The Iran Nuclear Crisis: A Chronology

Paul Kerr

2002

August 14, 2002: The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an Iranian opposition group, announces that Iran is building two secret nuclear facilities: a heavy-water plant near Arak and a "nuclear fuel" facility near Natanz.

September 2002: Iran notifies the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it is "building new facilities as part of its program to develop a nuclear fuel cycle."

December 12, 2002: The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), a Washington nongovernmental organization, issues a report—which State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher confirms as accurate the next day—stating that commercial satellite images support the NCRI allegations. In particular, ISIS says the images suggest Iran is building a uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy-water plant at Arak.

Simultaneously, the IAEA announces that, at Iran's request, agency Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei has postponed until February a visit to that country. This marks a second delay; the visit was first scheduled to take place in October.

2003

February 9, 2003: Iranian President Mohammad Khatami announces that Iran has started mining uranium near the city of Yazd and is developing the facilities necessary for a complete nuclear fuel cycle, including a uranium conversion facility, a uranium-enrichment facility, a fuel fabrication plant, and a facility to produce uranium oxide.

February 21-22, 2003: ElBaradei visits a pilot uranium-enrichment facility and a larger commercial facility at Natanz. According to a State Department official, ElBaradei is "taken aback" by the advanced state of the program, which utilizes gas-centrifuges to enrich uranium.

Secretary of State Colin Powell states March 9 that ElBaradei's discovery proves Iran has a "far more robust nuclear weapons development program" than has been publicly known.

February 23, 2003: An Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson states that Iran will discuss concluding an additional protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement "in the course of future negotiations." Additional protocols require states-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to provide significantly more information about their nuclear activities to the agency than ordinary safeguards agreements. Such protocols also provide the agency with more authority to verify IAEA states-parties' nuclear declarations.

May 6, 2003: Aghazadeh states during an annual meeting of NPT states-parties that Iran will build Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU)-type heavy-water nuclear reactors, but asserts that their construction will not be a proliferation concern because they will operate under IAEA safeguards.

June 6, 2003: ElBaradei issues a report to the IAEA Board of Governors detailing Iranian clandestine nuclear activities that are not in compliance with its safeguards agreement. In particular, the report cites Tehran's failure to disclose: its importation of nuclear material; the use of that material in various nuclear activities; and the facilities where the material—as well as nuclear waste—was stored and processed.

The report reveals that Iran imported 1,800 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride, uranium tetrafluoride, and uranium dioxide in 1991 without reporting to the IAEA that it did so—a violation of its safeguards agreement. A State Department official told Arms Control Today the previous month that China supplied the material, which can be processed into fuel for civilian nuclear reactors or fissile material for nuclear weapons. Significantly, the report says that some of the uranium hexafluoride has not been accounted for, suggesting that Iran may have covertly tested centrifuges with nuclear material -- also a violation of its safeguards agreement.

The report also discusses a facility of special interest to the IAEA, called the Kalaye Electric Company. According to the June report, Tehran acknowledged that it had produced "centrifuge components" there and the IAEA asked to conduct inspections and environmental sampling at the site to verify "the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities." The report states that Iranian officials allowed the inspectors to visit the facility after some hesitation, but did not allow environmental sampling.

The report also reveals that Iran had "a substantial" laser-based uranium-enrichment program and converted its imported uranium tetrafluoride into uranium metal in 2000.

June 19, 2003: The IAEA Board of Governors issues a statement expressing "concern" that Tehran failed to report nuclear "material, facilities, and activities as required by its safeguards obligations."

The statement stops short of saying that Iran is in violation of its safeguards agreement, but urges Iran to remedy its failures and "resolve" open questions about its nuclear activities. It also calls on Iran to conclude and implement an additional protocol. Additionally, the statement requests Iran to refrain from introducing nuclear material into the centrifuges at the Natanz facility.

June 25, 2003: Iran introduces nuclear material into a single centrifuge for testing purposes.

August 19, 2003: Iran begins testing a small cascade of 10 centrifuges.

