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North Korea and Iran: Test Cases for an
Improved Nonproliferation Regime?
If Iran and North Korea acquire nuclear arsenals, their weapons
will present obvious and direct dangers to the United States, its
troops, its allies, and regional and global stability. Yet, the
current standoffs with Tehran and Pyongyang also represent an opportunity—a
chance to fill in important gaps in the nonproliferation regime.
Taking advantage of this opportunity will require near-term fixes
to deal with Tehran and Pyongyang and longer-term solutions to prevent
other states-parties to the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) from following similar paths.
But by doing so, the Bush administration can chart a course that
will lead to enhanced security in the 21st century.
The most promising way to keep North Korea and Iran from developing
nuclear weapons is the effective, forceful, and determined use of
the full range of nonproliferation tools, ranging from diplomacy
to the threat of international sanctions and use of force. The norm
of nonproliferation remains strong if not absolute, and the use
of traditional nonproliferation approaches that have stood the test
of time remain viable for addressing these current crises. Moreover,
several of the motivations both states have to pursue nuclear weapons
can be affected by concerted action by the United States and its
allies. Although Washington may not hold all the cards, the means
to affect the security of both states for better or for worse exist
and can be applied to moderate their interest in going nuclear.
Still, the type of nuclear challenge posed by these two states has
not been nor is likely to be fully prevented over the long term
using only existing nonproliferation-regime mechanisms. This requires
initiatives that go beyond the regime as currently defined. The
two cases, aside from their immediate impact, shed new light on
long-standing gaps within the regime.
Article IV: A Gap in the Regime?
Chief among these is that the NPT permits non-nuclear-weapon states
to acquire technology that can create both the ingredients for nuclear
weapons, namely highly enriched uranium and plutonium, and the lower-grade
fuels needed for civilian nuclear reactors. As a condition, the
NPT requires that any produced or processed uranium or plutonium,
regardless of quality, be accounted for and placed under “safeguards,”
that is, subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). This system is supposed to serve as an alarm system
but cannot and was never intended to physically prevent misuse of
material.
Indeed, the NPT explicitly seeks to make such technology available
to non-nuclear-weapon states. The preamble to the NPT affirms that
“the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology…should
be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties of the Treaty.”
Article IV of the NPT describes this as an “inalienable right”
to all nuclear fuel-cycle technologies including “the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information.” Article IV was an essential provision in the
“Grand Bargain” that convinced key non-nuclear-weapon
states to accept the nuclear constraints of the NPT and has helped
foster the near universal acceptance of the pact.
Yet, by allowing non-nuclear-weapon states to import nuclear technologies
that can be used to build nuclear weapons, the NPT (and its predecessor,
the “Atoms for Peace Program” [see page 26]), Article
IV has also made it possible for states to use peaceful nuclear
programs as a cover for weapons programs. North Korea’s and
Iran’s misuse of these provisions, in particular, threatens
to undercut the viability of the nuclear nonproliferation regime
and the entire system of international nuclear commerce. Is this
a permanent state of affairs? Can sovereign states possess or pursue
facilities that by their nature inherently present a threat to the
security interests of their neighbors? Under what conditions can
such facilities be made benign or less threatening? As the United
States and its allies move to reinforce the regime and adapt it
to the new insecurities of this era, these are only a few of the
fundamental questions that must be addressed.
Some States Are More Equal than Others
Clearly, all states are not equal when we examine the potential
security risk they might pose in possessing such facilities. Nuclear-weapon
states that operate commercial enrichment or reprocessing facilities
represent the lowest category of concern, as long as they maintain
facility and material security at high international standards.
A country with a nuclear weapons infrastructure has little or no
incentive to appropriate safeguarded materials.
On the other hand, non-nuclear-weapon states with uranium-enrichment
or plutonium-production and extraction capabilities represent at
least a potential concern. Yet, context matters. States with potential
incentives to acquire nuclear weapons, due to their location, regional
instability, or leadership, present a greater concern than states
fully integrated into the international political, diplomatic, and
economic systems. Iran and North Korea clearly fit into the highest
category of concern, just as Japan, Belgium, and Germany are a lesser
worry.
Still, even “safe” states present more concern than states
without any means of nuclear material production. Japan’s pursuit
of an independent nuclear energy supply in the 1970s, for example,
began a long-running debate between advocates and opponents of plutonium
reprocessing, focused on concerns that Japan was either secretly
interested in building nuclear weapons or at least had the potential
for doing so by creating a plutonium-based fuel economy. These fears
lay dormant for many years but have been recently revived by concern
that North Korea’s nuclear weapons drive could prompt a reciprocal
move from Japan. East Asia also has the examples of previous attempts
by Taiwan and South Korea to misuse research reactors for weapons
purposes—efforts that the United States clamped down on bilaterally
but that left the systemic gaps in the nonproliferation regime unaddressed.
