NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS VS. NONPROLIFERATION:
THE CHOICE BEFORE CONGRESS
MODERATOR:
DARYL KIMBALL,
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION
SPEAKERS:
SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY
DR. SIDNEY DRELL,
STANFORD UNIVERSITY
DR. MATTHEW MCKINZIE,
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL
Tuesday, APRIL 29, 2003
Hall of States
Transcript by:
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.
The Arms Control Association held a press briefing on the dangers
posed by the Bush administration's initiatives to research new nuclear
weapons. Congress is expected to begin debate on these proposals
in upcoming weeks. This is a rushed transcript of the event.
The Panelists:
DARYL KIMBALL: Good morning, everyone.
I'm Daryl Kimball - and we are having a few sound problems this
morning and I apologize for that. Welcome to this morning's Arms
Control Association briefing on "Nuclear weapons versus non-proliferation:
The choice before Congress." The Arms Control Association is
a private, non-partisan organization devoted to supporting effective
arms control and nonproliferation strategies to reduce and eliminate
the dangers of weapons of mass destruction. We're pleased to have
this morning with us three very distinguished speakers to help us
understand the choices facing Congress in the next few weeks on
the Bush administration's proposals for research on new bunker busting
nuclear weapons capabilities and its proposal to appeal the existing
prohibition on research and development leading to production of
low-yield nuclear weapons. That is five kilotons or below. We hope
to address not only the political dynamics of these proposals but
also the technical realities and the proliferation implications.
We have a couple of handouts on the table that elaborate on these
issues, an Arms Control Association briefing paper. We have Dr.
Sidney Drell's recent article from our journal, Arms Control Today,
"New Bunker Busters Versus Nonproliferation," and I believe
there's a draft report from NRDC that will soon be available on
this subject that we'll let you know about.
Now, all of us here agree that these proposals are but the latest
in a series of imprudent steps by the administration to develop
a more flexible and aggressive nuclear force posture that threatens
to undermine U.S. and global nonproliferation objectives. This includes
the National Security Presidential Directive 17 that clarifies that
nuclear weapons may be used in response to chemical or biological
threats, and the Nuclear Posture Review that asserts that nuclear
weapon capabilities are needed to defeat deeply buried and hardened
targets. And the administration has taken steps to lower the barriers
to resume nuclear testing which might be necessary to field these
types of weapons.
Now, Congress is going to decide soon about whether to continue
funding for the research on bunker busters and to repeal the ban
on low-yield weapons research. The House and Senate Armed Services
Committee will soon evaluate these issues, and our next speaker,
Senator Edward Kennedy, is going to be in the middle of that discussion
on Capitol Hill.
We're very honored to have Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts with
us here today to share his perspectives on the Bush administration's
more aggressive nuclear weapons policies in the upcoming debate.
Senator Kennedy hardly needs an introduction but I'd just like to
say that he certainly is, in the view of the Arms Control Association,
one of our nation's foremost and stalwart advocates of sane nuclear
policies from arms reduction agreements with Russia, to the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty over the years, to vigorous inspections in Iraq.
After he speaks I hope he'll have a few minutes to take some questions.
Thank you very much for being here, Senator Kennedy. The floor
is yours.
SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY (D-MA): Good
morning. I'm grateful for the invitation to be here today and I
thank Daryl Kimball for that generous introduction. I have great
respect for the Arms Control Association and the wise leadership
it continues to provide on key issues of arms control, especially
nuclear arms control.
Of all the challenges we've faced over the past half-century, the
prevention of nuclear war may be the most difficult and the most
important. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other
nations and to terrorists is the most urgent aspect of that challenge
today. We all hope that the Bush administration will be successful
in the current negotiations with North Korea and that the progress
made in recent weeks will continue. Many of us are concerned, however,
that certain steps taken by the administration in recent months
are raising doubts about our own long-standing policy on nuclear
weapons.
"More has changed on proliferation than on any other issue."
CIA Director George Tenet made that statement to the Senate Armed
Services Committee last February. Nowhere is this clearer than in
the modifications that the Bush administration is making in nuclear
weapons policy. Because of their unique and massive destructive
power, nuclear weapons have always been kept separate from other
weapons as part of our strong commitment to do all we can to see
that they are never used again.
The reason the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 has been
so successful is the presumption that nuclear weapons will not be
used except in the most extreme circumstances. For 25 years, Republican
and Democratic administrations alike have emphasized our commitment
not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations. The assurance
to other nations that nuclear weapons will not be used against them
has been a major factor in avoiding nuclear war and reducing the
nuclear arms race and preventing the proliferation of these weapons
to other countries and to terrorists.
Control of current stockpiles is more critical than ever and the
danger is very real that terrorists may be able to acquire nuclear
material or nuclear warheads. Even before 9/11, Congress and the
administration had recognized this threat. We enacted the Nunn-Lugar
threat reduction program in 1991 to safeguard and reduce the arsenals
of Russia and other former Soviet states, and it's been effective
in deactivating or destroying literally thousands of nuclear warheads
and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and hundreds of tons of
fissionable material.
Nevertheless, shortly before President Bush's inauguration, the
taskforce reported that the most urgent national security threat
to the United States today is the dangers that weapons of mass destruction,
or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to
terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops
abroad or citizens at home. On September 11th, terrorists clearly
demonstrated their willingness and their ability to cause catastrophic
damage to America, yet the Bush administration continues to spend
less on the Nunn-Lugar program than we did before 2001. In January,
the administration released a Nuclear Posture Review that could
take us in a new and far more dangerous direction than before.
The review blurs the line between conventional and nuclear weapons.
It suggests that certain events might compel the United States to
use nuclear weapons first, even against non-nuclear nations. It
also relies much more strongly on a nuclear threat by America in
dealing with the difficult challenges we face in the world. The
administration has even indicated that it might use nuclear weapons
in response to a chemical or biological attack.
There is no justification for that kind of escalation. Our conventional
weapons are more than adequate to deal with that threat. We gain
no greater deterrent by threatening to go nuclear. It makes no sense
to break down the firewall that we have always maintained between
nuclear weapons and other weapons, and that has succeeded for over
half a century in preventing nuclear war. Other nations have complied
with this basic principle, too. A nuclear weapon is not just another
item in our arsenal and it's wrong to treat it like it is.
The Review specifically discusses circumstances in which the United
States might engage in the first use of nuclear weapons, such as
a North Korean attack on South Korea or a military confrontation
over the status of Taiwan. We also appear to be considering the
use of nuclear weapons against Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. We
reap what we sow, and if we brandish our nuclear weapons, we only
encourage other nations to develop their own.