August 26, 2003: ElBaradei presents a report on the IAEA's investigation of Iran's nuclear activities to the Board of Governors. Among the report's findings are revelations that environmental samples taken at Natanz by agency inspectors in March and June "revealed particles of high [sic] enriched uranium." Tehran cites its importation of contaminated centrifuge components to explain the material's presence.

The report also notes that IAEA inspectors were able to take environmental samples at the Kalaye Electric Company during the August 9-12 visit, something Iran had previously refused to allow. However, Iran's "considerable modification" of the site since inspectors' first visit in March could adversely impact the samples' accuracy, the report adds.

The report also includes Iran's admission that it conducted uranium conversion experiments in the early 1990s. Iran had previously claimed that it built its uranium conversion facility without testing it with nuclear material, arguing that it was able to do so with design and testing information it obtained from another country.

September 12, 2003: The IAEA Board of Governors unanimously adopts a resolution setting an October 31 deadline for Iran to cooperate fully with the agency's investigation. Specifically, the resolution calls on Iran to "provide accelerated cooperation and full transparency" to the IAEA, "remedy all failures identified" by the agency, and "suspend all further uranium enrichment-related activities," as well as "any reprocessing activities." The resolution also reiterates the IAEA's June request that Iran "promptly and unconditionally" implement an additional protocol.

White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan says September 25 that the October 31 deadline represents a "last chance" for Iran to comply and the IAEA should refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council if Iran does not do so.

October 21, 2003: In a joint statement with the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, Iran agrees to cooperate with the IAEA "to address and resolve…all requirements and outstanding [IAEA] issues," sign and ratify an additional protocol, and "suspend all uranium-enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA." Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hamidreza Assefi tells reporters October 26 that suspension is only "temporary" and Iran will resume enrichment "whenever…it is necessary."

ElBaradei tells reporters October 23 that Iran has provided the IAEA with a new declaration regarding its nuclear programs. Iran's representative to the IAEA, Ali Akbar Salehi, says the same day that the declaration is complete.

November 10, 2003: ElBaradei reports to the IAEA Board of Governors that Iran has conducted a variety of clandestine nuclear activities for more than two decades, deceiving the agency on numerous occasions by concealing facilities and providing incomplete and false information.

According to the report, Iran admitted October 21 to using small amounts of uranium hexafluoride to test centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1999 and 2002. Iran had previously acknowledged producing centrifuge components there but denied conducting any tests with nuclear material. Iran tested the centrifuges with uranium hexafluoride imported in 1991, although it had previously explained the missing material by saying it had leaked from its containers.

The report adds that Iran continued to obstruct the IAEA's investigation of the Kalaye facility. Tehran initially told agency inspectors that the centrifuges had been destroyed but later admitted to their existence and allowed the IAEA to inspect them October 30-31.

ElBaradei's report also discloses that Iran had been pursuing a laser-based uranium-enrichment program since 1991 and conducted laser-enrichment experiments with undeclared imported uranium metal at a site in Tehran until October 2002. In addition, Iran established "a pilot plant for laser enrichment" at a site called Lashkar Ab'ad in 2000, conducting enrichment experiments there between October 2002 and January 2003.

The report also reveals further details about Iran's uranium conversion program and reveals that Iran separated a "small amount" of plutonium from spent fuel produced in a research reactor in Tehran.

November 26, 2003: The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution which "strongly deplores Iran's past failures and breaches of its obligation to comply with the provisions of its Safeguards Agreement." The resolution also urges Iran to adhere to its October agreement and "re-emphasizes" that Iran should act "as if the Protocol were in force in the interim." In addition, the resolution includes a "trigger mechanism" that requires the board to meet immediately to consider all options at its disposal if "any further serious Iranian failures come to light."

The resolution is adopted after a prolonged debate, during which the United States fails to persuade the board to refer the matter to the UN Security Council.

December 18, 2003: Iran signs its additional protocol, but the Iranian parliament must ratify it before the protocol formally enters into force.

2004

February 4, 2004: Abdul Qadeer Khan—the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program—reveals in a television appearance that he ran a network which supplied Iran's centrifuge technology.

February 24, 2004: ElBaradei issues a report to the Board of Governors, detailing that Iran has still not fully resolved the agency's concerns about its nuclear programs.

