Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Pakistan

This profile summarizes the major arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that Pakistan subscribes to and those that it does not. It also describes the major weapons programs, policies, and holdings of Pakistan, as well as its proliferation record. This profile is one of a series focused on the arms control record and status of key states, all of which are available on the Arms Control Association’s Website at http://www.armscontrol.org.

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Not a member.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Not a member. Pakistani entities have been sanctioned by the United States for engaging in trade involving missiles and missile technologies controlled by the regime.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Not a member. Pakistan is prohibited from importing key nuclear materials and technologies from the 45 group members because Islamabad does not subject its entire nuclear enterprise to safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Not a member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: No, Pakistan has not negotiated such an agreement.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Participant.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Not a participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Not a participant. A senior U.S. official indicated to Arms Control Today that the initiative does not target transfers to and from Pakistan because it is a U.S. ally.[2]

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673: Pakistan has filed the requested reports on its activities to fulfill the resolutions and volunteered to provide assistance to other states.

Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:
No government has alleged that Pakistan is violating its Biological Weapons Convention commitments. The U.S. Department of Defense, however, noted that Pakistan has the “capabilities to support a limited biological warfare research effort.”

Chemical Weapons:
Pakistan did not declare possessing any chemical weapons when it joined the Chemical Weapons Convention. Pakistan remains in good standing under the treaty.

Missiles:

• Ballistic Missiles: Pakistan has an active ballistic missile program and has flight-tested and deployed nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. The system with the longest estimated range that has been flight tested is the Ghauri-2, which reportedly can travel up to 2,300 kilometers. Pakistan’s program has benefited from missile and technology transfers from China and North Korea. In 2005, the U.S. Department of State reported that transfers from China were still occurring.

• Cruise Missiles: Cruise Missiles: Pakistan has tested an indigenous cruise missile system, the Babur/Haft-7. It is nuclear-capable and has a range of 500 kilometers, according to the Pakistani military.

Nuclear Weapons:
Pakistan is estimated as having an arsenal of approximately 60 warheads. Available delivery vehicles include ground-launched ballistic missiles and dual-use fighter aircraft, reportedly including U.S.-origin F-16A/B fighter jets. The planes were not transferred for the purpose of delivering nuclear bombs, but Pakistan is believed to have modified the planes for that mission.

Pakistan has not ruled out the possible first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict. Pakistani officials have claimed, however, that nuclear weapons would be used only as a matter of last resort.

Pakistan’s secret nuclear weapons program began in the early 1970s and was spurred on by India’s first nuclear test in 1974. The effort was aided by the theft of nuclear technology and know-how from the European company URENCO by Abdul Qadeer Khan, who became a leading figure in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons establishment. Although U.S. intelligence was aware of Pakistan’s illicit program, the United States continued to provide military assistance and foreign aid to Islamabad up until 1990 when President George H. W. Bush decided that he could no longer certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. U.S. sanctions related to Pakistan’s nuclear program were dropped after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks when the United States decided to pursue closer relations with Pakistan as part of the U.S. declared “war on terror.”

Pakistan has conducted two nuclear weapon tests, although one of those involved five simultaneous explosions. The first test occurred May 28, 1998, and the last took place May 30, 1998.

Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for weapons purposes and is apparently seeking to expand its production capacity by building additional nuclear facilities, including a heavy water reactor. Pakistan is currently estimated to possess approximately 1,300 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and 90 kilograms of weapons plutonium.

Conventional Weapons Trade:
In recent years, Pakistan has emerged as a top conventional arms buyer. A 2007 arms trade report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service identified Pakistan as the leading developing world arms buyer in 2006, tallying roughly $5.1 billion in new arms sales agreements. Those agreements included a purchase of up to 36 new F-16C/D combat aircraft from the United States.

Proliferation Record

Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan developed a black market network of suppliers to procure technology and know-how for Pakistan’s secret nuclear weapons program and then transformed that network into a supply chain for other states. Iran, Libya, and North Korea were all clients and other states might have been as well. After the interception of one of his shipments to Libya in October 2003, Khan appeared on Pakistani television in February 2004 and confessed to running the network, which transferred items ranging from centrifuges to bomb designs.

The Pakistani government denied any complicity in or knowledge of the network and confined Khan to house arrest. Although reportedly serving as an intermediary to foreign governments, the Pakistani government has not made Khan available to direct interviews by other states. General concern exists that remnants of the network might still be functioning.

Pakistan instituted new export control laws following the public exposure of Khan’s network.

Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

Pakistan has concluded bilateral confidence-building measures with India. After their tit-for-tat nuclear tests in 1998, the two rivals volunteered to abstain from nuclear testing. They also have established a hotline to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war and agreed to exchange advance notifications of ballistic missile flight tests.

At the 65-member Conference on Disarmament, Pakistan is calling for negotiation of an “effectively verifiable” fissile material treaty. In light of its existing fissile material stockpile disparity with India, Pakistan also wants the agreement to apply to existing stockpiles rather than simply outlawing future production. Several states, including the United States, oppose these Pakistani positions, particularly the latter demand.

-Researched and prepared by Alex Bollfrass.

ENDNOTES

1. Pakistan has not ratified Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. It also has not agreed to an amendment that extends the convention’s application beyond just interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts.

2. Boese, Wade, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: An Interview with John Bolton,” Arms Control Today, December 2003, p. 37.

3. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001.

4. Natural Resources Defense Council, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2007,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2007, p. 71.

5. Mian, Zia, A. H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, and M. V. Ramana, Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the U.S.-Indian Nuclear Deal, International Panel on Fissile Materials, September 2006, 36 pp.

6. Grimmett, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999-2006, Congressional Research Service, September 26, 2007, 92 pp.