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Unfinished Business in Iraq
IAEA and UNMOVIC Outline Remaining Disarmament Tasks
On March 19, the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission
(UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) submitted
work programs to the UN Security Council detailing the status of
their efforts to verify Iraq’s disarmament and future steps
to realize that goal. UNMOVIC was charged with overseeing Iraq’s
elimination of its proscribed biological, chemical, and missile
programs, while the IAEA was responsible for the abolition of Baghdad’s
nuclear weapons program.
The presentation of the work programs had a surreal quality. All
of the arms inspectors had departed Iraq the day before under the
prospect of a looming U.S.-led invasion of Baghdad, an action that
U.S. and British officials said was intended to disarm Iraq. That
attack began March 19. Backed by the United Kingdom and several
smaller countries, the Bush administration argued force was needed
to accomplish what it said the inspectors could not do. Many other
countries, including China, France, Germany, and Russia, disagreed.
Although it appears that the UNMOVIC and IAEA work programs might
have come to an end with the U.S.- led invasion, the inspectors’
lists of key remaining disarmament tasks may well serve as a starting
point for any post-war effort to account fully for Iraq’s weapons
of mass destruction programs.
The IAEA expressed confidence that it had a “coherent”
picture of Iraq’s illegal nuclear weapons program and had succeeded
in eliminating it by 1998 when inspectors first left Iraq—only
days before Washington and London carried out military strikes against
Baghdad for its failure to cooperate fully with inspectors. Upon
resuming its Iraq inspection work in November 2002, the IAEA set
out to determine whether Iraq had restarted its nuclear weapons
program during the four-year absence of inspectors. This year, the
IAEA has reported several times to the UN Security Council that
it “found to date no evidence or plausible indication of the
revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq.” With that
said, the IAEA still has some unresolved questions about Iraq’s
past nuclear weapons efforts, which the IAEA’s work program
was designed to answer.
UNMOVIC’s predecessor, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM),
had said it succeeded in dismantling the key facilities involved
in Iraq’s efforts to acquire chemical and biological weapons
and in supervising the destruction of significant quantities of
proscribed weapons, including missiles. Yet, it had a much more
difficult time than the IAEA in accounting for Iraq’s past
weapons efforts. UNMOVIC inherited from UNSCOM a host of unresolved
questions and most of those remain unanswered, which UNMOVIC’s
much more extensive work program makes clear.
Summarized below is the IAEA’s list of actions Iraq needs
to take with regard to its past and current nuclear activities as
well as the dozen disarmament issues in the biological, chemical,
and missile fields that UNMOVIC highlighted as remaining unresolved.
IAEA
Saying its main task—the elimination of the Iraqi nuclear
weapons program—has been accomplished, the IAEA focused its
work program on obtaining as complete a picture as possible of Iraq’s
past nuclear efforts as well as a clear understanding of any current
Iraqi activities or personnel that could be employed to reconstitute
an illicit weapons program. To achieve these objectives, the IAEA
said Iraq must provide full technical descriptions of its past nuclear
weapons activities; turn over all documents related to nuclear activities;
name and make available for interviews all personnel previously
involved in Iraq’s nuclear weapons program; describe any industrial
infrastructure improvements over the past four years; list and explain
any procurement activities that could be related to a nuclear weapons
program; and describe its current procurement system. The IAEA also
called on Baghdad to institute laws and create administrative bodies
for enforcing UN prohibitions against weapons of mass destruction.
UNMOVIC
1. Scud Missiles and Associated Biological and Chemical Warheads
Beginning in 1974, Iraq began importing Scud-B missiles, which
are surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with an estimated range
of 300 kilometers. Iraq claimed it imported a total of 819 Scud-B
missiles, a matching number of conventional warheads, and liquid
missile propellants. Iraq also initiated its own programs to develop
similar capabilities. Those programs, according to Iraq, resulted
in the production of seven “training” engines for its
own missiles and 121 Scud-type warheads. It is uncertain whether
they were biological, chemical, or conventional warheads. Iraq also
imported turbo-pumps needed to produce its own missiles.
