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NEWS BRIEFS
Asian and Pacific Leaders Pledge to
Control Shoulder-Fired Missiles
Contracts Awarded to Replace Russian
Reactors With Fossil-Fuel Plants
U.S. Civilian Nuclear Reactor to Produce
Weapons Material
Defense Science Board Calls for
New Nuclear Weapons Capabilities
GAO Covertly Buys Bioweapons Gear from
Defense Department
New U.S., Russian Chemical Destruction
Deadlines Approved
U.S. Requests License for Plutonium
Shipment to France
Congressional Delegation
Cancels Trip to North Korea at White House Request
France's Deterrence Policy in
Question
U.S. Reviewing FMCT Policy
Asian and Pacific Leaders
Pledge to Control Shoulder-Fired Missiles
Leaders of countries from Asia to the Western Hemisphere pledged
Oct. 21 to better control the international trade in shoulder-fired
surface-to-air missiles that could be used by terrorists against
civilian and commercial aircraft.
Promoted by the United States, the nonbinding pledge came at the
end of a two-day Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit
in Bangkok, Thailand. APEC’s 21 members include China, Japan,
and Russia, all three of which produce shoulder-launched anti-aircraft
missiles, collectively referred to as Man-Portable Air Defense Systems
(MANPADS). The United States also manufactures and exports MANPADS.
APEC members stated they would strengthen national controls on producing
and exporting MANPADS and better protect their stockpiles against
theft. They further agreed not to sell these types of missiles to
nonstate actors.
The Group of Eight (G-8) issued a similar statement this past June
and the 33-member Wassenaar Arrangement adopted criteria to guide
MANPADS controls and exports in December 2000. Wassenaar members,
which include most major arms suppliers, agreed to sell MANPADS
only to governments or their licensed agents. China is not a member
of either the G-8 or the Wassenaar Arrangement.
The threat posed by MANPADS has gained greater prominence following
a failed November 2002 attempt in Kenya to shoot down an Israeli
commercial airliner and a high-profile sting operation this past
August to arrest an arms dealer selling a Russian-made shoulder-fired
missile in New York City.
Washington has been trying to draw attention to the problem for
several years. In June 1998, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
called for the negotiation of an international agreement to “place
tighter controls on the export of these portable, easily concealed
weapons.” At that time, the Department of State reported that
“more than 115 countries and dozens of subnational groups”
possessed MANPADS.
Contracts Awarded to Replace
Russian Reactors With Fossil-Fuel Plants
In another step toward shutting down Russia’s three remaining
reactors that produce weapons-grade plutonium, the U.S. Department
of Energy Sept. 29 announced that the Russian company Rosatomstroi
inked agreements with Washington Group International and Raytheon
Technical Services to replace the existing facilities with plants
that use fossil fuel. Plans for the U.S.-Russian cooperative project
were announced in March 2003. (See
ACT, April 2003.)
Under the agreement, worth $466 million, the companies will refurbish
one existing plant to become a coal-fired heat and electricity facility
and construct another one to replace the three reactors that provide
heat and electricity to the closed cities of Seversk and Zheleznogorsk
in Siberia. After the fossil-fuel plants are successfully brought
online, the existing reactors will be shut down. According to plans
outlined in May, the Seversk plant will be refurbished by Washington
International Group and activated in 2008. Raytheon Technical Services
is tasked with constructing the new plant in Zheleznogorsk. Officials
are eyeing 2011 as the year the last of the three targeted Russian
nuclear reactors will cease operation.
U.S. Civilian Nuclear Reactor
to Produce Weapons Material
In a break from decades-long U.S. policy, a civilian nuclear power
reactor will generate power (for homes and businesses) while producing
materials for nuclear weapons. The Watts Bar Nuclear Station, operated
by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), returned to operation Oct.
20, equipped with rods that will allow TVA to produce tritium for
the Department of Energy.
Workers began inserting tritium-producing burnable absorber rods
at Watts Bar in early September. The rods will be removed in 18
months at the end of the reactor’s normal fuel cycle. The Energy
Department will then send these bars to a tritium-extraction facility
at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina.
Tritium is a short-lived isotope of hydrogen used to boost the yield
of nuclear weapons. Its half-life of 12 years requires that the
material be replenished and regularly replaced in nuclear weapons.
