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Controversy Grows Surrounding Prewar Intel
FUELED BY A White House admission that discredited intelligence
was used in President George W. Bush’s 2003 State of the Union
address, the Bush administration’s prewar claims that Iraq
possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have come under increasingly
intense scrutiny. As the search for proscribed weapons continues
without any actual weapons being found, it is becoming increasingly
apparent that Bush administration officials’ unequivocal claims
that Iraq possessed militarily significant quantities of weapons
of mass destruction were likely flawed and, in some cases, did not
accurately reflect the more ambiguous judgments of the intelligence
community.
The dispute has gained political traction as U.S. casualties in
Iraq continue. Members of Congress and the public have questioned
both the veracity of U.S. claims about Iraq and the magnitude of
the Iraqi threat at the time of the U.S.-led coalition forces’
March 19 invasion. The controversy has harmed British Prime Minister
Tony Blair’s political standing and coincided with a decline
in the U.S. public’s confidence about operations in Iraq. Bush
could face a new round of questions this fall, with the House and
Senate intelligence committees continuing their investigations into
intelligence matters when Congress returns from its summer recess.
The controversy has centered around two claims Bush made in the
State of the Union speech about Iraq’s suspected nuclear weapons
program. The first was that “the British government has learned
that [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein recently sought significant
quantities of uranium from Africa,” a reference to a claim
that appeared in a September
2002 British report about Iraqi weapons capabilities. The second
was that Hussein “has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum
tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production” when used in
centrifuges for uranium enrichment.
The claims were not limited to the State of the Union address. Bush
asserted two days before the invasion that “[i]ntelligence…leaves
no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some
of the most lethal weapons ever devised,” but recent revelations
regarding U.S. intelligence on Iraq have raised doubts about that
statement. Additionally, UN weapons inspectors—who had been
working in Iraq since late November 2002—reported less than
two weeks before the invasion that they had found no evidence Iraq
had active programs to produce nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons.
Much of the supporting evidence for the claim about Iraq’s
attempts to procure uranium in Africa was known to be weak at the
time of Bush’s speech, and UN inspectors further undermined
it shortly after, particularly when the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) said in March that documents supporting the claim
were forged. Additionally, the U.S.
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) published in October 2002,
which is said to be the basis for the claims in the speech, contains
a dissent by the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (INR) that characterizes “claims of Iraqi pursuit
of natural uranium in Africa” as “highly dubious.”
These facts have raised questions about the process for clearing
the information in Bush’s speech. Bush first tried to pin the
blame on the CIA, claiming July 14 that the speech was “cleared
by the CIA.” Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet
stated July 11 that his agency cleared the speech but should not
have allowed the language to appear in the final draft.
Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, however, acknowledged
July 22 that the CIA had previously warned him that the information
might be inaccurate, and White House speechwriters subsequently
removed the information from an October 7, 2002, presidential speech.
Hadley said he should have removed it from the State of the Union
address but that he had forgotten the CIA warnings.
Hadley also said National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice was
informed about the CIA’s warnings, but Rice claimed July 30
that she did not remember seeing them. A senior administration official
said July 18 that Rice did not read the INR dissents in the NIE.
Although Rice said July 13 that the uranium line should not have
been included in the State of the Union address, she claimed that
the statement was still accurate because it referred to British
intelligence that originates from sources that have not yet been
discredited. Washington does not have access to that information,
she added. Blair said July 17 that his government continues to stand
by the intelligence, but Tenet stated that the CIA “expressed
reservations” to British officials about the uranium information
before the United Kingdom published its September 2002 report.
Bush’s second claim was that Hussein tried to buy specialized
aluminum tubes that could be used for producing material for nuclear
weapons. The October 2002 NIE states that Iraq was attempting to
obtain such tubes for use as rotors in a gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment
facility but notes that part of the intelligence community disagreed
on this point. Uranium enrichment has civilian uses, but it also
can produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. IAEA Director-General
Mohamed ElBaradei told the UN Security Council in March that IAEA
experts concluded that it was “unlikely” Iraq was procuring
the tubes for centrifuges.
Bush administration officials also continue to argue that Iraq possessed
chemical and biological weapons at the time of the U.S.-led invasion.
Although U.S. pre-inspections intelligence is more consistent with
administration statements that Iraq possessed chemical and biological
weapons, it still contains qualifiers that were not reflected in
the administration’s public statements. (See
ACT, July/August 2003.)
Shifting Rationale for War
Meanwhile, administration officials have downplayed the importance
of the intelligence controversy, arguing that evidence of Hussein’s
malicious motivations and his residual capability to develop and
use weapons of mass destruction, along with uncertainty surrounding
Iraq’s suspected weapons programs, provided sufficient basis
for determining that Iraq was a threat. This level of certainty
satisfied the White House because the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks on the United States made the administration less tolerant
of perceived risks of catastrophic terrorism, according to officials’
statements.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained this argument to
the Senate Armed Services Committee July 9, stating that the U.S.-led
coalition did not invade Iraq “because we had discovered dramatic
new evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of WMD; we acted because we
saw the existing evidence in a new light—through the prism
of our experience on 9/11.”
Although critics have argued that inspections should have been given
more time to succeed, the administration contended that this course
was futile because Iraq was deceiving inspectors and refused to
cooperate fully with them.
UN inspectors, however, also reported that they saw no evidence
that Iraqi agents had infiltrated the organization or were moving
prohibited weapons materials to avoid detection. They told the Security
Council in March that Iraqi cooperation with the inspectors was
increasing, albeit marginally. (See
ACT, April 2003.)
In addition, intelligence reports had suggested that inspections
could contain Iraq’s nuclear programs. For example, the October
2002 NIE stated that Iraq could obtain a nuclear weapon “if
left unchecked”; a 2001 Defense Department report states, “From
April 1991 to December 1998, Iraqi nuclear aspirations were held
in check by...[UN] inspections and monitoring.”
Search, Hearings Continue
In Iraq, forces of the U.S.-led coalition continue to search for
evidence of prohibited weapons but have yet to reveal any significant
finds. David Kay, special adviser for strategy to the CIA on the
weapons search, stated July 31 that the Iraq Survey Group (ISG)—the
organization formed to ferret out Iraqi weapons of mass destruction—was
making “progress.” He said the ISG would probably have
a “substantial body of evidence before six months” during
a July 15 interview on NBC’s “Nightly News.”
However, a July congressional delegation, led by Porter Goss (R-FL),
chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, and Jane Harman (D-CA),
the committee’s ranking member, reported July 15 that the “evidence
emerging on Iraq’ s WMD programs does not point to the existence
of large stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons.” In
recent weeks, discussion of the Iraqi threat has emphasized Iraq’s
weapons programs rather than actual weapons, although administration
officials continue to assert that forces will find functional chemical
and biological weapons.
The intelligence committees plan to continue their investigations
into the matter, but no specific hearings have been scheduled, and
it is not known whether government officials will testify in open
hearings.
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