- Although UNSCOM concluded that 817 of Iraq’s 819 imported
Scud-B missiles had been “effectively” accounted for—meaning
that inspectors verified each missile’s destruction or use—UNMOVIC
reported, “It cannot be excluded that Iraq retained a certain
number of the missiles.” In addition, UNMOVIC said Iraq had
not provided evidence to support its claims that it had destroyed
the seven training engines. Also unaccounted for were some 21
imported turbo-pumps and a significant amount of the liquid propellant.
Iraq stated that the liquid propellant would no longer be usable
even if it did exist, a contention UNMOVIC disputed. UNMOVIC further
found it could not verify Iraq’s claim to have destroyed
approximately 50 Scud-type warheads. Iraq could not account for
a 50-ton trailer that it had imported to convert into a mobile
missile launcher.
Some, perhaps all, of Iraq’s domestically produced Scud-type
warheads were to be filled with chemical or biological agents. Baghdad
repeatedly altered its claims as to how many “special warheads”
it built and the ratio of chemical to biological warheads. The last
Iraqi statement on the issue claimed that 50 chemical and 25 biological
warheads were manufactured, although UNSCOM had received evidence
suggesting that at least 100 total special warheads had been produced.
- UNSCOM verified the destruction of 73-75 special warheads. Due
to Iraq’s various claims, discrepancies in evidence, and
its attempts to mislead UNSCOM about its biological weapons program
in general, UNMOVIC assessed that “uncertainty remains concerning
the types and numbers of chemical and biological agents [Iraq]
filled into the special warheads.”
2. SA-2 Missile Technology
In the early 1970s, Iraq started importing SA-2 surface-to-air
missiles, which are also called Volga missiles. Iraq launched a
number of programs to modify or reverse engineer the SA-2 missiles
into surface-to-surface missiles. Early projects were the Fahad-300
and Fahad-500 missiles. Later, when UNSCOM was in Iraq (1991-1998),
Iraq initiated covert programs, G-1 and al Rafidain, based on the
SA-2. Iraq subsequently claimed it had canceled these programs with
few results, but it did not provide evidence to back up its assertion.
In a December 7, 2002 declaration to UNMOVIC, Baghdad admitted
production of al Samoud-2 missiles, which were based on the SA-2.
Iraq contended the new missile was legally compliant with the UN
prohibition against any Iraqi missile capable of traveling 150 kilometers
or more. But al Samoud-2 flight tests exceeded the limit, and UNMOVIC
ordered Iraq to destroy its 76 al Samoud-2 missiles, 118 warheads,
and 9 launchers. By the time UNMOVIC left Iraq in March, it had
supervised Iraqi destruction of 72 missiles and 47 warheads.
Related to its al Samoud program, Iraq illicitly purchased an undetermined
number of Volga engines. Iraq initially claimed importing 131 Volga
engines, but UNMOVIC discovered 231 such engines, and one Iraqi
engineer said a total of 567 Volga engines had been acquired all
together.
- UNSCOM oversaw the elimination of nine Fahad-300 missiles but
said it could not confirm the total number of SA-2 missiles that
Iraq modified or used in testing. UNMOVIC stated, “It cannot
be excluded that some Fahad-300 missiles still remain in Iraq.”
Overall, UNMOVIC remained concerned about the amount of uncertainty
regarding how all the SA-2-based programs were interrelated and
how much progress Iraq made on each. UNMOVIC noted, “Other
missile systems with ranges in excess of 150 kilometers may possibly
be under development or planned.” UNMOVIC supervised the
destruction of solid propellant casting chambers that could be
used to build proscribed missiles. As a result of this action,
UNMOVIC described Iraq’s ability to produce large rocket
motors as “diminished.”