Renewed production at Watts Bar will allow the Energy Department
to avoid tapping into its five-year tritium reserve, which it would
otherwise be expected to do sometime in 2005. The U.S. government
has not made tritium since 1988, when it stopped production at its
Savannah River Site due to operational and safety problems. Since
then, the United States has recycled tritium from dismantled nuclear
weapons to meet its stockpile requirements.
The Energy Department chose to produce tritium in a commercial reactor
despite criticism that such action would blur the distinction between
nuclear technology used for civilian and military purposes and undermine
the credibility of U.S. nonproliferation policies. However, the
Energy Department determined that using commercial reactors would
be more flexible and cost-effective than the alternative construction
of a new reactor dedicated to tritium production. Last year, the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved requests to allow tritium
production at TVA’s Watts Bar and Sequoyah nuclear power facilities.
(See
ACT, November 2002.)
However, John Moulton, a TVA spokesman, said that there were “no
plans at this time” to begin tritium production at the Sequoyah
facility, although he acknowledged that the Sequoyah reactors remain
in “standby phase” for future production of the material.
Defense Science Board Calls
for New Nuclear Weapons Capabilities
The Defense Science Board (DSB) is recommending that the United
States scale back its current reserve nuclear weapons stockpile
and develop lower-yield nuclear weapons that cause less collateral
damage. The recommendation is contained in a yet-to-be-released
study completed this summer and first reported by Jane’s
Defence Weekly Oct. 22. The board is a civilian panel charged
with advising defense leaders on scientific and technological matters.
According to documents obtained by Arms Control Today, the
study entitled “Future Strategic Strike Forces” suggests
that the U.S. arsenal does not meet current and future threat requirements.
The board cites a “different, more complex threat environment”
that may not be appropriate for the “legacy weapons” that
the Department of Energy maintains. The stockpile stewardship program,
which may cost up to $6.4 billion in fiscal year 2004, according
to the president’s budget request, uses science-based programs
to ensure the safety and reliability of U.S nuclear weapons without
using explosive testing.
Calling for a “strategic redirection” of stockpile stewardship
priorities, the report recommends scaling back weapons life-extension
programs in favor of focusing on a “more relevant” nuclear
weapons stockpile. According to the study, a future nuclear stockpile
should contain weapons that have “great precision, deep penetration,
[and] greatly reduced radioactivity” as well as special electromagnetic
pulse and neutron bombs, “all with reduced fission yield.”
The board also recommends streamlining the nuclear weapons complex
to be “agile and responsive” to meet the new needs of
the U.S. arsenal. In addition, the study suggests reducing the nondeployed
stockpile in line with the U.S. nuclear posture.
Many of the DSB’s recommendations fall in line with current
U.S. priorities as outlined in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review and
reinforced in the Bush administration’s fiscal year 2004 budget
request. As part of the new “capabilities-based” approach
touted in the review, the Departments of Defense and Energy are
currently studying whether an existing nuclear design can be modified
to destroy hardened and deeply buried targets, and defense officials
are seeking permission to research a low-yield nuclear weapon. In
addition, the Energy Department requested funding to compress the
preparation time for a nuclear weapons test so that it can be executed
in 18 months or less. (See
ACT, March 2003.)
The DSB study also suggests expanding response capabilities to include
new non-nuclear options. Broadening the number of non-nuclear options
may reduce dependence on nuclear capabilities, sources told Jane’s
Defence Weekly. The DSB recommends developing new options such
as earth-penetrating weapons using conventionally armed ballistic
missiles, microwave weapons, and high-energy lasers.
GAO Covertly Buys Bioweapons Gear
from Defense Department
The General Accounting Office (GAO), the auditing and investigative
agency for Congress, disclosed in a congressional hearing Oct. 7
that it was able to purchase surplus laboratory and safety gear
from the Defense Department that could be used in weaponizing biological
agents. The discovery raised serious concerns about the widespread
availability and resale of the equipment and follows reports by
GAO and other federal agencies that poor oversight and lax controls
at U.S. laboratories increased the odds that biological agents may
have been stolen or improperly transferred.
According to the testimony, the agency established a fictitious
company for the purposes of its study and purchased $46,960 worth
of Defense Department biological laboratory equipment and safety
gear over the Internet for $4,100. GAO investigators procured a
bacteriological incubator, centrifuge, laboratory evaporator, and
protective clothing from govliquidation.com, a surplus equipment
reseller for the Defense Department.
