Coalition Forces Still Searching For WMD in Iraq
As coalition troops advance on Baghdad and special forces capture
Iraqi sites suspected of housing weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
the United States and its allies are still searching for Iraqi nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons—so far without any visible
results. The United States and coalition members initiated military
conflict against Iraq March 19, citing Iraq’s failure to comply
with its disarmament obligations as a chief justification for military
action.
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage cautioned that the process
of finding and destroying weapons of mass destruction would be “quite
time consuming” in a March 25 interview on the PBS “Newshour
with Jim Lehrer.”
UN weapons inspectors left Iraq March 18 after almost four months
of work when the United States failed to gain support from Security
Council members opposed to the immediate use of force against Iraq.
In a March 21 briefing, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld listed
locating and destroying weapons of mass destruction as one of the
most important U.S. military objectives. U.S. Central Command briefer
General Victor Renuart said March 25 that coalition forces, consisting
almost entirely of U.S. and British troops, are exploiting information
gained from seized documents and interviews with captured Iraqi
soldiers to find WMD facilities, although no weapons have yet been
found.
Assistant Secretary of Defense Victoria Clarke said in a March
26 briefing that U.S. forces did discover 3,000 chemical protective
suits, along with gas masks, nerve agent antidote, and antidote
injectors in an Iraqi hospital March 25. The equipment was to protect
Iraqi forces if Baghdad decides to use chemical weapons, Clarke
claimed.
By month’s end, no weapons of mass destruction have been used
in the war, but Rumsfeld confirmed, in a March 23 briefing, the
existence of intelligence reports that Iraq has dispersed chemical
weapons among some of their forces and given “selected”
commanders the authority to use them.
Diplomacy Fails
The final steps to war began March 7 when the United Kingdom formally
introduced a draft resolution stating that Iraq had until March
17 to comply with its disarmament obligations—implying that
the council members would take military action if Iraq failed to
meet the deadline.
The resolution, co-sponsored by the United States and Spain, stated
that, “Iraq will have failed to take the final opportunity
afforded by resolution 1441 unless…Iraq has demonstrated full…and
active cooperation in accordance with its disarmament obligations…and
is yielding possession to UNMOVIC and the IAEA of all weapons, weapon
delivery and support systems…and all information regarding
prior destruction of such items.”
Resolution 1441, adopted November 8, 2002, gave Iraq a “final
opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations” as
set out by Security Council resolutions stretching back to the end
of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. (See
ACT, December 2002.) The resolution was an attempt at
compromise. A similar resolution introduced by the three countries
February 24 had said that Iraq had failed to comply with Resolution
1441 and did not give Iraq any further time to disarm. (See
ACT, March 2003.)
Washington ultimately failed to persuade a majority of Security
Council members to adopt the resolution. France, Russia, China,
and Germany called for allowing inspectors more time and increasing
their resources. France said it would veto any resolution that implicitly
or explicitly authorized the use of force, and Russia backed the
French position. Whether China would have vetoed the U.S.-U.K.-Spain
resolution is unclear, but it supported France and Russia’s
stance. Various compromise proposals to outline specific disarmament
tasks and give Iraq more time to comply also failed.
In a March 6 speech, Bush said the United States would push for
a Security Council vote on the resolution, regardless of whether
it would pass. In the face of opposition to Bush’s plan for
an immediate confrontation with Baghdad, however, Washington decided
not to call for a vote. In a March 17 statement, U.S. Ambassador
John Negroponte cited France’s previous veto threat as the
reason for the decision.
The Bush administration had repeatedly said that it did not need
UN authorization to go to war. After the United States had already
begun the invasion, Secretary of State Colin Powell said that existing
Security Council resolutions provided justification for the use
of force.
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced March 17 that he was
ordering weapons inspectors to leave Iraq.
Inspectors’ Progress
On March 17, UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Hans Blix and IAEA Director-General
Mohamed ElBaradei presented their last pre-war briefings to the
Security Council. On March 19, Blix and ElBaradei submitted draft
work programs to the Security Council outlining remaining disarmament
tasks for Iraq. The work programs are required under Security Council
Resolution 1284. (See
ACT, April 2003.)
Since beginning work November 27, the inspectors have found no
concrete evidence indicating that Iraq has reconstituted its WMD
programs. ElBaradei stated in a March 7 report to the Security Council
that the IAEA found “no evidence or plausible indication”
that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons program. The UNMOVIC work
program states that “no proscribed activities, or the result
of such activities from the period of 1998-2002 have…been detected
through inspections.”
The inspectors, however, said many unresolved questions remain.
Blix noted March 19 that, since his February 14 Security Council
briefing, Iraq had turned over several sets of documents related
to prohibited weapons programs, but they yielded little new information.
Despite outstanding issues regarding Iraq’s arsenal, Blix
reported that Iraq’s cooperation with the inspectors had improved.
In his March 7 briefing, which discussed and augmented the UNMOVIC
quarterly report submitted March 1, Blix reported that inspectors
were able to “perform professional no-notice inspections all
over Iraq and to increase aerial surveillance.” Iraq had previously
objected to the operation of aerial surveillance.
