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Blair Testifies; British Intelligence Crisis Continues
While the Bush administration faces criticism about its handling
of intelligence on Iraq, British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s
government has endured a summer of political crisis over the issue.
The debate has centered around a dossier
on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities the British
government released in September 2002. Out of a storm of accusations
that has tarnished the reputations of Blair’s government and
the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), two facts have emerged:
there were disagreements over the dossier among intelligence officials,
and key Blair aides were involved in reviewing the final drafts
of the dossier. The depth of the aides’ involvement and the
dissension among intelligence officials, however, remains murky.
The eye of the storm has recently moved before a judge. The Hutton
Inquiry, which follows an investigation by the House of Commons
Foreign Affairs Committee, has heard public testimony into the formation
of the dossier by top officials, including Blair.
The Blair government continues to deny that it ever misled parliament
or the public in the months before the Iraq war. In August 28 testimony
before the Hutton Inquiry, Blair vehemently denied that the government
inserted information into the September dossier against the wishes
of the intelligence services. If that allegation were true, “it
would have merited my resignation,” he said.
Several media reports in May and June helped spark the crisis by
suggesting that Blair and his key aides interfered in the process
of compiling intelligence on Iraq. In particular, BBC reporter Andrew
Gilligan reported May 29 on the radio show “Today” that
“one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up that [September
2002] dossier” on Iraq’s weapons programs said the government
had ordered that the dossier on Iraq “be sexed up, to be made
more exciting and ordered more facts to be...discovered.” The
source, according to Gilligan, specifically pointed to the inclusion
in the dossier and its executive summary of a statement saying that
Iraq’s military planning allowed for some weapons of mass destruction
“to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them.”
The source also allegedly accused Alastair Campbell, Blair’s
close communications and strategy chief, of inserting the claim.
Gilligan refused to reveal his source, but on June 30, David Kelly,
a top expert on biological and chemical weapons and an adviser for
the Ministry of Defense, told his manager at the ministry that he
had met with Gilligan May 22. The Ministry of Defense informed the
Commons committee, and Kelly’s name was subsequently leaked
to the press. Kelly gave public testimony before the Foreign Affairs
Committee July 15 and testified in private to the Intelligence and
Security Committee, which has also been investigating the use of
intelligence on Iraq.
In his public testimony, Kelly said he did not think he was Gilligan’s
main source. Kelly said he did not believe Campbell had transformed
the September dossier, stated that he felt the September dossier
was true and not embellished, and denied that he was aware whether
the 45-minute claim was added to the dossier at the last minute.
From his conversation with Gilligan, Kelly said, “I do not
see how he could make the authoritative statement he was making
from the comments that I made.” He refused to deny categorically
that he was the source, however, saying, “I do realize that
in the conversation that I had there was reinforcement of some of
the ideas he has put forward.”
The day after his private testimony, Kelly left his home and did
not return. On July 18, police found Kelly dead of apparent suicide.
On July 20, the BBC stated that Kelly was Gilligan’s main source.
Kelly’s death and the BBC’s identification of him as the
main source ignited a firestorm of criticism against both the BBC
and Blair. The prime minister appointed Lord Hutton to investigate
the circumstances surrounding Kelly’s death. The inquiry, which
began August 1, has gone far beyond the simple question of Kelly’s
death to examine how the September dossier was drafted and published.
The inquiry has revealed that some intelligence officials were unhappy
with aspects of the September dossier. In particular, concerns have
arisen that the final language did not reflect the qualifications
common in an intelligence document.
In a taped interview between Kelly and BBC reporter Susan Watts
on May 30, 2003, Kelly indicated there was an argument between the
intelligence services and Blair’s government. He said intelligence
officials were possibly concerned about some of the facts that were
in the dossier or at least were unhappy with the way the information
was expressed.
Kelly, however, also said he did not think the Blair government
was “being willfully dishonest” but was simply trying
to phrase things so the public would understand. John Scarlett,
head of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which was charged with
assembling the dossier, testified at the inquiry that he was responsible
for the dossier and that it accurately reflected the intelligence.
Testimony before Lord Hutton has revealed that Campbell and other
top aides were very involved in reviewing the final drafts of the
dossier. E-mails sent between Blair aides show they were discussing
phrasing in the dossier. Campbell denies inserting the claim that
the Iraqi military could deploy chemical or biological weapons within
45 minutes of an order to do so. The Wall Street Journal,
however, reported August 24 that an earlier draft had said “[t]he
Iraqi military may be able to deploy...” such weapons within
45 minutes and Campbell recommended that the phrase “may be”
should read “are.”
Foreign Affairs Committee Findings
In events leading up to Kelly’s death, the Foreign Affairs
Committee report released July 7 found the government innocent of
a number of accusations regarding misuse of intelligence but was
highly critical of two intelligence dossiers on Iraq that the government
used as evidence in its bid to win over public opinion.
The report concluded that Campbell was not responsible for including
the 45-minutes claim in the September dossier. The committee also
exonerated Campbell of exerting any undue pressure on those drafting
the dossier, although it did criticize him for chairing a meeting
on an intelligence matter. Campbell announced his resignation August
29, saying he had planned to resign since April 7.
In the case of the September dossier, “allegations of politically
inspired meddling cannot credibly be established,” the report
says. But the committee also complains that British ministers refused
committee members access to intelligence papers and personnel, saying
that without such access, “we cannot know if it was in any
respect faulty or misrepresented.”
The committee report expresses basic confidence that the Joint Intelligence
Committee acted responsibly with the intelligence, but it also expresses
concern that certain points were overemphasized, such as the 45-minute
claim. In addition, the committee indicated that the United Kingdom
probably relied too much on U.S. intelligence and on Iraqi exiles.
Beyond the September dossier, serious doubts have been raised about
a February dossier focused on Iraqi attempts to deceive the international
community. British officials have since admitted that the February
dossier used material from a journal article published by an American
scholar. The committee harangued the government for plagiarizing
the work and called the February dossier “almost wholly counter-productive,”
adding that “the February dossier was badly handled and was
misrepresented as to its provenance.”
The committee stated that Blair did not intentionally mislead parliament
when he referred to the February dossier as “further intelligence,”
because he did not necessarily know that the key sections in the
report did not come from intelligence sources. The committee also
concluded, however, that Blair “inadvertently” misrepresented
its status.
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