3. R&D on Missiles Capable of Proscribed Ranges
Around the mid-1980s, Iraq began researching the development of
medium-range ballistic missiles capable of traveling 1,000-3,000
kilometers. Iraq also said it looked into development of a space-launch
vehicle. Baghdad further explored technology to enable warheads
to separate from their boosters and imported a different fuel than
what was needed for Scud-B missiles. UNSCOM uncovered Iraqi efforts
initiated after 1991 to develop turbo-pumps for a proscribed missile
as well as a computer disk with missile flight simulation information
for illegal missiles.
- UNMOVIC said it would be unlikely that Iraq could build proscribed
missiles based on the computer simulations. The inspectors declared,
however, “What is of concern is the apparent intent behind
such activities and, in particular, the conscious decision to
act in contravention” of UN prohibitions. UNMOVIC also stated
that Iraq could use its past prohibited research and development
to make headway on “less ambitious and less complex proscribed
missile systems.”
4. Munitions for Chemical and Biological Agent Fill
Iraq began domestically producing a low-altitude bomb that could
be filled with chemical or biological agents for use by combat aircraft
in 1990. Iraq designated this bomb the R-400. Iraq initially claimed
in 1992 that it had produced 1,200 R-400 bombs for chemicals but
amended the figure to 1,550 following revelations about its biological
weapons program in 1995. Iraq provided various figures on how many
R-400 bombs had been filled with what type of agent.
- UNSCOM could not account for at least 300-350 R-400 bombs. (Two
UN reports in 1999 put this figure at 500.) Claiming that it is
“impossible” to confirm production or destruction tallies
for R-400 bombs, UNMOVIC stated that it “cannot discount
the possibility that some [chemical] and [biological] filled R-400
bombs remain in Iraq.” UNMOVIC further noted that Iraq possesses
the knowledge and resources to produce R-400-type bombs “easily.”
Iraq made or acquired more than 30,000 “major aerial bombs”
for delivering chemical or biological agents between 1983 and 1990.
An Iraqi Air Force document seen by UNSCOM—later handed over
to UNMOVIC—suggested that Iraq used roughly 6,500 fewer chemical
bombs during its eight-year war with Iran than Baghdad claimed,
casting doubt on Iraq’s declarations. Iraq explained that the
air force document was incomplete.
- UNSCOM could not confirm Baghdad’s assertion that it destroyed
some 2,000 empty bombs. Nor could UNSCOM verify that some 450
bombs filled with mustard, a chemical blistering agent, were destroyed
in a fire. UNMOVIC noted that, although much of Iraq’s chemical
and biological aerial bomb arsenal was “presumably eliminated,
its ability to reconstitute that inventory remains largely intact.”
Before 1991, Iraq declared it filled some 70,000 155-millimeter
artillery shells and more than 100,000 122-millimeter rocket warheads
with chemical agents.
- UNSCOM could not account for 550 155-millimeter artillery shells
or some 15,000 empty 122-millimeter rocket warheads that Iraq
said it had destroyed. UNMOVIC inspectors found a total of 14
empty 122-millimeter rocket warheads in January 2003, and Iraq
handed over another four. UNMOVIC expressed concern about the
inability to account for the 550 155-millimeter artillery shells
because it determined that the mustard in the shells would still
be potent. UNMOVIC further noted that Iraq possesses “significant
stocks” of conventional 155-millimeter artillery shells and
122-millimeter rocket warheads that Iraqi industry could modify
for chemical agents.
Starting in the 1980s, Iraq explored using cluster munitions to
deliver chemical agents but denied it ever made much progress. Iraq
also claimed it never investigated using cluster munitions for biological
agents. UNSCOM, however, noted that Iraq’s main chemical production
facility, the Muthanna State Establishment, was involved in testing
sub-munitions that could be useful for cluster-type weapons. A high-ranking
Iraqi official, who recanted in front of his superiors, also linked
cluster bombs and biological weapons together in an interview.
- UNMOVIC discovered a 122-millimeter cluster sub-munition component
for either chemical or biological agents at the warehouse of a
cluster bomb factory in February 2003. UNMOVIC concluded, “Iraq’s
interest in cluster munitions, and the developments it did make,
may have progressed well beyond what it had declared.”
