 |
Chinese Concession Fails to End UN Disarmament Conference's Stalemate
Proving the adage that “the more things change, the more they
stay the same,” the 66-member Conference on Disarmament (CD)
Sept. 10 concluded its fifth straight year without holding any negotiations.
The stalemate persisted even though China compromised on an issue
perceived to be a key obstacle blocking progress in the UN arms
control negotiating forum.
No clear explanation has emerged as to why the conference failed
to revive after China dropped its long-standing insistence that
any work program must include the drafting of a treaty on the prevention
of an arms race in outer space. That demand has long been a stumbling
block to negotiations: the disarmament conference operates by consensus,
and the United States has refused for several years to support any
negotiations for limiting weapons in outer space. Washington, which
is exploring space-based interceptors for its proposed layered missile
defense system, claims such a treaty is unnecessary. The CD has
not completed any arms control agreement since it wrapped up the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
in 1996.
Several factors appear to have continued to block progress in the
wake of China’s Aug. 7 announcement, which occurred in the
last weeks of the conference’s negotiating period for the year.
By conference rules, negotiations started one year do not carry
over to the next. Some delegations probably wanted to avoid a repeat
of 1998 when negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty were
started in August, shelved in September, and not resumed the following
year.
Disputes about the proposed outer space accord was also not the
only controversial issue holding up the proposed CD work program,
just the most prominent. Misgivings remain about nuclear disarmament
talks, a negative security assurances treaty, and a fissile material
cutoff treaty, which would forbid the production of plutonium and
highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons purposes.
Despite their recent tensions on Iraq and other issues, France and
the United States are of the same mind on not wanting to discuss
nuclear disarmament in a multilateral setting. Russia reportedly
shares this reluctance.
Joined by the United Kingdom, these three nuclear-weapon states
also have little enthusiasm for negotiating an accord on negative
security assurances, which are commitments by nuclear-weapon states
not to use nuclear weapons against countries without them. All four
countries have consented to such negotiations before because the
implicit understanding was that nothing would happen. Speculation
exists that the United States might not support a repeat of such
a charade, given February 2002 remarks by U.S. Undersecretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton questioning
the value of negative security assurances (See ACT, March 2002)
and general Bush administration distaste for international negotiations.
Further dampening prospects for negotiations on negative security
assurances is China’s insistence that an agreement include
commitments by all nuclear-weapon states to forswear the first-use
of nuclear weapons. London, Moscow, Paris, and Washington all reserve
the right to use nuclear weapons first and oppose the Chinese proposal.
The United States has essentially declared that it will not compromise
on issues it does not want addressed. U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker told the conference in
February that Washington would only consent to a “clean resolution”
to start fissile material cutoff treaty negotiations. He warned
that tying issues together to “win approval for dubious, unpopular,
or outdated proposals must end if this body is to have a future.”
Although rhetorically enjoying consensus CD support, a fissile material
cutoff treaty negotiation is not without detractors and potential
pitfalls. Israel, for example, opposes the treaty, and relented
to the start of treaty negotiations in 1998 only after intense U.S.
arm-twisting. Israel’s Prime Minister at the time, Benjamin
Netanyahu, warned that Israel had “fundamental problems with
the treaty.”
Egypt, Pakistan, and Syria have argued that a completed treaty should
not be limited to barring future production but also take into account
existing stockpiles. They contend a treaty failing to do so would
unacceptably codify unequal holdings of weapons-making material.
Aside from conflicting views about the conference’s work program,
there is also an undercurrent of skepticism about whether all members,
notably the United States, want the CD to succeed. A former senior
U.S. government official familiar with the conference said in a
Sept. 16 interview that Bolton and others in the Bush administration
“detest the CD.”
The United States did not have a dedicated CD ambassador during
this year’s round of negotiations, though in June the Bush
administration nominated Jackie Wolcott Sanders, currently a deputy
assistant secretary of state, for the position. The Senate has not
yet voted on her nomination.
Regardless of the reasons, the conference found itself in a familiar
position nearing the end of this year’s negotiating session.
On Aug. 21, Japanese Ambassador Kuniko Inoguchi, who was serving
as the rotating conference president, described the CD as being
at a “serious impasse.” Expectations for the conference’s
Jan. 19 start next year are not optimistic.
|
