Statement on the 2005 NPT
Review Conference and Beyond
April 5, 2005
Formatted PDF
of the Campaign Statement and
Biographies of Each Statement Signer
Thirty-five years ago, the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) set into place one of the most important international
security bargains of all time: states without nuclear weapons
pledged not to acquire them, while nuclear-armed states
committed to eventually give them up. At the same time,
the NPT allowed for the peaceful use of nuclear technology
by non-nuclear-weapon states under strict and verifiable
control.
Over the years, the NPT security framework has led several states to abandon
their nuclear weapons ambitions and has made it far more difficult for other
non-nuclear-weapon states to acquire the material and technology needed to build
such weapons or to avoid detection of a covert nuclear weapons
program. The NPT process also has encouraged action on several nuclear arms
control initiatives and led the nuclear-weapon states to pledge not to use nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear-weapon NPT members, thereby reducing incentives
for others to seek nuclear arms for prestige or defense.
Today’s security environment requires an even more comprehensive and robust
global nonproliferation strategy. The NPT’s future success depends on universal
compliance with tighter rules to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, more
effective regional security strategies, and renewed progress toward
fulfillment of the nuclear-weapon states’ NPT disarmament obligations.
We call upon all states-parties to recommit themselves to the legal and political
obligations established by the treaty and successive NPT Review Conferences,
as well as agree on a specific and balanced program of action to strengthen
treaty implementation and compliance.
Since the 2000 Review Conference, the nuclear threat has evolved in dangerous
ways and the global nonproliferation system faces difficult challenges. We have
seen new and more deadly forms of terrorism, wars, nuclear black markets, states
cheating on the NPT, and even one, North Korea, announcing
its withdrawal from the treaty. Perhaps today’s greatest threat stems from
the existing global stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, the
fissile materials that are the fuel of nuclear bombs. These materials remain
far too accessible to terrorists as a result of inadequate security and accounting
at nuclear facilities throughout the former Soviet republics and in dozens of
other countries.
Another significant concern is that additional countries could acquire the
capacity to produce fissile
materials and manufacture nuclear weapons under the guise of “peaceful”
nuclear endeavors. North
Korea may already have manufactured a small nuclear weapons arsenal. Iran may
soon have the capacity
to produce fissile material for weapons and may do so if current European diplomatic
efforts falter.
As the NPT has been interpreted, countries can acquire technologies that bring
them to the very brink
of a nuclear weapons capability without explicitly violating the agreement,
and can then leave the
treaty without penalty unless the United Nations Security Council takes action.
Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, the majority of countries also
feel that the five original
nuclear-weapon states do not intend to pursue their NPT-related nuclear disarmament
commitments.
That growing conviction—reinforced by lackluster progress on disarmament—erodes
the willingness among certain states in the non-nuclear-weapon majority to fulfill
their own treaty obligations, much
less to agree to strengthen the regime.
For all these reasons, there are rising doubts about the sustainability of
the nonproliferation regime.
Nations with ample technological ability to develop nuclear weapons may be reconsidering
their
political decisions not to do so.
As the United Nation’s recent High-Level Panel Report A More Secure
World concludes: “We are approaching a point at
which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become
irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.”
The global nuclear threat cannot be reduced without stronger international
leadership and
cooperation.
Consequently, the United States and other countries should pursue a comprehensive
and balanced approach beginning with the 2005 NPT Review Conference. They should:
- Agree to establish more effective controls on technologies that can be used
to
produce materials for nuclear weapons.
- Expand the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect
and
monitor compliance with nonproliferation rules and standards through existing
authority and the Additional Protocol, to which all states should adhere.
- Conduct vigorous diplomacy to halt uranium-enrichment and other sensitive
nuclear fuel cycle activities in Iran and dismantle North Korea’s nuclear
weapons
capacity, as well as diplomacy designed to address the underlying regional
security problems in Northeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, which
would facilitate nonproliferation and disarmament efforts in those regions.
- Accelerate implementation of the nuclear-weapon states’ disarmament
obligations
and commitments, including further reducing the alert status and size of their
nuclear stockpiles, permanently barring nuclear test explosions and the production
of fissile materials for weapons, refraining from development of new nuclear
weapons, and reaffirming existing assurances to NPT non-nuclear-weapon states
that they will not be subjected to nuclear attack. These steps would reduce
the
risk of nuclear war and the allure of nuclear weapons.
- Secure all nuclear-weapons-usable material to the highest standards to prevent
access by terrorists or other states by expanding programs to secure and eliminate
these materials, halting the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian reactors,
and strengthening national and international export controls and material
security measures as required by UN Resolution 1540.
- Clarify that no state may withdraw from the treaty and escape responsibility
for
prior violations of the treaty or retain access to controlled materials and
equipment
acquired for “peaceful” purposes.
The May 2005 Review Conference is a crucial forum for parties to measure progress—or
lack of progress—in implementing their mutual NPT obligations and commitments.
It is also an essential opportunity for the parties to demonstrate their political
will to make further tangible progress to meet all of the treaty’s
objectives. The success of the conference should be judged by the ability of
the parties to agree on specific, additional steps that will strengthen the
treaty regime. The security of the international community demands no less.
Sec. Madeleine K. Albright
Alexei G. Arbatov (Russia)
Amb. George Bunn
Amb. Ralph Earle II
Robert J. Einhorn
Amb. Robert L. Gallucci
Amb. James E. Goodby
Rose Gottemoeller
Amb. Thomas Graham, Jr.
Amb. Robert Grey, Jr.
Hon. Lee H. Hamilton
Hon. John D. Holum
Hon. Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.
Jessica Mathews
Sec. Robert S. McNamara
Sec. William J. Perry
Lt. Gen. Robert E. Pursley (USAF Ret.)
Sen. Douglas Roche (Canada)
Amb. Henrik Salander (Sweden)
Hon. Lawrence Scheinman
Amb. Wendy R. Sherman
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Co-Chairs
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Joseph Cirincione,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
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Daryl G. Kimball,
Arms Control Association
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