An Unrealized Nexus? WMD-related Trafficking, Terrorism, and Organized Crime in the Former Soviet Union
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, powerfully advanced the notion that terrorist groups might acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or, more plausibly, radiological dispersal devices (RDD). Terrorist interest in weapons of mass destruction is ample. Al Qaeda has been on record as determined to acquire and use these weapons.
In 1995, several years prior to the September 11 attacks, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo sought to gain nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and it successfully used sarin gas. That same year, Chechen rebels planted but did not explode an RDD made of cesium-137 and dynamite in Moscow’s Izmailovsky Park.
In 2004 the uncovering of the Abdul Qadeer Khan network fueled new concerns that trafficking in WMD material could give rise to a parallel black market of nuclear material linked to organized crime. Pointing out that terrorist organizations and organized crime had already cooperated in the drug trafficking business, a number of analysts warned that organized crime might decide to channel WMD material to terrorists.
Much of the concern about a possible nexus between WMD trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism focused on the former Soviet Union, particularly Central Asia and the Caucasus. There, a large number of insufficiently secured nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities are located in close proximity to trafficking routes for drugs and small arms. Powerful radiation sources also are plentiful and inadequately protected. Furthermore, several terrorist groups in the region have become increasingly radicalized since the September 11 attacks.
Even though these developments suggested that a perfect storm was brewing, more than five years later there is no compelling evidence of a solid nexus among WMD-related trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime in the former Soviet Union. To be sure, a cautionary note is in order. Serious data collection problems in the region make understanding trafficking patterns an inherently limited proposition at best. They also make it essential to improve the quality and quantity of data collection and sharing by local and regional authorities.
Nonetheless, all available evidence indicates that the character of WMD trafficking in the post-2001 period has remained essentially the same as in the pre-2001 period, displaying amateurish features and dominated by the supply side. Trafficking cases involving weapons-grade nuclear material have entailed minuscule quantities, and their number has substantially decreased compared to the pre-2001 period, when most of the proliferation-significant events involving kilogram-level quantities of material were reported. That said, the post-2001 evidence of trafficking in WMD-related material does show new and potentially worrisome characteristics that bear close scrutiny.
The Data Set
This article is based on an analysis of 183 trafficking incidents that occurred in the former Soviet Union between January 2001 and December 2006. The incidents were reported in the Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ (CNS) NIS Export Control Observer, the International Export Control Observer, and the CNS Newly Independent States Nuclear Trafficking Abstracts Database, which gather information from a variety of regional, national and international sources, including gray literature such as conference reports and interviews. The data set includes incidents that constitute illegal activities, with or without criminal intent; orphan material; and cases where the arrest of the perpetrators or seizure of the material occurred outside the former Soviet Union but concerned material or individuals originating or suspected of originating from the former Soviet Union. Hoaxes and events that were first reported as illicit trafficking cases but later revealed to be legal shipments or that had no WMD connection were discarded. Yet, because of the incompleteness of information available in open and gray sources and inconsistencies in press reporting, the data set may include occasional mistakes.
WMD-Trafficking Incidents Prior to 2001
Prior to 2001, aside from a few proliferation-significant incidents in the early 1990s, WMD-related trafficking in the region displayed amateurish features. Although known trafficking involved primarily nuclear and radioactive material—low-enriched uranium (LEU), radioactive isotopes, and contaminated scrap metal—the material was most often stolen for the value of the metal casing and not for the radioactive or nuclear material it contained.
Perpetrators were primarily opportunists motivated by financial gains. They generally were uninformed about the value of the material, which they typically overestimated, or unaware of the possibility of detection or of the associated health hazards. Trafficking was conducted in contraband style, with material hidden in a bag, car, or bus and transported along a southern route, crossing Central Asia and the Caucasus, and proceeding west toward Europe through Turkey. In the late 1990s, the more commonly used westbound route from Russia to Europe was replaced by the southern route. Trafficking appeared dominated by the supply side, with no evidence of an actual demand or connection with organized crime or terrorist groups.
General Trends of Post-2001 WMD Trafficking
Since 2001, the features of WMD-related trafficking appear not to have changed substantially. Most known trafficking incidents involve radioactive orphan sources, contaminated scrap metal, radioactive isotopes such as cesium-137, and low-grade nuclear material, primarily LEU. The first three items account for about 50 percent of the trafficking transactions. In many ways, this is not surprising. Powerful radiation sources disposed of improperly by medical and industrial facilities or abandoned by the Soviet army are abundant throughout the former Soviet Union. Other potent sources contained in radioisotope thermoelectric generators—devices built to provide electricity in lighthouses, radio beacons, and meteorological stations—are inadequately protected.
