A Dec. 2-5 meeting in The Hague of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) states-parties failed to adopt a consensus final report but agreed on a budget for 2009 and modest measures to reform the treaty's verification system.
The 126 state-parties participating in the conference approved a 74.5 million euro (about $105 million) budget for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is implementing the 1993 convention. This marks the fourth consecutive year that the OPCW will have a zero nominal growth budget.
Currently, the OPCW spends about 80 percent of its verification resources on monitoring the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and 20 percent on industry verification to detect and deter illicit development or production of chemical weapons.
In the run-up to the December meeting, differences surfaced among states-parties on how to structure the OPCW budget. With chemical weapons destruction making progress, associated verification costs are slowly falling. The 2009 OPCW budget is also likely to benefit from the fact that chemical weapons possessor states have improved their record in paying their required share of the costs of verifying the weapons' destruction. Western countries would like to use the freed-up funds to inspect additional commercial facilities, particularly so-called other chemical production facilities (OCPFs).
Many OCPFs use modern production techniques and could be converted with relative ease for chemical weapons production. Yet, these facilities produce chemicals that fall outside the three "schedules" of chemicals that can be used for chemical weapons production. These schedules form the basis of most industry verification activities. (See ACT, January/February 2007.) As a result, the OCPFs are inspected at a relatively low rate. French Ambassador Jean-François Blarel, speaking Dec. 2 on behalf of the European Union, pointed out that "if we did not increase the number of inspections, and if the number of declared OCPF sites remained stable, it would take 33 years to inspect them all."
The second CWC review conference in April 2008 had charged the OPCW's Technical Secretariat with evaluating the effect of revisions to the site selection methodology for OCPFs. (See ACT, May 2008.) In the run-up to the conference of states-parties, OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter had suggested conducting an additional 10 OCPF inspections in 2009.
Developing countries, on whose territory a relative large share of OCPFs operate, preferred to wait. Cuba, speaking on behalf of member states of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), stated Dec. 2 that "any changes in the frequency of OCPF inspections, if required, should take into account any refinements to the OCPF inspection regime or improvements in site-selection methodology, and should be based on a thorough discussion and a decision of the policy-making organs."
In the end, the 2009 budget contains a slight increase in the budget for industry inspections, including for the OCPFs. Member states agreed on an additional eight industry inspections in 2009, seven of which will be conducted at the OCPFs and one at a scheduled facility. A knowledgeable U.S. official told Arms Control Today in a Dec. 18 interview that the United States was "happy to see a recognition that OCPFs require more inspections, but of course we would have liked to see even more OCPF inspections next year."
With the budget decision out of the way, the chair, Japanese Ambassador Minoru Shibuya, prepared the meeting's final report. According to diplomats, Iran blocked consensus on the last day of the meeting by insisting on tougher language urging chemical-weapon possessors to comply with treaty deadlines for destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. The U.S. official said that "there were no speakers on the issue of destruction when it came up on the agenda of the conference. We were therefore surprised when Iran circulated language on the issue on Friday afternoon."
According to the CWC, all chemical weapons stockpiles have to be destroyed no later than April 29, 2012. The U.S. government has conceded that it will not be able to meet that deadline, and it is unlikely that Russia will be able to comply with destruction timelines. The United States and Russia have the world's largest chemical weapons stockpiles. (See ACT, December 2008.)
Iran reportedly remained isolated with its position but adamant. The Iranian delegation thus prevented the adoption of a consensus final report, but its request to open up previous issues, including the agreement on the budget, was unsuccessful. The meeting concluded with the adoption of a chairman's report instead of a consensus document.
Observers and participants hold different views about the significance of the meeting's inability to adopt a consensus report. OPCW spokesperson Michael Luhan, in a Dec. 18 e-mail to Arms Control Today, pointed out that the chairman's report included all necessary decisions to ensure the normal functioning of the OPCW in 2009. "The lack of a consensus, while unfortunate, owed to a rare combination of circumstances and we don't see any trend emerging from it." The U.S. official also predicted that the failure to adopt a consensus report will have a limited effect on the future operation of the convention: "There was a lot of frustration in the room, but we have a strong ethic of consensus in the CWC, and I believe that ethic still remains or may even have been strengthened by what happened."
Other diplomats and observers speaking in private were more concerned about the implications. They remarked this was the first time that CWC states-parties had been unable to agree on a consensus final report and feared that a precedent might have been set. Some also viewed the disagreement as a reflection of underlying divisions about whether the CWC is primarily a disarmament accord or a nonproliferation treaty and whether, accordingly, the OPCW's primary task is the monitoring of chemical weapons destruction or the verification of the nonproduction of chemical weapons.