Fixing the Problems in Article IV
Although the seeds of the conflict are built into the NPT itself,
changes to that agreement are not the answer. Amending the NPT would
be impractical and inadvisable, but other mechanisms can and should
be developed to reduce national control over materials and facilities
that can be used to advance nuclear weapons capabilities. At least
two areas of promising efforts exist: internationalization of the
fuel cycle and fuel supply, and management guarantees.
The basic proliferation problem is not the construction and operation
of a nuclear power reactor. It is what goes in and what comes out
of the reactors that pose the challenge. Countries that build facilities
for enriching uranium to the point needed for reactor fuel can also
use those same machines and techniques to continue enriching the
uranium to the point where it can be used for nuclear weapons. The
plutonium-bearing spent fuel can be chemically treated, or reprocessed,
to separate plutonium from unwanted radioactive waste by-products.
The resulting plutonium can be used in reactors or in nuclear weapons.
Obviously, the greatest barrier to the misuse of enrichment or reprocessing
facilities is for them not to exist in the first place. On the other
end of the spectrum, the greatest risk of misuse comes when these
capabilities are built by states that have a track record of noncompliance
with IAEA safeguards or have strong incentives to acquire nuclear
weapons. There are, however, some interesting possibilities for
a middle ground. Facilities can be operated and controlled in a
way that makes misuse impractical or politically unattractive.
Alternative Fuel-Cycle Arrangements
One potentially useful model could be private enrichment or reprocessing
facilities under multilateral or international control. For example,
the enrichment company Urenco has capabilities owned jointly by
Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Although the company’s
enrichment facilities are able to produce weapons-grade uranium,
actually doing so would require the acquiescence of three countries
or the seizure of existing plants by national authorities in one
of the three countries. Such highly observable events would not
only draw attention but provoke such sharp national and international
reactions that they significantly raise the cost to taking such
action. Such multilateral control does not constitute a guarantee;
nonetheless, the deterrent effect of such institutional barriers
may be useful if applied to facilities in some other places. Japan’s
facilities present a potentially attractive candidate for such measures.
More generally, in an October interview with Arms Control Today,
IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei suggested the “multilateralization
of the fuel cycle.” A possible new protocol to the NPT, he
said, could continue to guarantee access to nuclear technology for
health, agriculture, medicine, and reactors but “would restrict
the parts of the fuel cycle that create the most concern, and these
are, in my view, the reprocessing and enrichment and also, possibly,
a final repository where you have spent fuel with plutonium in it.”
Another approach is market based. Increased attention is now being
paid to the idea of trying to create viable commercial and political
alternatives to national fuel-cycle facilities for states willing
to abandon domestic enrichment and reprocessing programs. One such
option is guaranteed access to fresh-fuel and spent-fuel management
at prices cheaper than any one nation could match. Such arrangements
could go beyond simple commercial contracts and provide a broader
international promise of access to supplies of fresh fuel for reactors
and of management of irradiated materials.
Arrangements that pooled potential suppliers would carry greater
weight and be more attractive to customers concerned about reliability
of supply. Joint Russian, European, and U.S. commitments to provide
fuel services would require prior development of a political and
commercial consensus, but these too would need to be placed in a
form that gave the client confidence in their durability. No guarantees
are absolute, and the challenge is to develop a formula that gives
both sides confidence that the underlying bargain—access to
nuclear fuel services for abandonment of the domestic capability
to produce weapons-usable materials—can be sustained.
In one model, the IAEA could act as an intermediate supplier, with
material sold to it by enriching states as provided under the IAEA
statute. A less complex (but by no means simple) arrangement would
see the IAEA act as an auctioneer of fuel services to states, helping
to ensure competitive pricing for recipient states. The IAEA could
even glean much needed resources by taking a commission on sales.
At present, such schemes only exist on paper. Many questions remain
unanswered. It is not clear how states giving up the Article IV
rights to fuel-cycle facilities would codify these commitments.
Would a supplemental treaty be required or desirable? Could any
of the states pull out for unrelated reasons? How would such agreements
be verified? If potential violations are uncovered or alleged, could
the guarantees be rescinded?
These are important long-term questions that require careful study
and serious debate. In the more immediate future, however, the nuclear-weapon
states, especially the United States, need to deal with North Korea’s
and Iran’s attempts to develop nuclear weapons. In doing so,
a balance must be maintained between immediate resolution of nonproliferation
challenges and preservation and strengthening of the regime for
the future. In dealing with Iran, for now there appears to be some
room to maneuver, thanks to U.S. pressure and an agreement negotiated
between European foreign ministers and their Iranian counterparts
in October (See
ACT, November 2003). In North Korea, with a repeated
record of violating treaties and promises, the only solutions may
rest in complete nuclear abstinence, at least until the nature of
the regime, if not the regime itself, changes. Below is a broad
outline of how these new concepts and arrangements could be applied
to the twin crises.