No proliferation-significant cases have been reported in the 2001-2006 period. Known trafficking incidents with plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) involve minuscule quantities of material that would not pose a proliferation threat. In addition, a very small portion of these incidents involves weapons-grade material. For instance, 7 percent of the trafficking transactions (14 cases) involve plutonium (Pu-238 and Pu-239), but they consist of minuscule amounts contained in industrial instruments or smoke detectors, which would not pose a proliferation threat.
Only 5 percent, or 10 cases of the known trafficking incidents during the 2001-2006 period, involve HEU. Three of these cases concern HEU with an enrichment level of at least 80 percent, but they also involve only small quantities of material. One had five grams of HEU enriched to about 80 percent. The material, suspected of originating in an unidentified former Soviet Union country, was seized in France in 2001. Another incident involves 170 grams of HEU seized in Georgia at the border with Armenia. Although media reports issued after the material was seized in 2003 did not specify the material’s enrichment level, later reports indicated that the HEU was enriched to almost 90 percent. The third case, which occurred in early 2006, involved 100 grams of HEU enriched to 89.4 percent. This material was also seized in Georgia at the border with Armenia. The enrichment level of the remaining seven HEU cases was not specified, but four of these incidents were reported in 2005 by Georgian authorities, who indicated that the material had been seized during the previous two to three years and was not weapons-grade HEU.
The profile of the perpetrators and their trafficking methods also remains constant. Perpetrators usually are opportunists (39 percent), either facility insiders or native residents of the city or country of material acquisition. Seven percent of the trafficking cases over the 2001-2006 period involved crime groups (12 cases), which include established organized crime groups (seven cases), such as the Balashikha group in Moscow, and groups of individuals suspected of belonging to a regional or international smuggling rings (five cases). Trafficking perpetrated by crime groups hardly differs from the other incidents. They do entail potent radioactive sources that could be used in RDDs, such as cesium-137, or nuclear material such as HEU (two cases) and LEU (two cases). They also involve material with no nuclear application, such as osmium-187 (four cases), or with low radioactivity levels, such as depleted uranium. This may indicate that these groups have a limited understanding of the material’s value. In addition, these incidents generally involve small quantities of material.
Only three cases are loosely connected to a terrorist organization. The first case is based on a 2002 report published in The Guardian, indicating that, according to an unidentified U.S. official, Chechen rebels stole radioactive sources and nuclear material from the Volgodonsk nuclear power plant located in Rostov Oblast, Russia. These allegations were not corroborated by other sources and even denied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, and Volgodonsk officials. The second case involved two individuals from the Caucasus who attempted to acquire 15 kilograms of uranium with an unspecified enrichment level from a Russian nuclear combine in 2003. The Russian press speculated that the material was to be used for a dirty bomb to be exploded in St. Petersburg during the city’s tercentennial celebrations. These allegations could not be corroborated as the buyer escaped the police. In addition, given the low radioactivity level of uranium, it would not have made a particularly powerful RDD. The third case, which took place in 2005, involved a Sunday Times reporter posing as an intermediary for Algerian terrorists. He approached an arms dealer in the secessionist region of Transdniestria, Moldova, who was willing to sell Alazan rockets with warheads purportedly containing the radioactive material strontium and cesium. Yet, the possibility that these conventional rockets had been modified to carry radioactive warheads has been subject of much debate and no firm conclusion. Moreover, the reporter’s allegation could not be corroborated as he broke off the deal before paying a substantial amount of money to the arms dealer.
As far as the structure of the market is concerned, it remains decidedly supply side. There are no established connections between suppliers and possible brokers or clients, who most often are nonexistent. Suppliers still overestimate the value of the material and do not seem to have a clear idea of what material has value for nuclear weapons or RDD development. Indeed, many of the transactions entail materials that have no nuclear weapons or RDD application or hardly any radioactivity (e.g., osmium-187, cesium-133, [red] mercury, or depleted uranium). In addition, trafficking transactions are often held in public spaces, such as train stations, with few precautions taken to hide these activities. Twenty-two percent of the trafficking cases identified during the 2001-2006 period were discovered during the sale of the material, 10 percent of which were the result of sting operations. Another 22 percent were discovered during the transportation of the material, most often while crossing a border or as a by-product of roadside police checks.
