examined the role of the CTBT in advancing disarmament and curbing proliferation, and evaluated the obstacles and pathways to the Treaty’s entry into force. This conference report includes formal conference presentations and summarizes the discussions.

The Nuclear Security Summit: Assessment of National Commitments

By Michelle Cann, Kelsey Davenport and Margaret Balza

March 21, 2012

The report, published jointly by ACA and PGS, concludes that approximately 80 percent of the 67 national commitments made by 30 global leaders at the 2010 summit in Washington have been completed.

The Seoul Nuclear Security Summit is expected to review states' progress on implementing their commitments and to set the course for future efforts to secure weapons-usable nuclear materials. A third summit is planned for the Netherlands in 2014.

Reducing the Role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe:
Perspectives and Proposals on the NATO Policy Debate

Edited by Paul Ingram and Oliver Meier

May 2011

This report, produced by the Arms Control Association (ACA), the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) and the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), contains a selection of views from participants in series of ACA-BASIC-ISFSH policy seminars held in 2010 and 2011.

"Reducing the Role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Perspectives and Proposals on the NATO Policy Debate" examines the debate about NATO nuclear policy leading up to and beyond NATO's November 2010 Lisbon summit. The report includes essays by leading European and American experts and officials, such as German Ambassador Peter Gottwald, Lukasz Kulesa from Poland, former British defense secretary Des Browne, Mustafa Kibaroglu of Bilkent University in Turkey, Paul Zajac of the French embassy in Berlin, and Steven Pifer of the Brookings Institution.

The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit: A Status Update

By Robert Golan-Vilella, Michelle Marchesano, and Sarah Williams

April 2011

In April 2010, forty-seven nations attended the first-ever Nuclear Security Summit in Washington and made commitments to strengthen the global nuclear security regime and reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. This report tracks those commitments and provides a “status update” on how countries are faring with their commitments one year later. It aims both to highlight the significant progress that has been made in the past year and to provide a basis for looking forward to the 2012 summit in South Korea.

The Case for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

By Tom Z. Collina, Daryl G. Kimball, and ACA Research Staff

November 2010

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) reduces the bloated Russian and American nuclear arsenals, while ensuring the ability of the U.S. to inspect and monitor Russian strategic nuclear forces. This report lays out the arguments in favor of New START ratification, and addresses the arguments of New START critics.

Updated Nov. 30

Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation
and Disarmament: 2009-2010 Report Card
NPT Report cover

By Peter Crail and ACA Research Staff

October 2010

This report measures the performance of 11 key states in 10 universally-recognized nonproliferation, disarmament and nuclear security categories over the past 18 months. It gives grades to China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, India, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran and Syria.

Major Proposals to Strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty:
A Resource Guide for the 2010 Review Conference

NPT Report coverBy Cole Harvey and ACA Research Staff

March 2010

This report lays out the debates surrounding this essential treaty on issues such as verification, disarmament, the nuclear fuel cycle, and others.  It includes a detailed pictorial timeline of the NPT, as well key treaty-related documents.  The report is a useful guide for anyone looking to deepen their understanding of this cornerstone of the international nonproliferation regime.

Now More Than Ever: The Case for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

CTBT Briefing Book Cover

By Tom Z. Collina with Daryl G. Kimball

February 2010

Nuclear testing is a dangerous and unnecessary vestige of the Cold War that the United States rejected almost 20 years ago. There is no military justification for resuming U.S. testing, and the United States does not need nuclear testing to maintain the effectiveness and reliability of its nuclear deterrent.

The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an essential part of a commonsense strategy to reduce nuclear dangers.

It is in the U.S. national security interest to prevent nuclear weapons testing by others and to improve the U.S. and international ability to monitor compliance with the treaty.

A growing list of bipartisan leaders agree that by ratifying the CTBT, the United States stands to gain an important constraint on the ability of other states to build new and more deadly nuclear weapons that could pose a greater threat to American security.

This briefing book reviews the key facts and issues at stake.

The 2008 Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference Reader

March 2008

A collection of articles, essays and interviews on the threats posed by chemical weapons. Includes interviews with Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter and Ambassador Donald A. Mahley. The reader focuses on the future of chemical weapons control effors, including destruction deadlines, threats to treaty effectiveness, and Chemical Weapons Convention universality. Contributors include Oliver Meier, Daniel Feakes, John Hart, Jonathan B. Tucker, Ralf Trapp and Kyle M. Ballard.

What Are Nuclear Weapons For? Recommendations For Restructuring U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces

By Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby

Revised and Updated October 2007

The U.S. and Russia have agreed to cooperatively reduce their large nuclear stockpiles. The report recommends that the U.S. reduce its arsenal to 500 operational deployed warheads, with 500 warheads in a responsive force, by 2012. These reductions would be made in concert with Russian warhead reductions. The authors specifically outline where and how the remaining warheads should be deployed.

The 2006 Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference Reader

November 2006

In this reader, leading experts summarize new and old dangers associated with biological weapons and recommend ways of addressing them. The reader includes an interview with Ambassador Masood Khan, the designated president of the 2006 BWC review conference. Other contributors include Oliver Meier, John Borrie, Nicholas A. Sims, Trevor Findlay, Nicolas Isla, Iris Hunger, Jonathan B. Tucker, Roger Roffey, John Hart, Frida Kuhlau, Mark Wheelis, and Christopher F. Chyba.

Major Proposals to Strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: A Resource Guide

By Claire Applegarth and Rhianna Tyson
Arms Control Association and Women's International League for Peace & Freedom

April 2005

The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) set into place one of the most important international security bargains of all time; states without nuclear weapons pledged not to acquire them, while nuclear-armed states committed to eventually give them up. At the same time, the NPT allows for the peaceful use of nuclear technology by non-nuclear weapons states under strict and verifiable control. The report outlines a variety of proposals that would strengthen the NPT regime in light of challenges the treaty currently faces.

What Are Nuclear Weapons For? Recommendations For Restructuring U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces

By Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby

April 2005

This report is aimed at revising the current US defense strategy towards Russia to more closely represent the recent policy shift towards cooperation. It advocates the reduction of the U.S. strategic arsenal to 500 operationally deployed nuclear warheads and 500 responsive forces. Such a force would be composed of existing warheads and require no new nuclear weapons while maintaining the diversity of force that protects against common failure modes. The report concludes that the United States can enhance its national security by strengthening the nonproliferation regime.

 

Full Proceedings of the Paul C. Warnke Conference on the Past, Present & Future of Arms Control

January 28, 2004

Ambassador Paul C. Warnke was a leading proponent of arms control, most notably serving as the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under President Jimmy Carter. The purpose of this conference was to explore vital issues that Warnke devoted his career to addressing and the solutions he championed. In addition to highlighting the impact of previous arms control efforts, the conference also aimed to present new ideas of concepts about how to best tackle the evolving threats to international peace and security posed by nuclear weapons.