In a Sept. 1 report to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei said he was closing the agency’s probe into two aspects of Iran’s nuclear program. But contrary to Iran’s wishes, he said that the more than two-year-old investigation would continue.
In his report, ElBaradei pointed to “steady progress” that has allowed him to conclude special investigations into Iran‘s laser-based uranium-enrichment program and its past uranium-conversion experiments, adding that “further follow-up [on these issues] will be carried out as a routine safeguards implementation matter.”
The agency is still investigating several other issues relating to Iran’s nuclear program, but the report contains little new information about them.
Most importantly, IAEA investigators continue to probe the source of uranium particles enriched by centrifuges and found at several locations in Iran. Uncertainty about the particles’ origin has caused concern because it suggests that Iran may have conducted nuclear experiments that it has not yet admitted or may be concealing nuclear material it either produced or imported. Such actions would also violate Iran’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. (See ACT, July/August 2004.)
Uranium enrichment increases the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope to produce low-enriched uranium for civilian nuclear reactor fuel or, if enriched enough, highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons. Uranium conversion can produce uranium compounds from uranium oxide. These include uranium hexafluoride, which can be used as the feedstock for gas centrifuges. Such centrifuges enrich uranium hexafluoride gas by spinning it at very high speeds. (See ACT, September 2004.)
Iran has admitted to testing centrifuges with nuclear material, but maintains that it only produced uranium enriched to a very low level and asserts that other types of enriched uranium particles originated from centrifuge components obtained from a procurement network run by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. Iran continues to say that it does not know the origin of the components.
According to the report, several unanswered questions about the particles remain. For example, the IAEA still does not know why Iran’s domestically manufactured centrifuge components have been contaminated with a different type of enriched uranium than their imported equivalents or why uranium enriched to 36 percent U-235 has been found at some facilities where imported components were located, but not at other sites.
Previous reports from ElBaradei have said that some HEU particles found in Iran likely did not come from imported components. The September report, however, states that it “appears plausible” that uranium particles found at the Kalaye Electric Company and Iran’s pilot uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz “may not have resulted from enrichment of uranium by Iran.” Tehran tested centrifuges at Kalaye Electric and has a pilot centrifuge facility at Natanz, where Iran also is constructing a much larger commercial centrifuge facility.
A diplomatic source in Vienna close to the IAEA told Arms Control Today in August that imported components can probably account for all of the uranium particles in question, but cautioned that this will not be confirmed for some time. The source confirmed press reports that particles enriched to 54 percent came from centrifuges imported from Pakistan and that particles enriched to 36 percent apparently came from equipment originating in the former Soviet Union. That equipment reached Iran via China and Pakistan, the source said.
The IAEA also is still attempting to determine the source of uranium hexafluoride found in a storage facility located at the Tehran Research Reactor. According to the report, agency experts continue to regard “as not technically plausible” Iran’s claim that the material leaked from bottles stored at the site.
The agency also continues to examine the scope of Iran’s advanced P-2 centrifuge activities, which Iran initially omitted from an ostensibly complete October 2003 declaration of its nuclear activities. Tehran later claimed that the program was solely for research and development and that it had not obtained any components from foreign sources.
However, Iran later admitted to acquiring magnets for the centrifuges from foreign suppliers. Furthermore, Tehran has indicated interest in acquiring thousands of additional magnets, suggesting that it intends to mass-produce centrifuges. Iran has not yet provided the IAEA with enough information regarding these procurement efforts, the report says.
Additionally, the IAEA continues to doubt Iran’s claim that it obtained the designs for the P-2 centrifuge in 1995 from a foreign source, but did not test any components until 2002. In discussions with the IAEA, Iran attributed this lack of activity to its focus on the P-2’s predecessor, as well as to “organizational” changes in the relevant government agency. The report, however, says this explanation does not “provide sufficient assurance that there were no related activities carried out” during the period in question. IAEA experts believe that Iran’s program is too advanced for Tehran’s time frame to be accurate.
Suspension of Enrichment Activities
The IAEA continues to monitor Iran’s declared suspension of its uranium-enrichment activities. Iran agreed to the suspension as part of an October 2003 agreement with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Tehran then specifically agreed in February to stop assembling centrifuges and manufacturing related components. However, ElBaradei reported in June that Iran had not stopped manufacturing components.
In June, responding to European support for a toughly worded IAEA resolution adopted earlier that month, Iran notified the IAEA that it would resume both component manufacturing and centrifuge assembly under agency supervision. The resolution had specifically called on Iran to fully suspend these activities.
According to the September IAEA report, Iran has since removed from relevant facilities the IAEA seals used to monitor the suspension. As of mid-August, Iran had assembled about 70 centrifuge rotors. Iran has not accepted an IAEA proposal to place these rotors under seal after they have been tested, the report says, adding that the agency’s supervision of the suspension “cannot be considered effective” without such seals.
In addition to its centrifuge activities, Iran produced “about 30-35” kilograms of uranium hexafluoride in its uranium-conversion facility between May and June. Tehran also told the IAEA that it would soon begin another test involving a larger quantity of uranium oxide. Iranian Vice President Gholamreza Aghazadeh announced Sept. 21 that Tehran had begun the test, Reuters reported.
According to ElBaradei’s report, Iran intends to use 37 metric tons of uranium oxide for the test. This amount of uranium could yield a quantity of uranium hexafluoride sufficient to produce HEU for four or five crude nuclear weapons, an IAEA official told Arms Control Today Sept. 22.
Other Issues
The IAEA also is continuing to investigate Iran’s plutonium separation experiments. Separating plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel is another method for obtaining explosive material for a nuclear weapon. According to the report, Iran previously understated the amount of plutonium it separated from uranium irradiated in a research reactor in Tehran, but now agrees with the IAEA’s assessment that Iran produced “milligram quantities” of plutonium. Additionally, the agency continues to investigate the timing of Iran’s plutonium experiments, which may have been conducted more recently than Tehran stated.
The report also describes the agency’s investigation of the Lavizan Shian site, which agency inspectors visited in late June. The IAEA still needs to analyze environmental samples taken at the site, but the Vienna source told Arms Control Today in August that there is no evidence Iran undertook prohibited nuclear activities there. According to the report, Iran told the IAEA that it had established a physics research center at Lavizan Shian in 1989.
Additionally, the report states that the IAEA and Iran have “discussed…open source information relating to dual-use equipment and materials,” apparently a reference to press accounts describing Iranian attempts to purchase deuterium and high-speed electronic switches. Both of these materials can be used in more advanced nuclear weapons.
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