The study also found that some equipment supplied by the Defense
Department to other purchasers had been resold to buyers in countries
such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates,
which have been known to retransfer defense-related items to countries
alleged to be state sponsors of terrorism and prohibited from acquiring
certain U.S. technologies. However, current federal regulations
and Defense Department policies “do not generally restrict
[the Defense Department] from selling our case study biological
equipment to the public,” GAO reported, which allows for resale
beyond U.S. end-use controls.
A full GAO report with recommendations on improving controls over
sensitive equipment is forthcoming.
New U.S., Russian Chemical Destruction
Deadlines Approved
States-parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention have approved
the extension of U.S. and Russian interim deadlines for destroying
portions of their chemical weapons holdings, leaving undetermined
the final date for destroying all stockpiles.
Meeting in The Hague, the Oct. 20-24 Conference of States-Parties
approved Russia’s request to extend the deadline for destroying
20 percent of its 40,000 tons of declared chemical weapons to April
29, 2007. The conference, which brought together 116 countries,
also agreed to push back the U.S. target date for destroying 45
percent of its 31,500-ton stockpile to December 31, 2007. The conference
also approved a 2004 budget of $86 million, a 6.7 percent increase
from the 2003 allocation.
Because these new deadlines will infringe on the treaty’s date
for Russia and the United States to destroy 100 percent of chemical
weapons stockpiles, states-parties extended the final deadline “in
principle” but held off setting a date pending further information
from Moscow and Washington. The treaty calls for all stockpiles
to be destroyed no later than April 29, 2007, but also includes
provisions allowing that deadline to be extended up to five years,
if necessary. Russia already has requested that the date be pushed
back to 2012. (See
ACT, November 2002.)
Russia and the United States have each experienced setbacks to their
chemical weapons destruction programs that have forced both countries
to extend the deadlines. Russia announced the destruction of one
percent of its stockpile April 26—three years after the original
deadline—and currently operates only one destruction facility;
two additional sites are still under construction due to financial
and political setbacks. (See
ACT, June 2003.)
Political and operational obstacles, as well as management problems,
have plagued the U.S. program. (See
ACT, October 2003.) Most recently, officials overseeing
construction of the Umatilla destruction facility announced a three-month
delay for the start of operations at the site. Mary Binder, an Army
public affairs spokesperson, said Oct. 27 that officials now expect
the site to begin burning chemical weapons in June or July of 2004—over
two years after the original milestone projected in 1998.
U.S. Requests License for Plutonium
Shipment to France
The Department of Energy has filed an application with the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission seeking permission to ship up to 140 kg (308
lbs) of weapons-grade plutonium oxide to France next year to advance
U.S. efforts to convert excess U.S. plutonium stocks into mixed-oxide
(MOX) fuel. MOX is a combination of plutonium oxide and uranium
oxide that can be used in nuclear reactors.
According to the license request submitted by the Energy Department
Oct. 1, the program is “necessary to obtain…approval for
large-scale use of weapon[s]-grade MOX fuel in commercial reactors.”
The Bush administration decided in January 2002 to convert U.S.
stocks of excess weapon-grade plutonium to MOX fuel as the primary
means of eliminating 34 tons of plutonium no longer necessary for
military use in compliance with a 2000 agreement with Russia. (See
ACT, March 2002.) Under the plan, the Energy Department
would ship plutonium from Los Alamos National Laboratory to France’s
Cadarache MOX facility.
The plutonium would be converted into MOX fuel, returned to the
United States, and tested in the Catawba nuclear power plant in
South Carolina to “confirm fuel performance and to demonstrate
the United States’ capability to receive, inspect, [and] store
the fuel assemblies at commercial reactors.” The Energy Department
requested that the application review be completed by June 15, 2004,
with an eye toward shipping the material in August 2004.
The United States currently is developing its own MOX fabrication
facility at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. According
to Energy Department officials, the United States must process the
test fuel in France because it is unable to manufacture MOX fuel
at this time. The U.S. facility is slated to start up in 2007.
In an attempt to head off concerns about possible proliferation
and safety risks in transferring the weapons-grade material, the
Energy Department application outlined security measures that would
be taken. The Energy Department’s Safe Secure Transport system
would provide guarded transportation of the material on the U.S.
side, and the fissile material would be safeguarded in accordance
with the U.S.-EURATOM peaceful nuclear agreement in France and while
in transit overseas. The French government assured U.S. officials
that material safeguards would be implemented in compliance with
international regulations and that France would take security measures
“comparable to those used” in the United States.