It's ominous as well that the administration is asking the weapons
laboratories to consider the possibility of resuming nuclear testing
to protect our current stockpile and to meet new requirements in
the future. They've budgeted $700 million for fiscal year 2004 budget,
including funds that could be used for new tests, and cut in half
the time needed to conduct them. It makes no sense to abandon our
moratorium on nuclear testing. That moratorium has stood for over
a decade and it has served us well.
Last year the administration also requested $15 million, and it
wants another $15 million this year, to study the feasibility of
modifying existing warheads to create what they call "a robust
nuclear earth-penetrator," a bunker buster with 10 times the
size of the Hiroshima blast to be used to destroy hardened enemy
targets buried deeply underground. The scientific community has
raised serious questions about the need for this type of nuclear
weapon and the danger it presents. A nuclear explosion in a bunker
could spew tons of radioactive waste into the atmosphere, with a
devastating plume that could poison huge areas in its path. Obviously
developing such weapons would distract us from strengthening conventional
weapons to fulfill this purpose.
Finally, the administration wants to lift the current statutory
ban on low-yield nuclear weapons which now prevents the development
of weapons with yields under five kilotons, about half the size
of the Hiroshima blast. The precision guided munitions and standoff
weapons we have today make these many nukes unnecessary. They would
be no more effective than conventional munitions and would be far
more dangerous to our troops. Some say that the long-standing firewall
between nuclear and conventional weapons is making us more vulnerable
to nuclear blackmail, and that lowering the threshold for using
nuclear weapons will make our own nuclear threat a stronger and
more credible deterrent. That's the last thing we need. The obvious
danger of change in policy is that they will encourage other nations
to develop nuclear deterrents of their own. The entire world will
be at greater risk that these weapons will be used, and used against
us.
The real debate on these all-important issues of nuclear policy
is only just beginning. Clearly these issues demand far more attention
from Congress and the country. They have been eclipsed for too long
by the war on terrorism and the war against Iraq. We can ignore
them no longer. We have an obligation to our nation and our people
and to all nations and all peoples to see that nuclear weapons are
never used again.
I'll be glad to answer questions.
KIMBALL: Thank you, Senator Kennedy. Questions from the
audience, please.
SEN. KENNEDY: If it doesn't make any difference I'll take
them sitting down.
KIMBALL: Sure.
Q: -- from the Guardian. Do you feel this
administration is serious about considering breaking the U.S. test
moratorium? Do you see that on the horizon?
SEN. KENNEDY: Well, what I'm outlining today, the statements
and actions that they have made to date and also their request of
the defense authorization legislation which is before our Armed
Services Committee, I think what we ought to do is just take those
actions and interpret them reasonably as to what their intention
is. And I think that's going to be a matter that will be considered
by the Armed Services Committee, the authorization, and I also think
that there will be floor action as well. And I expect that debate
to be some time probably before the Fourth of July.
I think we ought to follow the money request. The best way to follow
- to get the indication of the seriousness of the administration
is to follow the request of the money, defense authorization in
the various categories, and it is as I've outlined here today, and
that's, I think, the clearest indication of where they're going
besides the statements that they've made.
KIMBALL: Thank you. Other questions? Pat Towell.
Q: Pat Towell, Congressional Quarterly. Senator, on the
Spratt-Furse amendment that they want to repeal, last year they
said - and they said again this year their intention is not, in
fact, to begin developing a warhead but rather to pass - this legislation
is drafted so broadly that it inhibits research intended for other
purposes that could theoretically be seen. And so, in the House
they were willing last year to work out a deal that would narrow
the scope. I mean, does that final approach appeal to you at all?
SEN. KENNEDY: Well, I think Congressman Spratt has addressed
that and is the author of that amendment for very good and sound
purposes and still strongly committed to it. We would certainly
consider any proposal, but the underlying principle I think still
remains sound and is one that should be defended. Obviously, if
the administration has some other points in mind they can be considered,
but the basic concept, the basic principle, is still as compelling
today as it was at the time that it was adopted and is a principle
that I would strongly support and urge my colleagues to.
KIMBALL: Yes, sir.
Q: (Off mike.) You mentioned the Bush report about
the possible use of weapons in a North Korea/South Korea situation,
Taiwan, China. Can you give us your sense of what the situation
is now with North Korea, and if these weapons - if there's any connection
between bunker busters and developing them and asking for money
for them and the administration's policy toward North Korea?
SEN. KENNEDY: Well, I think their position is independent,
maybe. In terms of the particular negotiations that are taking place
now, I think - there may be others that want to draw other conclusions
- but I think that their position in terms of the development of
bunker-busters has been there for a longer period of time than these
more recent negotiations with North Korea.
I think what is happening in the North Korean situation - the nature
of these discussions is basically positive. I think both sides have
been stating their positions. As negotiators we understand that
the North Korean position as stated is not going to be wholly acceptable
to us, and either is our position to them. That's the nature of
the negotiations. And I think that that is certainly hopeful; I
think it would be. And it's quite clear from the statements and
comments that the actions that have been taken by the administration
in opening up these discussions have been supported by the Chinese,
by the South Koreans, and by the Japanese as well. And I think that
we should certainly pursue them, and very hopefully we will.
I think it's understandable that you have a variety of different
issues that are involved: the nuclear weapons grade plutonium and
the nuclear weapon that the North Koreans have, the danger that
that poses as well as their missiles; their desire, if they are
going to give those up, about the dangers of aggression to them,
their own security; and they've obviously got economic challenges
as well. And these are matters that I think are pretty increasingly
well understood by all the sides of this and I would certainly hope
that the continued discussions would take place. Don't call them
discussions, call them negotiations, but whichever word you want
to use, it's very important, I think, in terms of trying to work
through a safer and more secure region.
KIMBALL: Yes, ma'am.
Q: (Off mike) Can you discuss the report on the
[robust nuclear earth penetrator] that the Pentagon released last
month to the Armed Services Committee, and are you or anyone else
on the committee fishing for an unclassified version to be released?
KIMBALL: The robust nuclear earth-penetrator report
that was filed earlier.
Q: Last month, was it?
SEN. KENNEDY: Yeah, well, I can - rather than just on the
particular details, I think that, quite clearly, as I mentioned,
I have very serious reservations about it. I think that whatever
can be achieved in terms of any projections that I've seen in the
Armed Services Committee about nuclear [use] are well within the
range in terms of conventional, and that obviously has very important
and significant advantages, for the reasons I've outlined: the dangers
of using the nuclear weapons and the risks that are out there in
terms of our own personnel.
