 |
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's Statement to the Indian Parliament
on the Civil-Military Separation Plan
March 6, 2006
In my statement on February 27, 2006, I had provided an assurance
that this august House will be informed of developments in our discussions
with the United States on separation of our civilian and military
nuclear facilities. I now inform this august House of developments
since my suo motu statement of February 27.
The President of the United States, His Excellency Mr George W Bush
visited India between March 1-3, 2006. His visit provided our two
countries an opportunity to review progress made in deepening our
strategic partnership since the Joint Statement issued during my
visit to Washington last July.
Our discussions covered the expansion of our ties in the fields
of agriculture, economic and trade cooperation, energy security
and clean environment, strengthening innovation and the knowledge
economy, issues relating to global safety and security and on deepening
democracy. Expanded cooperation in each of these areas will have
a significant impact on India's social and economic development.
I have pleasure in informing the House that during President Bush's
visit, as part of the process of promoting cooperation in civilian
nuclear energy, an agreement was reached between India and the United
States on a Separation Plan. Accordingly, India will identify and
separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and place
its civilian nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards.
I would like to outline some salient elements of the Separation
Plan:
- India will identify and offer for IAEA safeguards 14 thermal
power reactors between 2006-14. There are 22 thermal power reactors
in operation or currently under construction in the country. Fourteen
of these will be placed under safeguards by 2014 in a phased manner.
This would raise the total installed thermal power capacity in
megawatts under safeguards from 19% at present to 65% by 2014.
I wish to emphasize that the choice of specific nuclear reactors
and the phases in which they would be placed under safeguards
is an Indian decision. We are preparing a list of 14 reactors
that would be offered for safeguards between 2006-14.
- We have conveyed that India will not accept safeguards on the
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor and the Fast Breeder Test Reactor,
both located at Kalpakkam. The Fast Breeder Programme is at the
research and development stage. This technology will take time
to mature and reach an advanced stage of development. We do not
wish to place any encumbrances on our Fast Breeder programme,
and this has been fully ensured in the
Separation Plan.
- India has decided to place under safeguards all future civilian
thermal power reactors and civilian breeder reactors, and the
Government of India retains the sole right to determine such reactors
as civilian. This means that India will not be constrained in
any way in building future nuclear facilities, whether civilian
or military, as per our
national requirements.
- India has decided to permanently shut down the CIRUS reactor,
in 2010. The fuel core of the Apsara reactor was purchased from
France, and we are prepared to shift it from its present location
and make it available for placing under safeguards in 2010. Both
CIRUS and Apsara are located at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre.
We have decided to take these steps rather than allow intrusive
inspections in a nuclear facility of high national security importance.
We are determined that such steps will not hinder ongoing Research
and Development.
- Reprocessing and enrichment capabilities and other facilities
associated with the fuel cycle for our strategic programme have
been kept out of the Separation Plan.
- One of the major points addressed in the Separation Plan was
the need to ensure reliability of fuel supplies, given our unfortunate
past experience with regard to interruption in supply of fuel
for Tarapur. We have received commitments from the United States
for the reliable supply of fuel to India for reactors that will
be offered for safeguards. The United States has also reaffirmed
its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to
have assured and full access to fuel for such reactors. Under
the July 18 Joint Statement, the United States is
committed to seeking agreement from its Congress to amend domestic
laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions
for India to obtain full access to the international market for
nuclear fuel, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual
access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations. This has
been reflected in the formal understandings reached during the
visit and included in the Separation Plan.
- To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies for
India, the United States is prepared to take other additional
steps, such as:
-
- I) Incorporating assurances regarding fuel supply in a bilateral
Indo-US agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy which
would be negotiated.
II) The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate
with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement.
III) The United States will support an Indian effort to develop
a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption
of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors.
IV) If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies
to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly
convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include
countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to
pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.
In light of the above understandings with the United States, an
India-specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India
and the IAEA. In essence, an India-specific safeguards would provide
on the one hand safeguards against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear
material from civilian use at any time, and on the other permit
India to take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation
of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign
fuel supplies.
Taking this into account, India will place its civilian nuclear
facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate
an appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA. In
terms of Separation plan, there is hence assurance of uninterrupted
supply of fuel to reactors that would be placed under safeguards
together with India's right to take corrective measures in the event
fuel supplies are interrupted. The House can rest assured that India
retains its sovereign right to take all appropriate measures to
fully safeguard its interests.
During my suo motu statements on this subject made on July 29, 2005,
and on February 27, 2006, I had given a solemn assurance to this
august House and through the Honorable members to the country, that
the Separation Plan will not adversely effect our country's national
security. I am in a position to assure the members that that this
is indeed the case. I might mention:
o That the separation plan will not adversely affect our strategic
programme. There will be no capping of our strategic programme,
and the separation plan ensures adequacy of fissile material and
other inputs to meet the current and future requirements of our
strategic programme, based on our assessment of the threat scenarios.
