Statement of Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director
Regarding the Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency on Its
Investigation of Iran's Nuclear Program
For Immediate Release: June 15, 2004
Press Contacts: Paul Kerr, Nonproliferation Analyst, (202) 463-8270 x102; Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x105
(Washington, D.C.): The report by the Director-General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency makes it clear that leaders in Tehran must go further
to explain the details and ultimate purpose of Iran's nuclear program
and should do so without further delay. Russia, Pakistan, and other states
involved in nuclear trade with Tehran should fully cooperate with the
IAEA's ongoing efforts to get a complete picture of the Iranian nuclear
program.
Over the last two years, the IAEA has uncovered evidence that Iran
is now closer to a nuclear weapons-making capability than previously
believed. An IAEA investigation and inspections in early 2003 led the
agency to report Nov. 10, 2003 that Iran had for many years pursued
nuclear activities in violation of its nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) obligations. The latest report from the IAEA makes it clear that
while Iran has sometimes grudgingly granted the IAEA access to the sites
and facilities in question, a number of key issues regarding Iran's
nuclear activities need to be clarified. The report finds that Iran
has stopped uranium enrichment as it pledged last fall, but that it
has continued to seek parts for such activities.
Leaders in Tehran should maintain their suspension of uranium enrichment
activities and refrain from other projects that have military applications
until international concerns about its nuclear program are resolved. Iran
is legally permitted under the NPT to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes
but this process can also be used to develop nuclear weapons.
Even with greater transparency under the Additional Protocol, which Iran
signed last year and which allows more intrusive IAEA inspections, it
is still possible that Iran might someday decide to withdraw from the
NPT and pursue nuclear weapons.
In the long run, turning Iran away from nuclear weapons will require a
new and more sophisticated joint U.S.-European-Russian strategy to reduce
Iran's incentives to acquire nuclear weapons and increase the benefits
of openness and compliance. An important element of such a strategy would
be for the United States and Israel to reassure Tehran that it does not
have to fear an attack by either country if Iran drops its pursuit of
nuclear weapons, ends its support of terrorism, and stops threatening
the existence of Israel.
The United States should also make clear that it does not support the
possession of nuclear weapons by other countries, including Israel,
India, and Pakistan, which are not party to the NPT. To avoid the perils
of nuclear weapons, all states must comply with global rules against
the development and possession of nuclear weapons. Leaders in Tehran
cannot be allowed to justify their nuclear weapons ambitions by pointing
to the nuclear bomb arsenals and activities of other countries.
Nevertheless, it is ultimately up to Iran to abide by its commitments
not to develop nuclear weapons. Tehran should not use the behavior of
others as a pretext for activities that go against its own security
interests and threaten its neighbors. As Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran's former
envoy to the IAEA, wisely noted in an interview June 9, acquiring nuclear
weapons will not improve Iran's prestige and cannot buy more security,
but only invite more dangers to Iran and the region.
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The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership
organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support
for effective arms control policies to address security threats posed
by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as conventional
arms.
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