And I think that that's also true with regards to the statement
that the administration has at least left open for countries that
are going to use weapons of mass destruction, for example, whether
they use bioterrorism or chemical warfare. We can deal with those
situations with a conventional force. Again, the use -- we can clean
up a chemical and biological attacks but cleaning up a nuclear is
far more dangerous and more difficult and poses much greater threats
in terms of American troops.
Finally, I think, going down that road in terms of threatening
use against countries, the fact is that the terrorists today are
going to be - if they're going to use any of these they're going
to use them from countries that may very well be countries which
are not harboring or supporting these terrorist activities and which
the surrounding populations are completely innocent from these kinds
of situations. I think we're much better off not threatening [nuclear
use in] these situations and I think we ought to continue what steps
have been taken, and they're very robust steps in the development
of conventional forces, and maintain what is the most basic and
fundamental issue, and that is the firewall that has existed between
the use of nuclear weapons of all forms and shapes and conventional
forces. That is a firewall. You have to understand, it's a firewall.
Many of us have serious questions about the administration's statements
and comments that seem to blur this, the whole series of comments.
Even [British Prime Minister] Tony Blair in the Iraq situation indicated
very clearly that he could not foresee any circumstances whatsoever
where nuclear weapons would have been used. That kind of clarification
was not as clear in terms of our own homeland.
KIMBALL: Thank you. Yes, sir.
Q: David Kassomel (ph), National Public
Radio. Do you worry at all about the loss of expertise in the weapons
(inaudible)?
SEN. KENNEDY: I think others who are more competent to really
speak to that. I think it's better that those that can answer that
more completely, knowledgably and competently, speak to that.
DR. SIDNEY DRELL: Just look at their budgets recently.
KIMBALL: Yes?
Q: Senator Kennedy, I was hoping that you could
just comment on your concerns vis-à-vis developments with
the Nuclear Posture Review and the reduction of tactical nuclear
weapons and Russia.
SEN. KENNEDY: Well, we still have, obviously, a very important
ways to go, with regards to tactical nukes, with [Russia]. I mean,
we welcome the fact of this last treaty with [Russia], but the fact
remains that the tactical nukes are still out there, and this remains
a very important factor and force and more has to be done in that
area. There was a criticism in the last treaty. It was that we did
not take more - well, there's several, but this is certainly one
of them - that strategic weapons weren't being disposed - destructed
- but the fact that we were not taking steps in the tactical area,
and that remains an area of enormous potential and importance and
it ought to be an objective of national policy to address that in
a more comprehensive way.
And I imagine -- as I see heads nodding here -- there will probably
be some important recommendations on it, but clearly that's an area
that I think ought to be a prime area of interest and initiation,
hopefully, in terms of [reducing] the dangers and the proliferation
not only in tactical weapons but also there ought to be additional
kinds of support in terms of Nunn-Lugar, and there also ought to
be an extension in terms of Nunn-Lugar to deal with bioterrorism.
That's an area where the security issues are in terms of the protections
of the materials in the Soviet Union, particularly of greatest concern.
Here this morning you can hear a great deal of information about
the nature of the protections of materials and the dangers of proliferation
of the nuclear, but in the area of bio it is much more significant
and much - I mean, in terms of security, the protection of it, it
needs a lot more attention, and many of us are hopeful that the
extension and expansion of Nunn-Lugar would include those scientists
and researchers and also those security interests as well. Very
little is being done, but I know Senator Lugar has been interested
in that as well.
KIMBALL: I think it would be fair to say that the further
U.S. pursuit of new types of nuclear weapons or modifications, whether
they're high-yield or low-yield, would complicate efforts to try
to deal with the tactical weapons in the former Soviet Union.
If there are no further questions we'll go on to our next speaker.
I want to thank Senator Kennedy very much for his remarks and leadership,
and we wish him -
SEN. KENNEDY: I'm going to stay here a little while and
listen.
KIMBALL: Because you want to see the presentation. Excellent,
thank you. So, thanks again.
SEN. KENNEDY: Thank you very much.
KIMBALL: So, Dr. Drell.
(Applause.)
DRELL: Senator Kennedy has touched just
about every important point and I'm going to make some comments
upon technical issues, but I have to make a few comments based upon
his statement, which was excellent, because the firewall between
nuclear weapons and any other weapon is an extraordinarily important
wall to protect. Nuclear weapons are the only weapon of mass destruction.
There are weapons of terror, like biological and chemical; nuclear
weapons are unique.
I want to read a very brief statement made 15 years ago at a conference
out at Stanford by Father Bryan Hehir, a priest and also for a while
headed the Divinity School at Harvard, who played such a major role
in the Catholic bishops' letter in the '80s, pastoral letter on
nuclear weapons. It just puts what we're talking about in context
before we get down to technical details. This is what he wrote:
"For millennia, people believed that if anyone had the right
to call the ultimate moment of truth, one must name that person
God. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, we have progressively
acquired the capacity to call the moment of truth, and we are
not gods but we must live with what we have created."
And I think one should keep that in mind, this terrible idea that
nuclear weapons are an answer to chemical or biological weapons,
or that they might be usable in tactical situations against a bunker
or for this purpose. I think that's the most dangerous idea in the
world that we face. For 58 years, since Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
we have built the norm of nonuse of nuclear weapons, even though
we've been involved in unwinnable wars, and so has the rest of the
world, the Russians in Afghanistan for example. We have built a
norm of non-possession. The nonproliferation regime has been a tremendous
success. Only eight nations are known to have nuclear weapons today,
out of 189. That's a far smaller number than was thought to be the
case as one looked at prospects 40, 30 years ago.
We have found, with even an inadequate verification system, that
Iraq and North Korea and Iran were on their way to nuclear weapons
long before they got them. Let's make the nonproliferation regime
stronger. Let's give the United Nations or the International Atomic
Energy Agency broader power to inspect suspect sites that it does
not have now. But we must preserve the nonproliferation regime.
Look at the alternatives if more countries or terrorists get their
hands on this material. And as Senator Kennedy said, the report
by former Senator Howard Baker and White House counsel, Lloyd Cutler,
said there's hundreds of tons of material in the former Soviet Union.
Those are the greatest threats we face, and here we're spending
one-third - less than one-third of 1 percent of our defense budget
on that problem. That's terribly out of whack. So there are major
problems, and I want you - please remember every major point the
senator made because there was a wonderful summary. I'm going to
talk about a few technical details, and they're important.
