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Iran Signs Additional Protocol With IAEA
Iran signed an additional protocol to its International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement on Dec. 18, less than
a month after the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution condemning
Tehran for pursuing clandestine nuclear activities. States-parties
to the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) already have IAEA safeguards agreements
to ensure that they do not divert civilian nuclear programs to military
purposes, but additional
protocols grant the IAEA authority to conduct more rigorous,
short-notice inspections at undeclared nuclear facilities to ferret
out secret nuclear activities.
The IAEA board acted after Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei presented
a report detailing numerous instances in which Iran concealed nuclear
activities that it was obligated to report to the agency under its
safeguards agreement. (See
ACT, December 2003.)
In a press statement Dec. 18, the IAEA hailed Iran’s action
as a “confidence-building measure.” The move did not come
as a surprise. It was first promised as part of an October agreement
with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Additionally, the
Iranian government has said it would “act in accordance with
the protocol’s provisions” even before it formally signed
the agreement. Still, the Iranian parliament must ratify the protocol
before it formally enters into force. (See
ACT, November 2003.)
ElBaradei pointed out that the agency’s ongoing investigation
into Iran’s nuclear program—including inspections—will
require continued Iranian cooperation. In addition, the IAEA is
trying to determine which foreign suppliers may have assisted Iran’s
nuclear programs. (See
ACT, December 2003.) ElBaradei is due to provide a progress
report on the investigation to the Board of Governors in February.
The United States continues to express skepticism about Iran’s
cooperation. Department of State spokesman Adam Ereli stated Dec.
18 that Tehran’s signature is a “useful step” but
added that Tehran needs to demonstrate that it will live up to its
commitments. One U.S. demand that is likely to prove controversial
is the Bush administration’s insistence that Iran “abandon”
its nuclear-fuel-cycle activities, including uranium enrichment
and spent nuclear-fuel reprocessing.
ElBaradei’s November report described an active uranium-enrichment
program as well as decade-old instances where Iran conducted prohibited,
clandestine reprocessing experiments. Iran agreed to suspend its
uranium-enrichment program as part of the October agreement with
the European governments but has not pledged to refrain from enrichment
activities permanently.
Although neither spent fuel reprocessing nor uranium enrichment
are prohibited under the NPT, they must be conducted under IAEA
supervision. They are especially worrisome because they can produce
the fissile material—plutonium or highly enriched uranium—needed
for nuclear weapons.
A November CIA report to Congress contended that “there is
a serious risk that Iran could use its enrichment technology in
covert activities,” even with intrusive IAEA inspections. ElBaradei
acknowledged Dec. 4 that the agency will probably not be able to
find small-scale “research and laboratory activities”
in countries pursuing clandestine nuclear programs but added that
it could detect “industrial scale” weapons programs, according
to Reuters.
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