Global Missile Proliferation: June 2001

Twenty-eight states besides the five de jure nuclear-weapon states possess ballistic missiles.  However, fewer than 10 have the capability to indigenously develop or maintain their missiles, and only five—India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea—have produced or flight-tested missiles with ranges over 1,000 kilometers. The majority of other states with ballistic missiles possess short-range Scuds or SS-21s inherited or purchased from the Soviet Union. According to the CIA, Russia, China, and North Korea are the largest suppliers of ballistic missile-related goods, technology, and expertise.

 

The North Korean and Iranian missile programs are frequently cited as being of concern to the United States and as the rationale for the development of a U.S. national missile defense. Iran most recently tested a variant of the Shahab-3 in September 2000 and continues to develop its medium-range missiles. North Korea flight-tested a 2,000-kilometer-range Taepo Dong-1 in August 1998 but has pledged not to conduct any further flight tests while negotiating with the United States on ending its missile program and exports.

For more information, contact Alex Wagner

COUNTRY	SYSTEM	STATUS	RANGE/PAYLOAD1	SOURCE2
Afghanistan	Scud-B	Operational	300 km/1,000 kg	USSR
Armenia	Scud-B	Operational	300 km/1,000 kg	Russia
Azerbaijan	Scud-B	Operational	300 km/1,000 kg	USSR
Bahrain	ATACMS	To Be Delivered 8/2002	165 km/560 kg	USA
Belarus	SS-21 Scud-B	Operational Operational	120 km/480 kg 300 km/1,000 kg	USSR USSR
Bulgaria3	Scud-B SS-23	Operational Operational	300 km/1,000 kg 500 km/ 450 kg	USSR USSR
Egypt	Scud-B Project-T Scud-C Vector	Operational Operational Operational Development	300 km/1,000 kg 450 km/985 kg 550 km/600 kg 685 km/450 kg	USSR Domestic/DPRK DPRK Domestic/DPRK
Georgia	Scud-B	Operational	300 km/1,000 kg	USSR
Greece	ATACMS	Operational	165 km/560 kg	USA
India4	Prithvi-1 Prithvi-2 Dhanush Sagarika (SLCM?) Agni-1 Agni-2 Agni-3 Surya	Operational Operational Tested/Development Development Prototype Only Serial Production? Development Development	150 km/1,000 kg 250 km/500 kg 350 km/1,000 kg 350 km/500 kg 1,500 km/1,000 kg 2,000 km/1,000 kg 3,000-5,500 km/? kg 5,500+ km/2,000 kg	Domestic Production Domestic Production Domestic Production Domestic/Russia Domestic Production Domestic Production Domestic Production Domestic/Russia
Iran	Mushak-120 CSS-8 Mushak-160 Scud-B Scud-C Shahab-3 Shahab-4 Shahab-5	Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Tested/Development Development Concept Stage	130 km/150 kg 150 km/190 kg 160 km/~500 kg 300 km/1,000 kg 550 km/600 kg 1,300 km/700 kg 2,000 km/1,000 kg 3,000-5,500 km/1,000 kg	Domestic/China China Domestic/China Libya/DPRK DPRK Domestic/DPRK/Russia Domestic/DPRK/Russia Domestic/Russia
Iraq5	Ababil-100 Al Samoud Scud-B Al Hussein Al Abbas	Development Tested/Development Destroyed Destroyed Destroyed	100-150 km/300 kg 150 km/300 kg 300 km/1,000 kg 600-650 km/500 kg 900 km/300 kg	Domestic Production Domestic Production USSR Domestic/USSR Domestic/USSR
Israel	Lance Jericho-1 Jericho-2 Jericho-3	Operational Operational Operational Development	130 km/450 kg 500 km/500 kg 1,500 km/1,000 kg 2,500 km/1,000 kg	USA Domestic/France Domestic/France Domestic
Kazakhstan	Tochka-U (SS-21)	Operational	120 km/480 kg	USSR
Libya	Al Fatah Scud-B Scud-C Nodong-1	Tested/Development Operational Potential Acquisition Potential Acquisition	200 km/500 kg 300 km/1,000 kg 550 km/600 kg 1,300 km/750 kg	Domestic Production USSR DPRK DPRK
North Korea (DPRK)	Scud-B Scud-C variant Nodong-1 Nodong-2 Taepo Dong-1 Taepo Dong-2	Operational Operational Operational Development Tested/Development Development	300 km/1,000 kg 550 km/700 kg 1,300 km/750 kg 1,500 km/770 kg 2,000 km/1,000 kg 5,000-6,000 km/1,000 kg	Domestic Production Domestic Production Domestic Production Domestic Production Domestic Production Domestic Production
Pakistan	Hatf-1 M-11 Hatf-2 Hatf-3 (M-11 Derivative) Tarmuk (M-11 Derivative) Shaheen-1 Ghauri-1 Shaheen-2 Ghaznavi Ghauri-2	Operational Operational Program Canceled? Development   Development   Tested/Development Tested/Development Development Development Tested/Development	80-100 km/500 kg 280 km/800 kg 300 km/500 kg 300 km/500 kg   300 km/800 kg   750 km/500 kg 1,300+ km/700 kg 2,000 km/? kg 2,000 km/? kg 2,300 km/700 kg	Domestic Production China Domestic/China Domestic/China   Domestic/China   Domestic/China Domestic/DPRK Domestic/DPRK Domestic Production Domestic/DPRK
Saudi Arabia	CSS-2	Operational	2,800 km/2,150 kg	China
Slovakia	SS-21 Scud-B	Operational Operational	120 km/480 kg 300 km/1,000 kg	USSR USSR
South Korea	ATACMS NHK-1 NHK-2	Operational Operational Not Yet Deployed	165 km/560 kg 180 km/500 kg 260 km/450 kg	USA USA USA
Syria	SS-21 Scud-B Scud-C Scud-D	Operational Operational Operational Tested/Development	120 km/480 kg 300 km/1,000 kg 500 km/600 kg 750 km/200 kg	USSR Domestic/USSR Domestic/DPRK Domestic/DPRK
Taiwan	Ching Feng Tien Chi	Operational Development	130 km/270 kg 300 km/500 kg	Domestic/USA/Israel? Domestic Production
Turkey	ATACMS	Operational	165 km/560 kg	USA
Turkmenistan	Scud-B	Operational	300 km/1,000 kg	USSR
Ukraine	SS-21 Scud-B	Operational Operational	120 km/480 kg 300 km/1,000 kg	USSR USSR
United Arab Emirates	Scud-B	Operational	300 km/1,000 kg	USSR
Vietnam	Scud-B	Operational	300 km/1,000 kg	USSR
Yemen	SS-21 Scud-B	Operational Operational	120 km/480 kg 300 km/1,000 kg	USSR USSR