So you have to look at bunker busters and say, you know, what are
they good for? What are they going to do? Well, why are we interested
in them? It is true that there are now some 70 or so nations in
the world that have become adept at digging deep bunkers, deep for
storage. There are estimated by the intelligence community to be
about 1,000 such sites for command and control, for storage of weapons.
We have to do something about them. But what have nuclear weapons
got to do with that? What have nuclear weapons got to do with that?
In fact, if you take those bunkers of serious concern that we talk
about, they are things that have been hardened, like with concrete
or granite or in hard rock, to stand 1,000 atmospheres of overpressure,
and they're as deep as 1,000 feet. Let me tell you, you can look
at all the small nuclear weapons you want, but if you're going to
do any damage to some hard target at 1,000 feet, that's going to
be more than 100 kilotons. I mean, this is physics; this has nothing
to do with policy.
You're not talking about small, usable, low-collateral-damage weapons.
If I just detonate one kiloton, one-thirteenth of Hiroshima, at
a depth that I can reach physically without destroying the material
that the bomb is encased in, which means at depths of less than
50 feet, there is no material that will take us lower that that,
even if we slam them in at supersonic speeds. That one-kiloton is
going to create a crater larger than the World Trade Center, larger
than a football field. It's going to put a million cubic feet of
radioactively contaminated dust into the atmosphere. That's much
more collateral damage. And what's more, one kiloton isn't even
going to get close to a deep, hardened, buried target. You have
to get up to 100 kilotons. To contain 100 kilotons or so, you would
have to detonate the weapon more than 1,000 feet below ground.
So what are we talking about when we talk about bunker-busters?
We're not talking about low collateral damage, low-yield weapons.
That's a physical myth - that's a myth. And so what we can do, as
the senator said, what we can do is improve our conventional forces.
It's important to be able to make our bombs, our conventional weapons,
penetrate before they detonate. If you can penetrate an explosion
on the order of 10 to 20 feet below the surface before it detonates
-- you know, it's hardened enough so it doesn't destroy itself and
it digs down on the order of 20 feet or so before it detonates,
you can increase the shock delivered to a target by order of magnitude
by a factor of 10 to 20. That is something very important to do.
Also, you have to know where the target is. Is it a tunnel of miles
length? Where do you want to hit it, except finding an entrance
and blocking it off? But you have to have accuracy. You have to
know, where are the underground targets, what's their character,
where, if there are serious materials in there that you want to
destroy like biological agents or chemical weapons, where are they?
You can't just - the need for good intelligence to increase the
effectiveness on conventional forces, identifying targets, characterizing
them, locating them, that's far more important than any marginal
gain you're going to get out of a nuclear weapon.
Also the ability to deliver the munitions accurately. We've shown
a great improvement in that capacity, especially most recently in
Iraq. The effectiveness with which conventional weapons can increase
their - the ability to increase their effectiveness goes up radically
with good accuracy of delivery. In fact, over the years the laboratories,
particularly Sandia, has had programs where they make, for conventional
weapons, pilot holes. It takes one detonation to create a hole,
and now, using GPS, the global position satellites, to follow beacons
into the hole and have successive explosions, you can increase the
depth to which you penetrate.
There have been some experiments that I'm aware of, done by people
like Patterson and Young (sp). People have been working this
problem for 30 years, which show that in hard granite-type targets,
you can increase your penetration depth if you have a pilot hole
from the previous explosion by as much as 30 percent. Against ordinary
soil you can get 10 percent - 10-foot increases in depth.
So these are real things to do with conventional weapons, but the
lure of nuclear weapons and trying to weaken that firewall that
has, for 58 years, been so important to our survival in this world,
that is a terrible thought, that's a dangerous thought. I want us
to work hard to preserve what we have done so well at so far.
One final comment. When we talk about the nonproliferation regime,
in getting the extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty at it's
fifth and final schedule of review in 1995--that took place
at the United Nations - in getting 185 nations of the world out
of 189 to sign onto the nonproliferation treaty, the nuclear powers
had to agree--it's not in writing on a treaty but they understood
that the condition to get these countries to sign on was the assumption,
the commitment that we would not test. That was explicit in getting
the signature of many of these countries. If we were to, for some
minor advantage, illusionary in part, of improving our ability to
get buried targets by violating the Comprehensive Test Ban and resuming
testing, we would lose enormous support for the nonproliferation
regime.
As I said, all but four countries have signed on to that: India,
Pakistan, Israel and now North Korea, which pulled out. So the Comprehensive
Test Ban, or at least continuing the moratorium on testing, is a
very important part of our facing the threat of nuclear weapons.
And the Comprehensive Test Ban has been signed by 166 countries,
been ratified by 97, and 31 of the 44 nuclear-capable powers that
have to sign it before it comes into effect. There is the challenge
to not only preserve the moratorium but to strengthen it, because
once the Comprehensive Test Ban comes into effect there will be
further strengthening of our ability to verify compliance.
So that, I think, is the challenge we face. And I think the senator
has put out every important reason why.
KIMBALL: Thank you, Dr. Drell, for those excellent remarks.
Let me just remind the audience that Dr. Drell is one of the nation's
most trusted advisors on nuclear weapons issues--nuclear policy
issues for decades. He's a member of the advisory committee for
the National Nuclear Security Administration, a member of the JASON
group at the MITRE Corporation, which has advised the Defense Department
and the Department of Energy for many years on these issues.
Next we'll hear from Dr. Matthew McKinzie, who is with the nuclear
program of the Natural Resources Defense Council, who is a physicist
who has worked as a post-doctoral associate at the Cornell University
Peace Studies program before joining NRDC in 1997. Dr. McKinzie
is going to provide us with a visual demonstration of many of the
facts that Senator Kennedy and Dr. Drell have laid out, demonstrating
the potential effects of the collateral damage of an earth-penetrating
nuclear weapon on possible targets.
Matt, are we almost there?
MATTHEW MCKINZIE: Almost there. One second.
KIMBALL: Okay. Let me also note, for those of you who may
have come in late, that one of the reasons why we're putting together
this press briefing today is because the Senate Armed Services Committee
will, in the next few days, be considering the proposal put forward
by the administration in it's defense authorization request for
fiscal 2004. The committees are scheduled to look at this issue
over the next two to three weeks. A bill will then move to the floor
by probably the July Fourth recess, or thereabouts. These issues
are very much on the agenda of the Congress and these watershed
decisions will be happening very soon.