No constraint has been placed on our right to construct new facilities
for strategic purposes. The integrity of our Nuclear Doctrine and
our ability to sustain a Minimum Credible Nuclear Deterrent is adequately
protected. Our nuclear policy will continue to be guided by the
principles of restraint and responsibility.
o The Separation Plan does not come in the way of the integrity
of our three-stage nuclear programme, including the future use of
our thorium reserves. The autonomy of our Research and Development
activities in the
nuclear field will remain unaffected. The Fast Breeder Test Reactor
and the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor remain outside safeguards.
We have agreed, however, that future civilian thermal power reactors
and
civilian Fast Breeder Reactors would be placed under safeguards,
but the determination of what is civilian is solely an Indian decision.
o As I mentioned in my statement on February 27, the Separation
Plan has been very carefully drawn up after an intensive internal
consultation process overseen by my office. The Department of Atomic
Energy and our nuclear scientific community have been associated
with the preparation of the Separation Plan. The chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission and the principal scientific adviser to
the Government of India were actively involved closely at every
stage. I am in a position to assure honourable members that we have
not permitted information of national security significance to be
compromised in any way during the negotiations.
I believe that the significance of the July 18, 2005, statement
is the prospect it offers for ending India's nuclear isolation.
It will open up prospects for cooperation not only with the US but
with countries like Russia, France and other countries with advanced
nuclear capabilities, including those from the NSG. The scope for
cooperation in the energy related research will vastly expand, so
will cooperation in nuclear research activities. India will be able
to join the international mainstream and occupy its rightful place
among the top countries of the nuclear community.
There would be a quantum jump in our energy generating capacity
with a consequential impact on our GDP growth. It also ensures India's
participation as a full partner in cutting edge multilateral scientific
effort in the nuclear field such as ITER and Generation IV Initiative.
Sir, successful implementation of the July 18 Joint Statement requires
reciprocal actions by the United States as well as India. Steps
to be taken by India will be contingent upon actions taken by the
US. For our part, we have prepared a Separation Plan that identifies
those civilian facilities that we are willing to offer for safeguards.
The United States government has accepted this Separation Plan.
It now intends to approach the US Congress for amending its laws
and the Nuclear Suppliers Group for adapting its Guidelines to enable
full civilian cooperation between India and the international community.
At the appropriate stage, India will approach the IAEA to discuss
and fashion an India-specific safeguards agreement, which will reflect
the unique character of this arrangement. Since such a safeguards
agreement is yet to be negotiated
it will be difficult to predict its content, but I can assure the
House that we will not accept any provisions that go beyond the
parameters of the July 18, 2005, statement and the Separation Plan
agreed between India and the United States, on March 2, 2006. We
are hopeful that this process will move forward in the coming weeks
and months.
I would request honourable members to look at this matter through
the larger perspective of energy security. Currently, nuclear energy
provides only three per cent of our total energy mix. Rising costs
and reliability of imported hydrocarbon supplies constitute a major
uncertainty at a time when we are accelerating our growth rate.
We must endeavor to expand our capabilities across the entire energy
spectrum; from clean coal and coal-bed methane, to gas hydrates
and wind and solar power. We are actively seeking international
partnerships across the board and are members of many international
initiatives dedicated to energy.
Indeed, at the end of my talks with President Bush, we announced
Indian participation in two more programmes: the Future-Gen programme
for zero emission thermal power plants and the Integrated Ocean
Drilling Programme for gas hydrates.
The House will appreciate that the search for an integrated policy
with an appropriate mix of energy supplies is central to the achievement
of our broader economic or social objectives. Energy is the lifeblood
of our economy. Without sufficient and predictable access, our aspirations
in the social sector cannot be realized. Inadequate power has a
deleterious effect in building a modern infrastructure. It has a
direct impact on the optimal usage of increasingly scarce water
resources. Power shortage is thus not just a handicap in one sector
but a drag on the entire economy.
I believe that the needs of the people of India must become the
central agenda for our international cooperation. It is precisely
this approach that has guided our growing partnership with the United
States. I would, in particular, draw attention to the launching
of the Knowledge Initiative in Agriculture with a three-year financial
commitment to link our universities and technical institutions and
businesses to support agricultural education, research, capacity
building, including in the area of biotechnology. Our first Green
Revolution benefited in substantial measure from assistance provided
by the US. We are hopeful that the Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture
will become the harbinger of a second Green Revolution in our country.
Sir, India and the United States have much to gain from this new
partnership. This was the main underlying theme of our discussions
during the visit of President Bush. The resumption of civilian nuclear
energy cooperation would demonstrate that we have entered a new
and more positive phase of our ties, so that we can finally put
behind us years of troubled relations in the nuclear field. I am
confident that this is a worthy objective that will receive the
full support of this House.
|