Iraq claimed that it explored, but abandoned in 1988, developing
a warhead to deliver chemical agents for a short-range battlefield
rocket known as FROG. Documents dated March 1989 and August 1990,
however, were found that suggested such work was still ongoing
at those times.
- UNMOVIC assessed that no evidence exists that Iraq continued
work on a chemical warhead for the FROG beyond 1990, but added
that “the possibility cannot be ruled out.”
5. Spray Devices and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
Iraq researched two types of devices for spraying chemical and
biological weapons from the air: modified auxiliary fuel tanks and
modified agricultural sprayers. Iraq provided conflicting accounts
of when it tested these systems and for what purposes. Baghdad said
its plans to modify 12 auxiliary fuel tanks for use with a Mirage
F-1 combat aircraft were frustrated by a shortage of valves. Iraq
claimed it only managed to build three modified fuel tanks and one
prototype. Baghdad said the prototype and the Mirage jet were destroyed
during the 1991 Persian Gulf War and that it destroyed the three
other tanks.
The other serious Iraqi research program on a spray device entailed
developing biological weapon aerosol generators for a modified crop-dusting
helicopter. This system was called the “Zubaidy” device.
Iraq described field tests of the helicopter system as inconclusive.
Iraq also separately explored using a MiG-21 fighter and a L-29
training jet as remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) for delivering
various payloads.
- Arms inspectors were never able to confirm that the Mirage F-1
combat aircraft and prototype fuel tank were destroyed. In addition,
a document was found suggesting that Iraq had an excess, not a
shortage, of valves for modifying fuel tanks. UNSCOM also found
an Iraqi report indicating the helicopter field tests went well.
None of the components of that system were ever accounted for.
UNMOVIC asserted, “Spraying devices modified for [chemical
and biological weapon] purposes may still exist in Iraq”
and reported that Iraq possesses many agricultural aircraft spray
systems identical to the ones converted to disseminate biological
weapons. UNMOVIC found modified fuel tanks in December 2002, which
Iraq explained as being part of an air force agricultural spray
system. With regard to Iraqi RPV/UAV programs, UNMOVIC said more
investigations must be done.
6. VX and Its Precursors
Iraq initiated laboratory research into VX, a potentially lethal
nerve agent, as early as 1975 and intensified its work in 1985.
Iraq explored four different methods for producing VX. Initially,
Iraq denied that it ever produced more than a few grams of VX, but
it started changing its story in 1995. Iraq eventually admitted
to producing 3.9 tonnes of VX. Baghdad claimed it used or destroyed
its entire stockpile. Iraq further denied ever weaponizing VX, but
samples of warhead remnants revealed traces of VX.
- Although arms inspectors found the presence of VX at the sites
where Iraq contended it destroyed the chemical, no determination
could be made about the actual quantities destroyed. The absence
of complete production records, including for all of 1990, have
frustrated inspectors’ efforts to conclude how much VX Iraq
made. UNMOVIC stated, “Given Iraq’s history of concealment
with respect to its VX programme it cannot be excluded that it
has retained some capability with regard to VX.” UNMOVIC
further highlighted that there are “significant discrepancies
in the accounting for all the key precursors…required to
produce VX.”
7. Mustard Gas and Its Precursors
The largest quantity of illegally produced chemical agent acknowledged
by Iraq was mustard. Between 1982 and 1990, Iraq churned out 2,850
tonnes of mustard agent. However, Iraq did not provide arms inspectors
with a complete accounting of its production, weaponization, and
use of mustard gas, raising questions about the accuracy of its
declarations.
- As stated above, arms inspectors have been unable to verify
Iraq’s claims of destroying 550 155-millimeter artillery
shells and 450 major aerial bombs filled with mustard. In addition,
the Iraqi air force document suggesting that Iraq used roughly
6,500 fewer chemical bombs in its war against Iran raises doubts
that all of Iraq’s mustard weapons have been accounted for.
UNMOVIC declared, “It is possible that viable Mustard filled
artillery shells and aerial bombs still remain in Iraq.”