The report contains more evidence which appears to cast doubt on Iran's assertion that highly enriched uranium particles found at its Natanz and Kalaye facilities came from contaminated, imported centrifuge components.

The report also reveals that Iran failed to declare in October that it had conducted research and development on a centrifuge of a type more advanced than the one it had been using in its previously-disclosed enrichment facilities. Although Iran told the IAEA that it had not received any centrifuges from foreign sources and had tested the machines using domestically manufactured components, a February 20 report from Malaysia's Inspector General of Police states that used centrifuges were sent to Iran from Pakistan in either 1994 or 1995—about the same time Iran received advanced centrifuge designs from a foreign source.

In addition, ElBaradei's report states that Iran told the agency in November that it had produced polonium, a radioactive isotope that has civilian applications but can also be used to trigger a nuclear chain reaction in a nuclear weapon. Iran has not been able to provide evidence to support its claim that it produced the element for civilian purposes, the report adds.

ElBaradei's report also states that Iran has agreed to stop manufacturing centrifuge components—an activity which had continued, despite Tehran's October promise to suspend its uranium-enrichment program. Tehran had also continued to assemble centrifuges until mid-January, although it had halted its enrichment activities at Natanz and other facilities by the end of 2003.

March 12, 2004: Iran's ambassador to the IAEA announces that Iran is postponing an upcoming IAEA inspection. Although the ambassador explains that the delay is necessary because of the approaching Iranian New Year, Khatami later indicates that Tehran's decision is a reaction against the IAEA resolution. ElBaradei announces March 15 that Tehran will allow the inspectors to visit March 27.

March 13, 2004: The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution stating that " Iran's cooperation so far has fallen short of what is required [and] calls on Iran to continue and intensify its cooperation."

The resolution also "calls on" Tehran to maintain and expand its October commitment to suspend its uranium enrichment activities, as well as "be pro-active in taking all necessary steps...to resolve all outstanding issues" outlined in ElBaradei's February report.

March 28, 2004: Iranian Vice President Gholamreza Aghazadeh announces on state television that Iran will begin "experimental production" in April at its uranium-conversion facility. IAEA officials say that Iran had given prior notice to the agency that it would begin uranium conversion in March, adding that these "conversion activities" do not violate Iran's October agreement to suspend its enrichment activities.

Early April, 2004: Iran announces it will start construction on a heavy-water nuclear reactor in June, according to a State Department official.

April 6, 2004: ElBaradei and Iran reach agreement on a "joint action plan" to resolve outstanding concerns about Iran's nuclear programs. Iran agrees to provide the agency with "detailed information regarding aspects of its centrifuge program" by the end of April, as well as the first declaration of its nuclear activities under its additional protocol.

April 12, 2004: Mohammad Saeedi, an official from Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, tells Reuters that Iran stopped making centrifuge components April 9.

April 29, 2004: Iran informs the IAEA that it intends to conduct production tests at its uranium-conversion facility to produce uranium hexafluoride. The IAEA informs Tehran May 7 that “given the amounts of nuclear material involved,” these tests “would technically amount to the production of feed material for enrichment processes.”

May 16, 2004: ElBaradei tells CNN that "the jury is still out" on whether Iran's nuclear programs are "exclusively for peaceful purposes" and that Iran should be "more forthcoming" in cooperating with the IAEA's ongoing investigation.

May 18, 2004 : Iran informs the IAEA that its suspension commitments under its October 2003 agreement do not include uranium hexafluoride production. This characterization is inconsistent with the IAEA’s interpretation of Iran’s original pledge.

May 21, 2004: Iran submits its initial declarations about its nuclear-related facilities and operations under its additional protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, even though it has yet to ratify the agreement. Additional protocols require states-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to provide significantly more information about their nuclear activities to the agency than ordinary safeguards agreements. Such protocols also provide the agency with more authority to verify IAEA states-parties' nuclear declarations

Late May - June 2004: Iran produces between 40-45 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride at its uranium-conversion facility.

June 1, 2004 : ElBaradei issues a report to the IAEA Board of Governors updating the agency’s investigation.

