

issue would contribute to...realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction.”

The resolution reiterates Resolution 1737’s provision that if Iran suspends its enrichment-related activities, the council “shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as” the suspension holds. Similarly, the council “shall terminate” the sanctions if it has determined that “Iran has fully complied with its obligations.”

A March 24 joint statement from Germany and the five permanent council members articulated similar conditions and voiced continued support for the June 2006 offer.

Resolution 1747 also states that the council will adopt “further appropriate” nonmilitary measures if Iran does not comply.

Sanctions

Resolution 1747 does not require any additional actions from Tehran. But it imposes some new restrictions and expands the scope of the sanctions described in the previous resolution. For example, the resolution newly designates 28 Iranian officials and entities as subject to travel and financial restrictions described in Resolution 1737.

Additionally, Resolution 1747 strengthens a previous provision requesting governments “to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through their territories” of certain Iranian officials. The new resolution says that governments should also exercise “restraint” in admitting such officials. A European diplomat told *Arms Control Today* March 27 that the idea is for governments to refuse designated officials permission to travel unless there is good reason to do otherwise.

The resolution imposes new restrictions on Tehran, particularly in the area of weapons transfers. For example, it “decides that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly...any arms or related materiel.” Similarly, the resolution calls on other countries to “exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale or transfer” of certain weapons to Iran.

Additionally, the resolution calls on governments and international financial institutions to refrain from “enter[ing] into new commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans” to the Iranian government, “except for humanitarian and developmental purposes.” However, neither this requirement nor the provision regarding arms exports to Iran is legally binding.

All governments are to report on their implementation of the sanctions to a committee established by Resolution 1737.

Expanded Focus?

Although the previous resolution targeted Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, another European diplomat acknowledged that Resolution 1747 brings more “political” pressure on Tehran. However, the official emphasized that “all we want is for Iran to end its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.”

Asked during a March 20 press briefing about the relationship between a ban on Iranian arms exports and Tehran’s nuclear program, U.S. Acting Permanent Representative to the UN Alejandro Wolff said that Iran’s military “derives revenues from its military exports” and implied that the military is involved in the country’s nuclear programs. The first European diplomat agreed that their is “overlap” between Iran’s military and nuclear programs.

Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns, however, indicated during a March 24 call with reporters that the arms export ban is part of a broader effort to “block and contain Iranian power [in] the Middle East,” arguing that Tehran’s arms exports to groups that the United States considers to be terrorist organizations are part of a strategy to exert influence in the region.

Iran Reacts

Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said after the resolution’s adoption that suspension is “neither an option nor a solution” but reiterated that Iran is willing to negotiate about its nuclear program without suspending it.

Tehran announced the next day that it would cut back its cooperation with the IAEA. Government spokesperson Gholam-Hossein Elham said Iran would stop complying with certain subsidiary modifications to its IAEA safeguards agreement, the semi-official Mehr News Agency reported March 26. Iran agreed to the modifications in February 2003. (See *ACT*, March 2003.)

Those modifications require Tehran to provide design information for new nuclear facilities as soon as it authorizes construction. Previously, Iran was required to provide design information for new facilities six months before introducing nuclear material.

Subsidiary arrangements specify in detail how the procedures contained in a country’s IAEA safeguards agreement should be implemented. Such agreements, which are required under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), allow the agency to monitor NPT states-parties’ declared civilian nuclear activities.

IAEA spokesperson Melissa Fleming told *Arms Control Today* March 28 that the agency had not yet received any official communication from Iran on the matter.

Meanwhile, Javier Solana, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, continued efforts to persuade Iran to negotiate. According to Reuters, Solana spoke March 26 by phone with Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and Iran’s lead nuclear negotiator. Solana’s spokesperson, Cristina Gallach, said that “there was no discussion of substance” but added that the two had agreed to speak again soon. —PAUL KERR

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Russian news agency RIA Novosti Feb. 26 that “the negotiating process could last several years because of various technical, legislative, and other issues.” Fotyga remained opposed, however, to making the missile defense plans a European issue. “All I can say with certainty is that, during the discussions, we will prioritize Poland’s security and then the security of Europe and the world,” she said.

Czech Vice Prime Minister and Europe Minister Alexandr Vondra in a March 3 interview with the German paper *Die Tageszeitung* said that his government was open to a limited debate in NATO on missile defense plans but cautioned that Prague “will not ask Russia for permission” to build the radar site.

Ondrej Liska, chairman of the European Affairs Committee in the Czech parliament, told *Arms Control Today* March 21 that his Green Party would make its “support for the construction of a radar site on Czech territory conditional on consensus in the EU Council and the NATO Council on U.S. missile defense plans.” The Green Party is the junior partner in Prague’s current coalition government, which also includes Conservatives and Christian Democrats.

Liska, deputy head of the Green Party, said that NATO and the EU first have to agree on

how real the threat is from ballistic missiles, whether defenses are capable of defending against such a possible threat, whether such a system could fuel new arms races, and whether missile defenses could have a negative impact on other, cooperative instruments to tackle proliferation. Opposition Social Democrats also said they would condition their support on an agreement within NATO on the missile defense plans.

According to recent polls, a majority of Czech citizens is opposed to building a U.S. missile radar in the country. Of the 72 citizens of the village of Trokavec, where the X-band radar facility is supposed to be built, 71 voted against the government’s plan.

Should Poland or the Czech Republic decide to drop out of the project, the United States could consolidate both sites in one of the two countries. Bases could also be built in other countries. Ukraine, for example, has recently indicated some interest in participating in such a system. Russian radio station Ekho Moskvy reported March 19 that Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko was considering whether it should “join the countries that had missile defense plans.” The broadcast, which was translated by the BBC, also quoted Ukrainian Prime

Minister Viktor Yanukovych as saying that Kyiv was ready for talks and could bring space monitoring capabilities, shared jointly with Russia, into such a system. There has also been talk of basing radars for the missile defense system in the Caucasus, a suggestion that has triggered strong reactions from Moscow.

On Feb. 23, a spokesperson for the British government confirmed reports that London was involved in talks with Washington about the potential deployment of interceptors in the United Kingdom and that the government welcomes “plans to place further missile defense assets in Europe.” Obering confirmed that missile defense bases on British territory would improve the U.S. ability to intercept Russian ICBMs.

“If [the Russians] are concerned about us targeting their intercontinental ballistic missiles, I think that would be problematic from the [perspective of the United Kingdom] because I believe we probably could catch them from a UK launch site,” he told the *Financial Times* March 7. The United Kingdom already hosts a radar at Fylingdales, which feeds information to the U.S. missile defense system. — OLIVER MEIER

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