Energy Department Endorses Shorter Preparation for Nuclear Test
The Department of Energy submitted a report to the Senate Armed
Services Committee on May 20 calling for the United States to shorten
the time it would take to conduct a nuclear test to 18 months in
order to provide a “reasonable level of flexibility” for
the Bush administration.
Congress requested the report in November 2002, instructing Secretary
of Energy Spencer Abraham to draw up plans that would enable the
department to test within six, 12, 18, or 24 months. Currently,
the United States can conduct a nuclear test within 24-36 months
of a presidential directive to do so. Congress also asked Abraham
to determine, in consultation with the secretary of defense, which
readiness period would be optimal. (See
ACT, December 2002.)
The 18-month recommendation “reflects what is achievable and
cost effective,” according to the report, which was prepared
by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous
agency within the Energy Department. The report indicated that 18
months is the minimum amount of time needed to evaluate a problem
identified in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, propose a solution, and
“execute a test that would provide the information needed to
certify the ‘fix.’” The recommendation is “consistent
with realistic testing schedules” established during previous
U.S. nuclear testing, which ceased in 1992.
By contrast, shortening test readiness to six or 12 months would
require a “substantial diversion of personnel and facilities
at the laboratories,” according to the report. That would “represent
a major redirection of the stockpile stewardship program,”
which is intended to maintain the nuclear arsenal in the absence
of testing. Adopting a testing posture of a year or less would be
“most relevant…[if] the President might direct that testing
resume for political reasons.” The report also noted that the
shorter readiness period would be considerably more expensive.
The transition to shorten the current 24-36 month readiness posture,
expected to take three years, is already underway. NNSA conducted
an Enhanced Test Readiness Cost Study in July 2002 to determine
the steps and funding required to shorten the readiness posture,
and the Nuclear Weapons Council, a consultative group of officials
from the Energy Department and the Pentagon, approved the plan to
transition to an 18-month readiness window in September 2002, according
to the report. The Bush administration asked for funds to begin
moving to a shorter test readiness posture in its fiscal year 2004
budget request. (See
ACT, March 2003.)
Charles Anson Franklin, NNSA spokesman, said that the current readiness
posture of 24-36-months was “a policy decision of the previous
administration. This administration has made a policy decision of
an 18-month readiness period.” He added, “It’s been
out there—it’s not been a surprise…We’ve been
talking about [moving to an 18-month readiness posture] since 2001.”
The changes will be fully implemented by the end of fiscal year
2005 and will cost $83 million, with an additional $25-30 million
needed annually to sustain the heightened state of scientific, technological,
and personnel preparedness, according to the report. The report
examined a speedier transition but concluded that reaching the 18-month
readiness posture sooner would cost more and disrupt other programs
because of the limited number of nuclear weapons personnel.
Addressing Foster
The Energy Department’s test readiness assessment also responded
to the latest findings by the Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety,
and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile, which was established
by Congress in the fiscal year 1999 Defense Authorization Act. Senators
on the Armed Services Committee received those findings April 11
from the panel’s chair, John Foster.
The Foster panel suggested that applicable defense agencies and
nuclear laboratories identify possible tests that could be needed
and set aside the test articles and instrumentation in advance.
However, the Energy Department noted that, while various tests are
routinely identified, “none of these tests have been deemed
essential by any of the directors in the context of today’s
stockpile stewardship program.” The Energy Department report
also rebuffed the Foster panel’s recommendation that the nuclear
laboratories should propose tests to enhance their knowledge of
nuclear weapons science, stating that there are no gaps in scientific
knowledge that would require full-scale testing.
In March 2002, the Foster panel recommended a readiness window
of 3-12 months, and in its April report the panel characterized
the Energy Department’s test readiness assumptions as “overly
conservative.” (See
ACT, April 2002.) In response, the Energy Department
noted that the recommended 18-month period is based on U.S. experience
with nuclear testing toward the end of the Cold War and that it
“would be optimistic to assume that a well-diagnosed test could
be conducted in a much shorter period of time after a decade hiatus.”
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