Iran Failed to Comply With Nuclear NPT, IAEA Reports
Amid increasing pressure from the United States, the International
Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) board of governors addressed
concerns regarding Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program at
a June 16-19 meeting. What follows are excerpts from Director-General
Mohamed ElBaradei’s report “Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
[The full IAEA document is available at http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf.
D. Findings and Initial Assessment
32. Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards
Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the
subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration
of facilities where the material was stored and processed. These
failures, and the actions taken thus far to correct them, can be
summarized as follows:
(a) Failure to declare the import of natural uranium in 1991,
and its subsequent transfer for further processing.
On 15 April 2003, Iran submitted ICRs on the import of the UO2,
UF4 and UF6. Iran has still to submit ICRs on the transfer of
the material for further processing and use.
(b) Failure to declare the activities involving the subsequent
processing and use of the imported natural uranium, including
the production and loss of nuclear material, where appropriate,
and the production and transfer of waste resulting therefrom.
Iran has acknowledged the production of uranium metal, uranyl
nitrate, ammonium uranyl carbonate, UO2 pellets and uranium wastes.
Iran must still submit ICRs on these inventory changes.
(c) Failure to declare the facilities where such material (including
the waste) was received, stored and processed.
On 5 May 2003, Iran provided preliminary design information
for the facility JHL. Iran has informed the Agency of the locations
where the undeclared processing of the imported natural uranium
was conducted (TRR [Tehran Research Reactor] and the Esfahan Nuclear
Technology Centre), and provided access to those locations. It
has provided the Agency access to the waste storage facility at
Esfahan, and has indicated that access would be provided to Anarak,
as well as the waste disposal site at Qom.
(d) Failure to provide in a timely manner updated design information
for the MIX Facility [xenon radioscope production facility] and
for TRR.
Iran has agreed to submit updated design information for the
two facilities.
(e) Failure to provide in a timely manner information on the
waste storage at Esfahan and at Anarak.
Iran has informed the Agency of the locations where the waste
has been stored or discarded. It has provided the Agency access
to the waste storage facility at Esfahan, and has indicated that
access will be provided to Anarak.
33. Although the quantities of nuclear material involved have not
been large,6 and the material would need further
processing before being suitable for use as the fissile material
component of a nuclear explosive device, the number of failures
by Iran to report the material, facilities and activities in question
in a timely manner as it is obliged to do pursuant to its Safeguards
Agreement is a matter of concern. While these failures are in the
process of being rectified by Iran, the process of verifying the
correctness and completeness of the Iranian declaration is still
ongoing.
34. The Agency is continuing to pursue the open questions, including
through:
(a) The completion of a more thorough expert analysis of the
research and development carried out by Iran in the establishment
of its enrichment capabilities. This will require the submission
by Iran of a complete chronology of its centrifuge and laser enrichment
efforts, including, in particular, a description of all research
and development activities carried out prior to the construction
of the Natanz facilities. As agreed to by Iran, this process will
also involve discussions in Iran between Iranian authorities and
Agency enrichment experts on Iran’s enrichment programme,
and visits by the Agency experts to the facilities under construction
at Natanz and other relevant locations.
(b) Further follow-up on information regarding allegations about
undeclared enrichment of nuclear material, including, in particular,
at the Kalaye Electric Company. This will require permission for
the Agency to carry out environmental sampling at the workshop
located there.
(c) Further enquiries about the role of uranium metal in Iran’s
nuclear fuel cycle.
(d) Further enquiries about Iran’s programme related to
the use of heavy water, including heavy water production and heavy
water reactor design and construction.
35. The Director General has repeatedly encouraged Iran to conclude
an Additional Protocol. Without such protocols in force, the Agency’s
ability to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of
undeclared nuclear activities is limited. This is particularly the
case for States, like Iran, with extensive nuclear activities and
advanced fuel cycle technologies. In the view of the Director General,
the adherence by Iran to an Additional Protocol would therefore
constitute a significant step forward. The Director General will
continue to keep the Board informed of developments.
NOTE
6. The total amount of material, approximately 1.8 tonnes, is
0.13 effective kilograms of uranium. This is, however, not insignificant
in terms of a State’s ability to conduct nuclear research and
development activities.
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