Even though post-2001 trafficking data does not support the feared nexus among terrorism, organized crime and WMD-related trafficking, new trafficking characteristics have emerged that bear close monitoring.
One of these new features is the appearance of trafficking in chemical and biological material. Only two incidents have been reported for the 2001-2006 period. One involved a nonpathogenic strain of the Ebola virus in Ukraine in 2002. The other concerned mustard gas in Georgia in 2003. In both cases, a dearth of information was provided on the material and, in the case of the Ebola strain, no details about the origin, destination, and perpetrators were revealed, making it difficult to ascertain if this was indeed a trafficking case. Nevertheless, the two cases share something in common: the material was discovered by chance, during an unrelated roadside check (Georgia) and during a customs shipment inspection (Ukraine). Because of the absence of appropriate material detection equipment deployed in the former Soviet Union, this fact alone underscores the difficulty of detecting biological and chemical material. Therefore, the small number of reported incidents may not be representative of actual trafficking in these materials.
Notably, trafficking routes appear to have become more varied during the post-2001 period. Seizure and arrest patterns show that previously the main route went south through Central Asia and the Caucasus and then west to Europe. Today, traffickers are likely using three main corridors. First, the east-west route, going directly from Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus to Europe, which was more widely used in the early 1990s, has been reactivated. Second, a new south-east route crossing Central Asia into neighboring Asian countries seems to have emerged. Finally, the late 1990s south-west route has been maintained, with a good portion of the traffic merging in the Caucasus, probably because, from there, the goods can either go west through Turkey or east into Asia and the Middle East. Although today most materials are seized before they reach their declared destination, the use of multiple routes is worrisome because it may indicate that traffickers have detected a possible new demand in these regions. Multiple routes may also deplete the few resources available to the region’s enforcement communities, thus making it more difficult to monitor and control trafficking.
Another troubling feature is that a few cases involved nuclear or radioactive material in combination with small arms (four cases) and narcotics (two cases), which may indicate a convergence between arms or drugs and WMD-related material. In some of these cases, the nuclear or radioactive material was discovered by chance during an unrelated drug or financial investigation. This may indicate that the drug control and financial fraud enforcement agencies can also be useful instruments of proliferation prevention.
The data set also includes a small number of cases involving opportunists that show a higher degree of organization. Several incidents involve groups of individuals who do not belong to an established organized crime group but collaborate for a specific operation, sometimes with the active participation of former law enforcement representatives. Some opportunist cases also involve weapons and explosives, which may be indicative of a link with organized crime.
In addition, one out of four cases involves potent radioactive sources, particularly cesium-137 (37 cases) and stronsium-90 (six cases), which could be used for RDDs. This characteristic is not completely new; trafficking with these sources was common before 2001 because they can be found in many orphaned industrial instruments. Prior to 2001, however, monitoring focused on state capabilities, and because these materials cannot be used for nuclear weapons, this type of trafficking was not considered a high proliferation risk. Given current concern over terrorist use of RDDs, trafficking with these potent radioactive sources has become more preoccupying. Yet, in light of the meager information in media reports about either the quantity or quality of the material, it is difficult to ascertain whether these events are of proliferation significance.
Absence of Proliferation-Significant Cases
The most striking change in the post-2001 period is the absence of reported proliferation-significant cases (kilogram-level quantities of weapons-grade material). Whereas during the early 1990s, when several cases involving kilogram-level quantities of weapons-grade material were recorded, data for the post-2001 period show only three incidents with gram-level quantities of HEU enriched to 80 percent or more. An analysis of these three cases indicates a connection with organized crime for only one of them and no apparent connection with terrorism.
The two Georgian cases have several common characteristics. They both involve opportunists, who were arrested in Georgia while coming from Russia. In both cases, the enrichment level of the material was almost 90 percent, which might indicate that they came from the same source. The French case, on the other hand, involved a criminal group. Although the investigation and the trial that followed the seizure and arrest of the perpetrators did not establish the origin of the material, plane tickets and documents written in the Cyrillic alphabet found in the apartment of one of the perpetrators point to an Eastern origin. The French perpetrators also kept the material in a glass ampoule contained in a lead cylinder. This is in sharp contrast with the transportation means used by the perpetrator in the 2006 Georgian case, which consisted in a plastic bag tucked in his pocket. As HEU is not highly radioactive, this did not represent a health hazard for the perpetrator as long as the HEU was not ingested. Whether the perpetrator was simply blissfully ignorant or was advised by a knowledgeable co-conspirator not to fret about the matter is unknown. In any event, aside from the fact that the three cases involve gram-level quantities of material that could have constituted a sample of a larger quantity of material, the three cases do not seem to constitute a consistent trafficking pattern.
