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Reducing the Role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Edited by Paul Ingram and Oliver Meier May 2011
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The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit: A Status Update By Robert Golan-Vilella, Michelle Marchesano, and Sarah Williams April 2011 In April 2010, forty-seven nations attended the first-ever Nuclear Security Summit in Washington and made commitments to strengthen the global nuclear security regime and reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. This report tracks those commitments and provides a “status update” on how countries are faring with their commitments one year later. It aims both to highlight the significant progress that has been made in the past year and to provide a basis for looking forward to the 2012 summit in South Korea. |
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The Case for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty By Tom Z. Collina, Daryl G. Kimball, and ACA Research Staff November 2010 The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) reduces the bloated Russian and American nuclear arsenals, while ensuring the ability of the U.S. to inspect and monitor Russian strategic nuclear forces. This report lays out the arguments in favor of New START ratification, and addresses the arguments of New START critics. Updated Nov. 30 |
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Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation By Peter Crail and ACA Research Staff October 2010 This report measures the performance of 11 key states in 10 universally-recognized nonproliferation, disarmament and nuclear security categories over the past 18 months. It gives grades to China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, India, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran and Syria. |
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March 2010 This report lays out the debates surrounding this essential treaty on issues such as verification, disarmament, the nuclear fuel cycle, and others. It includes a detailed pictorial timeline of the NPT, as well key treaty-related documents. The report is a useful guide for anyone looking to deepen their understanding of this cornerstone of the international nonproliferation regime. |
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Now More Than Ever: The Case for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
By Tom Z. Collina with Daryl G. Kimball February 2010 Nuclear testing is a dangerous and unnecessary vestige of the Cold War that the United States rejected almost 20 years ago. There is no military justification for resuming U.S. testing, and the United States does not need nuclear testing to maintain the effectiveness and reliability of its nuclear deterrent. The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an essential part of a commonsense strategy to reduce nuclear dangers. It is in the U.S. national security interest to prevent nuclear weapons testing by others and to improve the U.S. and international ability to monitor compliance with the treaty. A growing list of bipartisan leaders agree that by ratifying the CTBT, the United States stands to gain an important constraint on the ability of other states to build new and more deadly nuclear weapons that could pose a greater threat to American security. This briefing book reviews the key facts and issues at stake. |
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The 2008 Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference Reader March 2008 A collection of articles, essays and interviews on the threats posed by chemical weapons. Includes interviews with Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter and Ambassador Donald A. Mahley. The reader focuses on the future of chemical weapons control effors, including destruction deadlines, threats to treaty effectiveness, and Chemical Weapons Convention universality. Contributors include Oliver Meier, Daniel Feakes, John Hart, Jonathan B. Tucker, Ralf Trapp and Kyle M. Ballard. |
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What Are Nuclear Weapons For? Recommendations For Restructuring U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces By Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby Revised and Updated October 2007 The U.S. and Russia have agreed to cooperatively reduce their large nuclear stockpiles. The report recommends that the U.S. reduce its arsenal to 500 operational deployed warheads, with 500 warheads in a responsive force, by 2012. These reductions would be made in concert with Russian warhead reductions. The authors specifically outline where and how the remaining warheads should be deployed. |
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The 2006 Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference Reader November 2006 In this reader, leading experts summarize new and old dangers associated with biological weapons and recommend ways of addressing them. The reader includes an interview with Ambassador Masood Khan, the designated president of the 2006 BWC review conference. Other contributors include Oliver Meier, John Borrie, Nicholas A. Sims, Trevor Findlay, Nicolas Isla, Iris Hunger, Jonathan B. Tucker, Roger Roffey, John Hart, Frida Kuhlau, Mark Wheelis, and Christopher F. Chyba. |
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Major Proposals to Strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: A Resource Guide By Claire Applegarth and Rhianna Tyson April 2005 The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) set into place one of the most important international security bargains of all time; states without nuclear weapons pledged not to acquire them, while nuclear-armed states committed to eventually give them up. At the same time, the NPT allows for the peaceful use of nuclear technology by non-nuclear weapons states under strict and verifiable control. The report outlines a variety of proposals that would strengthen the NPT regime in light of challenges the treaty currently faces. |
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What Are Nuclear Weapons For? Recommendations For Restructuring U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces By Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby April 2005 This report is aimed at revising the current US defense strategy towards Russia to more closely represent the recent policy shift towards cooperation. It advocates the reduction of the U.S. strategic arsenal to 500 operationally deployed nuclear warheads and 500 responsive forces. Such a force would be composed of existing warheads and require no new nuclear weapons while maintaining the diversity of force that protects against common failure modes. The report concludes that the United States can enhance its national security by strengthening the nonproliferation regime.
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Full Proceedings of the Paul C. Warnke Conference on the Past, Present & Future of Arms Control January 28, 2004 Ambassador Paul C. Warnke was a leading proponent of arms control, most notably serving as the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under President Jimmy Carter. The purpose of this conference was to explore vital issues that Warnke devoted his career to addressing and the solutions he championed. In addition to highlighting the impact of previous arms control efforts, the conference also aimed to present new ideas of concepts about how to best tackle the evolving threats to international peace and security posed by nuclear weapons.
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