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“For half a century, ACA has been providing the world … with advocacy, analysis, and awareness on some of the most critical topics of international peace and security, including on how to achieve our common, shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.”

– Izumi Nakamitsu
UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs
June 2, 2022
North Korea
  • September 4, 2009

    In a key step aimed at implementing a June sanctions resolution against North Korea, the UN Security Council blacklisted 10 North Korean organizations and individuals connected to Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs July 16. Security Council Resolution 1874, passed June 12, directed council members to take steps toward identifying North Korean entities and persons that would be subject to the financial restrictions, asset freezes, and travel restrictions outlined in the resolution. (See ACT, July/August 2009.) The council adopted that measure in response to North Korea’s May 25 nuclear test, building on a 2006 sanctions resolution adopted in response to Pyongyang’s first nuclear test. (Continue)

  • July 2, 2009

    The UN Security Council last month broadly expanded sanctions and counterproliferation measures against North Korea in response to that country's May 25 nuclear test.

    Resolution 1874, which the council unanimously adopted June 12, builds on the measures the council took in 2006 when it adopted Resolution 1718 in response to North Korea's first nuclear test. (Continue)

  • July 2, 2009

    North Korea has recently taken a series of provocative steps to challenge the international community. These steps include test-launching a long-range rocket, walking away from the six-party talks and all disarmament agreements, kicking out international inspectors from its nuclear facilities, conducting an underground nuclear test May 25-a more powerful blast than the one conducted in 2006-testing a half-dozen short-range missiles, and announcing it had resumed plutonium production and started a program to enrich uranium. Pyongyang reportedly also is preparing a long-range missile test and a third nuclear test. If unchecked, North Korea will surely increase the quantity and quality of its arsenal. Even worse, once Pyongyang has more than enough weapons for its deterrent, it might be tempted to sell the surplus. The longer the crisis lasts, the more nuclear capable North Korea will become and the more difficult it will be to roll back Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions. (Continue)

  • July 2, 2009

    The security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and infrastructure has been the subject of much coverage and debate in recent months as Pakistani government forces have stepped up their fight against insurgents. In this month's issue, two leading experts offer detailed analyses of the risks and possible policy responses. (Continue)

  • June 4, 2009

    North Korea conducted its second nuclear test May 25, prompting international condemnation for violating UN demands and raising tensions in the region. The test comes a month after North Korea declared that it would no longer participate in multilateral talks on its denuclearization and would carry out nuclear and missile tests to strengthen its deterrent capability. (See
    ACT, May 2009.) After the test, Pyongyang's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) struck a similar note, saying the blast was "part of the measures to bolster up [North Korea's] nuclear deterrent for self-defense." (Continue)

  • June 2, 2009

    North Korea's second ­ and the world's 2,052nd ­ nuclear weapon test explosion represents yet another low in the long-running multilateral diplomatic effort to freeze and verifiably dismantle Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities. Pyongyang's test blast is also a stark reminder of the need to finally bring about a permanent, global test ban.

    Coming just two years after North Korea agreed to refreeze its plutonium separation operations and disable some of its key nuclear facilities in accordance with the 2005 Six-Party denuclearization agreement, North Korea's estimated 2-4 kiloton test blast, missile launches, and renewal of plutonium separation are reckless and exasperating. (Continue)

  • May 8, 2009

    North Korea's long anticipated rocket launch April 5 set off a chain of events resulting in international sanctions on North Korean firms and Pyongyang's withdrawal from six-way talks to end its nuclear weapons program.

    North Korea, which warned that any UN response would provoke a hostile reaction, insisted that it is no longer bound by multilateral agreements reached with the United States and countries in the region and stated its intention to reconstitute the nuclear facilities that it temporarily disabled under those accords. In an April 25 Foreign Ministry statement, Pyongyang declared that it had begun separating plutonium to enhance its "nuclear deterrence." (Continue)

  • May 8, 2009

    The process of determining noncompliance is an important aspect of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system, as well as the only established mechanism for determining noncompliance with the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) itself. Noncompliance with an NPT safeguards agreement constitutes violation of Article III of the NPT, the obligation to accept safeguards on all nuclear material, and, depending on the circumstances, possibly a violation of Article II, the obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons. (Continue)

  • May 8, 2009

    In the initial weeks of the Obama administration, former Vice President Dick Cheney stated that there was a "high probability" of a terrorist attempt to use a nuclear weapon or biological agent and that "whether they can pull it off depends on what kind of policies we put in place." President Barack Obama, in his April 5 Prague speech, said that terrorists "are determined to buy, build, or steal" a nuclear weapon and that the international community must work "without delay" to ensure that they never acquire one. Obama also outlined a number of policies for locking down vulnerable nuclear material and strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime. (Continue)

  • May 6, 2009

    In May 2009, ACA analyst Peter Crail discussed the North Korean nuclear program with Russia Today.

  • April 5, 2009

    Experts from the independent, nonpartisan Arms Control Association (ACA) declared that North Korea's launch of what is believed to be its long-range Taepo Dong-2 rocket satellite carrier today was a "confrontational move that undermines stability in the region and makes progress in the six-party talks on that country's denuclearization more difficult to achieve." (Continue)

  • March 31, 2009

    The United States, Japan, and South Korea warned North Korea in March that its intended satellite launch would violate a UN Security Council resolution prohibiting Pyongyang's missile activities, indicating that the council would consider the issue in the event of such a launch. North Korea maintains that the launch is only for civil space purposes and has provided information to UN agencies on the timing and route of its space launch vehicle. (Continue)

  • March 4, 2009

    Amid heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula, Pyongyang appears to be making preparations to test its long-range ballistic missile, the Taepo Dong-2. North Korea reportedly began moving components of the missile, which may be capable of reaching parts of the United States, to its eastern missile launch site at Musudan-ri in early February. The Wall Street Journal quoted an unnamed U.S. counterproliferation official Feb. 3 stating, "The North Koreans appear to be moving missile-related equipment around, but it's too early to say whether or not they will proceed with an actual test." (Continue)

  • March 4, 2009

    Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton traveled to Asia during her first overseas trip facing concerns about continued progress in negotiations on North Korea's denuclearization and questions regarding the status of North Korea's leadership. In order to help address these challenges, Clinton Feb. 20 named Ambassador Stephen Bosworth to serve as the U.S. special representative for North Korea policy. During a press conference with South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan, Clinton said that Bosworth "will be our senior official handling North Korea issues, reporting to me as well as to President [Barack] Obama." (Continue)

  • January 16, 2009

    U.S. presidents have struggled with the challenges posed by a hostile North Korea since the end of the Korean War and with the dangers of a nuclear North since the mid-1980s. The diplomatic struggle over Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program has had many ups and downs, from the near outbreak of a second war in 1994 to an agreement a few months later to end the nuclear program, from the prospect of a visit to Pyongyang by President Bill Clinton in 2000 to the breakdown of the 1994 agreement in 2002 and the North Korean nuclear test in 2006, from limited arrangements over the past few years that have constrained Pyongyang's plutonium production program to recent disputes over verification. (Continue)

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