Dealing with Iran and North Korea
Resolving Iran
The goal in Iran is to prevent that country’s acquisition
of nuclear weapons. An Iranian nuclear program could soon be matched
by similar programs in other Middle Eastern states, possibly including
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Libya; and Israel would almost certainly
accelerate the modernization of its nuclear deterrent. The misuse
of the NPT and a new, even regional, nuclear arms race would cripple
nuclear commerce globally and shatter the regime from within, forcing
dozens of states to question the value and future of the agreement
that has helped keep the number of nuclear-weapon states down to
single digits.
Iran’s clear violations of its safeguards obligations also
mean that in the future Tehran must not be permitted the means to
produce weapons-usable uranium or plutonium. Otherwise, such assets
would give Iran the ability at some point in the future to leave
the NPT and deploy nuclear weapons. In order to obtain Iranian acquiescence
to these restrictions, which go well beyond Tehran’s NPT commitments,
the United States and its allies should be willing to offer Iran
appropriate alternatives. In particular, offering Iran a commercially
viable method of acquiring fresh fuel for its nuclear reactors and
removing and disposing of the spent fuel would be a powerful lure.
Russia’s plans to supply fresh fuel for Iran’s Bushehr
reactor as long as Tehran guarantees that it will return any spent
fuel is an appropriate example. In exchange, Iran should be required
to verifiably and legally abandon its rights to develop and operate
facilities to enrich uranium and produce and separate plutonium.
Developing such a plan would have several benefits. First, it would
undercut the economic and energy security argument used by Iran
to justify these destabilizing programs. A decision by Iran to pursue
such a proposal, backed by effective verification, would begin building
trust between Iran and the rest of the world, which in the end is
the only way to head off long-term nuclear ambitions in Iran. Rejection
of a viable plan along these lines would then lay bare Iran’s
underlying ambitions to acquire advanced nuclear capabilities, allowing
the international community to pursue alternatives means, which
may include a mix of punitive and positive measures.
If Iran is going to remain a non-nuclear-weapon state or, at the
very least, abandon the most critical facilities needed to acquire
nuclear materials, it must make the decision to do so from within.
There are signs that Iran is moving in this direction. Although
trust remains justifiably low in Washington and European capitals,
Iran’s initial steps to deepen cooperation with the IAEA and
to disclose all past nuclear activities are promising.
Still, in order to enhance confidence that Iran is not seeking nuclear
weapons, the United States, Europe, and Russia must press Tehran
to abandon all uranium-enrichment activities, including operation
and construction of pilot or commercial facilities; uranium conversion;
and research, development, and construction of centrifuges and other
enrichment methods. In addition, Iran must give up plans to build
a proliferation-sensitive heavy-water reactor and other plutonium-production
and extraction facilities. The initiative undertaken by the European
foreign ministers is a promising step in this direction. In that
accord, Iran pledged to sign agreements to make it easier for the
agency to carry out wide-ranging inspections on its territory. Tehran
also agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment program.
Still, it is clear that the nuclear question is only one part of
the long-standing problems between the United States and Iran. Historical
issues aside, Tehran’s human rights record, its continued support
for terrorist groups, and its opposition to the Middle East peace
process make improvements in direct ties difficult. Moreover, the
process of political reform in Iran and the special role that policies
toward the United States play in Iranian politics complicates any
broad efforts to improve the relationship. Oddly, it appears that
the nuclear issue—among the most sensitive imaginable—holds
out the prospects for near-term progress that could allow the two
sides to build something broader in the near future.
Dealing with North Korea
In many ways, the situation in North Korea is more dangerous, immediate,
and complex. However, the range of possible solutions is easier
to define and determine. That North Korea is capable of building
nuclear weapons is no longer in doubt, even though claims (by either
the United States or North Korea) regarding its nuclear capabilities
should be viewed with some skepticism. What remains in doubt and
what must be addressed if any efforts to end Pyongyang’s nuclear
ambitions are to be successful is the desire and willingness of
North Korea to negotiate a verifiable end to its nuclear weapons
program. Despite more than 10 years of direct and indirect negotiations,
threats, confrontations, and analysis, the United States still does
not know with any certainty the answer to the question: Will North
Korea eliminate all of its nuclear facilities and give up all of
its nuclear materials under effective international inspection if
the terms are right?