The report states that several outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including the origin of the enriched uranium particles, have yet to be resolved, partly blaming Iran’s delay of the March inspections. The holdup prevented the agency from having sufficient time to analyze environmental samples from inspected sites in time for the board’s upcoming June 14 meeting, the report says.

The report also reveals that Iran has withheld additional information concerning its advanced P-2 centrifuge program. Despite previous denials, Iran admitted to acquiring some centrifuge components from foreign sources, the report says. Furthermore, Tehran told the IAEA that a key component for the P-2 centrifuges was manufactured in a facility associated with Iran’s Ministry of Defense, contradicting the government’s previous assertion that the components were manufactured at a private workshop.

The report also casts doubt on Iran’s account of the pace of its P-2 centrifuge work. Iran contends that it obtained the designs in 1995 from a foreign source but did not begin work until 2001. IAEA experts believe this timeframe to be inaccurate, the report says.

The report also reveals that three private companies are continuing to build centrifuge components, despite Iran’s previous claim that such manufacturing had stopped in early April.

Additionally, Iran provides the agency with a new explanation for the source of uranium hexafluoride contamination found in a storage facility located at the Tehran Research Reactor. ElBaradei reported in June 2003 that some uranium hexafluoride Iran had imported in 1991 was missing. Iran first claimed that the material leaked from its containers, thereby explaining both the contamination and the missing material. Iran, however, later admitted to using the missing uranium hexafluoride to test centrifuges.

Although this admission accounted for the missing material, it did not explain the contamination in the storage facility. According to the report, Tehran subsequently changed its explanation, saying that the contamination resulted from domestically produced uranium hexafluoride that had leaked from its containers. IAEA experts do not “consider this explanation credible,” the report adds.

In addition, the report says that Iran “understated” the amount of plutonium it secretly separated from spent fuel produced in a research reactor in Tehran, although “the amounts produced were only in the milligram range.” The report also suggests that these separation experiments occurred more recently than Iran had previously declared.

June 17, 2004: IAEA Deputy Director-General Pierre Goldschmidt states at a Board of Governors meeting that the agency has “indications” that Iran “had shown interest in acquiring up to 100,000” magnets for its P-2 centrifuge program. According to Goldschmidt, the new procurement information calls into question Iran’s claim that the program had only reached the research and development stage.

June 18, 2004: The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution condemning Iran’s failure to cooperate fully with the agency’s investigation, specifically citing Iran’s decision to delay the March inspections.

The resolution urges Iran to “intensify its cooperation” with the IAEA, especially in resolving questions concerning its P-2-centrifuge program and the presence of enriched-uranium particles at some Iranian facilities.

The resolution also calls on Iran to implement fully its pledge to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities, specifically requesting Iran to stop manufacturing centrifuge components and to refrain from producing uranium hexafluoride.

Additionally, the resolution calls on Iran “to reconsider” constructing a heavy-water nuclear reactor

June 23, 2004 : Iran responds to the resolution by sending a letter to the IAEA stating that it will resume assembling centrifuges and manufacturing related components on June 29. Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Hassan Rowhani tells reporters June 27 that Iran will continue cooperating with the IAEA and would like to “hold comprehensive negotiations” with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.

June 28-30, 2004: IAEA inspectors visit Iran’s Lavizan-Shian site and take environmental samples. The inspectors’ visit occurs after publicized satellite images seemingly showed that Iran had razed buildings and otherwise altered the site to conceal evidence of covert nuclear activities. Department of State spokesperson Richard Boucher states June 17 that the report raises “serious concerns and fits a pattern…that we’ve seen from Iran of trying to cover up on its activities, including by trying to sanitize locations which the IAEA should be allowed to visit and inspect.”

July 31, 2004 : According to a Reuters report, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi tells reporters that Tehran has started building centrifuges.

August 17, 2004: Undersecretary of State John Bolton states that Washington wants the IAEA to investigate Iran’s attempts to procure dual-use materials that have possible nuclear weapons applications.

Late August, 2004: Iran begins to convert a quantity of uranium oxide sufficient eventually to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for several crude nuclear weapons.