Perhaps the strongest indicator of Iraqi cooperation is its destruction
of its al Samoud-2 missiles. Iraq complied with an UNMOVIC order
to destroy the missiles, as well as their rocket motors, warheads,
and any casting chambers capable of manufacturing motors for prohibited
missiles. Iraq agreed to destroy the missiles late last month, and
it had destroyed 72 of them as of March 17, according to an UNMOVIC
press release that day.
Blix also stated that UNMOVIC continued to supervise the excavation
of a site where Iraq had destroyed biological weapons—an effort
which began in February.
Additionally, inspectors were able to secure more private interviews
with Iraqi weapons scientists. While Blix reported February 14 that
only three scientists had agreed to private interviews, 11 had agreed
to do so since that briefing, according to a March 17 UNMOVIC press
release. Five scientists, however, refused private interviews, according
to a March 12 UNMOVIC press release.
Resolution 1441 gives inspectors the right to interview anyone
they choose, without Iraqi officials present, and in any location
they wish, including outside of Iraq. Most scientists had declined
private interviews, insisting on recording the interviews or having
an Iraqi official present.
Blix also pointed out that Iraq provided some additional names
of scientists involved with Iraq’s chemical weapons program,
but its disclosures fell far short of the total number of scientists
UNMOVIC estimates to have been involved in the program, according
to a March 15 UNMOVIC release.
ElBaradei also said in his March 7 briefing that Iraqi scientists
had begun agreeing to private interviews with IAEA inspectors, citing
two interviews. Subsequent IAEA press releases, however, indicate
only one other such interview took place since the director-general’s
briefing. In addition, ElBaradei stated that Iraq “provided
a considerable volume” of documents related to procurement
issues for its nuclear program.
Both the inspectors and the Bush administration suggested that
the cooperation Baghdad offered was due in large part to the pressure
created by U.S. military forces stationed in the Persian Gulf.
Differences with the United States
The inspectors’ assessment of Iraq’s weapons activities
disputed several pieces of evidence the Bush administration has
used to support its contention that Iraq possesses weapons of mass
destruction.
ElBaradei’s March 7 report stated that documents allegedly
detailing Iraqi attempts to purchase uranium from Niger were forgeries.
A December 19 State Department fact sheet cited such attempts as
evidence that Iraq was withholding information about its nuclear
program. Powell acknowledged during a March 9 appearance on NBC’s
“Meet the Press” that the documents might be false.
In addition, the IAEA contradicted U.S. assertions that Iraq was
trying to import aluminum tubes to build centrifuges for use in
a uranium-enrichment program. ElBaradei said in his March 7 briefing
that Iraq was probably using them for rocket production and that
it is “highly unlikely” that Baghdad could have used them
for centrifuges. Powell had asserted during a February 5 briefing
to the Security Council that the tubes were linked to efforts to
build centrifuges.
Blix also suggested March 7 that the inspectors needed better intelligence
from UN member states, saying he would like to have more high-quality
information about possible weapons sites. The inspectors have criticized
the United States for its hesitancy to provide them with adequate
intelligence.
Meanwhile, the Bush administration continued to dismiss reports
about the inspectors’ progress. Powell stated in a March 5
speech that Iraq was continuing to move weapons around the country
in an effort to thwart inspections. He also said that the Iraqi
regime had ordered the production of more al Samoud-2 missiles to
replace those being destroyed.
Vice President Richard Cheney openly expressed skepticism of the
IAEA’s report during a March 16 interview on NBC’s “Meet
the Press,” saying that the IAEA has “consistently underestimated
or missed what…Saddam Hussein was doing.”
Whether UN weapons inspectors will have a future role to play in
Iraq is unclear, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated
in a March 20 press briefing.
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov stated March 26 that U.S.-British
claims about WMD discoveries would not be believed without a “conclusive
assessment” by “international inspectors.”
According to a March 30 Washington Post report, the Bush
administration does not want to allow UN inspectors back into Iraq
except, perhaps, with the limited role of verifying any U.S. and
allied discoveries of weapons of mass destruction. The administration
prefers to rely on its own inspectors and possibly inspectors hired
through private companies, the Post reported.
Inspectors' Accomplishments
UN weapons inspectors began their work in Iraq November 27 and
left March 18. Iraq submitted a declaration containing information
about its weapons of mass destruction December 7, as required by
UN Security Council Resolution 1441. IAEA inspectors conducted 237
inspections at 148 sites, including 27 sites not previously inspected.
As of February 28, UNMOVIC inspectors had conducted approximately
550 inspections at 350 sites, including 44 sites not previously
inspected.
The IAEA found no evidence that Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapons
program, but UNMOVIC found and/or supervised the destruction of
some items related to proscribed weapons programs.
The UNMOVIC inspectors:
- Supervised destruction of 72 prohibited al Samoud-2 missiles
and 47 associated warheads. Iraq declared 76 of these missiles
and 118 warheads to UNMOVIC.
- Supervised destruction of three al Samoud-2 missile launchers.
Iraq declared nine launchers to UNMOVIC.
- Supervised destruction of two casting chambers capable of producing
motors for prohibited missiles.
- Discovered 231 illegal Volga missile engines.
- Discovered 14 empty 122-millimeter rocket warheads that could
be used to deliver chemical weapons.
- Discovered a component of a cluster sub-munition designed to
deliver chemical or biological weapons.
- Discovered fuel spray tanks modified for possible use in delivering
chemical or biological agents.
- Found and destroyed one liter of a precursor chemical for the
production of mustard agent.
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