Congressional Delegation
Cancels Trip to North Korea at White House Request
A bipartisan congressional delegation led by Representative Curt
Weldon (R-Pa.) postponed a late October trip to North Korea after
the White House expressed opposition to the visit. “At the
eleventh hour, the White House withdrew its support,” Weldon
said in a statement. The congressman, a senior member of the House
Armed Services Committee, described the delay as temporary and said
a new date for the visit is forthcoming.
The postponement follows indications from the North Koreans that
they might consider President George W. Bush’s proposal to
provide a written guarantee that the United States will not attack
North Korea as part of a multilateral agreement.
“Discussions continue between our delegation and North Korean
officials,” Weldon stressed. “The members of the delegation
still believe that a congressional visit will positively impact
relations between our two nations. In that regard, the North Koreans
continue to make overtures that our delegation will have access
to the Yongbyon nuclear facility,” where the North Koreans
say they have reprocessed spent fuel rods to use in their nuclear
weapons program.
Representative Solomon P. Ortiz (D-Texas), a member of the delegation,
told Arms Control Today he is “dumbfounded” by
the administration’s stance. “We were going there because
we think we can be supportive of the administration,” Ortiz
said. Ortiz credits the delegation’s June 2003 visit with helping
to bring the North Koreans to the six-party talks. (See
ACT, July/August 2003.)
France's Deterrence Policy
in Question
French President Jacques Chirac has denied an Oct. 27 report published
in the French newspaper Libération that he plans to
modify the country’s current policy of nuclear deterrence to
“target what the Americans call rogue states.” The paper
cites an unidentified French senior military official and indicates
that the strategy may evolve over the long term to address a possible
threat from China as well.
Chirac’s office issued a statement Oct. 28 stating that his
country’s nuclear use policy has not shifted from the deterrence
doctrine he outlined in a June 2001 speech at the Institut des Hautes
Études de Défense Nationale. However, according to
Reuters, French General Bernard Norlain commented Oct. 27 on French
LCI television that “there is of course a need to adapt”
France’s nuclear policy in light of new threats.
In addition, Libération reported Oct. 28 that France may
also examine the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review’s endorsement
in January 2002 of low-yield, earth-penetrating nuclear weapons
that could be used to destroy underground facilities housing weapons
of mass destruction. (See
ACT, April 2002.)
U.S. Reviewing FMCT Policy
The United States has long pushed for a treaty to end the production
of the two key building blocks of nuclear weapons, but the Bush
administration may change that policy.
Even as the U.S. commitment to other arms control agreements has
lagged in recent years, U.S. officials have continued to champion
a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), which would prohibit the
production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear
weapons purposes. Yet, J. Sherwood McGinnis, deputy representative
of the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), said
Oct. 27 that Washington is “reviewing specific elements”
of its policy toward such a treaty. Speaking at the United Nations,
McGinnis further added that U.S. support for a resolution that day
urging the start of FMCT negotiations by the 66-member CD “is
without prejudice to the outcome of that review.” The diplomatic
language means that Washington is reserving the right to change
its position, although it does not suggest that the United States
will necessarily do so.
McGinnis provided no details about the review. Department of State
officials in Washington withheld any comment pending the review’s
conclusion.
An FMCT has topped Washington’s negotiating priorities at the
CD for a half-dozen years, but formal talks had been blocked by
other countries’ insistence that the treaty be negotiated in
parallel with other agreements on nuclear disarmament or outer space.
In August, however, China dropped its demand or U.S.-opposed outer
space negotiations, removing what had been seen as the central obstacle
to opening talks. (See
ACT, October 2003.)
Completion of an FMCT by 2005 was one of 13 steps to which nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty states-parties, including the United States,
committed themselves in May 2000. Yet, since taking office, the
Bush administration has acted contrary to several of those steps,
such as refusing to support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’s
entry into force and withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty, which barred Moscow and Washington from building nationwide
defenses against strategic ballistic missiles.
The United States, as well as France, Russia, and the United Kingdom,
have declared that they no longer produce fissile materials for
weapons purposes. China is also understood to have stopped. In addition
to codifying these actions, an FMCT would be aimed at blocking India,
Israel, and Pakistan from any future production of plutonium or
HEU for weapons.
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