UNMOVIC reported that Iraq is not currently capable of producing
new mustard because it lacks a dedicated facility. UNMOVIC added,
however, that Iraq does have the necessary equipment spread throughout
the country to assemble such a facility and it has the necessary
starting materials, making mustard the “easiest agent for
Iraq to produce indigenously.”
8. Sarin, Cyclosarin, and Their Precursors
Sarin and cyclosarin, two related nerve agents, constituted about
20 percent of Iraq’s chemical arsenal. Iraq claims that from
1984-1990 it produced 795 tonnes of sarin-type agents using two
methods. UNSCOM assessed Iraq’s sarin-type agents as being
of relatively low quality.
- UNMOVIC cited discrepancies in Iraq’s claims about the
status of nearly 4,800 rocket warheads and 12 aerial bombs filled
with sarin-type agents. That would be proportionate to about 40
tonnes of the chemical agent. Due to the low quality of Iraqi
sarin-type agents, however, UNMOVIC asserted that it would be
“unlikely that [past sarin-filled munitions] would still
be viable today.” UNMOVIC noted that uncertainties remain
about the amount of precursors Iraq acquired for making sarin-type
agents and whether Iraq ever instituted large-scale production
of binary artillery shells and rockets for use with sarin-type
agents. Unless Iraq retained the right precursors after the 1991
conflict or smuggled them into the country afterward, UNMOVIC
concluded Iraq would not be able to produce sarin or cyclosarin.
UNMOVIC noted that its inspections had not uncovered any evidence
of precursors.
9. Anthrax and Its Drying
After denying the existence of a biological weapons program up
until 1995, Iraq subsequently admitted producing, over a two-year
period, 8,445 litres of anthrax—a bacteria commonly found in
the soil that causes diseases in animals and can be very lethal
to humans in certain forms. Iraq claimed to have limited its production
of anthrax to two sites, but evidence of it was also found at a
third. Iraqi officials several times revised their accounts of how
many bombs and warheads they filled with anthrax. Iraq’s last
statement was that it had filled 50 R-400 aerial bombs and five
al Hussein warheads with anthrax. Iraq contends it destroyed all
of its stored anthrax in 1991.
- UNMOVIC cited several findings by UNSCOM that cast doubt on
Iraq’s declarations. UNSCOM determined that, based on Iraq’s
production capabilities, it could have produced 22,000-39,000
litres of anthrax. Iraq’s unaccounted for growth media could
have contributed to the production of anthrax in the range of
15,000-25,000 litres. UNSCOM further determined that at least
seven, not five, al Hussein warheads had been filled with anthrax.
UNMOVIC described Iraq’s claim to have ended anthrax production
in 1990 as not plausible. UNMOVIC further estimated that the total
amount of biological agent—the majority of it suspected to
be anthrax—in bombs, warheads, and storage at the time of
the 1991 Gulf War as being at least 7,000 litres more than Iraq
contended. UNMOVIC concluded, “Based on all the available
evidence, the strong presumption is that about 10,000 litres of
anthrax was not destroyed and may still exist.” Moreover,
UNMOVIC assessed that Iraq “currently possesses the technology
and materials, including fermenters, bacterial growth media and
seed stock, to enable it to produce anthrax.”
In general, biological agents are produced in a way that results
in a liquid product. Converting an agent into a dry form typically
means it can be stored for longer periods of time. Iraq reported
that it did not conduct any bulk drying of biological agents.
- UNMOVIC said it did not have evidence to dispute Iraq’s
claim, “but given Iraq’s interest in drying, the existence
of large quantities of liquid bulk agent in 1991, the availability
of suitable dryers and the expertise that Iraq had developed,
UNMOVIC cannot be certain that Iraq did not dry agent.”
10. Botulinum Toxin
Iraq began researching botulinum toxin, a lethal bacteria that
can be 15,000 times stronger than VX, in the 1970s, but it did not
commence dedicated research and development work until 1986. Iraq
said it produced a total of 19,000 litres of botulinum toxin and
estimated that it filled 100 R-400 aerial bombs and 16 al Hussein
warheads with the agent. These munitions and some 7,500 litres of
botulinum toxin were destroyed in 1991, according to Iraq.
