Statement of ACA to the Meeting with Non-Governmental Organizations at the OPCW, The Hague

For Immediate Release: November 19, 2007

Press Contacts: Oliver Meier: +49-171-359-2410

At the second review conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to take place on April 7-18, 2008, member states face the dual tasks of ensuring that treaty obligations are fully implemented and adapting the convention to new challenges.

First, the review conference needs to address the fact that ten years after entry into force, some member states are still not fully implementing their obligations under the convention.

Destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles

Russia and the United States will almost certainly be unable to destroy their stocks of chemical weapons before the extended treaty deadline of April 29, 2012. Moscow’s and Washington’s failure to devote the necessary resources to meeting the destruction deadline has wide-ranging implications for the convention, including the allocation of scarce verification resources to monitoring chemical weapons (CW) destruction even after 2012, weakening other verification-related tasks.

Given that the 2012 deadline is still four years away, the review conference should urge both states to do their utmost to accelerate CW destruction in a safe and environmentally sound manner. It is to be hoped that other states will renew their commitment to assist Russia in meeting its treaty obligations through financial and other assistance, for example in the context of the Global Partnership.

Because this will be the last review conference before treaty-mandated CW destruction deadlines expire, delegates should consider how to respond to the likely non-compliance of the United States and Russia. Any decision to extend destruction deadlines – whether through a risky amendment of the CWC or by invoking Article VIII, paragraph 36, which gives the Executive Council the power to adapt the relevant provisions – should be coupled with a tight and realistic schedule for final destruction of all CW stockpiles.(1)

Trade in dual-use chemicals

Provisions for restricting trade in dual-use chemicals have also been implemented half-heartedly.(2) Thus, states parties at the review conference should consider banning trade in Schedule 3 chemicals with CWC non-states parties, in order to provide another incentive to join the convention. Such a step, mentioned in the treaty and previously considered by states parties in 2002, would have the additional benefit of limiting the ability of non-states parties to develop and produce chemical weapons.

Proliferation concerns

Concern about chemical weapons proliferation remains an urgent issue. The United States has been most vocal in accusing other states parties of pursuing clandestine CW-related activities. In this regard, it has voiced concerns regarding China, Iran, Russia, and Sudan.(3) Whenever specific information regarding non-compliance is available, such concerns must be clarified using the treaty’s mechanisms, including the provision for on-site challenge inspections. The review conference should make clear that allegations of non-compliance that are not followed up and resolved through challenge inspection will only damage the convention’s credibility. At the same time, states parties should ensure that the Technical Secretariat has the necessary resources to mount a challenge inspection, anytime, anywhere, as foreseen in the treaty.

National implementation

Finally, the review conference should address the patchy compliance with the treaty’s provisions on national implementation. More than 100 states parties have not yet notified the OPCW of the actions taken to implement Article VII. The review conference should renew the Action Plan on National Implementation and expand it to ensure “that states parties incorporate the general purpose criterion and the schedules of chemicals into their subsidiary regulations and empower their national authorities to collect all of the data needed to monitor domestic implementation effectively.”(4)

“Non-lethal” chemical agents

Implementing the treaty’s provisions may not be sufficient to keep the taboo against chemical weapons as strong as it is today. Since the CWC has entered into force, a number of political, scientific, technological and economic developments have made it urgent to adapt key provisions at next year’s review conference.

Efforts by a number of states, including Russia and the United States, to develop and deploy so-called “non-lethal” chemical agents pose a serious threat to the convention. If the acquisition and use of these weapons for overseas counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations becomes accepted state practice, the norm against the hostile use of toxic chemicals will be seriously eroded. The United States, as the world’s greatest military power, bears a large burden of responsibility because U.S. military practice is emulated by other nations.

There is currently no clear line in the treaty between what is permitted and what is prohibited with regard to the use of non-lethal agents, creating ambiguities and potential loopholes. Accordingly, the review conference must not shy away from this issue. As a first step, states parties should establish a technical working group that will report within one year on key questions such as what types of non-lethal agents are prohibited by the convention, who may use them, and under what conditions such agents may be used. Although the issue is not yet ripe for political resolution, it must be explored on a priority basis. In another five years, facts may have been created that will make a consensus on the issue even more elusive than it appears today.

Verification

The CWC verification regime also needs to be adapted to new realities. First, it is essential to match verification resources to CW proliferation challenges. More than half of all OPCW inspections are still related to disarmament, limiting the ability of the organization to detect and deter proliferation. Further, industry inspections are skewed toward facilities that produce Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals. There is a growing consensus that increasing the number of inspections at Other Chemical Production Facilities that pose proliferation risks, such as flexible, multipurpose production plants, would improve the overall effectiveness of the industry verification regime and have a positive effect on the geographic balance of inspections. The review conference should mandate the Technical Secretariat to take further steps in this direction, and to make greater use during routine industry inspections of modern verification technologies such as sampling and analysis. Ironically, concerns over the potential loss of proprietary information through sampling and analysis are often greater at the political level than among companies that are the objects of on-site inspections.