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U.S. Biodefense Plans Worry Nonproliferation Advocates
The U.S. government’s efforts to combat bioterrorism are sparking
concerns over the dangers enhanced biodefense programs might pose
to the nonproliferation regime. New biodefense plans drawn up in
the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks call for more
than a sixfold boost in biodefense funding, with a sizeable portion
of the funds going toward the construction of new biosafety level
(BSL) 3 and 4 facilities, those capable of handling the most dangerous
pathogens.
According to the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID), part of the National Institutes of Health (NIH),
there are plans to fund the construction of one or two new National
Biocontainment Laboratories with BSL-4 containment capabilities
and four to eight Regional Biocontainment Laboratories with BSL-3
containment capabilities, utilizing a portion of the roughly $1.5
billion budgeted to the NIH for biodefense research in fiscal year
2003. NIAID is evaluating proposals for these new laboratories and
plans to announce the grant recipients in September 2003.
Proponents for the new laboratories contend that the increased research
capabilities and capacity will help accelerate biodefense research.
Opponents argue that the new biodefense laboratories might unintentionally
worsen the threat to the United States. One concern is that, although
the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) permits such research even
as it outlaws offensive biological weapons, it is hard for outsiders
to judge whether a country is in fact adhering to the BWC’s
restrictions. Opponents fret that, by coming close to this line,
the United States risks undermining its attempts to limit or control
other countries’ research with materials that could be useful
for biological weapons.
The Good and the Bad
Pathogens are categorized into one of four BSL classifications based
on the dangers they pose and the availability of treatments or vaccines.
Most pathogens that are considered bioterror threats, such as Ebola
and smallpox, are categorized as BSL-3 or BSL-4 organisms, meaning
they can only safely be worked on in a laboratory with at least
the same BSL rating. BSL-3 and BSL-4 facilities are specialized
to allow scientists to conduct research on organisms within proper
containment fields.
The U.S. government contends that new laboratories are needed to
conduct additional research on dangerous pathogens. An NIH official
claims that, of the existing five U.S. BSL-4 laboratories that are
operational or near operational, only the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia, and the U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick,
Maryland, are capable of dealing with extensive experiments on highly
dangerous agents.
Proponents say the new facilities would improve the development
of treatments or vaccines before an attack occurs as well as the
response to a biological attack. The process of developing and gaining
approval for treatments and vaccines requires extensive laboratory
research and testing that usually takes years. In the event of a
biological attack, however, this process would be further burdened
by the urgency for a therapy, given that the agent used might have
a high morbidity and mortality rate and spread rapidly, affecting
many people. Therefore, the NIAID, the agency in charge of defending
the United States from emerging diseases, including bioterror agents,
sees expanding not only its number of research grants but also the
number of high-containment biological laboratories as a way of both
accelerating the current research on potential pathogens and better
preparing the country for responding to an emerging disease or biological
attack.
Another benefit of expanding the number of BSL-4 laboratories is
to help equalize the responses to a threat regardless of where in
the United States one occurs. The CDC and USAMRIID are both located
on the East Coast, creating a situation where response times to
outbreaks on the eastern United States are faster than to outbreaks
in the western United States. In choosing the recipients of funds
for new laboratories, the NIAID might also consider the locations
of the proposals, trying to locate new facilities in regions that
currently lack the capabilities in order to create a more equal
distribution of major biological laboratories nationwide.
Yet, there are several issues that opponents to this plan cite as
reasons to maintain the current number of BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories—already
the most capable national network of high-containment biological
research facilities in the world—rather than build more. In
general, they view an increase in the number of laboratories and
the number of trained scientists as an increase in potential leaks
of material and expertise. Additionally, a terrorist attack at a
BSL-3 or BSL-4 research center aimed at breaching the airtight safety
precautions could cause the release of dangerous biological agents
into the surrounding communities. Opponents claim that increasing
the number of laboratories also increases the number of targets
for such attacks.
Lack of Transparency
Arms control experts are particularly concerned with the issues
of transparency and precedence. NIAID has been tight-lipped regarding
details on what research the new facilities will pursue, requiring
that the grant proposals remain confidential. The institute has
also indicated that it will limit information on what biological
agents are researched at the various facilities. The argument is
that secrecy is essential; otherwise, terrorists could search for
chinks in the U.S. biodefense armor and exploit them.
Other countries, however, might view this secrecy with distrust,
wondering whether the expansion in biodefense research is masking
covert biological weapons programs. For example, the U.S. government
has acknowledged that its BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories might develop
more virulent and robust strains of pathogens for the purpose of
developing defenses against weapons officials fear terrorists might
employ.
They also worry that the secrecy of the program might establish
a dangerous precedent. In the future, if an adversary dramatically
increases its biodefense research program without transparency,
the United States might question its intentions. Yet, that country
would be able to point to the U.S. expansion of its biodefense program
as a precedent, leaving the United States with little basis or diplomatic
leverage for criticizing the country’s efforts.
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