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Iraq Inquiry Winds Down; Blair Suffers Political Blow
As Lord Hutton prepares to wrap up his investigation into the suicide
of arms expert David Kelly, it seems that British Prime Minister
Tony Blair will escape legal charges that his government had falsified
and exaggerated pre-war intelligence information on Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Yet, Blair is hardly in the clear:
the investigation’s revelations about the Blair government’s
handling of intelligence and its treatment of Kelly have significantly
damaged the Labor leader’s political standing.
The Parliament Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) concluded
in a Sept. 11 report that, during the preparation of a September
2002 dossier documenting British intelligence analysis of Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction programs and capabilities, the Blair
government had not applied political pressure on the Joint Intelligence
Committee (JIC), which was in charge of drafting the dossier. Referring
to a May 29 report by BBC reporter Andrew Gilligan that alleged
such pressure and first sparked the controversy, the ISC said, “The
dossier was not ‘sexed up’ by Alastair Cambell or anyone
else.”
Testifying before the committee, Blair said he took the nation to
war because he was concerned that an Iraqi WMD capability would
develop “into a nexus between terrorism and WMD.” He noted
that “time will tell whether it’s true or not true.”
The committee also criticized some of the claims within the dossier
for their lack of clarity and context. In particular, the committee
said the dossier should have emphasized that, although it could
determine if Iraq had developed biological and chemical capabilities,
it did not have firm intelligence of exactly what had been produced
and in what quantities. The committee also said that the Blair government
had not placed in its proper context a claim that Iraq was prepared
to use biological or chemical weapons on 45 minutes’ notice.
The panel said that this charge had originally referred merely to
battlefield munitions and not any larger strategic capabilities.
The 45-minute claim has been at the center of the intelligence controversy.
In his May BBC report, Gilligan had cited an unnamed senior intelligence
official “in charge of drawing up that dossier,” later
acknowledged to be Kelly. Gilligan said the official asserted that
the claim had been added over the criticisms of the intelligence
community at the insistence of Downing Street. In June, Gilligan
wrote in the Sunday Mail that, according to his source, Blair communications
director Alastair Cambell had given the order.
Government officials have continued to deny that there was any government
pressure over that or any other claim made in the dossier. (See
ACT, September 2003.)
In his second appearance before the Hutton Inquiry, Campbell again
said that he had only been involved with the creation of the dossiers
in a “presentational” role and that he had not had any
say in the substance of the report.
Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of MI6 Secret Intelligence Service,
made a rare public appearance to testify before the inquiry that
he had personally followed the creation of the dossier throughout
its creation and that he was satisfied with the process. Dearlove
said that he had considered the 45-minute claim to be “well-sourced.”
He was “bemused” by the accusation that good intelligence
could not come from a single source, saying that many reports produced
by MI6 are single-source yet are still considered to be reliable.
Dearlove did say, however, that “in hindsight” it should
have been made clearer that the claim referred to short-range battlefield
weapons.
To be sure, John Scarlett, the head of the JIC, admitted that he
had revised the dossier after receiving an e-mail from Blair’s
chief of staff Jonathan Powell, removing a reference stating that
Saddam would only use biological or chemical weapons when “under
threat.” Powell’s e-mail asked Scarlett to redraft the
statement, because it would have supported arguments that Hussein
would only be a threat if attacked.
But in his testimony, Scarlett argued that the e-mail only made
him re-examine the statement and that removing the explicit phrase
was justified given recent intelligence that placed Iraqi WMD and
its importance in the context of Hussein’s “perception
of his regional position, his plans to acquire and maintain regional
influence and, as one report, and maybe more, put it: dominate his
neighbors.” Given this interpretation, he said that removing
the phrase permitted him to act within his instruction from the
JIC to keep the dossier in line with the most recent intelligence.
Kelly was found dead July 18 after becoming caught up in a conflict
between the Blair government and the BBC over Gilligan’s accusations.
The government has faced strong criticism over the way Kelly’s
name was revealed to the public. Representatives of the Kelly family
have accused the government of using Kelly as “a pawn in their
political battle with the BBC.”
Blair has seen his popularity plummet as a result of the crisis
and late September polls in the Guardian show that 61 percent of
British voters are unhappy with the job he is doing as prime minister
and that only 38 percent now believe the war in Iraq was justified.
Facing even greater political trouble is Secretary of Defense Geoff
Hoon. Hoon already faced substantial public criticism for his role
in revealing Kelly’s identity as Gilligan’s source. But
the ISC report also disclosed that Hoon had failed to disclose that
two aides had submitted written concerns about the dossier to him
prior to its publication. The ISC characterized this failure as
“unhelpful and potentially misleading,” leading Conservative
leader Ian Duncan Smith to call for Hoon’s resignation. Hoon
said that he regretted any “misunderstanding,” but a September
5 poll in the Sunday mail showed that 62 percent of the British
public backed Smith’s call for Hoon’s resignation.
The Hutton Inquiry and the ISC are two of the three committees that
have investigated the British governments handling of Iraqi intelligence.
The Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee also concluded in
July that Blair and his advisers did not interfere in the creation
of dossiers.
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