There is clear and compelling evidence to support speculation on
both sides, but neither case is conclusive. Yes, North Korea cheated
on its 1994 agreement with the United States to freeze its nuclear
activities, but it is equally true that the United States had abandoned
its efforts to normalize relations and improve ties with the North.
The debate is not whether North Korea can be trusted; it clearly
cannot. The questions that need to be answered are whether Pyongyang
can be motivated truly to abandon its nuclear program and, if not,
what outside states can do about it.
When North Korea’s nuclear program was still in its infancy,
the United States, South Korea, Japan, and others could afford to
wait to answer these questions. Now that the North’s program
is coming of age, they cannot. In a worst-case scenario, North Korea
could produce more than 100 nuclear weapons by the end of the decade.
Such an arsenal not only threatens U.S. allies and troops in the
region, but given North Korea’s economic strains, it is conceivable
that it could be motivated to sell nuclear materials to other states
or even terrorist groups if the price is right. Such a scenario
is so grave that U.S. policymakers could soon face a truly appalling
choice between accepting its realization or plunging into a full-fledged
war on the Korean peninsula. By comparison, many negotiated settlements—no
matter how distasteful—become attractive.
It is time for the United States to get serious about negotiations
with the North. President George W. Bush’s October statement
that he is willing to consider some form of security guarantees
for North Korea was a positive step. There is enough collective
experience in the United States after 10 years of efforts to know
how the North negotiates and how to make progress. At a minimum,
it takes time and a complex mixture of resolve and open respect
for the negotiations themselves. Any mixed messages, public or otherwise,
can quickly derail progress and undercut efforts at negotiations.
To test whether North Korea is prepared to eliminate its program
under effective verification, the United States needs to:
· Establish a full-time and ongoing negotiating mechanism
based on the six-party talks. They should be continuous, or close
to it, and work to establish a fixed timeline for conclusion.
· Appoint higher-level representation for the talks, including
a presidentially appointed envoy. This person must be fully committed
to the negotiations and prepared and empowered to make serious
progress.
· Ensure continued presidential engagement with the negotiating
process and effectively impose a coordinated position in the administration
(no loose statements or diatribes).
· Create a coordinated position among itself, Japan, and
South Korea. The lack of a common position within the six-party
talks is a major reason for its lack of progress.
· Continue to encourage Chinese engagement, with the awareness
of the limits of Chinese influence over North Korea.
Lastly, the United States needs to determine what it is prepared
to offer North Korea if that country is willing to terminate its
nuclear program and eliminate, under effective verification, its
nuclear capability. This can involve a broad mix of political, diplomatic,
economic, and symbolic steps including establishment of diplomatic
relations and the provision of considerable agricultural assistance.
Moreover, as many have suggested, the United States should be prepared
to offer more to North Korea than it did under the 1994 Agreed Framework
as long as Pyongyang also agrees to do more. The nuclear issue is
so pressing, however, that it should not become hostage to issues
related to ballistic missiles, conventional force deployments, chemical
and biological weapon programs, and human rights. The United States
should work to resolve those issues but only once the nuclear question
is answered.
To date, President Bush has moved from a wholesale rejection of
negotiations with the North to the verge of a new set of real talks.
To make progress, he must take the next step: test North Korea directly
and conclusively. If a positive result materializes, the president
must be willing to invest his personal prestige domestically and
abroad to make and sell a deal with the North. If the result is
negative, having tried the alternative, punitive options will remain
viable, and broader support for confronting North Korea’s continued
pursuit of nuclear weapons may materialize.
Conclusion
In the 1960 presidential debates, Senator John F. Kennedy (D-Mass.)
warned that, if the United States did not change its policy, there
would soon be dozens of nuclear states instead of the four that
then existed. Fortunately for America, Kennedy did change government
policy and started the process that led to the negotiations for
the NPT. Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon finished the
treaty and brought into being a system that, through the cooperative
work of liberals and conservatives, large nations and small, has
effectively proscribed, though not completely stopped, the spread
of nuclear weapons ever since. It is under a greater strain than
ever before, both internally and externally. Yet, 43 years later,
we have eight known nuclear-weapon states, not 20. The criticisms,
justified and not, should not be allowed to overshadow this seminal
success. Even as we reach to build new nonproliferation frameworks,
officials have to take great care not to burn the bridges on which
we now stand.
Forceful diplomacy utilizing and expanding the treaty regime has
put solutions to the Iranian and North Korean crises within reach.
They have also pointed the way toward a broader nonproliferation
regime that can help maintain global security well into the 21st
century. Doing so will require political will and the courage to
lead. It is still possible, as Kennedy said, to abolish the weapons
of war before they abolish us.
Joseph Cirincione is director and Jon B. Wolfsthal
is deputy director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. They are authors of Deadly
Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction.
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