Matt, are we -
MCKINZIE: I think we're ready. All
right, well, sorry for the change in venue here. It's an honor to
be on this panel, I have to say, as the junior member. The topic
of my presentation, I wanted to provide some sort of graphical examples
of both the properties of these weapons and their employment. And
what I'll first discuss, at NRDC, as of yesterday, our understanding
is that in fact there may be two contexts in which these weapons
could be developed and employment options that could be considered.
One context should be called - really thought of as strategic.
Earth-penetrating weapons were originally developed in a strategic
context in which targets were in Russia and, to a much lesser extent,
China, countries with which the U.S. has a deterrent relationship.
These weapons were thought of as part of the SIOP, or Single Integrated
Operational Plan, the nuclear war plan of the U.S., and targeted
destruction for earth-penetrating weapons is really the primary
criteria when considered in a strategic mode. So this is the region
of higher nuclear explosive yields.
The other context is regional or tactical use, and that has already
been discussed in this panel, but here we're talking about targets
in countries with regional or emergent weapons of mass destruction
capabilities, such as Iran, Syria or North Korea. In this case,
target destruction criteria for weapons design is really balanced
against minimizing what's called collateral effects, or death and
injury due to the radioactive fallout. So those are really the two
contexts in which earth-penetrating weapons will be designed - may
be designed and employment considered.
Now, I wanted to address two technical issues which Dr. Drell has
already addressed. One is the coupling of the energy from the nuclear
explosion to the earth to destroy underground structures. What do
you buy with an earth-penetrating weapon as opposed to one that
explodes on the surface? And the second is the fallout from a nuclear
explosion. How does that fallout change if you bury the nuclear
burst before it goes off?
Now, about a week ago we got an unclassified paper by a weapons
designer named Gerald Marsh. It was tremendously informative. On
paper at least, it looks like you can replace, in terms of target
destruction capabilities, a megaton-class thermonuclear weapon,
which is a weapon with a nuclear explosive yield in the range of
tens of kilotons. And that's what this graph right here would show
you, which is a combination of data points and a fit to those data
points.
Basically this--it's a logarithmic graph; on this side the
fraction of nuclear explosive energy that goes into destroying an
underground target. And on this axis you have what's called the
scaled depth of burst. So for contact burst, or a proximity burst
of a nuclear explosion, you're looking at basically a factor of
10 or more compared to penetrating even several meters into the
ground. So this is the amount of energy available - a small fraction
of the energy is available down here to go into the ground and destroy
things. Much larger fractions, 50-60 percent, of the energy is available
when you bury the weapon even a short distance, several meters.
So on paper at least, this is the quote, unquote "appeal"
of an earth-penetrating nuclear weapon.
Now, the issue of fallout. I'm going to show you some fallout calculations
that we put together for this briefing at NRDC. When you calculate
the fallout of a nuclear explosion, there are basically several
important variables. One is the explosive yield of the nuclear weapon,
obviously higher yield, more fallout. The second factor is what's
called the height of burst, or how high above the ground the weapon
goes off, or the depth of burial, how deeply it's buried. Above
a certain height of burst, above a certain altitude, no local fallout
is predicted, and that's what happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki
where the weapons went off about half a kilometer above the surface
of the earth.
The type of nuclear weapon really matters a lot for fallout, whether
it's a simpler fission design or a thermonuclear weapon, which would
produce yet less fallout per kiloton of yield. The winds are tremendously
important. The mushroom cloud basically is blown by winds, not just
the winds acting at the surface of the earth but tens of miles up
if the explosion is large enough. And finally, weather: if it's
raining out, whether there are mountains in the vicinity, all these
things enter into assessment of fallout.
Now, if the weapon is buried below a certain depth in the medium,
then no fallout would be predicted. You would have what's called
a contained burst. In the fallout code we use in the Department
of Defense there's a simple formula for calculating how deep the
weapon needs to go not to produce fallout, and it's actually quite
deep, even for fairly low-yield weapons. This is half a kiloton.
The code would estimate that there would be no fallout if it was
buried more than about 55 meters or so, 150 feet. At the Nevada
test site they have a slightly more conservative formula for predicting
no fallout, based on preventing exposure to test personnel.
Now, I used our code, and I'll show you more explicit calculations
in a bit, but I wanted to explore how the extent of fallout varies
as you vary a weapon. And I was very surprised to see this result,
that as you penetrate the earth and the weapon goes off, you actually
produce more fallout for fairly shallow dept of burst, and then
the fallout diminishes. And that's because the fireball is more
efficiently scooping out material from the earth; that material
is mixing with the radioactive debris and falling out within tens
of kilometers or more around the ground zero.
Now, what computer code did we use to calculate fallout for this
presentation? It's really an amazing piece of software called HPAC.
It's produced by SAIC, a Department of Defense contractor to the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency. It is unclassified. It's not generally
available, but an NRDC officially obtained a copy, with the intervention
of a member of Congress, and the code is incredibly capable. It
calculates a variety of things, not just nuclear weapons but also
radiological weapons, so-called dirty bombs, chemical or biological
weapon use, or accidents at nuclear facilities. It has data in the
code for all nuclear facilities worldwide.
Now, HPAC itself is very close to the U.S. nuclear war-planning
process. Despite the fact that it's unclassified, what you're seeing
here are fallout patterns - (audio break) - and what we've
done at NRDC in years past, we've used a code called KD53 (ph),
developed at Livermore, to understand in greater detail the U.S.
nuclear war plan, or SIOP. So this is the fallout pattern we calculated
using a Livermore code from attacking Russian - alert Russian ICBM
silos at a place called Kozalsk (ph), and this is the equivalent
calculation using HPAC. So I feel fairly confident that at least
as far as fallout goes, we do have a handle on the phenomenology
and on the many inputs to the code.
There's a lot in there and I - in this code, and probably the subject
of a report, but one piece of information that I just found utterly
fascinating was buried in the help file for the code. It was a tutorial
on how you use nuclear weapons to target biological facilities.
There was a training objective--there was a test afterwards
for the individual who went through this exercise, and basically
this training manual was about how you choose proper yield and height
of burst to target a biological weapons facility so as to minimize
the amount of agent released and the amount of fallout produced.
Now the last topic of my presentation: earth-penetrating nuclear
weapon employment. I thought here what I would do is sort of step
through the different phases of employment and then choose hypothetical
targets for such an earth-penetrating nuclear weapon in North Korea.