September 1, 2004: ElBaradei issues another report to the IAEA Board of Governors. This report states that the agency is concluding its investigations into Iran‘s laser-based uranium-enrichment program and past uranium-conversion experiments. “Further follow-up [on these issues] will be carried out as a routine safeguards implementation matters,” the report adds.

The report also states that it “appears plausible” that enriched-uranium particles found at two sites associated with Iran’s centrifuge program “may not have resulted from enrichment of uranium by Iran.” The report contains little other new information about Iran’s nuclear programs.

September 18, 2004: The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution again calling on Iran to cooperate fully with the agency’s investigation of its nuclear programs and to “suspend all [uranium] enrichment-related activities.” The resolution specifies that the suspension should include the “manufacture or import of centrifuge components, the assembly and testing of centrifuges,” and the production of uranium hexafluoride.

The resolution also calls on ElBaradei to report before the upcoming November board meeting on the investigation’s status, as well as Iran’s implementation of previous IAEA board requests. It also states that the board is to decide in November “whether or not further steps are appropriate.”

November 14, 2004: Following a series of talks with British, French, and German officials, Iran notifies the IAEA that, beginning November 22, it will suspend all of its uranium-enrichment activities for the duration of future negotiations concerning Tehran’s nuclear program.

According to the agreement, which enters into force November 15, the Europeans and Iran are to negotiate “a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements,” which includes “objective guarantees that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.” The long-term agreement is also to include “firm guarantees on nuclear, technological, and economic cooperation,” as well as “firm commitments on security issues.”

The text of the agreement recognizes Iran’s “rights under the NPT” and states that the freeze is voluntary, rather than “a legal obligation.”

The agreement specifies that Iran is to suspend the manufacture and importation of gas centrifuges and related components, as well as the assembly, installation, testing, or operation of such centrifuges. In addition, Tehran is to refrain from “all tests or production at any uranium-conversion installation.” Iran also is not to separate plutonium or construct a plutonium-separation facility.

According to a European diplomat, the three governments will not support referring Iran to the UN Security Council as long as the suspension holds. The IAEA Board of Governors is obligated to report violations of IAEA safeguards agreements to the Security Council for possible action.

After the IAEA verifies Iran’s suspension, a steering committee is slated to meet in the first half of December to launch the negotiations. The committee is also to set up three working groups to develop proposals for mutual cooperation on nuclear issues, non-nuclear technical cooperation, and “political and security issues.” The committee is to meet again within three months to review the groups’ progress.

Additionally, negotiations between Iran and the European Union on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement will resume as soon as the suspension is verified, the agreement says.

November 15, 2004: ElBaradei issues a report to the IAEA Board of Governors, which states that all of Iran’s known nuclear material “has been accounted for, and…is not diverted to prohibited activities,” but adds that the IAEA is “not yet in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran.”

According to the report, “the environmental sampling data available to date tends, on balance, to support” Iran’s contention that enriched-uranium particles found at several Iranian facilities came from imported centrifuge components.

The report notes that there are still unresolved issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programs, including the P-2 centrifuge project and the source of uranium hexafluoride found in a Tehran Research Reactor storage facility.

Additionally, the report reveals that environmental samples from the Lavizan-Shian site contain “no evidence of nuclear material” but adds that detecting nuclear material would be “very difficult” because the buildings were demolished. The IAEA is continuing to assess information about the site, the report says. Furthermore, agency officials reiterated their request to visit the Parchin military complex – a site which U.S. officials believe may have facilities that could be used to test conventional high explosives for use in an implosion-type nuclear weapon. In a September interview with Arms Control Today, a U.S. official had confirmed a Washington Post report that the IAEA first requested to visit the site in June.

According to the report, the IAEA also continues to investigate “open source reports relating to dual-use equipment and materials which have applications…in the nuclear military area.”

November 25, 2004: ElBaradei tells the IAEA Board of Governors that Iran has produced 3.5 tons of uranium hexafluoride in its uranium-conversion facility. Iran began this second conversion run in August but did not start producing uranium hexafluoride until sometime after mid-October.

He also informs the board that Iran has implemented the suspension .

