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Arms Control Today October 2004

Report Backs Access to Pathogen Codes

Michael Nguyen

Restricting access to information on the DNA of deadly pathogens will not prevent bioterrorism and will actually hinder efforts to combat infectious diseases, a National Research Council (NRC) report said Sept. 9. Instead, it recommended an international forum to discuss these issues and greater training for scientists on national security concerns.

Citing the rapid development of treatments and diagnostic tests following the public release of the DNA sequence of the SARS virus, the NRC report emphasized the benefits of openly sharing scientific research. It also downplayed the risks of misuse, stating that the genome sequences were not uniquely dangerous. Although the information might allow potential terrorists to begin studying how to enhance a pathogen or stabilize it for a weapon, DNA sequences were no substitute for actually possessing samples. Restricting access, even on a limited basis, would also be problematic because there is not a clear category of dangerous genome sequences.

Today, the vast majority of databases containing gene information, including those maintained by the U.S. government, allow unrestricted and anonymous access to scientists and the public. The genome sequences for 1,100 viruses are already publicly available, including sequences for deadly pathogens such as smallpox, anthrax, Ebola, hemorrhagic fever, botulism, and plague.

The report’s recommendations drew criticism from Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge, who told the Associated Press that terrorists can make use of new scientific findings. “I want to take a look at the report. But from my point of view, laying out recipes for the creation of systems or weapons of mass effect, I’m not sure the restriction on that is necessarily the infringement of free speech,” Ridge said.

The report’s recommendation to hold an international forum to discuss these issues tracks with the Biological Weapons Convention’s “new process,” which will consider scientific codes of conduct for the life sciences at the 2005 Meeting of States-Parties.