Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Pakistan

This profile summarizes the major arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that Pakistan subscribes to and those that it does not. It also describes the major weapons programs, policies, and holdings of Pakistan, as well as its proliferation record. This profile is one of a series focused on the arms control record and status of key states, all of which are available on the Arms Control Association’s Website at http://www.armscontrol.org.

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Not a member.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Not a member. Pakistani entities have been sanctioned by the United States for engaging in trade involving missiles and missile technologies controlled by the regime.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Not a member. Pakistan is prohibited from importing key nuclear materials and technologies from the 45 group members because Islamabad does not subject its entire nuclear enterprise to safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Not a member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: No, Pakistan has not negotiated such an agreement.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Participant.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Not a participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Not a participant. A senior U.S. official indicated to Arms Control Today that the initiative does not target transfers to and from Pakistan because it is a U.S. ally.[2]

UN Security Council Resolution 1540: Pakistan has filed the requested report on its activities to fulfill the resolution and volunteered to provide assistance to other states.

Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:
No government has alleged that Pakistan is violating its Biological Weapons Convention commitments. Islamabad has not filed a voluntary BWC confidence-building declaration.

Chemical Weapons:
Pakistan did not declare possessing any chemical weapons when it joined the Chemical Weapons Convention. Pakistan remains in good standing under the treaty.

Missiles:

• Ballistic Missiles: Pakistan has an active ballistic missile program and has flight-tested and deployed nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. The system with the longest estimated range that has been flight-tested is the solid-fueled Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6), which has a range of about 2,000 kilometers. Islamabad has also been developing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles with very short ranges to be used on the battlefield against Indian conventional forces. Pakistan’s program has benefited from missile and technology transfers from China and North Korea.

• Cruise Missiles: Pakistan been developing both ground- and air-launched cruise missile nuclear delivery systems. Its ground-launched system, the Babur (Haft-7), has a range of 700 kilometers, according to the Pakistani military. Pakistan has also tested the Ra'ad (Hatf-8) air-launched cruise missile system, with a range of 350 kilometers. The Pakistani military claims that both systems are highly accurate and have “stealth capabilities.”

Nuclear Weapons:

Pakistan is estimated as having an arsenal of about 100 warheads and is assessed to be expanding its arsenal faster than any other country. Each year, Pakistan produces enough fissile material for 10-21 nuclear weapons. [3] Islamabad is also expanding its production capacity by building additional nuclear facilities, including two heavy water reactors at its Khushab nuclear site that would effectively double the amount of plutonium Pakistan produces for weapons when they are operational. Pakistan is currently estimated to possess approximately 2.6 tons of highly enriched uranium and 100 kilograms of weapons plutonium. [4]

Available delivery vehicles include ground-launched ballistic missiles and dual-use fighter aircraft, reportedly including U.S.-origin F-16A/B fighter jets. The planes were not transferred for the purpose of delivering nuclear bombs, but Pakistan is believed to have modified the planes for that mission. Pakistani nuclear weapons are reportedly stored disassembled, and are not co-located with their delivery systems.

Pakistan has pledged no first use against non-nuclear weapons states, but has not ruled out the possible first use of nuclear weapons against India. Although Pakistani officials have claimed that nuclear weapons would be used only as a matter of last resort in such a conflict with India, Islamabad’s development of battlefield nuclear weapons to counter Indian conventional forces raises questions as to how central Pakistani nuclear weapons are in its security doctrine.

Pakistan’s secret nuclear weapons program began in the early 1970s and was spurred on by India’s first nuclear test in 1974. The effort was aided by the theft of nuclear technology and know-how from the European company URENCO by Abdul Qadeer Khan, who became a leading figure in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons establishment. Khan is also believed to have received a nuclear weapon design from China. Although U.S. intelligence was aware of Pakistan’s illicit program, the United States continued to provide military assistance and foreign aid to Islamabad up until 1990 when President George H. W. Bush decided that he could no longer certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. U.S. sanctions related to Pakistan’s nuclear program were dropped after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks when the United States decided to pursue closer relations with Pakistan as part of the U.S. declared “war on terror.”

Pakistan has conducted two public nuclear weapon tests, although one of those involved five simultaneous explosions. The first test occurred May 28, 1998, and the last took place May 30, 1998. In 1990, China is believed to have tested a Pakistani derivative of the nuclear design Beijing allegedly gave to Khan.

Due to severe political instability from extremist groups in Pakistan, there is unease regarding the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, materials, and facilities from both insurgent threats and insider collusion. However, both Pakistani and U.S. officials have repeatedly stated that Pakistani nuclear assets are secure from such threats.

Conventional Weapons Trade:
Pakistan is one of the top conventional arms purchasers in the developing world, concluding roughly $12.5 billion in arms sales between 2002 and 2009. [5] The Pentagon reports that from 2002-2010 the total U.S. military sale agreements with Pakistan were worth approximately $5.4 billion. [6] Those agreements included a purchase of 18 new F-16C/D combat aircraft from the United States (17 have been delivered as of January 2011).

Proliferation Record

Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan developed a black market network of suppliers to procure technology and know-how for Pakistan’s secret nuclear weapons program and then transformed that network into a supply chain for other states. Iran, Libya, and North Korea were all clients and other states might have been as well. After the interception of one of his shipments to Libya in October 2003, Khan appeared on Pakistani television in February 2004 and confessed to running the network, which transferred items ranging from centrifuges to bomb designs.

The Pakistani government denied any complicity in or knowledge of the network and confined Khan to house arrest. Although reportedly serving as an intermediary to foreign governments, the Pakistani government has not made Khan available to direct interviews by other states. General concern exists that remnants of the network might still be functioning.

Pakistan instituted new export control laws following the public exposure of Khan’s network.

Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

Pakistan has concluded bilateral confidence-building measures with India. After their tit-for-tat nuclear tests in 1998, the two rivals volunteered to abstain from nuclear testing. They also have established a hotline to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war and agreed to exchange advance notifications of ballistic missile flight tests.

Pakistan has blocked the start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) at the 65-member Conference on Disarmament. Islamabad has insisted that an FMCT must cover existing stocks of fissile material due to concerns about India's current stockpile, and is preventing the body from reaching consensus on an agenda that would allow negotiations on the treaty to begin.

-Researched and prepared by Alex Bollfrass and Erin Corcoran.

ENDNOTES

1. Pakistan has not agreed to an amendment that extends the convention’s application beyond just interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts.

2. Wade Boese, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: An Interview with John Bolton,” Arms Control Today, December 2003, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/PSI.

3. Hans Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2011.

4. International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report 2010, http://www.ipfmlibrary.org/gfmr10.pdf

5. Grimmett, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2002-2009, Congressional Research Service, September 10, 2010, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41403.pdf.

6. K. Alan Kronstadt, Major U.S. Arms Sales and Grants to Pakistan Since 2001, Congressional Research Service, January 4, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakarms.pdf.