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Questions Remain Over Failure to Find
Iraqi WMD; U.S. Begins Program to Employ Iraqi Scientists
The capture of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein Dec. 13 may
yield new clues as to whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) when a U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq last spring. During
interrogations with U.S. officials, however, Hussein has reportedly
clung to his pre-war claims that Iraq did not possess such weapons.
Iraqi officials repeatedly told UN weapons inspectors that they
had unilaterally destroyed their prohibited weapons after the 1991
Persian Gulf War but never provided conclusive evidence that this
was the case. UN Security Council Resolution 1441 required Iraq
to account for its past weapons programs, and President George W.
Bush and administration officials have cited Iraq’s failure
to resolve these discrepancies as grounds for the invasion that
toppled Hussein’s government.
Hans Blix, the recently retired executive chairman of the UN Monitoring,
Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), stated during
a Dec. 16 press conference that he did not believe Hussein’s
capture would result in new discoveries of prohibited weapons because
Iraq probably destroyed most of them in 1991. Furthermore, Blix’s
successor, Demetrius Perricos, told the UN Security Council Dec.
8 that the October progress report on the U.S.-led investigation
into Iraq’s prohibited weapons programs contained little information
that was new to the inspectors.
If proven true, Blix’s argument would counter U.S. speculation
that Iraq may have destroyed its weapons just prior to the U.S.-led
invasion of Iraq. Bush has offered this theory as a possible explanation
for the investigation’s failure to corroborate the administration’s
pre-war claims that Iraq possessed prohibited weapons. (See
ACT, May 2003.)
Before their work was halted by the invasion, UN inspectors were
attempting to account for Iraq’s missing weapons by requesting
further documentation and conducting interviews with Iraqi officials.
The inspectors also analyzed soil samples taken from sites where
Iraq claimed to have destroyed its biological weapons. A Nov. 26
UNMOVIC report stated that inspectors’ recent analysis of these
samples indicates that Iraq did destroy biological weapons in the
relevant locations but that the inspectors could not quantify the
amount destroyed.
UN inspectors reported just before the invasion that Iraq had failed
to resolve the issues surrounding its unaccounted-for weapons but
added that inspectors possessed no evidence that Iraq either had
weapons of mass destruction or had reconstituted its related programs.
(See
ACT, April 2003.)
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG), the organization coordinating the U.S.-led
inspections efforts, has found little evidence to rebut the UN inspectors’
reports. David Kay, a former International Atomic Energy Agency
inspector leading the ISG, reported in October that the current
investigation had discovered evidence of some low-level, dual-use
biological and nuclear research efforts but had found no actual
weapons. (See
ACT, November 2003.)
Kay also stated that Iraq had been conducting research and development
on several different programs to produce missiles exceeding the
150-kilometer range permitted under relevant Security Council resolutions.
Kay’s statement, however, contained no evidence that Iraq was
actually producing such missiles. The November UNMOVIC report stated
that the inspectors ordered Iraq to destroy its al Samoud missiles
because their “design was inherently capable of ranges greater
than 150 [kilometers]” but added that no evidence was found
that Iraq was actually modifying the missiles to achieve this greater
range.
Perricos told the Security Council that Kay’s statement generally
contained little new information but added that the United States
had not yet provided UNMOVIC with a copy of the full, classified
version of the ISG report. Perricos also acknowledged that UNMOVIC
had been unaware of allegations included in Kay’s report that
Iraq attempted to obtain missile technology from North Korea and
had a program to extend the range of a cruise missile to 1,000 kilometers.
(See ACT,
November 2003.)
Press reports that Kay may resign before the ISG’s work is
complete have raised questions about the investigation’s future.
White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan did not deny the report
but said Dec. 18 that the ISG “will continue and complete its
work.”
Despite the lack of weapons discoveries, Bush defended the invasion
in a Dec. 16 television interview, saying Kay’s findings proved
Iraq had “a weapons program” and was “in material
breach of Resolution 1441.” He added that there was no difference
between Iraq having a “weapons program” and possessing
actual weapons, arguing that the September 11 terrorist attacks
demonstrated that the “possibility that [Hussein] could acquire
[prohibited] weapons” was an intolerable risk.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld previously made this argument
to the Senate Armed Services Committee in July, stating that the
U.S.-led coalition did not invade Iraq “because we had discovered
dramatic new evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of [weapons of mass
destruction]; we acted because we saw the existing evidence in a
new light—through the prism of our experience on 9/11.”
Iraqi Scientists Program Initiated
Department of State spokesman Richard Boucher officially announced
Dec. 18 that the United States will begin a two-year program to
support the civilian employment of Iraqi personnel with WMD expertise
in an attempt to prevent them from assisting other countries seeking
weapons of mass destruction. Arms Control Today obtained a draft
proposal in November that sketched out the program’s general
parameters. (See
ACT, December 2003.)
The State Department will create an Iraqi International Center for
Science and Industry that will identify the personnel to be included
and “facilitate the development and funding of [employment]
projects” designed to aid Iraqi reconstruction efforts. According
to a department fact sheet, “Some of these programs will be
up and running by February,” Boucher said.
The program will be funded by the State Department’s Nonproliferation
and Disarmament Fund and is initially expected to cost approximately
$2 million, Boucher said. He noted that another $20 million may
be needed for future projects, although that funding has not yet
been decided.
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