The absence of proliferation-significant cases may be an indicator that international efforts to improve security at nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union are bearing fruit. If so, the occasional incidents involving small quantities of weapons-grade material may be instances of material stolen in the early 1990s, when security measures were not in place. Conversely, the absence of incidents with significant amounts of weapons-grade material also may be a sign that local authorities are unable to identify such cases or that perpetrators have become more sophisticated in their transactions. Because of the dearth of information, we can only speculate.
2003 Spike in Activity
The number of reported trafficking cases in most categories of material, except HEU and LEU, suddenly increases in 2003 and steadily decreases the following years. The number of cases involving opportunists shows a similar evolution. The surge in plutonium cases (small quantities contained in industrial instruments or smoke detectors) is slightly delayed, with an increase occurring in 2004 and a steady decrease starting in 2005. This parallel movement may indicate an improvement in detection capabilities that may have produced a deterrent effect, which is difficult to prove because media sources do not always indicate the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the material. Nevertheless, the possibility underscores the importance of U.S. and IAEA programs, initiated or accelerated after the September 11 attacks, to detect radioactive sources at border points.
The number of cases involving HEU, LEU, and other unspecified enriched uranium, on the other hand, decreases in 2002 and then flattens to a low level in subsequent years. This may be indicative of the fact that there are not many such cases because of the improvement of physical security measures at facilities storing such material. On the other hand, it may also indicate that due to their weak radioactivity, HEU and LEU cannot be detected by existing radiation-detection equipment. Consequently, more trafficking cases possibly have occurred. The small number of cases involving organized crime and terrorist groups can be interpreted the same way. This may indicate the absence of involvement of such groups in trafficking in the former Soviet Union, or it may show that existing border-control equipment and methods are not efficient against more sophisticated groups.
Absence of Evidence Is Not Evidence of Absence
Except for the cases having a loose terrorist connection, the data does not show much of a convergence between WMD-related material trafficking and terrorism. Yet, caution regarding this conclusion is warranted for several reasons. First, investigations of trafficking incidents in the former Soviet Union are usually incomplete, especially so in Central Asia and the Caucasus, because the enforcement communities in these countries do not have sufficient funding or appropriate training to conduct systematic investigations. As a result, investigations are often limited to the arrest of the seller, with little or no information on the identity of other members of a network, if any, or any determination of the origin of the material. The few cases where several members of a trafficking chain—seller, buyer, and intermediaries—were identified and arrested typically involve nationals of the former Soviet Union all meeting in the same place for the transaction. Seldom can the police or security services identify sellers or buyers if they are located in a foreign country. They are also often unable to discover the final destination of the material or even the origin of the material if it did not come from a local facility.
A second problem relates to the lack of information sharing among enforcement organizations in the region, which may spring from the absence of technical means, the lack of political will, and territorial or political disputes. The problematic cooperation between Russia and Georgia regarding the identification of the HEU seized by Georgian authorities in 2006 illustrates the fact that political disputes constitute a powerful obstacle to cooperation in preventing proliferation and identifying trafficking patterns.
Another major obstacle to understanding trafficking patterns is the infancy of export control in the region. For instance, Turkmenistan has no export control law and no export control list for strategic goods. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have export control laws, but implementing legislation and an export control list for each country are still under development. Uzbekistan’s export control law was adopted only in 2004, and the country’s export control list also is under development.
Except for Russia and Kazakhstan, most countries of the former Soviet Union have a weak legal basis for regulating exports with contradictory and/or incomplete legislation, an underdeveloped licensing system, and understaffed export control organizations with underpaid and untrained personnel. Customs border posts are still ill-equipped to deal with trafficking of WMD-related material, although several U.S. and international programs are underway to provide proliferation-prevention equipment and training in several countries of the region. Some border sections also remain unprotected because of access constraints, such as mountain passes, or territorial disputes. For instance, because of disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Azeri government does not control 132 kilometers of the border between Azerbaijan and Iran. Mountain passes in Tajikistan, especially at the border with Afghanistan, which stretches over 1,200 kilometers, are the most difficult to protect. Visibility in these areas is limited to 10 meters or less.
