October 2006
Press Contact: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director; (202) 463-8270 x107; or Oliver Meier, International Representative; +49-171-359-2410
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is a legally binding treaty that outlaws biological arms. After being discussed and negotiated in the United Nation’s disarmament forum[1] starting in 1969, the BWC opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975. It currently has 155 states-parties and 16 signatory states.
Treaty Terms
The BWC Bans:
- The development, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, and production of:
i. Biological agents and toxins “of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;”
ii. Weapons, equipment, and delivery vehicles “designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.”
- The transfer of or assistance with acquiring the agents, toxins weapons, equipment, and delivery vehicles described above.
The convention further requires states-parties to destroy or divert to peaceful purposes the “agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery” described above within nine months of the convention’s entry into force. The BWC does not ban the use of biological and toxin weapons but reaffirms the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits such use. It does not ban biodefense programs.
Verification
The treaty regime mandates that states-parties consult with one another and cooperate, bilaterally or multilaterally, to solve compliance concerns. It also allows states-parties to lodge a complaint with the UN Security Council if they suspect other member states are violating the convention. The Security Council can investigate allegations, but this power has never been invoked. Security Council voting rules give China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States veto power over Security Council decision, including those to conduct BWC investigations.
Membership and Duration
The BWC is a multilateral treaty of indefinite duration that is open to any country.
Compliance
The convention has been flagrantly violated in the past. The Soviet Union, a state-party and one of the accord’s depositary states, maintained an enormous offensive biological weapons program after ratifying the BWC. Russia says that this program has been terminated, but questions remain about what happened to elements of the Soviet program. Indeed, the U.S. government declared in an August 2005 treaty compliance report that “ Russia continues to maintain an offensive BW program.”[2] Moscow refuted the charges.
Iraq also violated its treaty commitments in the past. After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraq initially denied having an offensive biological weapons program to international arms inspectors, but admitted otherwise in July 1995. But inspectors never resolved all outstanding issues surrounding the Iraqi program and could not verify Iraqi claims that the program had been eliminated. Some governments, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, charged up until the March 2003 invasion of Iraq that the country maintained an active biological weapons program, even though international inspectors had no evidence supporting these allegations. U.S. post-invasion inspections found the charges of an illicit program to be false.
In its 2005 treaty compliance report, the U.S. government listed, in addition to Russia, BWC states-parties China, Iran, and North Korea, as well as BWC signatory Syria, as possessing offensive biological weapons programs in violation of the treaty. Washington also raised concerns about Cuba’s compliance with the convention.
Meanwhile, the United States maintains extensive biodefense programs that some independent analysts and foreign government officials have contended could be perceived as crossing the line between permitted and outlawed activities.[3]
Efforts to Enhance Compliance
States-parties have convened a review conference about every five years to review and improve upon the treaty’s implementation. In an effort to enhance confidence and promote cooperation among states-parties as the second treaty review conference in 1986, member states agreed to implement a set of confidence-building measures. Under these politically binding measures, states are called upon to:
- Exchange data on high-containment research centers and laboratories or on centers and laboratories that specialize in permitted biological activities related to the convention.
- Exchange information on abnormal outbreaks of infectious diseases.
- Encourage the publication of biological research results related to the BWC and promote the use of knowledge gained from this research.
- Promote scientific contact on biological research related to the convention.
At the third BWC review conference in 1991, the scope of the first measure was expanded to include national biodefense programs and the second and fourth measures were slightly modified. In addition, member states added the following three measures to the list:
- Declare legislation, regulations, and “other measures” pertaining to the BWC.
- Declare offensive or defensive biological research and development programs in existence since Jan. 1, 1946.
- Declare vaccine production facilities.
These endeavors have been largely unsuccessful; the vast majority of states-parties have consistently failed to submit declarations on their activities and facilities.
