The Senate Nov. 16 overwhelmingly approved a bill to facilitate expanded civil nuclear trade with India. The House earlier this year passed similar legislation. The two congressional chambers hope to negotiate a compromise measure for President George W. Bush to sign before the end of the year.
The Senate bill passed 85-12, bolstered by support from current Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and his expected successor, Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.). No Republicans dissented on the measure, which Lugar hailed as advancing the president’s “most important strategic diplomatic initiative.”
The measure essentially exempts India from legislation Congress passed three decades ago that virtually ended nuclear commerce with the South Asian state. Lawmakers enacted the earlier legislation after India in 1974 conducted a nuclear test using material produced by a Canadian-supplied reactor using U.S.-origin heavy water designated for peaceful purposes. In July 2005, Bush promised Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that he would push lawmakers to resuscitate nuclear trade between the two countries if India divided its nuclear complex into civilian and military sectors. (See ACT, September 2005. ) New Delhi unveiled its separation plan last March, classifying 14 of 22 existing and under construction power reactors as civilian. (See ACT, April 2006. )
In the day-long debate, proponents of enhanced trade put less emphasis on the virtues of nuclear cooperation per se than the importance of forging closer ties with a rising, democratic Asian power. For example, Sen. George Voinovich (R-Ohio) said India could serve as a counterweight to China. “As China expands its economic power and military strength, U.S. nuclear cooperation with India can help to even the international keel,” he said.
Advocates also contended nuclear commerce with India would help power India’s growing economy, profit U.S. industry, and provide India with more environmentally friendly energy. They also argued implementation of Bush’s initiative would give India a greater stake in global efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons.
Detractors disputed these claims. They also warned the current plan would lead to more nuclear weapons and undermine worldwide nuclear control rules. “This agreement means we are signing up to have more nuclear weapons produced on this earth,” Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-N.D.) stated.
In negotiations on the Bush-Singh pact, New Delhi rejected Washington’s request that India cease producing fissile material (highly enriched uranium and plutonium) for weapons. Indian leaders maintain they are not ready to cap or constrain their nuclear weapons program.
Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.) criticized the deal as it would provide “assistance to India without any restraint or limitation on its existing weapons program.” He argued it conflicted with a “fundamental tenet” of U.S. policy: countries seeking civil nuclear commerce should abandon or forswear nuclear weapons. This policy is also a core element of the 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which India has never signed.
Bingaman proposed an amendment requiring New Delhi to make progress toward checking the growth of its arsenal before receiving U.S. nuclear exports. His two-step approach would have permitted nuclear equipment and technology to flow to India if it was “taking specific steps” to conclude a treaty outlawing fissile material production for weapons, while the supply of nuclear material would have hinged on New Delhi halting such production.
Lugar conceded “an Indian commitment to abandon its nuclear weapons program would have been optimal,” but he characterized Bingaman’s proposal as a “killer condition.” India, Lugar contended, would construe the amendment as “moving the goalposts and an unacceptable renegotiation of the deal.” Senators sided 73-26 with Lugar.
Critics also voiced concern that increased U.S. nuclear exports to India would free up resources New Delhi now dedicates to energy for use in weapons production. They warned that such a development would call into question the U.S. NPT obligation “not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce” non-nuclear-weapon states to acquire nuclear arms. Despite having nuclear weapons, India is considered a non-nuclear-weapon state under the accord.
Sen. Russell Feingold (D-Wis.) proposed prohibiting all nuclear trade with India unless the president certified that such transactions would not “contribute directly or indirectly” to India’s nuclear weapons program. His amendment also would have required the president to secure assurances from New Delhi that it would not use fuel imports for its civilian sector to facilitate increased output on the military side. It was defeated 71-25.
Although Biden helped spearhead the opposition to Feingold‘s amendment, he acknowledged the thrust behind it. “I hope especially that India will not use its peaceful nuclear cooperation to free up domestic uranium for increased production of nuclear weapons,” he said. Absent an outside provocation, such an increase would be a “gross abuse of the world’s trust,” Biden declared.
Senators reaffirmed during the debate that an Indian nuclear test or transfer of civilian nuclear imports to its military sector would be a clear breach of the U.S.-Indian pact and result in its termination. Lugar said that, in the event of a test, the United States “shall have the right to request the return of supplies.”
Nonetheless, Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) indicated that India would be able to turn elsewhere after the deal was approved. “Once the door to cooperation is opened to India, it may be difficult to get other countries to agree to shut it again,” he observed. Indeed, France and Russia are already lining up as potential suppliers, and China and India issued a joint statement Nov. 21 agreeing “to promote cooperation in the field of nuclear energy.”
India’s ties with Iran drew some of the greatest scrutiny from lawmakers. Indian leaders have said they oppose a nuclear-armed Iran, but New Delhi also stated last year that the Iranian nuclear program did not pose a threat to international security. Bush administration officials have repeatedly portrayed India as playing a helpful role on Iran.
Senators rejected 59-38 an amendment by Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) requiring a suspension of Indian military-to-military relations with Iran before receiving U.S. nuclear imports. But they adopted by voice vote an amendment by Sen. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) conditioning future nuclear commerce on a presidential determination that New Delhi was “fully and actively participating” in U.S. and international efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear program.
Bush welcomed Senate passage of the legislation and said he looked forward to signing a final bill soon. Congress reconvenes Dec. 4 and will have to reconcile the recent Senate bill with the July 26 House version. (See ACT, September 2006. )
It remains to be seen whether a final product will retain some Senate provisions that India has criticized. New Delhi has been particularly critical of two. One calls for additional measures to verify that U.S. exports stay in India’s civil sector. The other prohibits exports of uranium-enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, and heavy-water technologies because they can be used to produce nuclear bombs as well as energy.
India is taking a wait-and-see approach. Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee told Indian parliamentarians Nov. 23 that “it would be premature to predict the eventual outcome of this process or to comment on the matter [until] we have seen the legislation in its final form.” He added, “[T]here is no question of accepting any additional requirements beyond those” in the original Bush-Singh statement and the separation plan.
The Senate bill includes a measure unrelated to India that could be a source of contention for House members. It would implement under U.S. law an additional protocol to a U.S. safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In March 2004, the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the protocol itself. Although largely symbolic, the protocol notionally gives the agency greater authority to conduct activities inside the United States. The House has not yet considered such implementing legislation, so that chamber would have to approve it as part of the final legislation that emerges from the House-Senate conference committee for the instrument to take effect.
Even if Congress approves a final bill and Bush signs it into law before the end of the current congressional session, it would still be some time before expanded U.S.-Indian nuclear trade could commence. The two governments first must complete negotiations on a formal bilateral nuclear cooperation accord, which then must be approved by Congress. In addition, India and the IAEA must reach a safeguards agreement specifying what types of oversight measures will be placed on Indian civil nuclear facilities. Finally, the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group would need to exempt India from the voluntary group’s nuclear supply restrictions. (See ACT, November 2006. )