And in doing so I came to believe that no rational decision-maker
would choose to use the existing earth-penetrating nuclear warhead
that we have on our arsenal, the B61 Mod 11, of which we have about
50 in our arsenal.
This map here shows sort of the backend of deployment. It's a map
of the United States, obviously, and what I've labeled on this map
are three sites in the United States: the White House, the Office
of the President -- the president of the United States has the ultimate
authority to authorize the use of nuclear weapons -- Offutt Air
Force Base in Nebraska, which is the location of all nuclear weapons
planning, targeting, acquisition and planning for the use of nuclear
weapons; and Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, where the B-2
bombers are deployed.
Thanks to the Internet revolution we can actually see what a U.S.
nuclear bomber base looks like simply by downloading an aerial photo
from an Internet site. So the U.S. conducts aerial photo surveys
and then typically state governments post these aerial photo surveys
on their Internet sites. And, in fact, this was an aerial photo
survey of Missouri, and this is the B2 bomber base, and if one zooms
in one can actually see a B2 parked in the parking area. And more
disturbingly, one can also see the nuclear weapons storage bunker.
That bunker is associated with this base, so it's a facility within
the Air Force base quite close to the B2 parking area. And it's
a little hard to make out, but these are drive-in bunkers where
nuclear weapons would be stored, and presumably the B61 Mod 11s
are there awaiting use.
Now, actual calculations. I looked at really two scenarios, two
simple scenarios. One looked at how an earth-penetrating warhead
and the nine-megaton bomb that the B61 Mod 11 was intended to replace
and what the fallout patterns would look like if those weapons were
targeted against a bunker outside Pyongyang or the mountainous area
just across the border near Seoul. So let's zoom into the Pyongyang
area. Now, again, quite incredibly, the U.S. National Imagery and
Mapping Agency, which is an agency within the Department of Defense,
actually publishes 10-meter resolution imagery of all of the Korean
Peninsula, so this is - and it's painstaking to sort of download
it all and get it into focus, but I've done so for this and for
other presentations.
And you can learn a lot about North Korea, about the demilitarized
zone, from this 10-meter imagery that, again, is freely available
for those who have the time to download from NIMA's website. And
if you look just west of Pyongyang there is an interesting--there
is a mountain here, or hill, and what I postulated in this calculation
was that this hill, which is adjacent to both military airfields
and heliports, might have a leadership or command and control function
in a bunker inside it.
The second target--potential scenario I looked at--again,
I tried to be plausible here without knowing an awful lot, frankly,
about the deployment of - without knowing a lot about North Korean
leadership sites, but it's been widely reported that in the mountains
just across the border from South Korea are many tunnels in which
there are artillery guns on rail cars, and these can be rolled out,
and because they are sort of between 40 and 60 kilometers from Seoul,
they could represent a threat to the--an immediate, quickly
deployed threat to the South Korean capital. So, again, here's the
10-meter image that shows this sort of mountainous area and you
do see sort of hints of facilities in this sort of one mountainous
area and then another one here even closer to Seoul.
So, just to show you the calculations quickly--it never ceases
to sort of stun me how comprehensive the fallout patterns can be
from a large-yield nuclear explosion, but here is the fallout patterns
from the weapon that the B61 Mod 11 was intended to replace. So
it's a nine-megaton weapon--nine-megaton gravity bomb that was
replaced by a weapon that probably has a yield around 100 kilotons,
so it's--but with its earth-penetrating capabilities it has
presumably equivalent, or nearly equivalent capabilities to damage
underground facilities.
So this is the fallout pattern that would be produced, using historical
weather data from the month of April. The fallout from a nine-megaton
weapon is just immense, and you can see why it - the innermost fallout
pattern is for a lethal dose to an individual who was in this zone
and had no sheltering for the first 48 hours after the attack. And
one caveat too, this fallout pattern was calculated irrespective
of mountainous terrain that might be in the path of the fallout
pattern. And then, similarly, this is the same fallout pattern from
a nine-megaton nuclear weapon targeted at that mountainous area
here, so in fact covered with substantial fallout. So, again, it's
just impossible to imagine that a rational leader would choose to
employ such a weapon in such a context.
The code calculates casualties. The casualties from such a calculation
are based on a worldwide gridded population density that was developed
by the U.S. National Laboratories specifically for nuclear weapons
modeling. And the casualties from the nine-megaton explosions are
from six to 14 million people. By comparison, here is the weapon
that's in the U.S. arsenal today. These are the smaller fallout
patterns, less extensive fallout patterns produced by 100-kiloton
earth-penetrating weapon. But again, the casualties from the intense
fallout patterns--and this was not for--these calculations
were not sort of a worst-case scenario where the fallout would blow
directly over in an urban area, this was just typical weather in
April, but the casualties there number in the hundreds of thousands.
So with that I'll conclude this presentation. What I wanted to
do was to provide an overview of some technical issues associated
with earth-penetrating weapons and then to make this issue more
concrete by showing an exclusive targeting of a country of concern
with these nuclear weapons and the fallout patterns produced.
Thank you.
KIMBALL: Thank you. Thank you very much,
Matthew. I think that gives us a very disturbing look at what we're
talking about here beyond the words and the intellectual theories.
We'd be happy to take questions, further questions from the audience
about these presentations for the next few minutes for Dr. McKinzie
or Dr. Drell.
Senator Kennedy.
SEN. KENNEY: Dr. Drell talked earlier in his presentation
about the limitations that you had in terms of the penetration,
except in those charts that you showed it showed a very extensive
penetration with very extensive kilotons.
MCKINZIE: In the bar graphs?
SEN. KENNEDY: In the bar graphs. So, can you relate those
together? I mean, how realistic, given what Dr. Drell said--your
other, going up to 160 meters underground. I have to--probably
some misunderstanding. What is the current technology in terms of
being able to reach that other depth?
MCKINZIE: I'll just clarify. The bar graph was meant to
illustrate, irrespective of what the capabilities are to penetrate
to a certain depth, how far you had to penetrate to preclude fallout.
And then if you actually put a line on that graph as to where we
are, it was almost all the way to the left. The B61 Mod 11 penetrates
maybe several meters in frozen tundra.
KIMBALL: Dr. Drell?
DRELL: Yes, the fact is - he just showed that you'd have
to penetrate much deeper than we are able to, or we will ever be
able to, given the limits of material because you're not going to,
without the material, the metals liquefying, ever get below 50 feet
unless you develop a tactic for successive pilot holes and drilling
your way in, in which case then you can be dealing with conventional
weapons just as well.