Missile Ranges

SRBM	Short-range ballistic missile (<1,000 km)
MRBM	Medium-range ballistic missile (1,000-3,000 km)
IRBM	Intermediate-range ballistic missile (3,000-5,500 km)
ICBM	Intercontinetal ballistic missile (5,500+ km)

1. The ranges and payloads, given in kilometers (km) and kilograms (kg), respectively, are estimates based on unclassified sources. However, these numbers do not reflect either the missiles’ maximum range or their heaviest possible payload. Equipping a missile with a lighter payload would increase its range, and likewise a heavier payload would decrease it.

2. Eight states formerly part of or allied with the Soviet Union retain the Soviet SS-21 and Scud-B missiles. Additionally, according to the CIA, Russian and Chinese technological and material support remains critical to any continued development of Iranian and Pakistani missile programs. A February 2001 CIA report notes that “despite overall improvements” in curtailing missile assistance, Russian entities continue to “supply a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, India, China, and Libya.” The report says that Russia’s assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile program is “substantial,” particularly in accelerating Iranian development of the Shahab-3. Although China has pledged to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime’s prohibition on the transfer of complete missile systems, the CIA contends that continued Chinese assistance is critical to both Pakistan’s rapid movement toward serial production of solid-propellant short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and development of the two-stage Shaheen-2 medium-range ballistic missile.

3. Bulgaria is believed to retain eight SS-23 intermediate-range missiles. According to Ambassador Steven Steiner, U.S. representative to the INF Treaty’s Special Verification Commission, the U.S. government has determined that the Soviet Union “negotiated in bad faith” by failing to notify the United States of the transfer of the missiles to Bulgaria, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia at the time of the treaty’s negotiation. As a result, those missiles were not accounted for in the treaty’s prohibitions. Steiner said that the United States has been engaging Bulgaria—which possesses the last remaining SS-23s in Europe—in discussions aimed at dismantling the missiles and that he is “optimistic” that they will “eventually” be eliminated.

4. The status of India’s Agni-2 remains unclear. The Indian Foreign Ministry announced that the Agni-2 had reached its “final operational configuration” after its apparently successful test in January 2001. Indian press reports also cite Indian officials claiming that the missile is ready to enter “serial production” and will be “inducted” in 2001 into India’s arsenal.

5. Iraq’s missiles with ranges in excess of 150 kilometers, as well as Iraq ’s capability to develop and produce them, were to be destroyed as part of the settlement that ended the Persian Gulf War. In December 1992, the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) claimed to have destroyed all of Iraq’s proscribed ballistic missiles as well as items related to their production and development. However, in October 1996, UNSCOM admitted that “in the missile area, Iraq has still not fully accounted for all proscribed weapons, items, and capabilities.” In a 2001 report, the Department of Defense notes, “Iraq likely retains a limited number of launchers and Scud-variant SRBMs…as well as the components and manufacturing means to assemble and produce others [in anticipation of] the reestablishment of a long-range ballistic missile force.”

 

---

 

Sources:

 

Central Intelligence Agency,
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 20 June 2000,
February 2001;

Department of Defense,
Proliferation: Threat and Response,
January 2001;

National Air Intelligence Center:
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,
September 2000;

Arms Control Association; International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance: 2000-2001;

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nonproliferation Project:
World Missile Chart;

Federation of American Scientists.