November 29, 2004 : The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution that emphasizes the importance of the November 15 suspension agreement and requests that ElBaradei notify board members if Tehran either fails to implement the suspension or impedes IAEA monitoring. The resolution implies that Iran could be referred to the UN Security Council if it breaks the suspension.

Additionally, the resolution calls on Iran to continue to cooperate with the IAEA’s investigation and requests ElBaradei to update the board on the investigation “as appropriate,” rather than requesting a report for the next board meeting, as past resolutions have done.

ElBaradei tells the board the same day that Iran has backed down from a last-minute demand that it be allowed to “use up to 20 sets of [centrifuge] components for [research and development] purposes.” Iran agreed to place the centrifuges under agency camera surveillance and refrain from “any testing” of the components.

December 13, 2004: The Foreign ministers from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom meet with an Iranian delegation to open negotiations toward a long-term resolution of concerns surrounding Tehran’s nuclear programs. Rowhani stated the previous day that Tehran “will continue the talks if [they] feel that they are progressing.” Iranian officials indicate that they want the talks to be concluded as quickly as possible.

A European diplomat later describes the discussions as “more symbolic than substantive,” adding that no negotiations took place. The ministers leave substantive issues to be hashed out by the established working groups.

2005

January7, 2005: Iran agrees to allow IAEA inspectors to visit the Parchin military complex. On February 27, Iran denies an IAEA request for an additional visit to the Parchin military site.

February 21, 2005: ElBaradei tells the German magazine Der Spiegel that Iran has the capability to produce a nuclear weapon in two to three years.

February 23, 2005: National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley suggests that Bush may consider presenting some incentives for Iran to reach an agreement with its European interlocutors. Hadley spoke one day after French President Jacques Chirac told reporters that the United States should consider dropping its objections to negotiations regarding Iran’s accession to the World Trade Organization, as well as eliminate U.S. barriers to Iranian purchases of civilian aircraft engines.

February 24, 2005: A European diplomat tells Arms Control Today that Iran has continued to honor its suspension pledge, despite “picking at the edges” of the agreement by conducting such activities as performing maintenance at its Natanz centrifuge facility.

February 27, 2005: Russian Federal Agency for Atomic Energy Director Alexander Rumyantsev announces that, a fter numerous delays , Russia and Iran have signed a nuclear fuel supply agreement. Russia is to supply fresh fuel for the light-water nuclear reactor it is constructing near the Iranian city of Bushehr, as well as take back the spent nuclear fuel. The latter part of the agreement is to prevent Iran from separating plutonium from the spent fuel.

According to a Russian government nuclear expert, the spent fuel will not go back to Russia until 2011 at the earliest. The returned fuel would then be stored at a facility in the Russian city of Zheleznogorsk (formerly Krasnoyarsk-26). There is some question, however, as to how long the spent fuel will need to remain in cooling ponds located in Iran before being sent to Russia. The Russian official’s estimate assumes that the fuel needs two years to cool. But other Russian officials have told the United States that the fuel must stay in Iran between three and five years, according to a State Department official.

March 1, 2005: One day after ElBaradei indicates that no new evidence of illicit Iranian nuclear activities has surfaced, Goldschmidt tells the agency’s Board of Governors that Iran has failed to cooperate fully with the IAEA’s investigation. Specifically, he says, Iran has failed to provide adequate information about its uranium enrichment program to the agency and has also lagged in providing IAEA inspectors access to some facilities suspected of playing a role in nuclear weapons research. But he acknowledges that Iran has continued to observe its November pledge to suspend its enrichment program.

Goldschmidt also discusses Iran’s possible connections to the Khan network. He says that the agency has learned that Iranian officials met in 1987 and 1994 with unidentified intermediaries who helped Tehran obtain materials relevant to its uranium enrichment program.

Additionally, Goldschmidt states that Iran has still not fully cooperated with the IAEA’s investigation of the Lavizan-Shian physics research center that was operating between 1989 and 1998. According to Goldschmidt, the agency wants more information concerning the center’s possible efforts “to acquire dual-use material and equipment that could be useful in uranium-enrichment and conversion activities.” Iran provided the agency with some relevant information in October but had apparently not cooperated further.