SEN. KENNEDY: So it's basically theoretical.
DRELL: Absolutely.
SEN. KENNEDY: Everything to the right of that is all just
theoretical in terms of physics, but in practical terms, where the
technology is as reflected in that presentation, that showed the
plume effect, that's where we are today.
DRELL: Just make sure the numbers are right. A five-kiloton
weapon, the kind that is limited by the Spratt legislation, you
have to dig down about 350 feet deep in order to get no fallout,
but in fact we don't know how to go below 50. So that gives you
the perspective.
KIMBALL: David?
Q: How bad is the fallout from a five-kiloton
weapon if it's not 350 feet but it's 50 feet?
MCKINZIE: If it's 50 feet?
Q: So that's sort of the limit of what we can
do, right? We can go down 50 feet, and say it's the lower-yield
weapon.
MCKINZIE: Well, I can calculate that for you in a second,
but -
Q: I mean, those are all big - those are all 500
- what was it, 100 kilotons, right?
DRELL: A reference number that's useful is that, again,
your one-kiloton will give you a million cubic feet of dirt with
radioactive contamination, and from there on it depends upon the
weather patterns, the terrain and whatnot. But it's a huge crater--it's
a huge crater. That's from one kiloton down at a level of 20 to
50 feet. It doesn't matter where you put it.
KIMBALL: In the back please.
Q: (Off mike.)
MCKINZIE: Well, I wouldn't expect such a weapon to be appropriate
for missile sites because of the long time it takes to deliver a
bomb to a target, and a missile site is a high--in terms of
nuclear war planning, it's a high-priority target. The intent would
be to destroy it as soon as possible so the missiles couldn't be
launched.
Perhaps Dr. Drell has a -
DRELL: What was the question?
KIMBALL: The question was about the potential fallout effects
of nuclear use in the Taiwan Straits situation. So I don't know
if you can answer that because there are a lot of variables there.
DRELL: There are many variables, and it depends upon the
weather and whatnot. I can't give you a number. The fact is you'll
get radioactive surge coming from these craters, which is quite
extensive. I would not give a number without saying - this assumption
of weather and whatnot, it's considerable.
KIMBALL: Other questions? Yes, Tim?
Q: Matthew, can you explain a little bit more
the two diagrams you did. Are those weapons that we have now?
MCKINZIE: The two diagrams -
Q: If you could just be more - explain more carefully,
you know, the two diagrams, the two estimates you made. Are they
weapons that we now have and that could be used, or are you talking
about something not developed?
MCKINZIE: You mean the larger and the smaller fallout patterns.
Q: Yes.
MCKINZIE: The larger was from the nine-megaton gravity
bomb. That is a weapon no longer in our arsenal that the B61 Mod
11 replaced with a lower yield because it had earth-penetrating
capabilities. The B61 Mod 11, we have about 50 in our arsenal right
now. So I was contrasting an old retired weapon and a currently
deployed weapon.
Q: Okay, so what I'm trying to get at is what
is the current capability then, the threat of dropping or using
a nuclear - a weapon like that in those mountains north of the DMZ
or in the area near Pyongyang? What is your estimate of what the
ramifications of such a use of a weapon - what you said, probably
no one sane would do but -
MCKINZIE: Well, it was the second set of estimates. That
was for the B61 Mot 11.
DRELL: This is one of the problems that we face, which
can have various people giving different views. We had a nine-megaton,
the old B53. It was an unsafe, huge bomb. That was the first set
of calculations. By taking an existing bomb, the B61, one of its
many versions, B61-7, and putting it in a hardened reentry vehicle,
we made it possible for that to dig into the earth some few meters.
I can't give a number; it depends on the soil very much, and that
gave the second set that he gave.
That raises the question - and this is what one has to answer seriously--well,
maybe if we were to work on taking a smaller-yield bomb and putting
it in a hard reentry vehicle so it could penetrate to the full 50
feet, or at least more than a few meters down to 30 or 40 feet,
you could reduce casualties further. Therefore, isn't that a good
thing to do? You've made it a more credible part of your deterrent
but you've also opened the question, are you making nuclear weapons
more usable for tactical situations?
And so you have to join the problem: what are nuclear weapons for?
Are they for defensive last resort or are they part of the tactical
battlefield? If we, the [world's] most powerful country, stand up
in front of the world and say, they're for our deterrent; we have
to make better and more usable nuclear weapons, how can we encourage
the rest of the world to think that they shouldn't do that too?
KIMBALL: Exactly.
DRELL: So, to go back to what Senator Kennedy said, we
have to work to improve our conventional forces to meet our national
security needs and not brandish the notion that we're going to use
these terrible weapons, except for defense, as a last resort.
KIMBALL: I would just add also that the Nuclear Posture
Review, which was the document that came out about a year and half
ago that kind of undergirds a lot of this thinking, it was contradictory.
On the one hand it suggested that the United States should minimize
the role of nuclear weapons in its military and foreign policies,
but it, at the same time, recommended the development of new capabilities.
So the Bush administration is Jekyll and Hyde on this subject, and
what is key right now is for the Congress to make it clear that
we should not extend the role of nuclear weapons into this new realm,
for all the reasons that Dr. Drell and the others have said.
Other questions? Yes, sir.
Q: Dr. Drell, one of the more seminal articles
came out in the Federation of American Scientists by Dr. Nelson
when he went through the reasons why we're looking at earth-penetrating
weapons. He looks at the labs and he points out the fact that the
labs are looking for munitions, that sort of thing, that they're
looking for more exciting work. (Inaudible.) I'm wondering,
if it's physically impossible, given the technology we have now,
to accomplish the mission we've set out, why then are the labs so
willing to lobby for this effort?
DRELL: Again, the labs, like the administration, you talk
to different people you get different answers. First of all, the
need to do this to attract good scientists or whatnot -- I think
Senator Kennedy commented, you know, the labs have a very healthy
budget for the Stockpile Stewardship Program, and the leaders of
the laboratories have all made statements now which say that the
Stockpile Stewardship Program is maintaining the current arsenal.
You know, in the beginning there were a lot of statements, when
the Stockpile Stewardship program first started and we had the moratorium
on testing, that we couldn't maintain a deterrent. That article,
I believe, has been put to bed and it has now been replaced by another
one by people who want to test, which says, well, we may need new
weapons for new missions. And again, as Daryl said, you have Jekyll
and Hyde statements. Read the testimony on April 8th by Admiral
Linton Brooks, the administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration. He says, we don't want to lower the threshold; we
don't want to build more usable bombs. If you read his statement,
there's nothing unexceptional in it, it's a good statement, but
then you read the Nuclear Posture Review and they say, well, maybe
we have to develop new ones.