Finally, insufficient reporting is another cause for concern. Because of their lack of training, customs officials, border guards, and security services sometimes do not recognize the importance of events. During an IAEA workshop in 2001, a Russian customs officer indicated that he was aware of more than 200 cases of illicit trafficking that had not been reported because field custom agents considered them insignificant. Nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities also may not report incidents occurring within their walls either because they poorly appreciate the importance of the event or they fear being involved in a police investigation.
Training programs on export control of strategic material have been launched in various countries in the former Soviet Union since the mid-1990s and are aimed to inform industry and the enforcement community. These programs, however, are primarily directed toward aiding the development of national export control systems or providing training on border control methods and the use of border control equipment. Very little is done in the field of increasing nonproliferation awareness among customs, border guards, and industry. The Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program managed by the Department of State is probably one of the few programs that sponsors such training. The program is very limited, with a total budget of $42 million in 2006 to cover 40 countries, of which former Soviet Union countries constitute only a small portion.
Because our capacity to understand future trends in WMD-trafficking hinges on appropriate reporting from the field, it will become increasingly important to improve the quality and quantity of information gathering by training local and regional officials in recognizing significant incidents. The proliferation consequences of such an imperfect system ought to galvanize the international community to lend appropriate assistance.
The data collected over the 2001-2006 period shows that programs aiming to provide radiation-detection equipment have had some success and should be continued and reinforced, especially in countries located on the southern borders of the former Soviet Union. Although existing technology does not detect HEU, it does detect other material with nuclear-weapon or RDD applications (plutonium and radioactive sources). Until recently, the bulk of such U.S. assistance went to Russia and Kazakhstan because they possessed the largest quantities of WMD material. Only after 2001 did other countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus begin to receive more attention, due to their location on trafficking routes, their position as transit countries, and their proximity to troubled areas such as Afghanistan and Iran.
Nevertheless, border-control assistance programs in countries such as Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are still wanting. These two countries are located on the trafficking routes for drugs coming from Afghanistan, they have porous borders, and Tajikistan is a theater of terrorist activity. In addition, their customs and border guards are ill-equipped and unprepared to deal with trafficking in WMD-related material. These also are the two countries in the former Soviet Union with the worst record in terms of export-control system development. It is important to direct more funding to install radiation detection equipment at their borders—some of which is already being done under the EXBS program—encourage the development of their national export-control systems, and train their border control personnel.
Considering that several countries of the region, such as Georgia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, have mountainous areas difficult to protect, the provision of other technical means would greatly improve border control. Tools such as night-vision equipment, all-terrain vehicles, communication equipment, and helicopters would sharply improve the efficiency of these organizations. It also is important to provide the means to support and operate such equipment. Some of these measures are already being implemented under U.S.-funded programs. Many customs and border guard posts remain unequipped, however, according to local customs and border guard representatives. Another important measure consists of raising the morale and motivation of customs and border guards to perform their tasks efficiently. Increasing or complementing their salaries can help here.
New methods are needed to improve data collection related to trafficking in the region. This could be achieved by establishing a regional information-sharing mechanism that would allow national export-control and intelligence communities to share information. Some countries in the region exchange information on licensing on a bilateral basis (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan) while others do not (Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine). Regional organizations such as the Eurasian Economic Community have been established to harmonize export control procedures and improve information sharing. The organization has a limited membership, however, and so far has achieved little tangible progress. No regional information-sharing mechanisms exist. Previous attempts to create such a system—the Regional Transit Agreement—were supported by the State Department for several years but failed in part because of conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The initiative should be reactivated, and conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan could be avoided by establishing Georgia as the intermediary between the two countries.
Considering that 20 percent of known trafficking cases have been discovered as a result of an investigation, improving police investigative capabilities and training police forces in the region—drug control and financial brigades—in identifying WMD-related material could also greatly benefit data collection and improve our understanding of the possible connections among crime, terrorism, and trafficking.