March 10, 2005: In a letter to Javier Solana, the European Union’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom acknowledge that the negotiations are not progressing “as fast as [they] would wish.” The major obstacle is reaching agreement on “objective guarantees that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.” The letter also states that the Europeans will push the IAEA Board of Governors to refer Iran to the UN Security Council if Tehran does not continue the negotiations and cooperate with the IAEA’s ongoing investigation into Iran’s past and current nuclear activities.

March 11, 2005: In an effort to strengthen the negotiating position of the Europeans, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice states that Washington “will drop its objection to Iran’s application to the [World Trade Organization] and will consider, on a case by case basis, the licensing of spare parts for Iranian civilian aircraft, in particular from the European Union to Iran.” This concession dovetails with the Euro-Iranian November agreement which states that the Europeans will “actively support” the start of negotiations for Iran to accede to the WTO. Rice’s announcement marks the first time that the U.S. has offered such support to the negotiations.

March 23, 2005: The steering committee charged with overseeing the Iran-European talks meets for the first time. Iranian diplomats present a proposal that would allow Iran to produce only low enriched uranium at the Natanz facility. The facility would first contain 3,000 centrifuges but then would eventually have centrifuges “up to the numbers envisaged” for the facility – more than 50,000. Iran also proposes various “objective guarantees,” such as forswearing plutonium and highly enriched uranium production (HEU), ratifying its additional protocol, improving its export control laws, and “allowing continuous, on-site presence of IAEA inspectors” at its uranium conversion and enrichment facilities. Tehran had previously threatened to break off the negotiations, but agree to continue the talks.

March 31, 2005: The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction releases a report which notes that the U.S. intelligence community lacks adequate intelligence regarding Iran and its nuclear capabilities. Hadley had acknowledged earlier in the month that U.S. intelligence regarding Iran’s nuclear program is limited.

April 30, 2005: After an inconclusive meeting with Tehran’s European interlocutors, Rowhani says that Iran might resume work at its uranium conversion facility. Four days later, President Khatami reiterates Iran’s position that a “total halt of enrichment or a long-term suspension is not acceptable." But he adds that Iran wishes to negotiate and compromise.

May 15, 2005: The Iranian parliament passes legislation urging the government to resume its nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment.

May 26, 2005: The WTO begins the process necessary for Iran to accede to the organization. The United States had blocked Iran’s candidacy numerous times since Tehran applied for membership in 1996.

June 5, 2005: Iran agrees to continue its freeze on uranium enrichment until August while its European interlocutors develop more detailed proposals. “The two sides should have offers in line with the main goal of the Paris agreement; that is objective guarantees from our side and solid agreements from the European side,” says Supreme National Security Council official Ali Agha Mohammadi. The Europeans had previously discussed ideas with Iran for resolving the nuclear dispute, but had not presented Tehran with a comprehensive proposal.

June 16, 2005: Goldschmidt tells the IAEA board that the agency’s ongoing investigation has raised further questions about Iran’s nuclear program and cooperation with the agency, but he does not reveal any previously-unknown nuclear activities.

Goldschmidt expresses concern about “complex arrangements” concerning Iran’s Gchine uranium mine. The IAEA is investigating why Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization suspended work on the mine between 1994 and 2000 to work on a “much less promising” deposit of uranium ore at another location. According to a State Department official and a European diplomat, Iran’s military or an affiliated organization may have begun working at the mine in an effort to obtain an independent uranium source.

Additionally, Goldschmidt states that the IAEA has determined that Iran provided inaccurate information to the agency concerning the dates of its plutonium-separation experiments. The IAEA also continues to investigate discrepancies in Iran’s accounts regarding the country’s efforts to obtain gas centrifuge technology.

Goldschmidt also reports that Pakistan turned over centrifuge components to the IAEA. The agency is to analyze the components as part of its investigation to determine the origin of highly enriched uranium particles that IAEA inspectors have found in Iran.

ElBaradei tells reporters the next day that Iran has been “a bit slow” to provide relevant information and expresses hope that some of the issues will be resolved by September.

June 24, 2005: Former Tehran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is elected president after defeating former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in a runoff election. Rafsanjani was widely viewed as being more willing to compromise on the nuclear issue.