A U.S. official called a working group meeting of midlevel officials held May 12-15 in Beijing “useful,” but there is scant evidence that the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula is closer to being resolved. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao noted May 13 that the parties expressed “major differences” during the talks. Department of State spokesperson Adam Ereli acknowledged May 17 that the talks produced no “breakthroughs.” The North Koreans expressed frustration.
The officials agreed to hold another working group meeting before the next round of six-party talks, to be held before the end of June, but no dates have been set for either session. Besides the United States, North Korea, and China, the working group meeting included representatives from Japan, South Korea, and Russia.
The crisis began in October 2002 when the United States reported that North Korea admitted to pursuing a covert uranium-enrichment program. As the crisis escalated, Pyongyang also restarted a plutonium-based nuclear program that had been frozen since 1994. Both programs can produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Two rounds of six-party talks have made little apparent progress. (See ACT, April 2004.)
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson said May 15 that North Korea at the mid-May talks repeated its offer to “freeze its nuclear facilities as the first-phase action and displayed utmost flexibility” but that the United States refused to discuss compensation until North Korea committed to dismantling all of its nuclear facilities. Another Foreign Ministry official described the U.S. position as “humiliating,” Agence France Presse reported May 14.
North Korea has issued detailed proposals to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in a series of steps in return for U.S. concessions. Washington has not responded publicly with a similar counterproposal.
Still, the meeting may have made some marginal progress. A State Department official told Arms Control Today May 18 that the U.S. delegation, led by U.S. Special Envoy Joseph Detrani, “clarified its position [on the nuclear issue] quite a bit” during bilateral contacts held during the meeting. Additionally, Liu stated that there were “new contents in the statements of all parties,” although he noted that “parties still have different views on the scope of denuclearization and the ways of verification.”
U.S. officials have repeatedly asserted that the United States and other participants are united against North Korea in pressuring it to give up its nuclear programs, but there are differences among the parties as to the extent to which they should engage North Korea.
The View from Pyongyang
North Korea’s UN ambassador, Han Song Ryol, implied in a May 12 interview that his government would address the “nuclear issue” in the six-party talks and reiterated North Korea’s past proposals to freeze its plutonium-based program. (See ACT, March 2004.)
However, Han said Pyongyang first wants to conduct bilateral talks with Washington “within the context of the six-party talks” to conclude a “peace treaty.” South Korea could also participate in such talks, he implied.
Han said a treaty is needed to end the U.S. “hostile policy” toward North Korea, which he said has motivated his government to develop nuclear weapons. Only when such a treaty has been concluded, he argued, can North Korea “negotiate disarmament issues” because otherwise the United States can “reverse” any other security assurances while North Korea is disarming. All other issues of bilateral concern could also be addressed at that point, he said.
The U.S. delegation informed North Korea during the last round of six-party talks that it “might” be willing to negotiate a “permanent peace mechanism” after resolution of the nuclear issues, the State Department acknowledged May 3.
Pyongyang has repeatedly argued that Washington plans a pre-emptive nuclear attack on North Korea and said it wants Washington to offer some sort of security assurance, although it has not always specified a peace treaty. (See ACT, January/February 2004.) The United States has repeatedly denied any intention of attacking North Korea and has offered to conclude a multilateral security agreement once North Korea achieves unspecified “benchmarks” in dismantling its nuclear programs. Undersecretary of State John Bolton suggested in a May 8 interview with Jiji Press Service that such assurances would take effect when North Korea has nearly finished disarming.
Han also discussed the contentious issue of North Korea’s suspected uranium-enrichment program. The United States, Japan, and South Korea want North Korea to acknowledge the program, but Pyongyang denies it has one. North Korea’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed irritation that the U.S. delegation raised the issue of the program during the working group talks, calling the U.S. charges a “fabrication.”
In the interview, Han also denied that North Korea has such a program but said that his government was willing to discuss the matter once the United States has shared evidence that the program exists. The United States has not yet done so, he claimed.
The State Department official stated that Pakistan has provided intelligence to the United States and other participants in the talks indicating that a clandestine network operated by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan provided North Korea with uranium-enrichment technology. (See ACT, March 2004.)
On May 19, Ereli reiterated Washington’s policy of pressuring North Korea to commit to the “complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement” of its nuclear programs without offering North Korea “inducements” to do so. (See ACT, May 2004.) Washington has said that it “could” normalize relations with North Korea once Pyongyang has taken action to resolve the nuclear dispute and rein in other military activities, such as its large conventional forces and long-running missile program.
Some administration officials, however, have recently been somewhat more explicit in articulating the steps that Pyongyang must take, as well as the possible benefits it might reap.
For example, Bolton told the House International Relations Committee in March that “complete and irreversible dismantlement” means the removal of “all elements” of both North Korea’s uranium- and plutonium-based nuclear programs. He added that some of the permanent five members of the UN Security Council would dismantle any nuclear weapons and “[extract] all weapons design information,” as well as work with the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify dismantlement of the nuclear programs and remove “critical items.”
In March, State Department Director for Policy Planning Mitchell Reiss issued the administration’s most specific articulation of the benefits North Korea might receive through its compliance with U.S. requests. Reiss did not specify, however, which North Korean actions would be sufficient to realize these benefits and added little to previous U.S. suggestions that it would normalize diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. (See ACT, April 2004.)
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