Programs in the field of chemical and biological nonproliferation are still wanting. Existing training programs and equipment provision are geared toward nuclear material and technology. Considering the dearth of biological and chemical detection equipment, it is important to help customs and border guards identify these materials with other means. These could include such tools as product identification workshops or the design of manuals describing goods related to biological and chemical weapons that could be used by border control personnel. The creation of expert centers on which border control personnel could call for assistance in identifying such material would also be helpful. So far, such centers only exist in Russia. Yet, many other former Soviet states have facilities that at one time produced biological and chemical weapons and that could serve as an expert adjunct to law enforcement agencies.Finally, for any new system or mechanism to be successful in the region, another major challenge will have to be overcome: the absence of a nonproliferation culture. Government and customs officials, border guards, and exporters alike have little understanding of the concept of export control as a means to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Improvements in this area have occurred in Russia and Kazakhstan, but in most other countries of the former Soviet Union, export control is usually understood as “customs control,” that is, the act of checking the validity of documents and collecting duties. It is important to educate local authorities and industry representatives about basic nonproliferation concepts while providing them with updated information on WMD-related material and trafficking techniques and patterns. Several training workshops have been organized under the auspices of the Departments of State, Energy, and Commerce as well as the IAEA. These workshops, however, are often organized with long intervals between them and for a limited number of actors. There is a need for continuous and wider training. Only such a system would truly generate a change in mentality and behaviors. This could be achieved by setting up a nonproliferation curriculum within customs, border guards, and police academies and supporting the creation of such academies where they do not already exist.
Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley is a senior researcher at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Marina Matevski and Karl Scheuerman provided assistance in collecting and organizing the data that form the basis for this article.
4. The incident involving weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) that was reported in January 2007 in The New York Times was included in the data set, as the material was seized in Georgia in January 2006. See Lawrence Scott Sheets and William Broad, “Georgia Says It Blocked Smuggling of Arms-Grade Uranium,” The New York Times, January 25, 2007, p. A1.
5. Proliferation-significant cases are defined as involving kilogram-level quantities of plutonium-239 or HEU with an enrichment level of 80 percent or more. At least 3 kilograms of plutonium-239 or 25 kilograms of HEU enriched to 80 percent or more would be required to build a nuclear bomb. In principle, a nuclear bomb could also be built with uranium enriched to less than 80 percent. The lower the enrichment level, however, the greater the quantity of uranium required. For instance, at 20 percent enrichment, about 200 kilograms of uranium or more would be needed to build a bomb. A bomb maker would also need to understand very advanced techniques in order to be able to use uranium enriched to about 20 percent. Charles Ferguson and William Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2005).
8. An additional plutonium event was reported in the press in 2003. Because the material was stolen in 1993 and the perpetrator attempted to sell it the same year, this case was not included in the data set.
9. Traditionally, plutonium-238 is used for civilian purposes, while plutonium-239 is used in weapons production. Other types of smoke detectors use americium-241, a radioactive isotope slightly heavier than plutonium. A terrorist would need millions of detectors in order to extract enough americium or plutonium to make a powerful RDD. Steve Coll, “The Unthinkable,” The New Yorker, March 12, 2007, pp. 48-57.
13. See “Cesium Sellers Caught Red-handed,” Security Service of Ukraine, May 6, 2004; “1.8kg Uranium Seized in Batumi, Georgia,” Interfax News Agency, July 24, 2001; “Balashikha Organized Crime Group Members Arrested for Attempted Sale of Uranium-235,” Gazeta.ru, December 4, 2001; “Omsk Oblast: Counterintelligence Agents Catch Pensioners Selling Radioactive Osmium and Counterfeit Iraqi Currency,” VolgaInform, March 2, 2003.
17. See “National Security Service Detains Three Residents of Tokmok Attempting to Sell Strategic Material for Over One Million Soms,” Kyrgyzinfo News Agency, February 11, 2005; “Incidents of Illicit trafficking in the NIS-Russia,” NIS Export Control Observer, April 2005.
20. See “Kazakhstani Officials Confiscate 1.5kg Uranium Oxide, Heroin,” Interfax News Agency, March 11, 2002; “Tajik Authorities Foil Attempt by Uzbekistani Citizen to Sell Plutonium,” ITAR-TASS, March 15, 2004; “Dirty Bomb in a Nuclear Suitcase,” Izvestia.ru, October 3, 2003; “Des trafiquants d’uranium arrêtés par hazard,” Liberation, July 24, 2001 (in French).
26. An artificial surge in HEU cases was created by the announcement made in 2005 by Georgian authorities that they thwarted four attempts of trafficking with HEU in the previous two to three years. As the dates of these incidents were not given, they were all recorded in 2005.
27. See “Radioactive Components Stolen From Scientific Research Institute’s Storage Facility Pass Through Ukraine and Seized by Special Services on Western Border,” Fakty i kommentarii (Kiev), May 23, 2002; “Smuggling of Rare-Earth Metals Into Russia Stopped,” Interfax News Agency, December 28, 2001.31. The Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC) was created in May 2001, when the five member states—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan—ratified the corresponding treaty. Uzbekistan has joined the organization recently. EURASEC replaced the customs union of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
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