Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Iran

January 2008

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Not a member.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Not a member.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Not a member.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Not a member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: Signed an additional protocol on Dec. 18, 2003. Iran submitted an initial declaration consistent with the protocol in 2004 and abided by the protocol for a brief period despite the fact that it has not entered into force. But Iran in 2005 ended its voluntary implementation in response to adoption of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors resolution declaring Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Not a participant.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Not a participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Not a participant.

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673: Iran has filed the requested reports on its activities to fulfill the resolutions.

Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:
The United States maintains that Iran’s biotechnology infrastructure gives it the ability to produce at least small quantities of biological weapons agents for offensive purposes. According to a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency report, Iran continues to import dual-use biotechnology which may support legitimate biotechnology activities, an offensive biological weapons program, or both.[1] U.S. officials have accused Iran of “probably” pursuing an offensive biological weapons capability in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention.[2] Iran denies that allegation.

Chemical Weapons:
Having suffered chemical weapon attacks during its eight-year war with Iraq, Iranian officials frequently speak about the dangers such arms pose. The United States, however, has sanctioned companies for providing dual-use chemicals to Iran and judges that “Iran may have already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and possibly nerve agents—and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them—which it previously had manufactured.”[3] Although an option exists for states-parties to request a challenge inspection of alleged weapons sites under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention, no state-party, including the United States, has called for such an inspection in Iran.   

Missiles:

• Ballistic Missiles: Iran is the only country not in possession of nuclear weapons to have produced or flight-tested missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 kilometers. The Iranian missile program is largely based on North Korean and Russian designs and has benefited from Chinese technical assistance. Iran’s most sophisticated operational ballistic missile is the liquid-fueled Shahab-3, which has a range of about 1,300 kilometers. According to Iran, variants of the Shahab-3 are capable of reaching up to 2,000 kilometers. Iran also claims to be working on solid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile systems, including the Ghadr and the Ashura.



• Cruise Missiles: Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko confirmed in 2005 that Iran illegally procured six Kh-55 cruise missiles from Ukraine four years earlier. The Kh-55 is an air-launched nuclear-capable cruise missile with a range of up to 3,000 kilometers. Iran also has acquired a variety of Chinese anti-ship cruise missiles.

Nuclear Weapons:
During the latter half of 2002, the IAEA began investigating two secret Iranian nuclear facilities, a heavy-water production plant near Arak and a gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment facility near Natanz. Since that time, the agency has discovered a series of clandestine nuclear activities, some of which violated Iran’s safeguards agreement with the agency. For instance, Iran carried out experiments on plutonium separation without declaring such activities to the IAEA. Much of Iran’s uranium-enrichment program is based on equipment and designs acquired through former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan’s secret supply network.

After the revelations of Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom launched negotiations with Iran to address international concerns about the intent and scope of its nuclear program. These negotiations collapsed in 2005. Subsequently, the IAEA Board of Governors declared Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations and referred the matter to the UN Security Council.

The UN Security Council has adopted three resolutions calling on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. Two resolutions, 1737 and 1747, imposed targeted sanctions in response to Iran’s unwillingness to comply with that demand. Still, Iran continues to expand its uranium enrichment program and has not fully disclosed the extent of its illicit nuclear-related activities. In August 2007, Iran agreed to a work plan with the IAEA to resolve a series of outstanding verification issues.

In a declassified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released Dec. 3, 2007, the U.S. intelligence community concluded with “high confidence” that Iran had “halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003” and expressed “moderate confidence” that the program has not been restarted.[4] The 2007 NIE defined “nuclear weapons program” as weapons design and weaponization activities, as well as covert uranium conversion and enrichment work.

Conventional Weapons Trade:
In a September 2007 arms trade report, the U.S. Congressional Research Service reported that Iran received $700 million worth of conventional arms between 1999 and 2006.[5] Iran’s latest weapons buys have largely focused on air defense systems, presumably to protect their territory and nuclear sites from possible U.S. or Israeli air attack.

Proliferation Record

In 2000, Iran exported rockets and several ballistic missile components to Libya. It also has been accused of violating a Security Council resolution barring arms transfers to the anti-Israel militia Hezbollah operating in Lebanon.[6]

Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

Iran was one of the first states to formally call for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, joining with Egypt to propose the goal to the UN General Assembly in 1974.

During the 1996 Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, Iran proposed an amendment to the convention to expressly prohibit the use of biological weapons.

-Researched and prepared by Alex Bollfrass.

ENDNOTES

1. Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January-31 December 2004, http://www.dni.gov/reports/2004_unclass_report_to_NIC_DO_16Nov04.pdf.

2. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation John C. Rood’s presentation to the Sixth Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, November 20, 2006, http://geneva.usmission.gov/Press2006/2011Rood.html.

3. Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/july_dec2003.htm#iran

4. National Intelligence Estimate, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” November 2007, http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf.

5. Grimmett, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999-2006, Congressional Research Service, September 26, 2007, 92 pp.

6. Bosley, C.I., “Iran Allegedly Skirts Hezbollah Arms Ban,” Arms Control Today, September 2007, p. 40.