The 1991 review conference also tasked a group of “governmental experts” to evaluate potential verification measures for use in a future compliance protocol to the BWC. The group subsequently considered 21 such measures and submitted a report to a special conference of states-parties in 1994. Building off this report, the conference tasked a second body, known as the Ad Hoc Group, with negotiating a legally binding protocol to strengthen the convention.
The Protocol Regime and Negotiations
The Ad Hoc Group met from January 1995 to August 2001 and aimed to finish its work before the fifth review conference scheduled to begin in November 2001. During the negotiations, the group developed a protocol that envisioned states submitting to an international body declarations of treaty-relevant facilities and activities. That body would conduct routine on-site visits to declared facilities and could conduct challenge inspections of suspect facilities and activities as well.
However, a number of fundamental issues, such as the scope of on-site visits and the role export controls would play in the regime, proved difficult to resolve. In March 2001, the Ad Hoc Group’s chairman issued a draft protocol containing language attempting to strike a compromise on the disputed issues. But in July 2001, at the Ad Hoc Group’s last scheduled meeting, the United States rejected the draft and any further protocol negotiations, claiming such a protocol could not help strengthen compliance with the BWC and could hurt U.S. national security and commercial interests.
The fifth BWC review conference, which many experts thought could resolve the fate of the Ad Hoc Group, was suspended on its last day, Dec. 7, 2001, after the United States offered a controversial proposal to terminate the Ad Hoc Group’s mandate and replace it with an annual meeting of BWC states-parties. The United States is the only country that publicly favors revoking the group’s mandate. Despite resuming the fifth review conference in November 2002, the states-parties still failed to agree on any verification measures, including the proposed protocol. Instead, they agreed to hold annual meetings before the next review conference in 2006. No decision was taken regarding the Ad Hoc Group, and its future remains unclear.
The New Process
During the subsequent annual meetings, member states discussed various nonproliferation measures each state-party can implement to prevent the spread of biological weapons. Each of the meetings, which included experts and state representatives, had a special focus:
- In 2003, improving national legislation and better national oversight on dangerous pathogens.
- In 2004, enhancing international capabilities to deal with alleged cases of biological weapons use and strengthening and broadening national and international disease surveillance.
- In 2005, developing of codes of conduct for scientists.
Due to U.S. opposition, the agenda of these meetings did not include any discussion of verification measures and participants were not allowed to issue formal recommendations to member states on more effective nonproliferation instruments. It will be up to the sixth review conference, taking place Nov. 20, 2006 to Dec. 8, 2006 in Geneva, to take action on the issues discussed the past three years and agree on a new set of meetings.
ENDNOTES
1. The forum, the Committee on Disarmament, is now known as the Conference on Disarmament.
2. U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, August 2005, 108 pp.
3. Brugger, Seth, “International Reaction to Secret U.S. Bio-Weapons Research Muted,” Arms Control Today, October 2001, p. 22, and Yang, Jonathan, “U.S. Biodefense Plans Worry Nonproliferation Advocates,” Arms Control Today, September 2003, p. 43.
Parties and Signatories of the Biological Weapons Convention
States-Parties: 150
| Afghanistan | Ghana | Paraguay |
Signatory States: 14
Central African Republic Cote d'Ivoire Egypt Gabon Guyana | Haiti Liberia Madagascar Malawi Myanmar (Burma) | Nepal Somalia Syria United Arab Emirates(5) |
Sources: State Department, United Nations
1. With reservation.
2. Based on general declarations concerning treaty obligations applicable prior to independence.
3. Effective January 1, 1979, the United States recognized the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole government of China. The authorities on Taiwan state they will continue to abide by the provisions of the convention, and the United States regards them as bound by its obligations.
4. Applicable to the Netherlands' Antilles and Aruba.
5. The United Arab Emirates, which did not ratify the convention, is listed as one country.
6. Extended to territories under the territorial sovereignty of the United Kingdom and to New Hebrides. Continued application to Vanuatu not determined.