Now, where do the labs come in on this? Obviously the laboratories
are trying to maintain something I support, a good technical credibility
to monitor and maintain our deterrent. We have a deterrent. In my
mind we want to know that that deterrent we have is reliable and
is safe, and that takes a very strong program with good people.
So I believe the laboratories have to stay first rate because the
argument that we can maintain a deterrent without testing depends
upon confidence in our laboratories being able to assure us that
our deterrent is safe and reliable, as long as we have one.
So the laboratories want to be able to challenge scientists with
new work. Obviously it rankles them to say, I can't have somebody
think about something, which in one interpretation of the Spratt
amendment says, you know, I can't think about things less than five
kilotons. There's something funny about that argument because first
of all, as the papers Daryl has put together show, what the Spratt
amendment limits is weaponizing for deployment, not thinking about
it. And one shouldn't confuse that. I mean, how do you stop somebody
from thinking about something?
You should also know--and the point I didn't make--the
fact is that if you look at our arsenal--not our deployed arsenal,
now, but weapons we have developed over a thousand tests during
50 years we have tested and developed every conceivable type of
weapon, from a primitive one to a fancy one, from very low yield,
even battlefield--like old Davy Crockett rockets and artillery
shells, to very high-yield ones. The issue is not testing or developing
new designs, it's deciding if you want to package one so it can
penetrate deeper without destroying itself before detonating.
So there is understandably a tension, which I can appreciate, from
the labs, saying, don't tell us we can't think about something.
But in fact, I don't believe the Spratt amendment says you can't
think about something. I think the proper answer on that question
was given by the senator before he left. So they can think about
many things. The only limit is, do you really want to go weaponize
something for deployment? And their big question is, first of all,
if you believe the danger of using low-yield nuclear weapons, but
to my mind even more worrisome immediately is you tell the rest
of the world, we're going to continue developing and deploying new
weapons because we need them for our security but we're going to
tell 188 other nations, you know, don't do it; you don't need them.
And so it's the impact on the nonproliferation regime that I consider
far more important than being in the minutia of whether a lower-yield
weapon that goes a little deeper will do a little bit more for a
deterrent or not. And that's why I say the emphasis is on intelligence
and accuracy in our conventional forces.
KIMBALL: I think we've got time for a couple more questions.
Yes, sir?
Q: Jason Forrester, the Nuclear Threat Reduction
Campaign. Matthew, on the North Korea side of things, back in the
early '90s it's been widely reported that the Clinton administration
considered the possibility of preemptive strikes against North Korea
in the months before the agreed framework. I mean, with the great
investigative skills that you all have, have you been able to ferret
out exactly what were the strike packages they were considering
at that point, in '93, '94, that Bill Perry and others were considering,
whether it included nuclear weapons considerations, what Pyongyang
- (inaudible) - the business of trying to get those hardened
artillery positions in the mountainous region, it numbers in the
hundreds, or something like that - something like 250 or something
like that, artillery pieces.
So I was just wondering if you all have -
MCKINZIE: No, the closest thing we've got are nuclear -
discussions about the use of nuclear weapons at the RAND Corporation
in the Korean War context, which are most interesting, but that's
it. And our capabilities were very different at that time.
Q: But I guess - and maybe Dr. Drell and maybe
Daryl as well - have you all had any indications that the Clinton
administration at that time had considered nuclear weapons to try
to - (inaudible)?
DRELL: I know nothing about it.
KIMBALL: I don't think we were privy to those discussions,
and I would be very surprised if nuclear weapons were the lead component
in that discussion.
Q: Matthew, could you discuss again - I think
maybe you touched on it in your presentation, but why does the fallout
increase in these weapons?
MCKINZIE: The radioactive to reproduce a nuclear explosion--and,
Dr. Drell, you may want to comment on this, too--they're very
fine, very light particles, and unless they adhere to material from
the ground in the vicinity of the explosion, they are lofted into
the upper atmosphere, circulate around the hemisphere in which the
explosion takes place, and fall down weeks later, much diluted,
much less radioactive. But if the nuclear explosion--if the
fireball comes into contact with the earth, then it scoops up material
which mixes with the radioactive debris. And for a depth of burial,
a shallow depth of burial, that's happening in a more efficient
way.
DRELL: That's right. I mean, you're just digging up more
dirt.
MCKINZIE: Yeah, another way to put it.
KIMBALL: Okay. Any other questions? Thank you very much.
DRELL: Daryl, I just want to comment on a previously -
it occurs to me to say when you look back at the problem of 1993,
1994 when the Clinton administration was almost ready to go, remember
what saved us. It was President Carter going over there and talking
to someone. It shows you that what we really have to be dealing
with in this era of non-usable nuclear weapons: diplomacy. We're
not going to make progress in reducing nuclear danger by threats
and coercion or whatnot; it's diplomacy. That's even more important
when especially dealing with unusable weapons, and there is a very
important lesson in that, I believe; the fact that President Carter
went over there and headed off the confrontation before it got out
of control.
KIMBALL: Yes, exactly. Preventing the threats before they
emerge is our best and first line of defense, and at this stage
in the Korean crisis we certainly can't give up on that. There is
a lot further to go, but that's the key approach there, perhaps
the only approach.
I want to thank everyone for being here, for paying attention to
this issue. Just to sum up, there are key issues before Congress.
We think it's clear that the costs of pursuing a path of new nuclear
weapons development is extremely high. The benefits are, at best,
marginal, and realistically, they're unrealistic.
There are four key things that can be done by the administration
and Congress, I think, to set us on a better course. First of all,
maintaining the prohibition on low-yield nuclear weapon research
leading to production, the Spratt-Furse prohibition. Second, shifting
the funding, the $15 million in the fiscal '04 defense authorization
bill request from robust nuclear earth-penetrator research to conventional
alternatives. [Third], reaffirming the United States' commitment
to the nuclear test moratorium and making sure that the Stockpile
Stewardship resources are focused on the surveillance and maintenance
activities that most directly address the reliability issues of
the existing arsenal. And finally, it's important for the president
to clarify that the role of nuclear weapons in the post-9/11 age,
so long as they exist, should be focused on deterring the use of
nuclear weapons by others and not to cross the firewall that has
existed for 58 years of nonuse.
So thank you very much for being here. I appreciate it. And we
are adjourned.
(END OF EVENT.)
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