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Effort to Find WMD in Iraq Comes Up Short
The U.S.-led effort to find Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
has so far found no evidence that Iraq possessed chemical or biological
weapons or that it was actively reconstituting its nuclear weapons
program at the time coalition forces invaded Iraq this past March.
Administration officials insist, however, the search’s results
to date justify their decision to go to war.
David Kay, a former International Atomic Energy Agency inspector
leading the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), testified
before the House and Senate Intelligence Committees Oct. 2 about
the group’s progress. (Click here
for a deconstruction of Kay's testimony). The ISG is the task force
coordinating the search effort. Kay’s testimony revealed that
Iraq was pursuing low-level, dual-use biological research and development
(R&D) efforts, may have considered plans to produce chemical
weapons, had a rudimentary R&D effort in dual-use nuclear technology,
and was pursuing several programs to develop missiles that exceeded
the range permitted under relevant UN Security Council resolutions.
Still, before the war, U.S. officials were more expansive in their
claim, saying Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, had
reconstituted its nuclear weapons program, and possessed prohibited
missiles.
Kay cautioned Oct. 2 that the report “does not represent a
final reckoning of Iraq’s WMD programs” and that “much
remains to be done.” He added that continuing the weapons search
is necessary for several reasons: learning lessons to improve the
quality of future intelligence; stopping terrorists and Iraqi insurgents
from acquiring WMD that may remain in the country; and keeping weapons,
information, and expertise from spreading elsewhere. Kay told National
Public Radio Oct. 5 that the task force could complete its mission
in six to nine months.
Meanwhile, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) James R. Clapper Jr., head of the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency, told reporters Oct. 28 that he personally
believes Iraqi officials decided to move prohibited weapons materials
to Syria prior to the war. He based his belief on pre-invasion satellite
imagery showing a heavy flow of traffic from Iraq into Syria.
Administration officials insist that Kay’s report justified
taking military action because it revealed that Iraqi leader Saddam
Hussein intended to acquire prohibited weapons and was concealing
the means to produce them. President George W. Bush told reporters
Oct. 3 that the Kay report proves Iraq “was a threat, a serious
danger.”
Secretary of State Colin Powell argued in an Oct. 7 Washington Post
op-ed that Iraq’s failure to declare its dual-use equipment
and activities to UN weapons inspectors placed it in material breach
of its disarmament obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions.
He added that Iraq intended to develop WMD despite the presence
of inspectors. Vice President Dick Cheney stated in an Oct. 3 speech
that Security
Council Resolution 1441, adopted in November 2002, “deemed”
Iraq’s material breach “to be sufficient cause to go to
war.”
However, Resolution 1441 required the Security Council only to “consider”
any instances of reported Iraqi noncompliance, rather than providing
an automatic authorization for invasion. Moreover, the inspectors
reported that prior to the March invasion Iraq was gradually increasing
its cooperation with inspectors, although Iraq had not met its requirement
to provide the Security Council with a complete declaration of its
weapons programs and related activities.
Kay’s findings also challenge the Bush administration’s
persistent dismissal of containment and UN weapons inspections as
a useful means of checking Hussein’s WMD ambitions. According
to an Oct. 27 article in The New Republic, Kay told reporters Oct.
3 that ISG workers have “been struck…by how often [Iraqi
scientists] refer to the impact of sanctions” in constraining
Iraq’s WMD programs.
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