- UNSCOM estimated that Iraq could have produced double the amount
of botulinum toxin claimed. UNMOVIC assessed that it was unlikely
that any remaining or stored botulinum toxin would be very potent.
UNMOVIC reported that it was important to obtain a clear understanding
of the amount of botulinum toxin produced because that would affect
estimates on the quantities of other biological agents, particularly
anthrax, that Iraq could have produced. Essentially, this is an
issue of fermenter availability. UNMOVIC concluded that Iraq could
“rapidly” recommence botulinum toxin production because
it has the necessary expertise, equipment, and materials.
11. Undeclared Agents, Including Smallpox
In addition to its major research and development of anthrax, botulinum
toxin, and aflatoxin, Iraq said it investigated a variety of other
agents for biological weapons purposes. These efforts, according
to Iraq, yielded little.
- UNMOVIC noted that its predecessor did not find any “substantial
evidence” that any of the biological agents, apart from those
identified by Iraq as part of its biological weapons program,
was produced for weapons purposes. Yet, UNMOVIC reported that
Iraq’s failure to account for certain types of growth media
raised questions because that growth media is suited for biological
agents Iraq declared it did not produce. “Accounting for
the outstanding media…would greatly reduce the uncertainty
surrounding this issue,” UNMOVIC stated.
Iraq also briefly set up a viral research program, which Baghdad
claimed looked at three incapacitating but not necessarily deadly
agents (enterovirus 70, rotavirus, and camel pox). Baghdad says
its biological weapons virus research lasted only 47 days.
- Although it assessed Iraq’s viral research as probably
being “short-lived,” UNMOVIC noted that the scope of
the research “remains unclear.” UNMOVIC further reported,
“There is no evidence that Iraq had possessed seed stocks
for smallpox or had been actively engaged in smallpox research.”
UNMOVIC concluded that it was unlikely Iraq accomplished much
through its viral research program, but it added that “these
areas of research identify the possible future directions of a
[biological weapons] programme and should be followed up.”
12. Any Proscribed Activities Post-1998
UNSCOM left Iraq in December 1998. Iraq contends that, during the
intervening period prior to UNMOVIC’s arrival in November 2002,
it did not undertake any proscribed activities. UNMOVIC warned that,
given the history of Iraq’s illicit weapons programs, Baghdad
“could have made considerable advancements in that time, particularly
in the biological and chemical fields.” UNMOVIC also noted
it had received many reports contradicting Iraq’s claim.
- According to some governments, Iraq has mobile biological weapons
facilities, namely trucks mounted with production equipment, such
as fermenters. UNMOVIC noted that Iraq did seriously consider
such an option in the late 1980s, but Iraqi officials said the
concept was abandoned as impractical. Investigating whether Iraq
does have mobile biological facilities would be “inherently
difficult,” according to UNMOVIC.
- Governments have also charged that Iraq has underground facilities
for producing chemical and biological weapons. When UNMOVIC was
provided with sufficiently specific information, it looked into
the charges. UNMOVIC reported that “no underground facility
of special interest has been found,” although it added it
does not “dismiss the possibility that such facilities exist.”
- UNMOVIC reported it had not been able to substantiate allegations
that Iraq is moving proscribed items around the country deliberately
to thwart arms inspectors.
- In reviewing Iraq’s legal chemical and biological activities,
UNMOVIC reported that it detected “no proscribed activities,”
although it cautioned, “There are a number of chemical and
biological facilities or production units that could be used for
both proscribed and non-proscribed purposes.”
- Iraq’s “largest failing” in its semi-annual declarations,
according to UNMOVIC, was in providing adequate information on
suppliers of its illicit programs. Iraq failed to provide sufficient
information in roughly 40 biological, 70 chemical, and 500 missile
cases.
- UNMOVIC further reported that Iraq had not been forthcoming
in providing names of individuals involved with its proscribed
weapons programs.
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